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 Abstract 
The thesis studies the impact of the EU on security sector reforms (SSR) in the Western 
Balkans with an aim to investigate recent changes in the security dynamics of the region. 
The study covers the period from 1991, which marks the break-up of Yugoslavia, to 2013, 
the year when the first Western Balkan state joined the EU. It investigates changes in the 
security situation in the Western Balkans on both regional and state levels. While the region 
as a whole has become much more secure and peaceful, compared to the 1990s, its separate 
states display varying degrees of stabilisation and development. By comparing the EU’s 
involvement in SSR in Croatia, Serbia and BiH, which in the studied period achieved a full 
membership, candidate status and potential candidate status respectively, the thesis aims to 
determine if these differences can be linked to EU policies. 
The work argues that between 1991 and 2013 the character of security interdependence 
between the Western Balkan states changed from negative to positive, and that the EU was 
one of the key actors behind this change. To explain this transformation, it uses Regional 
Security Complex Theory (RSCT), that provides a comprehensive framework for analysing 
regional developments from the security point of view. The dissertation contributes to the 
study of the EU as a security actor and indicates the possibility of new applications of RSCT 
by examining the EU’s engagement with security sector reform and the evolution of 
security dynamics in the Western Balkans as the result of this engagement. It also extends 
the understanding of the effects and limitations of Europeanisation in states recovering from 
war and conflict.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
Over the past twenty years the Western Balkans has been transforming from a war-
ridden region into a more peaceful and secure area. If in the 1990s it was one of the most 
unstable territories on the edge of Europe, engulfed in violence and ethnic conflict (Caplan 
2010: 359), at the beginning of the 21st century the region is often identified as a developing 
security community (Kavalski 2008; Keil and Stahl 2013; Cruise and Grillot 2013). The 
tensions existing between the Balkan states are, by no means, a matter of the past, yet many 
researchers point out that the risk of large-scale violence or war in the region is minimal 
(Caplan 2010: 361; Keil and Stahl 2013: 20; Peen Rodt and Wolff 2012: 146). This shift in 
the regional dynamic, from conflict to stability, to a great extent, has been inspired by the 
international community and direct involvement of external actors. It was mainly the efforts 
of the USA and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which put an end to the Balkan 
wars in the 1990s and the European Union (EU) policies which have been guiding the 
region through a series of reforms since the early 2000s.  
Although the EU did not set out to a good start in the Western Balkans, with the “hour 
of Europe” proclaimed by Jacques Poos in 1991, having turned out to be a great failure, it 
has been trying to redeem itself by developing a comprehensive approach to the region after 
the Kosovo crisis of 1999 (Peen Rodt and Wolff 2012: 140). As part of this approach, the 
EU took to promoting initiatives aimed at post-conflict reconstruction, stabilisation, and 
democratic and economic development. Considering the region’s turbulent past, it has also 
stepped up its efforts in the sphere of security provision. Security sector reform (SSR), due 
to its holistic nature, has been given an important place in the EU-Western Balkan relations. 
This thesis studies the impact of the EU on regional and state security in the Western 
Balkans through the prism of SSR. The research covers the period from 1991, which marks 
the break-up of Yugoslavia, to 2013, the year when the first state of the region1 became a 
member state of the EU. It focuses on Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina2, Croatia, the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Montenegro and Serbia, as well as 
Kosovo3, i.e. countries referred to as the Western Balkans in the EU parlance. The regional 
                                                          
1
 Here the region refers to the Western Balkans. Other Balkan states joined the EU prior to Croatia, e.g. see 
Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania.  
2
 Hereinafter referred to as Bosnia or BiH.  
3
 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ 
Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence. 
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analysis is complemented by the case studies of three states, which display different stages 
of development and integration into the EU. These are Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia.    
The subject matter was chosen with a view to contribute to the study of the EU as a 
security actor, fill in the gaps in the research of the security transformation of the Western 
Balkans and improve the understanding of discrepancies in the development between 
individual states of the region. Although it is widely acknowledged that the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its key component – Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP) were largely developed through their implementation in the 
Western Balkans (Ginsberg 1991; Howorth 2007; Blockmans 2007), there is little research 
on the implications of the EU’s foreign policy in the region for its evolution as a security 
actor. The EU’s experience in the region already informed works on conflict resolution and 
crisis management (Tocci 2007; Diez, Albert and Stetter 2008; Peen Rodt and Wolff 2012), 
the policy of conditionality and enlargement process (Anastasakis 2005; Noutcheva 2012), 
and even effectiveness of CFSP in separate Western Balkan states (Juncos 2013), yet the 
analysis of the impact this experience had on the evolution of the EU’s security credentials 
more broadly is still missing. This thesis aims to help bridge this gap by researching the 
EU’s role in promoting security sector reform in the Western Balkans on the regional and 
state levels. Another gap it strives to address concerns the transformation of the security 
situation in the Western Balkans in the last twenty or so years. While there is no shortage 
of works investigating the break-up of Yugoslavia (Malcolm 1994; Glenny 1996; Ramet 
2006) and literature studying the Western Balkans as a developing security community is 
constantly growing (Kavalski 2008; Keil and Stahl 2013), analysis of the full scale of 
security transformation in the region is not available. By studying the security situation in 
the Western Balkans between 1991 and 2013 and the impact of the EU on it, this work 
attempts to improve the understanding of the scale of transformation undergone by the 
region recently. Finally, the current work tries to explain differences in security dynamics 
among individual Western Balkan states. While the region as a whole has become more 
secure and peaceful, compared to the 1990s, its separate states display varying degrees of 
stabilisation and development. By comparing the EU’s involvement in SSR in Croatia, 
Serbia and BiH, which in the studied period achieved a full membership, candidate status 
and potential candidate status respectively, the thesis aims to determine if these differences 
can be linked to EU policies. 
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Analytical framework 
The thesis argues that between 1991 and 2013 the character of security 
interdependence between the Western Balkan states changed from negative to positive, and 
that the EU was one of the key actors behind this change. To explain this transformation, 
the work uses Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), that provides a comprehensive 
framework for analysing regional development from the security point of view. The theory 
was created to bridge the gap between the state and system levels of analysis, as neither of 
them could capture the complex nature of security (Buzan 2007: 159). While the key RSCT 
concepts are introduced in Chapter 2, this section uses some of the theory’s provisions to 
explain why it was chosen for the research. There are five reasons behind the choice. First, 
RSCT provides a clear and comprehensive framework for analysing regional development. 
By putting a security perspective in the centre of their research, Barry Buzan and Ole 
Waever, who developed the theory, avoided a common mistake of their predecessors that 
struggled with capturing the complexity of the region as a concept. As a result, the latter 
either avoided any attempts at theory altogether and presented empirical studies instead or 
produced “complex and cumbersome” research (Buzan 2007: 159). Russett (1967), Cantori 
and Spiegel (1970), Haas (1970), Thompson (1973), and Fawcett and Hurrel (1995) were 
some of the authors in this category. 
Due to its single focus, RSCT offers a manageable and clear approach to regional 
security (Buzan 2007: 159). The theory gives researchers the language to talk about security 
interdependence and, simultaneously provides them with tools to investigate the processes 
of formation, evolution and decline of regions in practice. Although the focus of this 
research is much narrower and more refined than that of RSCT, it still fits with the 
framework of the theory. The security dynamics in the Western Balkans have undergone 
drastic changes between 1991 and 2013 and the role of external actors in that process was 
crucial. By applying the ideas of RSCT to security sector reforms in the region, this thesis 
sets out to clarify the character of these changes and the role of the EU in their emergence. 
The relational character of RSCT is the second reason behind its choice for this 
research. While Buzan and Waever highlight the regional level as almost always operational 
and significant, they also differentiate other levels at which security relations can occur: 
domestic, interregional and global (2003: 51). This work investigates three of the four 
levels, identified by RSCT. The domestic level, which studies the situation inside states, is 
applied to the case studies of Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia. The examination of local contexts 
is used to gauge the extent to which externally promoted security sector reforms were 
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internalised and determine the influence of domestic developments on the security dynamic 
of the region. State-to-state relations between the Western Balkan countries in the security 
sector are analysed as part of the regional level of analysis, while interregional interactions 
are omitted from the analysis only because adding this level would over-complicate the 
research. Finally, the global level considers the impact of global actors engaged in the 
region, which, using the RSCT terminology, are represented by one superpower, the USA, 
and two great powers, Russia and the EU. Considering the topic of this research, special 
attention is paid to the EU, although the roles of Russia and the USA are also assessed, the 
same as cooperation between the global actors. Two remaining great powers, Japan and 
China, are mostly omitted from the analysis due to the limited engagement with the region 
during the studied period. It should also be mentioned that the work covers the role of 
Turkey in the region, which according to RSCT is classified as an insulator4, not a global 
power. By choosing a theory which sees security as a relational phenomenon, the current 
research project aims to capture the interaction of all levels of analysis, without 
overestimating the role of any single one of them.  
Third, RSCT offers a framework for studying the interrelation of external and internal 
factors in the development of security sectors. As noted above, the Western Balkans is 
heavily dependent on external leverage, which since the start of the 21st century has been 
mostly associated with the EU, though in the early and mid-1990s was predominantly 
exercised by the USA and NATO. The recognition of the external impetus, however 
important, led to the establishment of certain bias in studies of the region, which 
overwhelmingly tend to treat it as a passive recipient of policies from the outside (Keil and 
Stahl 2014). RSCT manages to overcome this bias by emphasising the mutual character of 
security relations. According to RSCT, actors on all levels of the security hierarchy can 
influence each other. Thus, external impact coming from the global level can exacerbate 
rivalries existing on the regional level, while a domestic situation in a country can influence 
the external response to it (Buzan 2007: 183). Even more, the theory consistently directs 
the attention of researchers towards lower levels of analysis, as it believes they gained in 
importance since the end of the Cold War. There is little doubt in the significance of external 
push for the transformation of the security dynamics in the Western Balkans, yet this push 
should not be overemphasised. It is time the local context of the region was given more 
attention, and this is exactly what this project attempts to do. Before moving further, a few 
                                                          
4
 An insulator, according to RSCT, refers to “a location occupied by one or more entities where larger regional 
security dynamics stand back to back” (Buzan and Waever 2003: 41).  
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words should be said about the status of the EU as an actor in the Western Balkans and 
approach undertaken in this thesis to study its impact on security of the region and its states. 
On the one hand, the EU is considered an external actor in the region, on the other – an 
internal one. Its externality can be explained from the membership perspective: in the period 
covered by the research the countries of the region were not granted the membership status 
in the EU, therefore for them the EU is an outside power5. From the point of view of RSCT, 
however, the EU is the centre of the regional security complex (RSC), which the Western 
Balkan states are also a part of. Thus, it should be perceived as an internal actor, although 
of a higher calibre. This is the distinction applied within the thesis: when the EU is described 
as an external agent, it is done so only in terms of membership rhetoric, without an attempt 
to challenge the provisions of RSCT. Another important point to make is that the EU is 
approached in this study as a single actor rather than a collection of institutions and/or 
member states. The notion of the EU as a unitary actor on the international arena was first 
introduced by Sjøstedt (1977) and over the years developed by many other scholars, 
including Hill (1993), Ginsberg (1999) and Bretherton and Vogler (2005). There have also 
been attempts to study the engagement of the EU in foreign affairs from the point of view 
of its member states, whose number increased from 12 to 28 in the studied period, or 
through the constantly evolving infrastructure of its institutions (Wessels, Maurer and 
Mittag 2003; Juncos 2013). While I recognise the evolution of the EU’s foreign and security 
policies and acknowledge the importance of individual member states in shaping the EU’s 
response to the situation in the Western Balkans between 1991 and 20136, my thesis 
examines the EU as a single actor since I predominantly focus on analysing the impact of 
the EU’s SSR policy on the region and not its formulation. This approach serves a two-fold 
purpose. On the one hand, it allows me to examine EU actorness in international security. 
On the other, it links the transformation of the security dynamics in the Western Balkans 
and emergence of an embryonic security community in the region to the process of 
European integration.  
The fourth reason for choosing RSCT is linked with its vision of regions as dynamic 
constructs or as Buzan called them “action-reaction phenomena” (2007: 173). Regions or 
regional security complexes, according to the theory, are durable systems that are 
susceptible to change. At the moment of writing the thesis, very little was done to 
                                                          
5
 Since the thesis covers the period from 1991 to 2013, the moment of Croatia’s accession, the EU represents 
an external actor to all the Western Balkan states. 
6
 For example, see Chapter 5 for the role of Germany in recognising the independence of Croatia and Slovenia 
and the contribution of the UK and Netherlands to the EU’s ICTY conditionality.  
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investigate how the Western Balkans went from a region engulfed in conflicts to a mostly 
stable part of Europe. There is a tendency in the scholarly literature to focus on either side 
of the transformation: either describing the Balkans as a turbulent region made of weak and 
failed states (Rozen 2001) or hailing the successful leap towards stability and security 
(Kavalski 2008). This is mainly connected with the limitations of theories applied by the 
researchers, which RSCT has the potential to overcome. It distinguishes three stages in the 
development of a security complex (four, including chaos), ranging from a conflict 
formation through security regime to security community (Buzan 2007: 180). Therefore, 
by recognizing a dynamic nature of regions, the theory offers a framework for analysing 
the entire process of the evolution of security dynamics in the Western Balkans.  
Finally, RSCT has been chosen for this research due to its flexibility and the use of a 
thin, open analytical framework that allows “to catch security in its increasing variation – 
across levels, sectors, and diverse units” (Buzan 2007: 71). Although the theory 
differentiates between different levels of analysis and stages in the development of regional 
security complexes, it does not prescribe a rigid methodology necessary for the study of 
security issues. On the contrary, RSCT creates an opportunity for establishing theory-based 
scenarios, adjusted to the specifics of any region in the world (ibid.: 45), encouraging 
scholars to employ an inductive approach and giving them freedom to identify the unique 
factors explaining the development of separate RSCs and their main components.  
It should also be mentioned that the thesis complements RSCT with provisions from 
theories studying regional conflict formations (Vayrynen 1984, 2003; Wolff 2011), security 
regimes (Jervis 1982; Krasner 2009) and security communities (Deutsch et al 1957; Adler 
and Barnett 1998; Kavalski 2008). While none of the additional theories is deemed to be 
sufficient for tracing the evolution of the security situation in the Western Balkans in 1991-
2013 on its own, each of them provides important insight into the specifics of different 
types of regional security (sub)complexes and thus complements RSCT. 
 
Original contribution 
There are three main areas of originality in this work. First, it offers a new application 
for RSCT. The theory was devised in the post-Cold War period with an aim to create a 
global map of regional security complexes and conduct their comparison. While it 
recognised that an RSC might develop along the spectrum of security interdependence from 
a region with predominantly negative security relations, i.e. regional conflict formation 
(RCF), through a region whose members seek cooperation on security issues, i.e. security 
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regime, to a region steeped in peace, i.e. security community, it did not study such 
evolution, nor the regional transformation in the opposite direction. This thesis 
demonstrates that the application of RSCT to the study of individual RSCs that went 
through considerable changes of security dynamics is not only possible, but also beneficial. 
It applies the theory to trace the evolution of the Balkan subcomplex from a region with 
overwhelmingly negative patterns of interdependence to the area of mostly peaceful 
coexistence and cooperation.  
Second, the work reconsiders Buzan and Waever’s approach to the definition of the 
Balkan subcomplex and argues that it is rather outdated and underdeveloped. Considering 
the developments in the region in 2003-2013, which Buzan and Waever did not account 
for, it reveals that the boundaries of the Balkan subcomplex during the studied period 
largely coincided with the area now known as the Western Balkans. It studies changes in 
the Balkan subcomplex from a regional and state perspectives, using new data, collected 
through elite interviews. Moreover, the thesis contains a comparative element, which 
investigates discrepancies and similarities between transformations in the security sectors 
of Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia, trying to determine whether they can be explained by the 
impact of the EU.  
Third, the thesis uses security sector reform as an analytical tool to examine the 
changes of security interdependence inside the Balkan subcomplex. SSR that promotes 
effective management, transparency and accountability of security actors reduces the focus 
of research to transformation of security sectors. As RSCT claims that the security 
dynamics of an RSC are influenced by a wide range of relations inside and between the 
units constituting the region that span political, economic, social and security spheres, the 
focus on SSR and security sectors deserves more extensive explanation.  
Security sectors are at the core of each type of an RSC. They do not function in the 
same way, but their activity is equally important for the emergence and development of 
regional conflict formations, security regimes and security communities. This is not to 
suggest that RCSc can be reduced to security relations alone, but to emphasise the fact that 
the latter determine the character of security interdependence. In RCFs, security institutions 
are often involved in fuelling hostilities between states and can even pose a direct threat to 
communities they are supposed to be protecting. Similarly, security structures could pose a 
latent threat by failing to protect borders or regulate economic activity (Hendrickson and 
Karkoszka 2002: 183).  Security sectors in RCFs are also likely to be highly autonomous 
and carry disproportionately heavy political weight. The lack of transparency and 
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accountability in the work of security forces means they cannot be trusted by security 
institutions from other states. They can be described as repressive, undemocratic, bloated 
and poorly structured (Short 2010: 11), or simply dysfunctional structures (Hänggi and 
Tanner 2005: 16). In security regimes, where war between members is still feared and 
prepared for, but considered unlikely, security institutions promote reciprocity. They keep 
member states accountable and contribute to the spread of a cooperative rather than 
competitive atmosphere inside regimes (Wallander, Haftendorn and Keohane 1999: 3). 
Here, security forces are governed more democratically and transparently than in RCFs and 
are under civilian control. The improvement, compared to RCFs, is considerable, but is still 
not as significant as in security communities. There, security sectors, as was noted by Adler 
and Barnett (1998), promote trust. They provide effective, accountable and legitimate 
security to citizens inside the community. It is not simply the security of states, they are 
responsible for, but also the security of individuals. Human security is at the heart of their 
work. Security forces in members of a security community, or more precisely in their 
mature types, enjoy the trust of the public and of other members of the community.  
As can be seen, there are big differences in the functioning and governance of security 
sectors inside different RSCs, although nominally their role remains the same, i.e. to 
provide security. This thesis argues that tracing these changes can offer valuable insights 
into understanding the transformation of regional security complexes, especially in the 
context of their evolution along the spectrum of enmity and amity. It can be objected, of 
course, that security sectors are meant to provide security to separate states and their 
citizens, not regions. The response to this objection can be found in the relational character 
of security as a concept. Security does not exist in a vacuum and a security sector of a state 
is very likely to engage with the security sector of another state. The work of security sectors 
thus has importance on the domestic level as well as on regional and international levels 
(Hendrickson and Karkoszka 2002: 200; Ball 2010: 41). By choosing to focus on security 
sectors, this thesis attempts to “reduce complexity to facilitate analysis” because “(t)he use 
of sectors confines the scope of inquiry to more manageable proportions by reducing the 
number of variables in play” (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998: 8). Although Buzan and 
his colleagues used this explanation regarding sectors in security studies in general, their 
argument is applicable to this research as well. It should also be emphasised that security 
sectors are investigated in this work not as static structures, but as dynamic constructs which 
can transform and develop under the influence of both domestic and external actors. The 
concept which captures and explains these transformations is defined as security sector 
reform. It is explained in detail in the next chapter. 
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Research question 
The main research question of the thesis is: 
To what extent did the EU’s engagement with security sector reform in the Western Balkans 
contribute to changing the region’s security dynamics?  
This question is complex and multifaceted as it can only be answered through the 
combination of theoretical and empirical analysis of RSCT, security sector reform as 
exercised by the EU in the Western Balkans on regional and state levels and transformation 
of the security situation in the region in 1991-2013. That is why, to ensure these points are 
addressed, the thesis includes four sub-questions: 
• How did the security situation in the Western Balkan change between 1991 and 
2013? • What constitutes the EU’s approach to SSR? • How was this approach implemented in the Western Balkans on the regional level? 
and  • How and why did Croatia, Serbia and BiH, the three countries chosen for case 
studies, respond to the EU’s SSR efforts differently? 
Each sub-question is answered through chapters that follow. Changes in the security 
situation of the region are studied with the help of RSCT in Chapter 3, after the theory’s 
main provisions are outlined in Chapter 2. By applying RSCT, not only do I demonstrate 
that the Western Balkans has become more stable in the studied period, but also that its 
security is now inextricably linked to that of the EU/Europe security community. Thanks 
to the open and thin framework of the theory that leaves it to the researcher to choose the 
lens through which to study the transformation of the character of security interdependence, 
I build my research around the concept of security sector reform. SSR that captures changes 
in the work and governance of security sectors is used here as an analytical tool for 
measuring evolution of the security and stability of individual Western Balkan states as 
well as tracing the emergence of amicable relations inside the region. Although the general 
definition of SSR is discussed in Chapter 2, the interpretation and development of the 
concept in the EU’s toolbox is presented in Chapter 4. Here, the conducted research 
confirms that the EU has been finetuning its approach to SSR through practice, the bulk of 
which was carried out in the Western Balkans. The region therefore provides a favourable 
ground for studying the EU’s approach to the reform. Chapter 4 also includes the analysis 
of the EU’s SSR activities in the Western Balkans on the regional level. It investigates the 
tools and policies employed by the EU in this sphere and defines goals it pursued. The 
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conducted analysis establishes that the EU’s regional endeavours in security sector reform 
have become more coherent with time, and by 2013 were applied as an instrument of peace-
building, crisis management, democratisation, and member-state building. Nonetheless, the 
regional level of SSR serves only as an extension of the reform on the state level. Hence, 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 investigate the EU’s impact on SSR in Croatia, Serbia and BiH 
respectively. By studying responses of local elites to the EU’s SSR demands in the three 
states, I search for factors that determined the extent of transformation of each of their 
security sectors. The presence of war legacy, degree of state consolidation of individual 
Western Balkan states, proximity of the EU’s membership promise and involvement of 
other external actors in SSR are identified as major intervening variables here.   
 
Research design 
The thesis is placed within Security Studies, as a sub-field of International Relations. 
The key theory, RSCT, used for the research, conceptually combines materialist and 
constructivist ideas. Its emphasis on territoriality to determine the boundaries of security 
complexes and reliance on the distribution of power to explain their structure take root in 
neorealism. While the character of interdependence, reflected through the patterns of amity 
and enmity, inclusion of non-state actors into the analytical framework and use of 
securitisation theory to explicate the processes of formulation of security issues tie RSCT 
closely with constructivism. At the same time, the theory cannot be nested exclusively 
within either of these schools of thought. It questions the primacy of the global level, 
promoted by neorealism, as well as treats patterns of polarity and interdependence as two 
independent variables (Buzan and Waever 2003: 4). The distribution of power is seen as 
affecting security relations on the regional level, but it is the patterns of amity and enmity 
which are considered to be the determining factor. Including a geographical variable, on 
the other hand, does not allow RSCT to be classified as a purely constructivist approach. 
The inability to place RSCT into one category, however, does not diminish its value, but, 
makes it interoperable with many other theories, as demonstrated by the addition of regional 
conflict formations, security regimes and security community studies into this research. 
Other theories complement RSCT with their own findings, allowing researchers to paint as 
full a picture of the regional security dynamics as possible. 
As discussed above, RSCT is a theory with an open and thin framework. This means 
that it offers researchers a lot of flexibility when it comes to the choice of the angle through 
which to study security relations as well as that it gives them considerable freedom at the 
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stage of designing a strategy of inquiry. Thus, in the current work the “thinness” of the 
theory is tested through the choice of SSR as an analytical tool and the research design that 
focuses on inspecting effects of a cause. Although causality was first discussed in the works 
of Aristotle and Hume (Holland 1993: 273), social scientists still cannot agree on the most 
appropriate way to examine causal mechanisms7 (George and Bennett 2005: 135). Most 
philosophical discussions of causality can be divided into two groups: those that prioritise 
the study of causes of effects and those that emphasise effects of causes8 (Holland 1993). I 
am employing the latter approach, given the focus and limitations of my study. By placing 
the EU in the centre of my research, I set out to examine the effects of its action in the 
sphere of security sector reform in the Western Balkans on changes in the work and 
governance of regional security sectors as well as the prevalent character of security 
interdependence inside the region. I do not claim that all changes in the security dynamics 
of the region can be traced back to the EU, as the EU has been one of several key actors 
engaged in the regional affairs since the early 1990s.9 However, as I do not have space to 
assess the contribution of other external actors into the security development of the Western 
Balkans, I design my research to study the effects of a cause (i.e. effects of the EU action 
in SSR) rather than investigate causes of an effect (i.e. all factors behind the improved 
security situation in the region). Following John Stuart Mill, I contend that investigating 
effects of a cause is more accessible to a qualitative study than building research based on 
the causes of an effect design (Robson 1974: 252).  
The objective of this research is three-fold: to analyse the transformation of the 
security situation in the Western Balkans between 1991 and 2013, to evaluate the role of 
the EU in the process by studying its SSR efforts and to explain differences in the security 
dynamics among individual Western Balkan states. To achieve these objectives, the thesis 
applies three research methods: process tracing, case study and comparative case studies. 
Process tracing is used to trace the evolution of the Western Balkans from a highly volatile 
and conflict-ridden area, labelled as a regional conflict formation in RSCT terminology, to 
an emerging part of the European zone of peace or the EU/Europe security community. It 
also helps to understand the evolution of the EU’s SSR approach and its application to the 
region. This method is a powerful “analytical tool for drawing descriptive and causal 
inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence – often understood as part of a temporal 
sequence of events or phenomena” (Collier 2011: 824). While many researchers contributed 
                                                          
7
 For example, see Dessler (1991), Mooney Marini and Singer (1988) and Little (1991).   
8
 For discussions on the advantages and disadvantages of each approach, see Holland (1993) and Pearl 2015. 
9
 See discussion in Chapter 3.  
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to its development, this thesis uses the works of Bennett (2006, 2008), Collier (1993, 2011), 
Mahoney (2010, 2012) and Van Evera (1997). Following their methodological advice, I 
examine the key events that took place in the Western Balkans in 1991-2013, such as the 
wars of Yugoslavia’s dissolution, NATO’s intervention, signing of the Dayton Agreement, 
the Kosovo conflict and launch of the Stabilisation and Association Process, and analyse 
their impact on the development of the security situation in the region.  
The case study approach is applied to study the EU’s impact on SSR in Croatia, Serbia 
and Bosnia. Although the methodological status of the case study remains problematic 
(Gerring 2012; Lijphart 1971: 691), it is widely used to test the “observable implications of 
theory” in International Relations (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 28-29). Relying on 
Gerring’s definition of a case study as the intensive inquiry into “a single case for the 
purpose of understanding a larger class of cases” (2012), I investigate the influence of the 
EU on security sector reforms in Croatia, Serbia and BiH to better understand its role in 
changes of the regional security situation. The choice of the states is not random but 
predicated by the variation in the values of the dependent variable. The three case studies 
represent states that used to be part of Yugoslavia, went through violent wars and stabilised 
under the influence of the international community. Nonetheless, the transformation of their 
security sectors is not identical, and the EU’s SSR efforts achieved varying results. Each of 
the case studies includes the analysis of three elements of SSR – defence, police and border 
reforms, and traces two levels of the reform – political and organisational10 – during three 
periods, identified with the help of RSCT. Such an approach ensures the possibility of using 
the comparative case study method in the conclusion of the thesis to compare the EU’s SSR 
efforts in the three Western Balkan states and identify the factors explaining the 
discrepancies in the results achieved. It follows the method of structured, focused 
comparison developed by Alexander George (1979; George and McKeown 1985; George 
and Bennet 2005). With the help of rich data and the in-depth analysis of the within-case 
variance of the value of the independent variable, i.e. the EU’s SSR policies that 
considerably developed over the studied period, the research is designed in a way that could 
be replicated to study the impact of the EU’s security policies in many other contexts.  
Data for the analysis was obtained from diverse primary and secondary sources, 
including official documents, contemporary accounts of Yugoslav wars, scholarly articles, 
monographs as well as elite interviews. The latter method of data collection, which obtained 
wide recognition in qualitative research (Briggs 1986; Kvale and Brinkmann 2009; Rubin 
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 The meaning of each is explained in Chapter 2.  
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and Rubin 2005), was used in the thesis to achieve a greater depth of analysis and address 
gaps in the published literature (Kvale 1996). The decision to conduct interviews was 
therefore made after I had completed a review of literature available on security sector 
reform in the three case studies and discovered that it lacked detail to fully answer the fourth 
research sub-question, i.e. “How and why did Croatia, Serbia and BiH respond to the EU’s 
SSR efforts differently?”. In certain instances, there was insufficient information on the 
same aspects of the reform across all the case studies, e.g. the political level and regional 
dimension of SSR were equally understudied in Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia (Knezovic and 
Mahecic 2012; Ejdus 2010; Hadzovic and Dizdarevic 2012). In others, there were gaps, 
specific to an individual case under investigation. For example, sources on Croatia provided 
only brief overview of the reform in 1995-1999 (Edmunds 2007: 121-132; Jovic 2006), 
while in Serbia there was a need for a deeper analysis of defence reform after 1999 (Popovic 
et al 2011:18-40; Watkins 2010). The availability of a large number of sources, however, 
did not necessarily mean that they provided enough depth and detail for the study of SSR. 
Thus, police reform in Bosnia has been studied extensively over the years but there are still 
disputes over the role of the EU in the process (Padurariu 2014).  
Given the objectives for using interviews in this research and specific nature of 
information sought through them, I combined two types of purposive sampling to select 
interview respondents: critical case sampling and snowball sampling (Palys 2008; Patton 
1990). These approaches were deemed most suitable for the thesis as they allowed me to 
identify SSR practitioners and experts that not only had significant experience in the reform 
in at least one of the countries, chosen for the analysis, but also possessed knowledge of the 
EU’s role in the process. Selecting respondents who fulfilled these criteria was rather 
challenging, especially since it had to be done remotely. Nonetheless, with the help of 
thorough preparation, which is widely seen as a crucial element of the interviewing process 
in social sciences (Berry 2002; Harvey 2011) and through contacts in the Western Balkans 
made at conferences and via my first supervisor, I chose 16 respondents who were 
interviewed in the autumn of 2016 in Zagreb, Belgrade and Sarajevo.11 Despite a relatively 
low number of respondents12, I managed to collect the data necessary for addressing gaps 
in the published literature. This was achieved through the use of semi-structured interviews, 
                                                          
11
 Interviewees included high-ranking local security personnel, experts from NGOs with experience in SSR 
and representatives of the EU, NATO and OSCE working on SSR in Croatia, Serbia and BiH. Due to the 
sensitivity of the topic, all interviews were anonymised. 
12
 For the discussion of the value of small sample sizes in qualitative research and especially case studies, see 
Adler and Adler (2012) and Crouch and McKenzie (2006).  
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which according to Rubin and Rubin (2005: 88), are a flexible tool for generating fine-
grained data. Questions for the interviews were presented in a guide that simultaneously 
covered generic issues13 and more specific areas, adjusted to the sphere of the interviewees’ 
expertise.14 Both categories of questions were linked to the fourth research sub-question. In 
cases when the data collected through the interviews contradicted information available in 
other sources, I turned to the provisions of RSCT and additional theories employed in the 
thesis to weigh the value of evidence (Glaser and Strauss 1967: 45). Additionally, I 
rigorously applied the methods of congruence and process tracing during the stage of data 
analysis.  
Both methods occupy a central place in case study research (Blatter and Blume 2008; 
George and Bennett 2005). The congruence method is usually applied “to test, assess, or 
refine the theory’s predictive and explanatory powers” (George and Bennett 2005: 200). 
This is done by investigating a relation between the variance in the independent variable 
(in the current thesis, the EU’s SSR policies) and variance in the dependent variable (the 
transformation of security sectors in the Western Balkans). Using RSCT, it is possible to 
ascertain that SSR, promoted by the EU on the regional and state levels in the Western 
Balkans, led to improved functionality and governance of the security sectors in the studied 
Western Balkan states, which contributed to the development of the positive character of 
security interdependence in the Balkan subcomplex. To establish this causal connection, 
however, the congruence method by itself is not enough (Little 1995). This is because a 
single congruence test is not sufficiently strong to prove that the consistency between the 
values of the independent and dependent variables is not spurious (George and Bennett 
2005: 188). One of the ways to account for spuriousness is to supplement the congruence 
method with process tracing, as “it is a methodology well-suited for testing theories in a 
world marked by multiple interaction effects” (Hall 2000 cited in George and Bennett 2005: 
206). Thus, by applying process tracing I examine the causal chain and causal mechanism 
between the independent variable and the outcome of the dependent variable (George and 
                                                          
13
 For example: What areas of defence/ police/ border reform in Croatia/ Serbia/ BiH were prioritised by the 
EU during the studied period? How did the EU promote the regional dimension of SSR? How did the EU 
influence the political level of the reform? What elements of the political level of the reform were still 
unfinished in 2013? 
14
 For example: Why did defence reform in Serbia was delayed after the ousting of Milosevic? When did the 
EU start engaging with the reform? What areas did it choose to tackle first/ why? What were the biggest 
challenges of police reform in Bosnia? How did the top-down model of police restructuring emerge? How did 
the EUPM cooperate with other actors, involved in police reform in BiH?  
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Bennett 2005: 206) and prove that the EU’s SSR efforts had a positive effect on changes of 
the security dynamics in the Western Balkans.  
 
Structure 
The thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter 2 provides the explanation of the 
analytical framework used in the work and reviews literature relevant for the research. It 
introduces key provisions of RSCT and additional theories chosen to complement it, i.e. the 
studies of regional conflict formations, security regimes and security communities. It also 
provides an overview of the concept of security sector reform and explains its application 
in the thesis. 
Chapter 3 applies the theoretical framework to the study of the transformation of 
security dynamics in the Western Balkans between 1991 and 2013. It reconsiders the 
definition of the Balkan sub-complex, introduced by Buzan, and evaluates the role of the 
international community in the region’s security development. Special attention is paid to 
the role of the EU, which is claimed to have developed the capabilities to act as a security 
provider in the region.  
Chapter 4 analyses SSR concept as understood and developed by the EU. Through 
the analysis of the EU policy papers, official documentation and policy work, it provides a 
comprehensive summary of the EU’s SSR framework and argues that it has mainly been 
developed through practice. Having defined the EU’s approach to SSR, the chapter 
examines its implementation in the Western Balkans on the regional level, identifying the 
goals and results it achieved by 2013.   
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 study the application of the EU’s SSR framework in three Western 
Balkan states, namely: Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia. SSR in each state and the impact of the 
EU on it are explored within three periods, identified through RSCT as the time when the 
Western Balkans presented a regional conflict formation (1991-1995), failed security 
regime (1995-1999) and an embryonic security community (1999-2013). Reforms also, 
whenever possible, are analysed on political and organisational levels. While some 
observations are made about the similarities and differences of the EU approach to the three 
countries, the comparison of case studies is reserved for the final chapter. 
It is argued that, in Croatia, the EU’s engagement with SSR was less visible, 
compared to Serbia and Bosnia. This is because the country achieved substantial level of 
development in its security sector by the time the EU emerged as the leader of the reform. 
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In Serbia, the EU’s engagement with the reform was delayed, which is linked to the 
country’s perceived image of an aggressor, constitutional uncertainty over its composition 
and anti-EU sentiments harboured by the state elites over the punitive measures the bloc 
employed to the FRY in the 1990s. In BiH, the EU used the most diverse toolbox to deal 
with the reform but achieved mixed results, to a great extent, due the continuing problems 
with state consolidation in the country.  
Chapter 8, while including the comparative analysis of the case studies, draws 
conclusions for the entire thesis. It argues that the EU, despite committing to a 
comprehensive version of SSR, in its policy framework, applied the reform in the Western 
Balkans on regional and state levels in a selective, uncoordinated manner. Nonetheless, the 
EU’s SSR efforts contributed to better governance and improved efficiency of the security 
sectors, and better security situation in the region as they brought it closer to the European 
zone of peace. The exact extent of this contribution is impossible to determine due to the 
engagement of other powerful actors in the reform and inconsistency of the EU action over 
the studied period, yet its significance is difficult to deny. Finally, the chapter highlights 
the strengths and limitations of the thesis and offers ideas for further development of the 
research.   
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Chapter 2 Studying changes in regional security dynamics through the 
lens of security sector reform 
 
Introduction 
As discussed in the introductory chapter, the thesis examines the impact of the 
European Union on changes of regional and state security in the Western Balkans through 
security sector reform (SSR). The research uses Regional Security Complex Theory 
(RSCT) and SSR as key analytical tools. To apply these tools to the context of the Western 
Balkans, a thorough, yet concise, exploration of their key characteristics is necessary. The 
sections that follow provide an outline of RSCT, focusing on its main concepts and 
variables, explain the selection of additional theoretical approaches used in the work to 
complement the RSCT framework and explicate how changes in the security dynamics of 
the Western Balkans will be studied on the example of SSR.  
Regional Security Complex Theory was devised as a model of regional security 
which could be used for the analysis, explanation and, to a certain degree, anticipation of 
developments within any region in the world (Buzan and Waever 2003: 40). The key 
concept of the theory is a regional security complex (RSC). The first part of this chapter 
explains what RSCs are, what significance they carry for understanding the international 
system, and how they develop and change over time. Special attention is paid to the 
classification of RSCs according to their position on the spectrum of security 
interdependence, which differentiates three types of regions: a regional conflict formation 
(RCF), security regime and security community. While RSCT distinguished these types, it 
did not develop its own analytical framework for their analysis, but used the frameworks 
designed by the theoretical schools engaged in the study of each of the security regions. 
The second part of the chapter therefore provides an overview of these theories. It is 
important to note that each of the additional theories can be used for the study of regional 
security in its own right, yet none of them is deemed to be comprehensive enough to cover 
the entirety of the transformation of security dynamics in the Western Balkans during the 
studied period. Thus, the theory of regional conflict formations can investigate the 
development of the region during the wars of Yugoslavia’s dissolution, but would struggle 
to explain regional stabilisation that followed. Similarly, studies on security communities 
are useful for researching the emergence of positive security interdependencies inside the 
region but are not necessarily effective when it comes to researching negative security 
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relations. Moreover, these theories tend to prioritise the regional level of analysis, while 
RSCT, as was already discussed, attempts to explore other levels, too.  
The final part of the chapter reiterates the limitations of the thesis, i.e. its focus on 
security sector reform and the impact of the EU on security of the Western Balkans. It also 
provides a definition of SSR, reviews the development of the concept and explains the 
aspects of the reform that are traced in the research. Overall, the chapter prepares the ground 
for studying changes of the security situation in the Western Balkans in 1991-2013. 
 
 Regional Security Complex Theory  
Regional Security Complex Theory is considered to be “one of the most influential 
concepts of regional security” (Bourne 2014: 128). It was formed to overcome the 
deficiencies of state-centric security studies and investigate the mitigating effect of the 
regional level on the interplay between states and the international system (Buzan and 
Waever 2003: 158). The first version of the theory appeared in 1983 as part of a more 
general work on international security, the same as its later releases in 1991 and 1998. The 
fullest and most comprehensive version was published by Barry Buzan in cooperation with 
Ole Waever in 2003, i.e. twenty years after the idea was first articulated. The concept 
proved popular in the scientific community rather quickly and was further developed by 
many distinguished scholars, such as Aves (1998), Ayoob (1995), Burnashev (2002), Lake 
and Morgan (1997), Vayrynen (1988, 1998) and Waever (1989). While referring to works 
of other scholars, this research will be largely based on the theory developed by Barry 
Buzan and his colleagues from the Copenhagen School. Apart from containing the original 
idea of the concept, Buzan’s approach is also the most comprehensive version of the theory 
available today.  
The central concept of RSCT is a regional security complex, which is defined as “a 
set of units whose major processes of securitisation15, desecuritisation, or both are so 
interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart 
from one another” (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998: 201). This definition has not 
featured in the original, later labelled classical security complex theory (ibid.: 44) but 
appeared as an attempt to accommodate a new understanding of security, which could no 
longer be confined to political and military matters nor exclusively applied to the analysis 
of states. Initially a security complex was defined as “a group of states whose primarily 
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 The concept of securitisation, developed by the Copenhagen School, denotes the process of making 
something a security issue. For more, see Bourne (2014: 52-57).  
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security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot 
realistically be considered apart from one another” (Buzan 2007: 160). The change in the 
formulation signalled a stronger constructivist emphasis in the theory, yet did not challenge 
its main provisions, linked to the concepts of interdependence and territoriality. 
Regions in RSCT are seen through the prism of security interdependence and 
geographical adjacency. To qualify as a regional security complex, simple proximity is not 
enough: the intensity of interdependence between the units inside the region should be 
relatively stronger than the intensity of their relations with the outside world. In other 
words, an RSC exists “where a set of security relationships stands out from the general 
background by virtue of its relatively strong, inward looking character, and the relative 
weakness of its outward security relations with its neighbours” (Buzan 2007: 162).  
According to RSCT, each security complex has a distinctive indigenous security 
dynamic, which is formed under the influence of distributions of power and relations of 
amity and enmity inside the region. Having introduced the patterns of amity and enmity, 
RSCT has gained an important advantage over other approaches, also trying to explain 
security in the regional context, but doing so only on the basis of polarity.16 The patterns of 
amity and enmity, representing two extremes of the interdependence spectrum, with 
neutrality and indifference in-between, can give a researcher a clearer idea of the relational 
patterns observed between different states or units of the region, and even more, between 
different regions and different levels of analysis (Buzan 2007: 160). This is because patterns 
of amity and enmity are more durable, or in Buzan’s terminology, “stickier” and more easily 
traceable than fluid and abstract movement of the distribution of power (ibid.). The 
character of interdependence, which can be positive, i.e. reflected in friendship and shared 
interests, or negative, represented through fear and rivalry, is usually determined by a 
mixture of factors, such as history, culture, religion, ideology or legacy of wars as well as 
many others (Buzan and Waever 2003: 48). Given the theory’s open and flexible 
framework, there is no definitive list of factors determining the predominant character of 
security interdependence inside an RSC, which gives it another important advantage over 
other theories. According to RSCT, the security dynamic of each region is determined 
through a unique combination of factors and therefore it is a task of a researcher to identify 
the most appropriate way to investigate the relations of amity and enmity inside an RSC or 
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 Attempts to analyse regional security on the basis of the concept of polarity can be found in Cantori and 
Spiegel (1970) and Ayoob (1986).  
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a regional security subcomplex, chosen for the analysis. In this work, it is done through the 
prism of security sector reform, described in detail below. 
It is important to stress that defining regions on the basis of patterns of amity and 
enmity does not make them imagined or purely discursive constructs. Security complexes 
are real, socially constructed regions, which comprise a set of units (usually states) linked 
by patterns of polarity and interdependence, located in geographical proximity to each 
other. Most threats tend to travel faster over short distances, that is why adjacent states often 
find themselves interlocked in nodes of security interactions with their neighbours (Buzan 
and Waever 2003: 45). If these interactions have a durable nature and security 
interdependence between neighbouring states is mutual, they can then form a security 
complex.  
Despite emphasising the importance of geographical proximity, RSCT can also 
account for external influences on security complexes, which can transcend borders and 
distances. This power is only accessible to global actors, which, thanks to their capabilities 
and the anarchic nature of the international system, are not restrained by territoriality and 
can interfere in security relations of any region in the world, regardless of its location. The 
USA and Russia, for example, representing a superpower and great power respectively17, 
can influence the security dynamics of the Western Balkans, without being inside of the 
region. Their impact is exercised through the mechanism of penetration. Furthermore, 
geography is not equally influential across all security sectors: it is most potent in political, 
military, societal and environmental areas and least obvious when it comes to dealing, for 
example, with economic issues (Buzan and Waever 2003: 45). These caveats 
notwithstanding, the issue of territoriality remains one of the central ideas in the theory. On 
the one hand, it binds together the security dynamics of units, allowing for the inclusion 
into the analysis of non-state actors, such as the EU, and states whose sovereignty is either 
contested or dependent on external support, e.g. Kosovo and BiH in the Western Balkans. 
On the other, it gives a certain order to the map of the world by dividing it into mutually 
exclusive complexes with distinctive security interdependences.  
The regional level is not necessarily dominant in the international system, but it is 
nearly always operative and “consistently significant” (Buzan and Waever 2003: 87). Its 
importance and relative autonomy have become more apparent since the end of the Cold 
War (Lake and Morgan 1997: 6). The end of bipolarity has signalled not only the rise of 
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regions’ visibility, but also their potency. In the environment where the USA, as the only 
superpower, has a rather limited interest in executing its influence over the whole 
international system (ibid.), and the global level is accessible to a restricted number of 
actors, the regional level is where most of the security action occurs (Buzan and Waever 
2003: 43). By emphasising the regional level, RSCT offers an operable approach for 
studying regional security interactions as well as exploring the local, interregional18 and 
global levels of analysis.  
The local level is examined by studying states or units, comprising a region.19 Within 
RSCT the study of states is important for two reasons: on the one hand, they can have an 
impact on the nature of interdependence inside a region; on the other, they can be influenced 
by the regional, as well as global dynamics. The types of states, forming a region, can affect 
the region’s structure, the character of interdependence inside the region and the way it 
operates. In general terms, RSCT sees weak states as more prone to forming conflict 
formations20, while it characterises strong states as more likely to be a part of security 
regimes or security communities (Buzan and Waever 2003: 22). In reality, the correlation 
is less straightforward, as weak and strong states are often located next to each other. 
Moreover, if states inside a regional security complex undergo considerable changes, the 
complex itself is more likely to transform. This claim has special significance for the 
Western Balkans, which over the past two decades has seen transformations on both the 
regional scale and state level. That is why regional analysis in this thesis is complemented 
with the case studies of three Western Balkan states.  
The global level, often seen as an abstraction, is given a concrete meaning in RSCT. 
This is achieved through the application of the level not to the international system in its 
entirety, but only to the actors with the status of a global power. Global powers, depending 
on their capabilities and position among other players of the system, are divided into 
superpowers and great powers. The USA, as already mentioned, represents the only 
superpower in the post-Cold War world. It qualifies as such thanks to several 
characteristics, among which: the possession of powerful military capabilities, strong 
economy that supports the latter, ability to exercise force and political influence over the 
whole international system and the fact that its rank is accepted by other players (Buzan 
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and Waever 2003: 34). Great powers, on the other hand, have less powerful military might 
and cannot exercise control over all the sectors of social and political life around the globe. 
They can still influence a large part of the international system, playing a role in regions 
which are not situated in their vicinity, and are seen by others as either former (Russia as a 
successor of the USSR) or potential superpowers (China, the EU and Japan) (ibid.: 35-36). 
The explanation of the global level through the concept of global powers allows RSCT to 
study the interplay between regional and global security structures as well as account for 
external influences, which can be exerted on security complexes. The differentiation 
between the two types of global powers makes the study more targeted and precise.   
Before delving into the typology of RSCs, some clarification of the inclusion of the 
EU into the category of great powers is called for. For a long time, polarity was seen 
exclusively through a state-centric lens, which made non-state actors, even with state-like 
qualities, very difficult to accommodate in International Relations, especially from the 
realist or neorealist perspective. Hence, a wide interest among scholars in determining the 
degree of stateness of the EU (Walker 2000; Walton 1997) or attempts at defining its 
potency through the study of its strongest member states, e.g. France, Germany and the UK 
(Buzan and Waever 2003: 31).  Unsurprisingly, in its initial form RSCT was not ready to 
fully incorporate the EU, nor any other non-state actor. However, the development of 
securitisation theory and subsequent amendment of the concept of a regional security 
complex (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998), outlined in the definition of an RSC, quoted at 
the beginning of this section, changed this situation. The revised RSCT is based on the open 
framework, according to which states are not considered to be the most important referent 
objects for security, nor are they classified as a no longer dominant unit of the international 
system (Buzan and Waever 2003: 45). This means that the theory recognizes the importance 
of non-state actors, while admitting that the world is still predominantly state-centric. As 
part of the revision, RSCT also introduced the idea of a unit to avoid state-centrism. Having 
done that, for reasons of simplicity, it kept referring to states as major building blocks of 
security complexes and providing clarifications for other actors, when necessary (ibid.). 
The same logic is preserved in this thesis. Going back to the issue of the EU, it should be 
reiterated that it is a great power of a sui generis nature with state-like features.21 Acting on 
the global level, it is able to exert influence over a large number of regions found all over 
the world, and RSCT owing to its inclusive and comprehensive character can help capture 
and understand that impact in the sphere of security.  
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By including the state, interregional and global levels into its framework RSCT 
provides context for the analysis of regional security complexes, which means they are not 
studied in isolation. As already mentioned, RSCs are shaped under the influence of two 
types of relationships: the distribution of power and patterns of amity and enmity (Buzan 
and Waever 2003: 49). The distribution of power decides the alignments inside a security 
complex, while the patterns of amity and enmity determine the character of security 
relations. If either of these factors undergoes a considerable change, a regional security 
complex will require a redefinition (Buzan 2007: 175). RSCT distinguishes four main kinds 
of changes an RSC can go through. They are: the status quo, internal transformation, 
external transformation and overlay.  
The maintenance of the status quo presupposes that the structure of a regional security 
complex remains largely unchanged. It does not deny, however, that some changes might 
have taken place. Some of them can be even brought about by external actors, yet their 
impact is not considered strong enough to transform the essential structure of a given 
security complex. The essential structure of an RSC contains four key elements: 
boundary22, which can sometimes be contested or hard to define; anarchic structure, 
reflected in the autonomous status of units inside the complex23; polarity of these units and 
social construction or patterns of amity and enmity (Buzan and Waever 2003: 53). An 
internal transformation can be reflected in changes to the anarchic structure, polarity or 
social construction of a regional security complex, whose outer boundary remains intact. 
This type of transformation is also applicable to cases of changes occurring inside a 
subcomplex within the structure of a larger security complex. Subcomplexes, seen as a half-
level within the regional one, are subsystems with distinctive security dynamics, which are 
also closely connected to the patterns of interdependence that define an RSC (Buzan and 
Waever 2003: 51). The Western Balkans, according to RSCT, is a subcomplex within the 
European security complex. After the break-up of Yugoslavia, which serves as a starting 
point for this research, there was a period when the Balkans had a chance to transform into 
a separate RSC, but its connection with Europe proved to be stronger. Chapter 2 will use 
RSCT to explain what prevented this separation and how the EU-Western Balkan security 
relations have developed since 1991. 
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An external transformation is linked to the expansion or contraction of the external 
boundary of an RSC. This type of change is uncommon and there are no current examples 
of it (Buzan 2007: 180). Overlay is another non-typical transformation. It occurs when an 
external power or several powers subjugate the indigenous security dynamics of an RSC 
(ibid.: 181). The rivalry between the USA and the USSR during the Cold War would be the 
most recent example of overlay. Overlay is very different from intervention: if the latter 
reinforces the local security dynamics, the former “subordinates them to the larger pattern 
of major power rivalries” (ibid.: 165). Its difference can also be seen in the transformative 
nature of the experience: after overlay is lifted, a new emerging security environment will 
be distinct from the one present in the RSC before.  
Having explained the essential structure and possible routes for the evolution of 
RSCs, this section will conclude with the typology of security complexes to single out the 
types of RSCs most relevant for this research. Based on polarity, regional security 
complexes can be divided into two main types: standard and centred. Standard RSCs are 
made of two or more units, linked together by a predominantly military-political security 
agenda (Buzan and Waever 2003: 55). The polarity inside a standard RSC is determined by 
regional powers, i.e. powers, whose capabilities do not allow them to exercise their impact 
outside the borders of their region. This leads to a clear distinction between the internal 
security dynamics and the external influence on the part of global players (ibid.). Such a 
distinction is much more difficult for centered RSCs, which contain global actors. In a 
centred RSC the security dynamics are governed from the centre, located within it, and 
belonging to the global level of the international system (ibid.: 58). The centre can be 
represented by a great power, superpower or an institution with the status of a global power. 
The EU is an example of the latter. Apart from unipolar RSCs, RSCT also distinguishes 
between regional security complexes comprising several centres. These are great power 
RSCs, i.e. security complexes with more than one global power, and supercomplexes, 
which can appear from the merging of several RSCs with one or more great powers at the 
core (ibid.: 60). The next chapter will demonstrate that the Western Balkans is a regional 
security subcomplex inside a centred EU/Europe RSC24. 
Each of the above mentioned RSCs, whether unipolar or multipolar, can be further 
classified into three types, depending on their position on the spectrum of amity and enmity. 
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They can be divided into regional conflict formations, security regimes and security 
communities. Regional conflict formations represent regional complexes dominated by 
conflict and war, which can also be inclusive of singular occurrences of amity among units 
of the complex. Security regimes can be described as regions, whose members cooperate 
between each other on security-related issues to avoid war and confrontation by attempts to 
mute the security dilemma on the basis of their actions and assumptions about the actions 
of others (Buzan 2007: 180). Security community is an amity-based regional complex, in 
which relations between members are cooperative and friendly to such an extent that no 
unit of the complex fears or prepares for war. This typology is well-positioned for the 
analysis of transformations in security situations of RSCs and units inside them. By placing 
RSCs on the spectrum of security interdependence, it offers a framework for the study of 
changes in their security dynamics. It is especially useful for researching regions, whose 
security dynamics changed significantly either from the negative pole of enmity to the 
positive pole of amity, or vice versa. That is why this is the typology applied in this thesis 
to explain the transformation of the security situation in the Western Balkans. It is argued 
here that between 1991 and 2013 the Western Balkans, under the influence of the 
international community, transformed from a region with overwhelmingly negative patterns 
of interdependence to an emerging part of the EU/Europe security community.  
Overall, RSCT offers a comprehensive framework for analysing regional security, 
which apart from distinguishing regions or regional security complexes, also pays attention 
to other levels of analysis, namely state, interregional and global relations. The regional 
level is considered to be the most appropriate and accessible level of analysis. Although not 
necessarily dominant, it has relevance to the largest number of actors at any given time in 
the modern international system. The open character of RSCT allows it to incorporate non-
state actors and regions with changing security dynamics.   
 
Additional theoretical frameworks: from regional conflict formations to security 
communities 
While RSCT provides a clear and comprehensive way of studying regional security, 
it cannot be used in isolation from other theories present in the field. Even more, it actively 
engages with the latter, especially if they provide more specialised and detailed knowledge 
to complement its provisions. Although RSCT distinguishes between three types of regional 
security complexes depending on the prevalent security pattern, i.e. regional conflict 
formations, security regimes and security communities, it does not provide an in-depth 
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independent analysis of these types. Instead, it uses the studies, conducted by other 
theoretical schools. The same approach is applied in this thesis: it refers to additional 
theories studying regional conflict formations, security regimes and security communities 
to further apply their findings for explaining the transformation of the Western Balkans 
along the spectrum of enmity and amity within the framework of security sector reform 
(SSR). It should be highlighted that none of these three theories is seen to be sufficient for 
the explanation of the transformation of security situation in the Western Balkans on its 
own. While each additional approach studies regional security and admits that regions are 
changeable, they only focus on one particular regional type. By doing so they are unable to 
capture the whole spectrum of regional security dynamics and, as a consequence, to explain 
how a region with predominantly negative patterns of interdependence can develop into a 
region with amicable relations or vice versa. RSCT, on the other hand, provides an 
overarching framework for an analysis of such changes.  
Among three types of regional security complexes, analyzed in this section, the study 
of regional conflict formations (RCFs) is least theoretically developed.25 Yet a rather weak 
theoretical standing does not mean the lack of interest in the subject among researchers and 
practitioners. Quite the contrary: there is no shortage of works on regional conflict 
formations, regional conflict complexes or regional conflict systems, as they are also 
known.26 A big proportion of these works has a rather limited focus as many of them study 
only certain aspects of regional security formations. Roberto Ades and Hak Chua (1997) 
and James Murdoch and Todd Sandler (2002) examine economic effects of regional 
conflicts, while Mark Duffield (2000, 2002) looks into the role of illegal economic networks 
in funding RCFs. The impact of refugee flows on the diffusion of violence in regions and 
other refugee-related issues, such as the militarisation and securitisation of refugees, are 
discussed by Karen Jacobsen (2000), Idean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch (2006), 
Stephen Stedman and Fred Tanner (2003) and Myron Weiner (1996). Many researchers 
focus on a specific type of conflict within the context of regional conflict formations, like 
Jeff Checkel (2010) and Michael Fuerstenberg (2010) who study civil wars or James Hentz 
(2007) who develops the idea of “wars without borders”.  
There are also quantitative studies on regional conflict formations. They are useful 
for identifying the areas of regional violence and marking them on the world map. Having 
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applied the quantitative approach, Peter Wallensteen and Margaret Sollenberg, for example, 
discovered that there were fifteen regional conflict formations27 in 1989-1997, which 
accounted for 57 out of 103 armed conflicts during the period, i.e. 55% of the conflicts 
identified (1998: 624). What is more, the researchers also claimed that all European wars 
in the studied period were waged within conflict formations, while in Africa this number 
was nine out of ten (ibid.). The problem with this and similar accounts, however, is that 
they fail to provide a systemic analysis of the causes behind the development of RCFs or 
an explanation of their dynamics. There are currently two holistic approaches to regional 
conflict formations, which do not suffer from such deficiencies. These are the approaches 
independently developed by Raimo Vayrynen (1984) and Andrea Armstrong and Barnett 
R. Rubin (2002, 2005). Although both visions somewhat lack in theory and contain certain 
ambiguities (for instance, in reference to identifying the boundaries of an RCF), if placed 
within the framework of RSCT, they can provide some important insights into the patterns 
of enmity in the regional context.  
According to Vayrynen, a regional conflict formation can be defined as “a complex 
mixture of intranational, intraregional and extraregional conflicts, … [which] have become 
more complex and more entangled in the sense that they cannot be easily decomposed into 
individual conflicts” (1984: 344). Armstrong and Rubin view RCFs in a similar way as 
“sets of transnational conflicts that form mutually reinforcing linkages with each other 
throughout a region, making for more protracted and obdurate conflicts” (2005: 79). As 
these definitions show, the researchers agree on one of the key characteristics of regional 
conflict formations – their complexity. Vayrynen sees its manifestations in their causes and 
variability of ways, in which RCFs can develop, while Armstrong and Rubin, study the 
complex nature of RCFs on the example of actors involved and factors behind their 
dynamics. 
The fact that RCFs operate on the regional level of the international system does not 
mean they are the result of regional causes only. Just like regional security complexes in 
RSCT in general, regional conflict formations can occur under the influence of global, 
regional and local factors (Vayrynen 1984: 351-353; Armstrong and Rubin 2002: 3). The 
competition between global powers, general trends in the world economy, relations 
between regional and global actors and distribution of power in the international system are 
only a few examples of the global level factors which could influence regional conflicts 
(Vayrynen 1984: 351). Regional causation can be observed through the linkages between 
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states in an RCF, their interaction with each other and patterns of enmity or amity guiding 
these interactions. Domestic causes are the ones originating in individual states inside a 
regional conflict formation (Vayrynen 1984: 352). Weak, fragile, failing and failed states 
are often found to be a part of an RCF. “The inability of a state to control its territory, 
enforce the law, or provide for its citizens” is identified by Armstrong and Rubin as a key 
aspect of an RCF (2005: 5). When a state loses its monopoly on violence, it also fails at 
fighting rebel groups based in neighbouring countries or preventing military interventions 
from outside (Ansorg 2011: 181). If state failure spreads around a regional conflict 
formation, it can turn into a state failure cluster, which Stefan Wolff (2011) has labelled a 
state failure region. The combination of global, regional and local factors varies for every 
regional conflict formation, which explains their diversity and the need to study each of 
them on an individual basis. The variability is therefore another key feature of regional 
conflict formations. The Middle East, Horn of Africa and the Western Balkans, the latter at 
least until the mid-1990s, are all examples of regions displaying the patterns of enmity, but 
each of them has emerged as an RCF in its own unique way under the influence of different 
global, regional and local causes.  
If taken on its own, RCF theory is underdeveloped and embryonic, which makes it 
rather problematic to use. However, if embedded into RSCT, it becomes much more 
functional. RSCT does not simply provide the study of RCFs with a firm theoretical 
standing, it can also make it more consistent and less complex. The boundaries of an RCF 
can serve as an example of the area which could be simplified and made more workable by 
RSCT. For Vayrynen the boundaries of an RCF as a regional subsystem are dependent on 
“the issue area through which they are observed” (1984: 343), which means they are 
decided on an issue by issue basis and a single state or unit can be a part of various RCFs, 
if looked at from different perspectives. Similarly, in Armstrong and Rubin’s interpretation, 
an RCF is defined empirically as a set of territories over which conflict networks are linked 
(2005: 81). Depending on the linkages studied, RCFs can have a different composition. 
Such approaches to the identification of boundaries can lead to a potentially unlimited 
number of RCFs and make the theory dependent on the subjectivity of researchers, who 
will be picking and choosing the issues and linkages at the core of regional conflict 
formations. RSCT offers a possibility to avoid these problems. That is why when further in 
the thesis the turbulent period of the Balkan wars of the 1990s is discussed, the region’s 
boundaries are decided with the help of RSCT and not the theory of regional conflict 
formations. The provisions of the latter, however, will be applied to define the factors, 
determining the dynamics of the Western Balkans as a conflict formation. 
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Armstrong and Rubin have shown in their research that RCFs are formed through 
economic, military, political and social relationships (2002: 5). This classification has been 
developed later by Pugh, Cooper and Goodhand (2004), who have considerably expanded 
the original idea of four networks, characteristic of an RCF, by investigating each of them 
in detail. Their research, however, was limited in scope, as its focus was predominantly on 
the economic effects of regional conflicts. This limitation notwithstanding, the concept of 
networks, piercing various units and uniting them into RCFs, provides a useful framework 
for analysing the dynamics of regional conflicts. Economic networks pertain to trade in 
conflict goods, smuggling and illegal tax systems, such as tax collection and tax avoidance. 
Military networks are formed through the flow of arms and migration of mercenaries, while 
political networks are defined by transborder linkages between political elites and groups. 
Finally, social networks include “occupational, familial, and diaspora affiliations that 
actively transcend borders” and are based on shared identities (Pugh, Cooper and Goodhand 
2004: 26-35). All of these networks are usually closely interlinked and entangled in such a 
way, that it is very difficult or rather impossible to determine which of them has caused an 
RCF to develop in a certain way. The only way out of this situation is to consider these 
networks as a closely interconnected system of relations (ibid.: 26). The same approach can 
also be used by external actors which are trying to bring peace and stability to turbulent 
regions. As the case of the Western Balkans will show later, this has been the approach 
applied to the region by the EU.  
Summing up, it should be emphasised that the idea of regional conflict formations 
goes beyond the spill-over effect, which has traditionally been used to explain the 
occurrence of regional conflicts (Armstrong and Rubin 2005: 80). RCFs are complex, 
variable and fluid subsystems, which occur under the impact of global, regional and local 
causes. Their dynamics are determined by a combination of overlapping economic, 
military, political and social networks, which cannot be studied in isolation from each other. 
The theory of RCFs is currently underdeveloped, but if applied within the framework of 
RSCT, it can help explain the emergence and development of regional conflicts.  
The second additional theory used in this thesis is the theory of security regimes. The 
concept of “international regimes”, which is an umbrella term for all types of regimes 
identifiable in International Relations, came to prominence in the 1970s. Since then many 
schools of thought have tried to define the concept and find an appropriate place for it in 
their teachings. For example, regimes have been studied by realists (Grieco 1988, Strange 
1982), neoliberals (Keohane 1982, Martin 1992), and representatives of the Grotian 
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tradition, which combines elements of liberalism and realism (Young 1982; Hopkins and 
Puchala 1982).28 The most comprehensive definition of regimes comes from Stephen 
Krasner, who describes them as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and 
decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations” (2009: 113). In compliance with this view, a security regime has 
been defined by Robert Jervis as “those principles, rules, and norms that permit nations to 
be restrained in their behaviour in the belief that others will reciprocate. This concept 
implies not only norms and expectations that facilitate cooperation, but a form of 
cooperation that is more than the following of short-run self-interest” (1982: 357).  
Security regimes share some of the main characteristics of international regimes in 
general, while simultaneously possessing certain unique features. Their formation and 
development, for instance, usually follow the same routes as those of other regimes. 
According to Oran R. Young, international regimes can appear as a result of one of three 
processes: spontaneity, negotiation or imposition (1982: 282-285). Spontaneous regimes 
emerge outside social engineering, without conscious coordination of actions between the 
actors involved or approval of prospective subjects of the regime. They can significantly 
improve the welfare of large groups without inflicting formal restrictions on rights and 
liberty of individuals (ibid.: 282-283). Their positive features aside, spontaneous regimes 
have some deficiencies, too. As well as taking a long time to shape, they have a rather 
limited spread. If they are common among markets and language systems, the sphere of 
security seems to be out of their reach. The latter, however, is well positioned for the 
application of two remaining processes: negotiation and imposition. Negotiated regimes 
result from conscious efforts to cooperate. They require explicit consent to participate in a 
regime by all its parties and formal expressions of the results of negotiations (ibid.: 283). 
Imposed regimes are constructed by dominant powers or their consortia, as a rule, without 
explicit consent of subordinate actors (ibid.: 284). Although Young distinguished only three 
origins of regimes, it can be argued that they are not always clear cut and a combination of 
processes can sometimes initiate a regime. The case of the Western Balkans will 
demonstrate, for example, that a security regime can be attempted through a mixture of 
negotiation and imposition. The failing of this regime with the outbreak of the war in 
Kosovo, on the other hand, can be interpreted as a weakness of this regime-building 
approach.  
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When it comes to unique features of security regimes, the most detailed account of 
these can be found in the work of Robert Jervis (1982). He identifies five differences which 
allow security regimes to stand out from the rest. They include: “the primacy of security, 
its competitive nature, the unforgiving nature of the arena, and the uncertainty of how much 
security the state needs and has” (Jervis 1982: 359). The need to provide security first, 
before pursuing many other goals such as economic stability, for example, means that many 
actors approach the idea of entering a security regime very cautiously. They can be wary of 
giving up even a fraction of control in their respective security sectors, unless relations with 
other potential members of a security regime are consistently guided by trust and 
reciprocity. This trust, however, as will be argued further, is not as deeply ingrained in 
members of a security regime, as it is in members of a security community. The fact that 
security issues often involve greater competitiveness than issues from other areas of 
international relations is another difference between security and other types of regimes. 
Jervis employs the concept of the security dilemma to clarify this disparity. Actions aimed 
at strengthening the offensive or defensive potential of one actor lead to the spread of threat 
and fear among other actors, who often choose to respond with growing their security 
sectors as well to protect themselves. The competitive streak of the sphere of security, 
therefore, contributes to the difficulty of setting up functional security regimes (ibid.). A 
third feature setting apart security regimes is connected with the scope of stakes in security: 
even the smallest errors can have unpredictable and irreversible consequences. If one 
member of a security regime decides to step away from the norms and principles defining 
the said regime, the security of all other regime subjects is likely to be shaken. Finally, 
security is characterised by greater uncertainty than any other area in international relations. 
Tariff policies and monetary manipulations are not always transparent, but they are still 
easier to predict than the outcome of a conflict or war. An actor, Jervis argues, can never 
be sure in its security because it can never know the capacity of others in this sector (ibid.: 
359). Taking into consideration these arguments, he concludes that security regimes are 
“both especially valuable and especially difficult to achieve” (ibid.: 358). Although the 
views presented by Jervis are based on a realist perspective, which scholars from other 
schools of thought will not necessarily share, his conclusion, at least with reference to 
difficulty, is hard to disagree with. Security regimes, if approached as cooperation in the 
security field in general and not on an issue by issue basis29, are indeed rare. The Concert 
of Europe is the most commonly cited example of such a regime.  
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Having said that, it should be noted that difficulty of achieving security regimes does 
not take away from their value. If attained, they can provide their members with peace and 
stability, which are much greater than the benefits they would have had without this 
cooperation. Not any form of cooperation in the field of security, however, qualifies as a 
regime. Based on shared norms, principles, rules and procedures, security regimes reject 
pure power motivations and require commitment to shared values. One such value is 
reciprocity, which demands mutual restraint and limitations on unilateral actions (Jervis 
1982: 360). When reciprocity is accepted inside a security regime, its members are willing 
to make concessions and sacrifice some of their interests for the common good (Krasner 
2009: 114). What is more, they also know that their sacrifices will be reciprocated in the 
future and will not be perceived by others as a sign of weakness. This is especially important 
in the sphere of security, where actors are equally concerned about the behaviour of others 
and the assumptions others draw about them from their own behaviour.  
In a way, a security regime can be considered a first step on the way to a security 
community, where the idea of war is foreign and unthinkable. With the help of principles, 
norms, rules and procedures that restrain the behaviour of their members, security regimes 
provide a safe and peaceful environment. This environment is conducive for cooperation, 
which, if developed further, can result in the emergence of a close-knit community. 
Conversely, if principles of cooperation are not upheld, a security regime can disintegrate. 
To understand how to encourage the first scenario and avoid the second one, the study of 
security regimes should be complemented with the theory of security communities, which 
is the third additional theory used in this research.  
The concept of security community, although introduced by Richard Van Wagenen 
(1952), has been developed in the work of Karl Deutsch and his associates (1957). In this, 
already classic, interpretation, a security community is defined as a group of people which 
has integrated to the point that “there is real assurance that the members of that community 
will not fight each other physically but will settle their disputes in some other way” 
(Deutsch et al 1957: 5). Depending on the level of integration, Deutsch divided security 
communities into amalgamated and pluralistic ones. An amalgamated security community 
comes into existence as a result of “the formal merger of two or more previously 
independent units into a single larger unit, with some type of common government”, while 
a pluralistic security community “retains the legal interdependence of separate 
governments” (ibid.: 6).  
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By using historical cases Deutsch emphasised three central and highly interrelated 
components of a security community: integration, sense of community and peaceful 
change. Integration stands for the attainment of a sense of community, which through 
formal and informal institutions and practices ensures a peaceful resolution of conflicts on 
a particular territory (Deutsch et al 1957: 5). There is no specific length of time a political 
community30 has to exist for in order to qualify as a security community. This is because 
according to Deutsch “integration is a matter of fact, not of time” (ibid.: 6). The time factor 
gains importance, however, once integration has been achieved, as “the length of time over 
which it persists may contribute to its consolidation” (ibid.). Integration is likened by 
Deutsch to the crossing of a threshold from a situation where war is feared and prepared 
for, to a situation where it is neither (ibid.: 32). Although the threshold analogy evokes a 
vision of a one-step transition, the exact point when a security community is initiated is not 
easily identifiable. Having admitted the difficulty of pinpointing the moment of emergence 
of security communities, Deutsch and his associated did little to elaborate on how this might 
affect the study of their initial stages. Some progress in this area of research has only been 
achieved after the end of the Cold War, when the concept of security community resurfaced 
after several decades in oblivion. In particular, important insights on the matter can be found 
in the seminal work of Adler and Barnett (1998).  
Returning to Deutsch’s concept, the second core component of his theory is a sense 
of community. It is defined as “a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of “we-feeling”, 
trust, and mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self-images and 
interests; of mutually successful predictions of behaviour, and of cooperative action in 
accordance with it – in short, a matter of a perpetual dynamic process of mutual attention, 
communication, perception of needs, and responsiveness in the process of decision-
making” (Deutsch et al 1957: 36). In Deutschian interpretation a sense of community, a 
“we-feeling”, is shared by the majority of population of a security community (or by its 
politically active strata) and developed as a result of both bottom-up and top-down 
processes (ibid.: 87-89). It is achieved through self-enforcement mechanisms from below 
and imposition from above (Adler and Barnett 1998: 35). This argument deserves special 
attention when assessing the possibility of a security community being initiated under the 
influence of external actors, like in the case of the Western Balkans. By following the 
bottom-up/ top-down dichotomy superficially, it is easy to dismiss cases where external 
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 In Deutsch’s work a political community is regarded as a social group “with a process of political 
communication, some machinery for enforcement, and some popular habits of compliance” (1957: 5). It is a 
broader term than a security community.   
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powers or local elites act as a driving force of integration as irrelevant to the theory of 
security community. However, such conclusions will not always be well-grounded. When 
applying Deutsch’s explanation of a sense of community, it is important to remember two 
points. First, Deutsch mostly speaks about already established and mature pluralistic and 
amalgamated communities. His observations thus do not always pertain to emerging 
security communities, which have only started developing. Second, his account pays little 
attention to the role of elites and external forces in the emergence and development of 
security communities in general. This is not to say he disregards them completely, but his 
main focus lies on the broader strata31. Taking these arguments into account, as well as the 
points raised in the previous paragraph, it can be concluded that Deutsch’s work is neither 
well suited for the study of evolving security communities, nor for the evaluation of the role 
played by external forces in their development. Nonetheless, it provides a starting point for 
the investigation of security communities and important insights into their ideal types. 
The third and final core component of a security community according to Deutsch is 
“peaceful change”. It refers to the fact that members of a security community use peaceful 
means to resolve any problems between each other, instead of resorting to large-scale 
violence (Deutsch et al 1957: 5). It is important to understand that the idea of peaceful 
change does not negate the possibility of conflicts inside a security community as such, 
since a security community is not entirely conflict-free. The conflicts which exist, however, 
can only be resolved peacefully, without resorting to violence or military action. Using 
Adler and Barnett’s words, peaceful change can be defined as “neither the expectation nor 
the preparation for organized violence as a means to settle interstate disputes” (1998: 34). 
Apart from defining the key characteristics of a security community, in his study 
Deutsch also attempts to determine minimum requirements for the establishment of its two 
types. As a result, he comes to the conclusion that pluralistic communities are much easier 
to attain and preserve than amalgamated ones (Deutsch et al 1957: 29). Because of their 
wider spread and durability, pluralistic communities have been better researched and more 
thoroughly analysed by those following in Deutsch’s footsteps. This thesis is also primarily 
concerned with pluralistic communities, since this is the category the European RSC falls 
into.  
According to Deutsch, there are three essential conditions for the success of a 
pluralistic security community. The first one is the compatibility of main values held by the 
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 For Deutsch’s views on the role of elites in the early stages of integration, see Deutsch et al (1957: 88-95).  
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politically relevant strata of security community units. These values include social, political 
and economic rights and liberties and have an impact on decision-making processes inside 
a security community. The second one is political responsiveness.  By responsiveness 
Deutsch means the capacity of “participating political units or governments to respond to 
each other’s needs, messages, and actions quickly, adequately, and without resort to 
violence” (Deutsch et al 1957 1957: 66). To achieve such responsiveness, institutions of 
each member of a pluralistic security community must work effectively and efficiently. 
Deutsch does not emphasise any type of state institutions in particular but argues that all of 
them need to function in compatible ways, making the work and communication of decision 
makers and governments easier. When Adler and Barnett presented their view on security 
communities almost fifty years after Deutsch, they highlighted the importance of security 
institutions. In their interpretation security institutions are “particularly symbolic and 
prominent” in facilitating trust (1998: 52). After all, the communities in question evolve for 
security reasons. It is only logical, therefore, that security institutions would play a 
significant role in their establishment. Yet having acknowledged the significance of security 
organisations for the development of pluralistic security communities, Adler and Barnett 
did not analyse their role at length. In a similar manner they talked about international 
organisations and multilateral institutions as important for interstate and transnational 
interaction (ibid.) but did not offer a comprehensive analysis of their roles either, at least 
not on a theoretical level.32 The third essential condition for a pluralistic community, 
according to Deutsch, is mutual predictability of behaviour. It is closely linked to the second 
condition of responsiveness and thus also assigns considerable weight to the functioning of 
political institutions inside units of a security community and their communication between 
each other (Deutsch et al 1957: 66). 
This thesis brings together Deutsch’s and Adler and Barnett’s ideas and emphasises 
the importance of both domestic security institutions and international organisations, or 
rather external actors more broadly, for the development of integration, a sense of 
community and peaceful change among members of an emerging security community. It 
goes even further by studying the interaction of these two sides in other types of regional 
security complexes, namely regional conflict formations and security regimes. This way 
the research is making a contribution into exploring a link between the work of security 
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 This deficiency was partially amended by some empirical work on individual international organisations, 
such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (Adler 1998) or Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Acharya 2001). 
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sectors and international organisations and security dynamics of a region (in the context of 
this work, the Western Balkans) and its separate states.  
Adler and Barnett define pluralistic security communities as transnational regions 
“comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful 
change” (1998: 30). The scholars offer a heuristic model to illustrate the development of 
such communities. The model takes into account the work of Deutsch and his associates, 
theorisation of community-building and security communities, and more recent empirical 
studies building on Deutsch’s insights (ibid.: 49). It has been designed as one possible 
explanation of mechanisms and conditions necessary for the development of pluralistic 
security communities, but, by no means, as an attempt to provide an all-encompassing 
theory of community development or security communities (ibid.). There are three phases 
in the model – nascent, ascending and mature, yet, a security community does not 
unavoidably go through all of them in its development and empirical studies included into 
the volume make this evident.  
Nascent communities come into existence when governments start coordinating their 
actions in order to increase their mutual security (Adler and Barnett 1998: 50). At this phase 
the interaction between governments is not aimed at the creation of a security community; 
this goal is not yet considered. What is more, the people of states, whose governments 
engage in these exchanges do not possess a common identity either. They do recognise, 
however, that they have joint interests and can “mutually benefit from some modest 
coordination of security policies” (ibid.). Nascent communities emerge under the influence 
of a variety of material and normative triggers which can range from a common threat 
through increased economic and social ties to a common future. Security cooperation at this 
stage is likely to be guided by international organisations and institutions, some of which 
are specifically established for this purpose. There is also a possibility that the most 
powerful state or a group of states in a nascent community will be in charge of the collective 
effort (ibid.: 53).  
Ascending communities are characterised by dense and varied networks between 
their units and new types of institutions and organisations that reflect reciprocity, 
responsiveness and mutual trust among and between societies. Trust, while present in 
economic, cultural and social relations, becomes prevalent in the security sphere, too. The 
coordination of military spending, exchange of intelligence information and dismantling of 
bureaucratic structures established to control and monitor security cooperation between 
units of the community during the previous phase are some of the evidence of this trust 
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(Adler and Barnett 1998: 54). If the nascent phase has more to do with the cooperation of 
governments and political actors, the ascending phase reaches the broader society and lays 
foundation for the emergence of a common identity. When alongside mutual trust and 
common identity members of a community start entertaining dependable expectations of 
peaceful change, the threshold of integration, using Deutsch’s terminology, is crossed and 
a mature security community is established. Inside a mature security community, therefore, 
war is neither feared, nor prepared for.  
As can be seen, Adler and Barnett’s three-phase model offers a clear-cut framework 
for the analysis of pluralistic security communities. The application of this model in 
practice, however, is not as straightforward. The trajectory of development of a security 
community is not necessarily linear. Various setbacks and hurdles can prevent it from 
evolving from one phase to another in a straight line. It is important to remember this when 
applying the theory to empirical research. In principle, the model provided by Adler and 
Butler is the most developed tool available for the study of pluralistic security communities, 
but it is not an all-encompassing tool. There have been many attempts to amend their 
approach and make it more comprehensive.  In the context of this thesis of special interest 
are the contributions by Jones and Smith (2001) and Kavalski (2008). Jones and Smith 
introduced the idea of an embryonic phase in the development of security communities, 
which precedes a nascent phase (2001: 273-274), and Kavalski analysed possible 
mechanisms triggering its emergence. Embryonic communities, according to Kavalski, 
appear due to the “socialisation of the decision-making practices of states (i.e. of state-
elites)”, which is often carried out by external powers (2008: 53-60). He refers to this type 
of an embryonic security community as an elite security community and argues that with 
time it can achieve the level of integration, characterised by peaceful change. His views are 
in line with some considerations presented by Deutsch et al (1957: 88-89) and Adler and 
Barnett (1998: 38, 50), who also pointed to the importance of elites during initial stages of 
integration processes, which could lead to (but did not guarantee) the emergence of a 
security community. Kavalski, however, went one step further than his predecessors and 
tested his ideas on the empirical case of the Balkans. Taking this into account, his work will 
be consulted in the next chapter while discussing how the security dynamics of the Western 
Balkans changed in the period from 1991 to 2013.   
To conclude, three additional theories outlined here complement RSCT with details 
which provide for a better understanding of different types of regional security complexes. 
These theories, just like RSCT itself, recognise that regional conflict formations, security 
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regimes and security communities are durable but changeable constructs. Yet none of them 
sets out to develop a comprehensive framework for the analysis of all possible ways of their 
emergence and development. The current thesis does not attempt to provide such a 
framework either, instead it investigates changes in regional security dynamics through 
changes in the work of security institutions inside RSCs. The next and final section explains 
why this approach is useful and how it can help research the evolution of RSCs along the 
spectrum of enmity and amity.  
 
Security sector reform as a tool for analysing changes in regional security dynamics 
As has been shown in the previous sections, regions, according to RSCT and studies 
of regional conflict formations, security regimes and security communities, are 
characterised by strong relations of security interdependence. The security dynamics in 
each type of an RSC, which are formed under the impact of distribution of power and 
patterns of enmity and amity, influence a wide range of relations inside and between the 
units constituting an RSC. The latter include, but are not limited to, political, economic, 
social and security relations. To trace changes in the security dynamics of an RSC, it is 
therefore necessary to conduct a comprehensive study of transformations taking place in as 
many sectors of RSC units as possible. Running such a study can be a highly challenging 
endeavour. For instance, if someone starts a research project aimed at exploring factors 
responsible for the evolution of RSCs along the spectrum of enmity and amity, it is likely 
for this project to have some limitations, otherwise it can become unmanageable. 
Alternatively, a project of such calibre can be conducted by a group of researchers over a 
prolonged period of time. After all, it took Buzan and associates around twenty years to 
formulate RSCT, while Deutsch (1957) and Adler and Barnett (1998) admitted that their 
studies presented only modest attempts at understanding regional security. 
In the context of this work, the first approach, i.e. the one requiring imposition of 
certain limitations on the research, is more feasible. While this thesis studies the transition 
of the Western Balkan region from a regional conflict formation to an emerging part of the 
EU/Europe security community, it does not aim to investigate all possible factors 
contributing to this transformation, mostly because such a goal would be overly ambitious. 
There are two main angles from which the transition of the Western Balkans is studied and, 
consequently, two limitations on the research. First, the research project focuses on the 
security sectors of the Western Balkan states and changes they have undergone between 
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1991 and 2013. Second, it looks at the role the EU played in these changes. Both limitations, 
as explained in Chapter 1, aim to make the research more manageable and focused.  
Having explained the key theoretical provisions guiding the research and defined the 
main concepts, the only thing remaining in this chapter is to introduce the concept of 
security sector reform (SSR) and clarify its application in the thesis. SSR emerged as a key 
component of development and security assistance, and to a lesser extent an element of 
democracy promotion in the end of the 1990s (Hänggi 2004: 1). The authorship of the term 
is attributed to Clare Short, the then UK secretary of state for International Development, 
who first spoke about security sector reform as a means of bringing together the fields of 
development and security in her speech, delivered in March 1999 at King’s College 
London. 33 At the initiative of the Department for International Development (DFID), 
supported by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Ministry of Defence 
(MOD), the United Kingdom became the first state to pursue and promote the SSR agenda 
on the international level. Soon this initiative was undertaken by a plethora of other states 
(e.g., the Netherlands, Germany and France), non-governmental organisations (e.g., the 
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and the Bonn 
International Centre for Conversion), and intergovernmental actors (the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), the EU and UN). The latter category played a major role in 
conceptualizing SSR by developing its definitions, explicating its principles and analysing 
the applicability of the concept to various contexts. Academic enquiry has followed policy 
work shortly: at the moment security sector reform is investigated as part of civil-military 
relations (Edmonds 1988; Barany 1991; Schnabel and Ehrhart 2006), police studies 
(Marenin 2005; Neild 2001; Perito 2009) and development research (Brzoska 2003; Chanaa 
2002).  
Partly due to its novelty, partly due to it bearing significance for a range of disciplines, 
the concept of security sector reform does not have a single, universally accepted definition 
and is therefore open to interpretation. This work uses the definition, provided by Heiner 
Hänggi, one of the most active and renowned scholars and practitioners working on SSR 
and security governance.34  According to Hänggi, security sector reform can be understood 
as all polices, programmes and activities, which are “aimed at the effective and efficient 
provision of state and human security within a framework of democratic governance” 
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 While the term “security sector reform” was introduced in the late 1990s, the origin of the concept can be 
traced back to the 1950s-1960s. For the history of the concept, see Chanaa (2002).  
34
 For the list of Hänggi’s works on SSR, see DCAF (n.d.) 
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(2009: 337). As a tool, SSR can be utilised by both domestic and external actors who seek 
to improve the provision of safety, security and justice inside a state or region (Meharg and 
Arnusch 2010: 3). It emerged after the end of the Cold War in response to the changing 
security environment and in recognition of new thinking about the role of security sectors 
in the political and economic life of countries (Ball 2010: 29). In the mid to late 1990s 
dysfunctional security services came to denote an obstacle to conflict prevention, post-
conflict reconstruction, peace-building and even democratisation, while effective and 
democratically governed security sectors started to be recognised as a precondition for 
stability and sustainable development (Hänggi 2009: 337; Short 2010: 16). A means and 
process of transforming repressive and undemocratic security sectors into effective and 
efficient ones is now increasingly known as security sector reform. It needs to be said, 
however, that SSR is only one of the terms used to define such transformations. Other terms 
include “security system reform”, “justice and security sector reform” and “security sector 
transformation”.35 “Security sector reform” is the term chosen in this thesis because it is 
most frequently used by scholars and practitioners. 
Despite being a relatively new concept, SSR has been studied extensively and the 
literature on the subject keeps growing. Among others, there are works investigating 
theories behind the concept (Chanaa 2002; Cooper and Pugh 2002; Germann and Edmunds 
2003; Hänggi 2004; Hendrickson 1999; Smith 2001), works researching the role of external 
actors in promoting and implementing SSR (Brzoska 2003; Hänggi and Scherrer 2007; Law 
2007; Spence and Fluri 2008) and works analysing the application of the concept in various 
contexts (Ball 1998; Edmunds 2007; Meharg and Arnusch 2010; Sedra 2010). Another 
promising, yet still underdeveloped field of research has been focusing on a regional 
approach to SSR (Hänggi 2004; Schnabel and Ehrhart 2005). It is informed by the 
understanding that most modern security threats and challenges are rarely confined to the 
territory of a single state and that interdependence plays a crucial role in the security sector. 
Scholars promoting this view, therefore, maintain that to increase the chances of success 
for SSR, it should be supplemented with a regional dimension (Ekengren and Simons 2011: 
3). The same line of argument is followed in this thesis, which attempts to contribute into 
further development of the regional approach to security sector reform.  
While there is no agreement between scholars as to what constitutes security sector 
reform, it is still possible to identify defining characteristics of the concept. This work 
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 For a more detailed explanation of differences in terminology, see Meharg and Arnusch (2010) and Hänggi 
and Tanner (2005).   
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differentiates four of them, but the list is by no means exhaustive. It simply presents the 
criteria of SSR, which most of the scholars working in the area tend to agree on, and they 
include: a comprehensive (or holistic) nature of the concept, its emphasis on good 
governance, focus on human security and context-dependent character. SSR is seen as a 
comprehensive concept due to at least four reasons. First, it is based on the broad view of 
security, which apart from military relations, also securitises economic, environmental and 
societal sectors. Second, it brings together a set of reforms, which were previously pursued 
in isolation from each other, although they all have security and safety of citizens and states 
at their core. These are reforms of the police, army, intelligence services and judicial 
systems (Albrecht, Stepputat and Andersen 2010: 77). Third, it incorporates not only 
security bodies, but also institutions and organs, responsible for their control and oversight. 
Thus, by adding a governance component, SSR contributes to the promotion of human 
rights and consolidation of democracy. And four, it recognises non-statutory security 
forces, such as guerrilla armies and private security companies, as part of the security sector 
(Hänggi 2009: 342).  
The second key feature of SSR is connected with the recognition of the concept as a 
governance issue (Ball 1998: 5). As hinted in the previous paragraph, SSR cannot be 
considered complete without covering elements of the public sector, which manage and 
oversee security policies and practices of a state. This is because good governance, which 
can be defined as “the effective, equitable, responsive, transparent, and accountable 
management of public affairs and resources” (USAID, USDD and USDS 2009: 4), and the 
rule of law are widely seen to be of crucial importance for the work of security sectors. It 
is important to highlight here that SSR is not a neutral, value-free concept, but a normative 
notion: it mainly seeks to improve the governance of the security sector in accordance with 
democratic principles (Meharg and Arnush 2010: 7), which prompts some researchers, 
including the author of this work, to consider democratic governance a component of 
security sector reform. Hence, a growing tendency in scholarly literature and policy circles 
to connect SSR with the processes of democratisation and democracy promotion (Chanaa 
2002: 28; Edmunds 2007: 27; Hänggi 2009: 337). The focus on human security is another 
element adding normative value to SSR. The human security agenda, or rather its broad 
variant, maintains that security of an individual holds significance for national, regional and 
international security and argues that people’s security and safety cannot be provided 
through military means alone (Ball 2010: 32). SSR subscribes to this view and sets out to 
improve the security of individuals as well as states, while attempting to have an impact on 
all aspects of human development, including economic, environmental, food and societal 
42 
 
security (Hänggi 2003:6). This approach to human security, however, reflects an ideal 
vision of SSR, which is largely confined to theoretical discussions and is yet to see practical 
implementation. 
The fourth and final feature of SSR, considered here, is its context-dependent 
character. It is widely accepted that there is no universal model of SSR and that the success 
of SSR efforts highly depends on the attention to domestic environments and promotion of 
local ownership of the reform (Hänggi and Tanner 2005: 17; Hendrickson and Karkoszka 
2002: 176; Stalvant 2011: 17). While each case of SSR is individual, it is still possible to 
differentiate several broad categories of contexts, within which security sector reform is 
usually undertaken. Traditionally, SSR is associated with post-conflict environments, 
which is not surprising taking into account volatile and unstable security situations in post-
war countries and regions. In such contexts security sector reform combats security and 
democratic deficits while contributing to the process of peace-building and even state-
building. SSR is also often found in transition states, whether the transition in question is 
from underdeveloped to market economy or from authoritarian to democratic rule (Hänggi 
and Tanner 2005: 17-19). When SSR is implemented in these countries, one can speak of 
developmental and post-authoritarian contexts of the reform respectively. Finally, SSR can 
be pursued in developed contexts, because as Law put it “there is a growing realisation that 
the connection between the state of a country’s security sector and its prospects for fostering 
sustainable social development and prosperity is relevant to all social-economic contexts” 
(2007: 3). Thus, SSR can have relevance in a variety of contexts, ranging from post-conflict 
to developed environments. There are cases, of course, when several contexts overlap, as 
can be seen on the example of the Western Balkan states. Such cases are both most 
challenging and most rewarding to study because of the complexity of transformation 
facing security sectors and the wealth of information they can give a researcher.  
With the definition of SSR and its key features analysed, there are two questions 
remaining before the investigation of SSR in the Western Balkans can be started, and they 
are: what is understood by the security sector and how will SSR be studied in this work? 
As can be gathered from the above-mentioned, this thesis adheres to a broad definition of 
security, which goes beyond the defence system of a state. Having said this, it rejects the 
idea of too wide a definition, which would include all aspects of society and governance. 
This is because adopting such a definition would make any research and policy work 
practically impossible. The definition of the security sector, followed here, comes from 
Timothy Edmunds, who takes a means-based approach and “identifies the management and 
43 
 
application of coercive force for collective purposes as the unique distinguishing feature of 
the security sector as a whole” (2007:23). While being wide, this approach is also narrow 
enough to provide a comprehensive and focused view of the security sector. By focusing 
on “the coercive force” of security bodies it emphasises their powerful status compared to 
other organisations, and by bringing in “collective purposes” into the picture it places the 
security sector in a wider context, which in most cases is represented by a state but can also 
take other forms. A wider context establishes a clear link between the security sector and 
governance, which as was shown above, is an important element of security sector reform. 
This means the security sector is not limited to security institutions, but also includes 
security management and oversight actors. In Edmunds’s words, the security sector can be 
defined as “those organisations that apply and manage coercive force for collective 
purposes” (2007: 25). In each country the list of such organisations will be different yet will 
include institutions from the following categories: core security actors, security 
management and oversight bodies, non-statutory security forces36 and non-statutory civil 
society groups.37 
On the basis of this definition the current work will investigate the impact of the EU 
on the reforms of the army, police, border control services, civil management and oversight 
bodies in Croatia, Serbia and BiH. This choice is determined by three main factors. First, 
there are currently very few examples of states undertaking a reform of the security sector 
in its entirety, although a holistic approach to SSR is highly commended (Hendrickson and 
Karkoszka 2002: 197). Exceptional cases like Sierra Leone only prove the existence of a 
large gap between the conceptualisation and implementation of SSR, because even there a 
reform does not include all the elements of the security sector as promoted by major SSR 
actors.38 The focus on several components of SSR is therefore justifiable. Second, the 
disparate composition of security sectors in different countries may jeopardise the cohesion 
of research. This thesis analyses the EU’s involvement in the reforms of several core 
security actors (army, police and border services) and security management and oversight 
bodies (parliamentary and governmental actors, and civil society) because they can be 
found in all three Western Balkan countries, selected for this research. This way the analysis 
conducted remains cohesive and consistent. Third, the choice of the security and oversight 
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 In his definition, non-statutory security forces are part of the security sector only if they apply coercive force 
for collective, and not private purposes.  
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 According to Edmunds, the security sector does not include justice and law enforcement institutions, yet the 
justice sector is still considered significant for SSR.    
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and UNDP (2002).  
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bodies is also dictated by the history of the region. There, core security actors and security 
control and oversight institutions, were directly involved in permeating violence. Their 
reform has been prioritised by both local and external actors, which is why they can provide 
a lot of data for the analysis.  
To investigate how chosen elements of the security sector in the Western Balkan 
states have been reformed under the influence of the EU, this work applies a two-tier 
framework of analysis, based on the defining characteristics of SSR and its key objectives. 
As mentioned above, SSR does not follow a set model and is unique for each country. Yet, 
regardless of the context in which it is applied, there are two objectives SSR pursues 
everywhere: to develop a professional, effective and efficient security sector for both a state 
and its citizens and to ensure there are operational control and oversight mechanisms in the 
security sector in place (Hänggi 2004: 5). This thesis will analyse the role of the EU in 
advancing these objectives in security sector reforms in the Western Balkan states. 
Objective one will be studied through the organisational level and objective two through 
the political level of analysis39. The organisational level will examine changes within 
security sectors of the chosen Western Balkan states, while the political one will focus on 
the governance of their security sectors and the ways they fit into the broader political 
context.40 Particular aspects of each level are to be defined in Chapter 4, when the EU 
approach to SSR is analysed. It should also be noted that in post-conflict environments the 
objectives of SSR are supplemented with the goal to deal with the legacy of war (Hänggi 
2004: 5). Therefore, considering the recent history of the Western Balkans, both levels of 
analysis will pay special attention to the post-conflict contexts.   
Finally, a few words should be said about the applicability of SSR to the RSCT 
framework. As mentioned above, SSR can be pursued in a variety of different contexts. 
Nonetheless, it does not cover conflicts or wars. It can therefore be assumed that security 
sector reform is not typically pursued in regional conflict formations. Having said this, I 
still provide the analysis of security sectors in the Western Balkans41 during the RCF phase. 
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 The political level of SSR is sometimes divided into the first and second generations.  This differentiation is 
omitted from this research.  For further discussion, see Edmunds (2007; 28-33). 
40
 The organisational and political levels of analysis come from the three-tiered framework, developed by 
Edmunds (2007). The third level in Edmund’s system is the international level, which refers to the role played 
by external actors in domestic SSR. The international level is not only closely inter-connected with the 
remaining two levels, it can also incorporate them. This is because external SSR efforts can be aimed at 
transforming the way security sectors work (organisational level of analysis) and are governed (political level 
of analysis). Since the current work investigates the role of the EU in SSR of the Western Balkans, it can be 
said it conducts research on the international level of analysis. For more details, see Edmunds (2007: 27-44).  
41
 At least on the state level, when analysing SSR in Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia.  
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This is important for two reasons: to understand whether elements of SSR are possible in 
separate units of an RCF and to identify the starting position of security reforms in the 
region. If the first point could shed light on factors contributing to changes of security 
dynamics in RCFs, the second sets the parameters of the challenge facing local actors and 
the EU when attempting SSR in the Western Balkans. As SSR focuses on the provision of 
effective and efficient state and human security within a framework of good governance, it 
is seen as a vehicle of promoting amicable relations between regional actors and therefore 
a means of moving regions along the spectrum of security interdependence from a pole of 
enmity to the pole of amity. Since SSR was not previously studied within RSCT, it is 
difficult to gauge what aspects of the reform are more likely to be addressed within the 
context of security regimes and security communities or whether the reform in these RSCs 
is distinctly different. Without making unsupported assumptions, I will look into these 
aspects by analysing the regional application of SSR in the Western Balkans and provide 
the findings in the conclusion of the work.  
 
Conclusion 
To summarise, the thesis applies Regional Security Complex Theory as the main 
instrument of analysis. RSCT, as an influential theory of regional security, offers both the 
language and toolbox for the study of security relations on local, regional and global levels. 
One of the biggest advantages of RSCT is that it investigates security dynamics of regions 
with both negative and positive patterns of interdependence. The current thesis adopts 
RSCT’s division of regions into regional conflict formations, security regimes and security 
communities and applies it to the study of the Western Balkans. This typology, developed 
by Barry Buzan and associates on the basis of already existing theories, which will also be 
consulted further in the work, puts regions on the spectrum of security interdependence, 
ranging from enmity to amity, with neutrality and indifference in-between. No region’s 
stance, however, is fixed and it can move along the spectrum, in the direction of either pole 
under the influence of internal and external forces.  
This work argues that the Western Balkans over the last twenty years has come 
through a rather considerable transformation from a volatile and conflict-ridden area (i.e. 
from the position of enmity) to a more stable and safe region (i.e. moving towards the pole 
of amity), which is on its way to becoming a part of the European Union. This 
transformation, to a large extent, has been encouraged by external actors. While the process 
of the region’s transformation has not yet been completed, it already can and should be 
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studied. To ensure the cohesion and manageability of the project, this process is analysed 
through the investigation of the EU’s impact on security sector reform in three Western 
Balkan states, namely Croatia, Serbia and BiH.  
Since security relations and sectors are at the core of each type of regional security 
complexes, it is argued here that exploring the changes they undergo, captured through the 
concept of SSR, can improve the understanding of the evolution of regional security along 
the spectrum of enmity and amity. While not reducing RSCs to security sectors, this work 
uses SSR as an instrument of analysis, which can provide an insight into understanding the 
transformation of regions from regional conflict formations through security regimes to 
security communities. This transformation can be studied through a variety of other means, 
pertaining to economic, social and political spheres, but since it is security which is of 
primary concern in this thesis, it makes sense to start the exploration of changes in the 
regional dynamics of the Western Balkans with a security-centred issue. SSR is approached 
here as a concept with a comprehensive nature with a strong focus on good governance, 
emphasis on human security and context-dependent character. As such it has significance 
for the processes of peace-building, post-conflict reconstruction and democratisation, as 
well as conflict prevention, development and security assistance. As explained above, SSR 
is applicable to a variety of contexts, whether developing, developed or post-conflict, which 
means it can be adjusted to specific situations of a country or region, undergoing security 
reforms. What is more, it can be attempted by both domestic and external actors alike.  
Taking all this into account, it can be concluded that SSR is a holistic concept and 
policy tool which is well positioned for capturing changes in regional and state security, 
which is why it has been chosen for this research. Having said this, it should be re-
emphasised that SSR cannot be studied in isolation: it needs to be placed in the broader 
context, which is provided in Chapter 3.  
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Chapter 3 Security dynamics of the Western Balkans in 1991-2013  
 
Introduction 
Having defined the main theory and concepts of the thesis in Chapters 1 and 2, 
Chapter 3 applies Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) to the case of the Western 
Balkans and analyses the role of external actors in the development of the region between 
1991 and 2013. The chapter starts with the definition of the Balkan subcomplex within the 
European regional security complex (RSC). It shows how between 1991 and 2013 the 
subcomplex formed, and why it is connected to and cannot be researched separately from 
the larger European RSC. It will be argued that the boundaries of the Balkan subcomplex, 
at least for the bigger part of the studied period, coincide with what is now defined as the 
Western Balkans, i.e. the region comprising Albania and all post-Yugoslav states apart from 
Slovenia. This is a new interpretation of Buzan’s approach to the Balkan subcomplex, 
which this thesis considers to be outdated. Buzan and his associates introduced the idea of 
the Balkan subcomplex in 2003, which means they did not account for another decade 
analysed in this thesis. The first section of Chapter 3 therefore attempts to remedy this 
deficiency by combining the theoretical considerations of RSCT with the analysis of the 
evolution of the Balkans in 1991-2013. 
Once the Balkan subcomplex has been defined, the attention will turn to the 
transformation of the security situation in the region. This section is divided into two parts. 
Part one covers the period from 1991 to 1999, which is viewed in the work as the time of 
mostly negative patterns of security interdependence in the region, except for several post-
conflict years, when the international community tried to stabilise the area. It examines the 
impact of the wars of Yugoslavia’s dissolution on the regional security situation and 
evaluates an attempt by external actors to change negative security relations after the 
fighting ceased with a number of regional policies or, using the RSCT terminology, 
transform a regional conflict formation (RCF) into security regime. The transformation, 
supported inter alia by the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) and the EU’s Regional Approach, 
did not take hold, and the incipient security regime fell apart with the outbreak of war in 
Kosovo. The period is therefore divided into two parts: 1991-1995, when the region 
represented an RCF and 1995-1999 – the time of a failed security regime.  
Part two covers the period from 1999 to 2013, which is presented as the time of 
predominantly positive security dynamics in the Western Balkans, the time when the 
subcomplex becomes more stable and secure and develops the characteristics of an 
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embryonic security community. This security community, however, is not self-sustaining, 
but a fragment of the European RSC. The Stability Pact42 (SP) and Stabilisation and 
Association Process (SAP) are to be given here special attention to show how the EU’s 
policies towards the Western Balkans have become more proactive and comprehensive. 
As mentioned previously, the thesis recognizes the importance of external factors in 
the transformation of the Western Balkans and aims to better the understanding of the EU’s 
role in the process. These issues are discussed in the final part of the chapter. Here, the 
discussion focuses on the US, NATO and the EU as the key players in the area, and on the 
UN, OSCE, Russia and Turkey as actors playing supplementary roles. This section also 
clarifies why the EU is currently the most important actor in the region and why neither 
NATO nor the US qualify for this role, despite leading the external effort in the Western 
Balkans for most of the 1990s. It is also argued that the Western Balkans is exceptionally 
well-placed to study the credentials of the EU as a security actor. This is not only because 
the EU developed a set of security tools in response to the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s, 
but also because it tested the application of many of them for the first time in the Western 
Balkan states.  
The conclusion reiterates the idea that in the studied period the Western Balkans 
underwent the transformation from an RCF to a part of the European security community. 
It also emphasises that the EU has been influencing the security situation in the region 
through a combination of bilateral and regional policies. Bilateral relations between the EU 
and individual Western Balkan states will be shown to serve as an important source of 
information on regional security transformation.  
 
The Balkan Regional Security Subcomplex 
In their seminal work “Regions and Powers”, Buzan and Waever (2003) used the 
Balkans as an example of a regional security subcomplex. Like an RSC, a subcomplex 
represents a group of units, whose security situations are closely interconnected, yet in 
contrast to an RSC, a subcomplex forms a part of a larger complex, outside the context of 
which it cannot be understood (ibid.: 378). This section will demonstrate that the security 
dynamics of the Western Balkan states are highly interdependent, while the region is also 
connected to the EU, thus qualifying as a subcomplex inside the European RSC.  
                                                          
42
 The Stability Pact was initiated by the Germany’s EU Presidency yet was not owned by the EU. For more 
details, see section two of this chapter.  
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The analysis of the Balkan subcomplex is provided here through the exploration of 
its essential structure, which, the same as in the case of a fully-fledged RSC, includes a 
boundary, anarchic structure, and patterns of polarity and enmity/amity. It should be noted 
that the complexity of the region’s development is not always easy to capture through the 
application of theoretical provisions and that is why the investigation of the Western 
Balkans offered in this work should not be considered as the only possible interpretation of 
RSCT’s approach to the region. Another note of caution should be added about the used 
terminology. The thesis, following Buzan, uses the term “Balkan subcomplex”, although it 
argues that the boundary of the subcomplex from 1991 to 2013 mostly coincided with the 
territory now referred to as the Western Balkans, while the borders of the region fluctuated 
and were often blurred. It is believed here that there is no need to use another term for the 
subcomplex, because, first, its borders are susceptible to change, and second, the 
preservation of the original term ensures continuity of the research.  
Defining the boundary makes a logical starting point for the analysis of any RSC or 
regional security subcomplex, yet in the case of the Balkan subcomplex it is not a 
straightforward task. One of the main reasons for this is the absence of agreement on what 
constitutes the Balkans as such. The region has varying definitions not only from the 
cultural and historical points of view, but also in terms of geography (Todorova 1997: 161). 
Traditionally the Balkans is said to comprise Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Kosovo, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, 
Serbia and Slovenia43. Greece and Turkey (at least the European part of the latter) are often 
mentioned, too. The list, however, is not set in stone, and the negative connotation of the 
term “Balkan” prompts states of the region to seek other labels for self-identification 
(Koneska 2007).  
With the beginning of the wars of Yugoslavia’s dissolution in 199144, violence was 
predicted to spread around the whole Balkan Peninsula. In the early 1990s it became 
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 Not all the states listed have been in existence as sovereign actors throughout the researched period. Six of 
them, namely Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, used to be 
republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Kosovo was also a part of the SFRY, 
however, as an autonomous province (until 1991), and not a republic. Even today the sovereignty of BiH and 
Kosovo remains limited – in the case of Bosnia by the Office of the High Representative, and in the case of 
Kosovo by the non-recognition of its status. For the detailed overview of SFRY’s disintegration, see Ramet 
(2006).   
44
 There are different views on the beginning of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. While it is possible to trace the 
collapse of the country to the breakup of the last Communist party congress in January 1990 (Lampe 2006) or 
a series of localised conflicts taking place in different parts of the federation in 1990-1991 (Ramet 2006), this 
research starts with 1991, which saw the declaration of independence from Yugoslavia by two of its republics, 
namely Croatia and Slovenia, and the outbreak of large-scale violence in the region. 
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popular to depict the Balkans as an inherently unstable territory, different from Europe, and 
characterised by “ancient hatreds and age-old animosities” (Gledhill and King 2010: 245). 
The accounts, such as the one produced by Robert Kaplan in “Balkan Ghosts” explained 
the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s “as a product of the social enmities of a “time-capsule 
world”, a land in which communities have “raged [and] spilled blood” for centuries” 
(Kaplan 2005 quoted in Gledhill and King 2010: 245). The ominous predictions about all 
the Balkan states plunging into ethnic violence, however, did not come true. The violence, 
conflicts and political upheavals were mainly concentrated in what is now known as the 
Western Balkans, although they did affect the broader region as well. Nonetheless, this 
effect was not strong enough to turn all the Balkan countries into a separate regional conflict 
formation.  
The Balkans, not only in the 1990s, but already after World War II, represented a 
heterogeneous group (Todorova 1997: 140). Failure to recognise this heterogeneity is one 
of the possible explanations for entrenching the view on the Balkans as a backward region, 
suffering from endemic violence.45 During at least half of the 20th century, the Balkans 
functioned within three political frameworks, divided by “the cold-war line” (ibid: 162). 
Greece, having escaped the Soviet Union’s communist sweep, together with Turkey aligned 
themselves with the Western powers; Bulgaria and Romania, although the latter to a lesser 
extent, were included into the orbit of USSR’s influence as members of the Eastern Block, 
while Yugoslavia and Albania pursued a neutral path, which in Albania’s case took the 
form of isolationism. From the point of view of RSCT, the division of the region was not 
necessarily conspicuous because the security interdependences during the Cold War were 
overlaid by the superpower rivalry. Countries in the Eastern Bloc had their security 
dynamics subordinated to that of the Soviet Union, while the rest of Europe’s security 
relations was overlaid by the United States. Like other non-aligned countries, Yugoslavia 
and Albania, which chose the path of neutrality in 1948 and 1961 respectively, despite 
having communist governments, still had their security dynamics overlaid as their major 
security concerns were defined externally.  
When the Cold War ended, and the overlay was lifted, there was a big temptation in 
policy circles and academia to lump all Balkan states together into one region (Lampe 2006: 
266-267). According to RSCT, such scenario would not be at all impossible because the 
states emerging from overlay are seen likely to develop different patterns of security 
                                                          
45
 For more on violence and the Balkans, see Gledhill and King (2010), and Pridham and Gallagher (2000). 
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interdependence to those they displayed before overlay was imposed (Buzan and Waever 
2003: 63-64). Had the wars of the Yugoslavia’s dissolution had an overpowering effect on 
the wider region, spilling violence outside Yugoslav states, the Balkan subcomplex would 
have developed into the Balkan RSC, separate from the European security community. The 
domestic polices of the Balkan states and approaches towards the region and its individual 
members by the international community have prevented this from happening.  
Greece, an EU member since 1981 and NATO member since 1952, became firmly 
integrated into the EU/Europe security community; Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia joined 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), or East Central Europe in Buzan and Waever’s 
interpretation (2003: 367), as part of the European RSC, whose security dynamics were 
structured by and subordinated to the process of European integration; while Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYROM, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia emerged as a 
separate subcomplex, yet still within the European RSC. Turkey continued assuming the 
role of an insulator – a state, situated between RSCs, where security dynamics of the 
EU/Europe, post-Soviet RSC and Middle East meet back to back (ibid.: 41). While it is 
tempting to try to determine the exact moment of emergence of this differentiation between 
the Balkan states, such an endeavour runs the risk of simplifying and distorting the reality 
for the purpose of making the theory and practice match perfectly. The trajectory of security 
development of the Balkan states split along four routes defined above under the impact of 
a plethora of factors, among which: the speed, intensity and quality of reforms, different 
economic and political starting points, wars of Yugoslavia’s dissolution, inconsistency and 
poor coordination of approaches among the external actors, especially the USA and the EU 
(Papadimitriou 2001: 72). The combination of these factors caused the fluctuation of the 
boundary of the Balkan security subcomplex, which remained blurred throughout the 
1990s.  
While there is no space here to analyse the post-Cold War development of all the 
Balkan states in detail46, it is important to explain why only Albania and the post-Yugoslav 
states, apart from Slovenia, formed a separate subcomplex and how its security dynamic 
became inherently connected to the European RSC. But first a few words should be said 
about Slovenia47, Bulgaria and Romania, which are approached in the thesis as members of 
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 For more on the development of the Balkan states after the Cold War see Lampe (2006), Radeljic (2013), 
Gallagher (2003) and Bideleux and Jeffries (2007). 
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 Despite being part of the SFRY and going through a short period of war, Slovenia thanks to a strong market 
economy and homogeneous population did not become part of the Balkan RCF. Instead, it joined the CEE 
frontrunners of the European enlargement process. It is notable that the EU started referring to the country as 
part of CEE early on, too (EC 1997). For more on Slovenia’s post-Yugoslav development, see Radeljic (2013: 
3-5) and Papadimitrou (2001: 74-76). 
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“the eastern circle” of the European RSC, i.e. separately from the Balkan subcomplex 
(Buzan and Waever 2003: 364). The main reason for this lies in the fact that starting from 
the early 1990s these states, together with the CEE countries, embarked on the journey of 
reforms with the ultimate goal of joining the EU. While the goal was getting closer to certain 
candidates and moving away from others, depending on their performance, it always 
remained real. The dependence on the EU became the central factor, defining political, 
economic and security situations in these states. All of them had security problems, 
concerning minorities, state borders or other historical and ethnic issues, yet these problems 
were subordinated to the process of the European integration.48 Bulgaria, Romania and 
Slovenia were sporadically included into numerous regional initiatives, organised under the 
aegis of the USA, EU and NATO49, which could potentially link security dynamics to other 
Balkan states, but none of these initiatives was strong enough to unify all Balkan states into 
a single security region.50 In a similar manner, Turkey and Greece took part in some of the 
regional schemes51 and tried to assist in managing and resolving the Balkan conflicts of the 
1990s, but neither state was sufficiently closely involved to become part of the Balkan 
subcomplex. Their interest in the region, underpinned by ethnic and historic ties, was not 
enough to interlink their security dynamics with the conflict-prone region.  
The security situation in Albania and all post-Yugoslav states, save Slovenia, was 
substantially different to that of other Balkan states mentioned above. Since the early 1990s 
it was defined by a dense network of conflicts (both existing and potential) and policies of 
stabilisation, pursued by the international community under the leadership of the USA. 
Unlike in CEE, the issues of minorities and state borders were heavily securitised here. At 
the end of the 1990s, stabilisation efforts were strengthened by the integration policies of 
the EU. When the states of the region were offered the membership perspective, first 
through the Stabilisation and Association Process and later by the 2003 EU Summit in 
Thessaloniki, their security dynamics became inherently linked to the EU. Albania, the only 
non-Yugoslav member of the Balkan subcomplex, found itself included into this regional 
formation as a result of at least three factors: continuing political instability in the country, 
poor economic performance and persisting problems with neighbouring states over the 
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 For more on security dynamics of CEE see Buzan and Waever (2003: 364-368). 
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 The most influential of these initiatives are analysed further in this chapter.  
50
 Under the influence of external pressure and internal developments, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania can 
sometimes be included into the Balkan subcomplex, hence, the observation about the blurred nature of the 
boundaries of the subcomplex. However, for the purposes of this research and ease of analysis the Balkan 
subcomplex is understood to coincide with the Western Balkans.  
51
 For example, Turkey was one of the participating non-beneficiary states in the Stability Pact, and both 
Tukey and Greece were included into the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative. 
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status and rights of the Albanian minorities. The security patterns in the Balkan 
subcomplex, which from 1991 to 1995 were predominantly dictated by enmity, shifted 
slightly towards the pole of amity with the DPA and Regional Approach coming into force 
in 1995 and 1996 respectively. It is argued below that these initiatives were trying to 
transform the Balkan conflict formation into the security regime, which after failing in 
1998-1999 gave way to an embryonic type of security community, linked to the European 
RSC. While this transformation is analysed in the next two sections, the current section will 
be completed by examining the remaining parts of the essential structure of the Balkan 
subcomplex – its anarchic structure and patterns of polarity.  
As former Yugoslav states were gaining independence, the composition of the region 
and distribution of power remained largely the same. If before 1991 Bosnia, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Slovenia and Serbia were interconnected as parts of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, after 1991 all of them, apart from Slovenia, but 
with the addition of Albania became closely interlinked through conflict and conflict 
networks, which are described below. Although two states of the region have their 
sovereignty partially limited52, none of them is fully subordinated to a third party, which 
means the anarchic structure of the subcomplex is still in place. The subcomplex has two 
poles:  one in Serbia and one in Albania. Serbia’s security situation is most closely linked 
to BiH, Croatia, Montenegro and Kosovo, while Albania’s security dynamics are 
interdependent with those of FYROM, Kosovo and Serbia. It is important to mention that 
neither of these poles can be the centre of the region as the overall pattern of security in the 
Western Balkans is decided in the EU core. The patterns of enmity and amity in the 
subcomplex varied greatly in the studied period and the analysis, presented in the following 
two sub-sections, aims to scrutinise the processes behind these variations.  
 
The transformation of security dynamics in the Western Balkans from 1991 to 2013 
 
From regional conflict formation to a failed attempt at security regime (1991-
1999) 
While the signs of Yugoslavia’s demise were discernible already at the end of the 
1980s, it was the events of 1991-1992 which signalled the emergence of an RCF on the 
Balkan Peninsula. The outbreak of war in Slovenia and Croatia in June 1991 and then in 
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 These states, as already mentioned, are BiH, where the international community exercises power through the 
Office of the High Representative, and Kosovo, whose independence, proclaimed in 2008, is not yet 
recognised fully and which therefore remains under the UN Interim Administration Mission.  
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Bosnia in March 1992 brought violence, instability and enmity to the (post)Yugoslav space, 
and evoked fears about the destabilisation of the Balkans as a whole (Daalder 1996: 45). 
The Yugoslav conflicts brought back “the memories of the scramble for the spoils of the 
Ottoman and Habsburg Empires in the nineteenth and early twentieth century and the 
ensuing turmoil in the interwar period” (Bechev 2011: 30-31). These fears notwithstanding, 
the conflict and violence were contained on the territory of the post-Yugoslav states and 
Albania. Albania and all former Yugoslav states, apart from Slovenia, thus constitute 
constant members of the Balkan subcomplex, which between 1991 and 1995 represented 
an RCF. Other Balkan states, e.g. Romania and Bulgaria, joined the formation occasionally 
as a result of domestic development and policies pursued by the external actors present in 
the region. Yugoslavia and Albania, having experienced “parallel fates as political systems 
bound mainly by national militaries, command economies, and political economies” during 
the Cold War (Pugh, Cooper and Goodhand 2004: 147), found their security situations 
interdependent and interlinked even when the Cold War rivalries stopped. Although 
Albania did not experience direct violence at the beginning of the 1990s, it still emerged as 
one of the poles of the Balkan subcomplex thanks to a whole range of connections with the 
post-Yugoslav space, which are explored further on the example of economic, military, 
political and social networks. What is more, as a country “pushed to a much smaller size 
than its ‘ethnic’ span” (Buzan and Waever 2003: 385), it was also linked to Yugoslavia 
through the prospect of conflict,53 which was realised at the end of the 1990s in Kosovo.  
The conflicts in the Western Balkans, born of the political crises, dire economic 
conditions and specific historical experiences54, grew increasingly violent to a great extent 
due to the inadequacy of the international community’s response. The wars of Yugoslavia’s 
dissolution55 broke out at the end of the Cold War, at the time when stability, which for 
decades had been produced by the rivalry of two blocs, disappeared from Europe (Glaurdic 
2011: 9). The disintegration of the Eastern Bloc made major powers wary of any further 
changes with the potential to destabilise the international system. That is why the initial 
response to the Yugoslav crisis of the 1990s was to try and preserve the unity of the 
federation. The proliferation of the “ancient hatred” argument as an explanation of the 
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 In 1996-1997, Albania experienced civil unrest and minor violence due to the country’s bad economic 
performance and collapse of several financial pyramid schemes. Despite fears, the turmoil did not turn into 
civil war. For more details, see Jarvis (2000) and Elbasani (2004).  
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 For the discussion on causes of the break-up of Yugoslavia, see Daalder (1996). 
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 A comprehensive overview of the break-up of Yugoslavia can be found in Glenny (1996), Posen (1993), 
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Yugoslav wars in the media and certain academic circles56 provided external actors with a 
convenient reason for non-intervention. As a result, when the break-up of Yugoslavia 
became imminent, the international community found itself unprepared to deal with its 
consequences. One of the first to react was the European Community (EC): its bid to 
manage the conflict was announced in June 1991 by Jacques Poos, the Chair of the EC 
Foreign Affairs Council and Foreign Minister of Luxembourg, in his “hour of Europe 
speech” (Riding 1991). This endeavour of the EC was supported by the USA, which was 
looking forward to reducing its engagement in European security. In the summer of 1991 
the US Secretary of State James Baker declared that “it was time to make the Europeans 
step up to the plate and show that they could act as a unified power” (Baker and DeFrank 
1995: 636-637). The wars of Yugoslavia’s dissolution, however, showed the opposite: the 
EC, transformed into the European Union (EU) under the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993, 
lacked the appropriate instruments, an effective foreign and security policy, unity among 
its key members, and, most importantly, military power to stabilise the turbulent region. 
While Germany, France, the UK and other EU member states made sizeable contributions 
to managing the conflict through the UN and NATO, the EU failed to provide a coherent 
and unified response as a single actor.  
Consequently, in the first half of the 1990s, the USA emerged as the most important 
international actor in the Yugoslav wars: not only did it lead NATO operations and bombing 
campaigns, but also coordinated the negotiations, which resulted in the Dayton Peace 
Accords, bringing the Bosnian war to an end in 1995. Having reluctantly assumed the 
leadership role, the USA put an end to the strategy of containment, pursued by the 
international community in the Balkans since 1991. Before 1995 the external players, 
although present in the region, were not deeply involved in the conflicts, but focused mainly 
on containing them within the borders of former Yugoslavia. This meant that the security 
situation in the Balkan subcomplex between 1991 and 1995 was predominantly internally 
driven (Buzan and Waever 2003: 383). Yet, even at the time of international 
disengagement, the subcomplex was not entirely isolated. There were two main threads 
connecting it with a wider world, namely, the expectations of the local actors and a range 
of networks, which united the Western Balkan states into an RCF. Many of the local actors 
interpreted, and in certain cases, misinterpreted messages from foreign governments and 
international organisations as signs of support, which, on the one hand, made the warring 
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parties less likely to look for compromises, and, on the other, did not allow the external 
players to disengage from the wars in the Balkans completely. Croatia’s expectations, for 
example, were with Germany, and through it, with the EU and NATO, Serbia’s – with 
Russia, while Bosniaks counted on the support of the USA (ibid.). While these expectations 
were formed because of complex processes57, the complexity of networks, piercing through 
the Western Balkan states and uniting them into an RCF, was much greater. That is why 
these networks merit special attention. 
As discussed in the theoretical chapter, RCFs are characterised by a complex nature 
of conflicts, which are so closely interconnected with each other that they cannot be easily 
untangled. The intricacy of relations between members of an RCF were explained by 
Armstrong and Rubin (2002) through the concept of networks, which form the basis of 
conflict formations. It is argued here that the Balkan subcomplex in 1991-1995 represented 
an RCF because of the proliferation of conflicts and violence, supported by a series of 
networks, which not only tied the region together but also connected it to the European 
RSC. Following the work of Pugh, Cooper and Goodhand (2004), four main types of 
networks are distinguished in the Balkan subcomplex, which can be defined as economic, 
military, political and social. Before analysing these networks, it should be reiterated that it 
is not always possible to draw distinct lines between them, which can be explained by the 
already mentioned high interconnectivity of relations in an RCF.  
Political networks in the Western Balkans can be observed on the example of the 
major local players involved in the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s. The war in Croatia was 
fought not simply between the Croatian government and Belgrade, it was also a war 
between the Croatian government and Croatian Serb rebels, backed and supported by 
the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and Serb paramilitaries, mostly based in Krajina and 
eastern and western Slavonia. The situation in BiH was even more complicated: the fighting 
between three major ethnic groups – Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks, also 
referred to as Muslims – was aggravated by the involvement of Serbia (from 1992 part of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)) and Croatia. Furthermore, these wars were 
fought not just by governments and national armies, but also by mercenaries, criminal 
syndicates and war entrepreneurs, hence a connection with economic and military 
networks. Monopoly on violence was lost by the states, embroiled in conflicts, making 
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security relations overly complicated. Another political network started emerging between 
Kosovo, through Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), Serbia (together with Montenegro as the 
other part of the FRY), Albania and later FYROM. In contrast to other political networks 
in the region, it did not emerge at the time of open warfare yet was actively influenced by 
the events in the neighbouring states. In addition, political networks between the Western 
Balkan states were developing through connections between political parties and 
movements. For example, the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(HDZ BiH) was closely linked to the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), and the National 
Liberation Army of Macedonia (UÇK) was in close association with the Kosovo Liberation 
Army (UÇK). It is symbolic that the names of these parties and movements were 
abbreviated in the same way, underlying the connection between countries.  
Economic and military networks in the Balkan subcomplex in 1991-1995 were 
closely linked to political ones, but also to each other. Their interconnectivity, in fact, was 
so high that they can only be analysed together. The link between poor economic conditions 
and violence, however, has not always been recognised, but was for a long time disregarded. 
As Francesco Strazzari and Fabrizio Coticchia put it, “caught in an obsessive attention to 
identity dynamics, clashes of civilisations and ethnic wars, most commentators overlooked 
the fact that the flaring up of violence in the Balkans was preceded by a decade of economic 
crisis” (2012: 149). Caused by the weakness of states and demands for reform as well as 
debt repayment from foreign creditors and Western governments, a sharp economic decline 
in the Western Balkan states had three main implications for the development of the Balkan 
subcomplex.  
First, shadow economies and clandestine economic activities financed the warring 
parties, including the governments of states, which often formed criminal networks 
themselves or provided them with protection. The Albanian regime, for example, invested 
in cigarette smuggling and networks, connecting Greek, Montenegrin and Italian players 
(Strazzari and Coticchia 2012: 150). In many cases illicit schemes were run by 
representatives of security services and army officials (Bechev 2011: 37), which later had 
a bearing on the importance of security sector reform for the region. Second, cross-border 
criminal syndicates provided the public with bare necessities and sources of income at the 
time when states were too weak to handle social and economic spheres (Strazzari and 
Coticchia 2012: 151-152). Having penetrated everyday life, organised crime remains one 
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of many unresolved problems of the Western Balkans even today.58 Third, war economies 
ensured an uninterrupted supply of weapons to the region after the imposition of the EU 
and UN arms embargo on the Yugoslav republics in 1991 (ibid.: 150).  In the mid-1990s 
the arms smuggling began in Kosovo. Many weapons were brought into Kosovo after they 
had been looted from the army depots in Albania (Bechev 2011: 37). Instead of suppressing 
transnational criminal activities, the arms and later economic embargo and international 
sanctions created a favourable environment for their proliferation.  
Transborder linkages also left a big impact on civilian populations, which can be seen 
on the example of social networks. The Western Balkan conflicts made hundreds of 
thousands flee their homes and seek refuge abroad, in many cases in neighbouring states, 
but also in Western Europe and North America. Large numbers of refugees from Bosnia, 
for example, came to Serbia and Croatia, while Kosovo Albanians were forced to relocate 
to Macedonia and Albania. Bosnia, in this respect, suffered the most: between 1992 and 
1995 2.2 million people fled their homes, which accounts for more than 50% of the 
country’s pre-war population (MHRR BiH 2005: 45). 1.2 million out of the above 
mentioned 2.2 million sought refuge abroad, while the rest were internally displaced (ibid.). 
Furthermore, the wars contributed to the spread of human trafficking, which did not stop 
with the end of fighting. The criminal channels were widely used to traffic women for work 
in the sex industry in the West and provided refugees from both inside and outside the 
Balkans with entry points to the EU (Bechev 2011: 38). Another dimension was introduced 
to social networks through diasporas. Not only did they provide financial help and sanctuary 
to those fleeing war (Pugh, Cooper and Goodhand 2004: 35), they also played a key role in 
political and military matters in their homeland. Thus, diaspora Croats were involved in 
state-building processes during the first Tudjman government through special government 
offices (Winland 2008: 83-84) and even took part in direct combat as part of the Croatian 
armed forces (Lukic 2008: 193-194). 
As can be seen, the proliferation of political, economic, military and social networks 
in the Balkan subcomplex had a two-fold effect. On the one hand, it brought the region 
together, although its members were often in conflict with each other. On the other, it linked 
the Western Balkans to the European RSC. Shared security concerns, politics, informal 
economies and interconnected societies united the former Yugoslavia (minus Slovenia) and 
Albania into a regional conflict formation with predominantly negative security dynamics. 
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It should be emphasised that the networks, which originated in the Western Balkans, unlike 
conflicts in 1991-1995, and later in 1998-1999, were not contained in or around the territory 
of ex-Yugoslavia (Bechev 2011: 35). Instead, they spread to other Balkan states, such as 
Bulgaria and Romania, and even further to the EU, e.g. Italy and Austria, and beyond, e.g. 
Switzerland. War economies and criminal networks connected the Western Balkans to the 
rest of Europe and the world, not allowing the region to be sealed off. The fact that these 
networks spread beyond the borders of the Western Balkans, however, does not mean that 
there is a need to redefine the Balkan subcomplex to incorporate all the states affected by 
them. The boundaries of the subcomplex still more or less coincided with the boundaries of 
the Western Balkans, because this is where the conflicts took place and networks were the 
densest.  
After the wars in Croatia and BiH stopped, the region started to slowly stabilise. Most 
Western Balkan states reinstated the state monopoly on violence59, cutting ties with 
paramilitary and irregular forces (Kaldor 2012: 57), and thus bringing an end to some of 
the political and military networks. Many other networks, e.g. built around clandestine 
economy, remained active, yet went further underground, or became dormant, to be 
reinvigorated by regional players during the Kosovo conflict.60 The stop of direct large-
scale violence, however, signalled to the international community that the regional conflict 
formation in the Balkans could be disentangled and brought closer to the amity pole of 
security interdependence.  
Starting from 1995 the strategy of containment gave way to external intervention with 
a regional twist. Yet, at that point there was still no agreement as to what constituted the 
region and therefore numerous externally-driven regional initiatives were aimed at various 
South-East European states. Moreover, regional security was still predominantly seen as 
separate from the rest of Europe. The situation changed in 1999-2000, when the EU started 
emerging as the leading actor in the region and the Western Balkans became formally 
recognized as a coherent region. It was also at this time that the region’s security was linked 
to the broader European security. Before that happened, however, the international 
community tried to pacify the subcomplex by pressuring and nudging its members to build 
reciprocal security relations, normally found inside a security regime.  
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To initiate change, the international community, still led by the USA, used negotiation 
and imposition. The processes were carried out through a plethora of initiatives61, which 
singled out regional cooperation as an important condition for the restoration of peace and 
normalisation of relations between regional actors as well as with the outside world. While 
regional interdependence of predominantly negative character, which defined the Western 
Balkans as a conflict formation between 1991 and 1995, resulted mostly from domestic 
factors, the states of the region started moving away from conflict and towards emerging 
security regime under the influence of external powers. The first attempt to employ a 
regional approach to the post Yugoslav space was made by the UN in 1992. By pressuring 
Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Macedonia to implement economic sanctions against rump 
Yugoslavia, the UN introduced the element of multilateralism into its relations with the 
regional actors (Bechev 2011: 43). Yet, it was not until 1995-1996 that regional approaches 
became a norm for the external actors looking to resolve the Balkan conflicts. The Dayton 
Accords, Sub-Regional Arms Control Agreement, Regional Approach and Southeast 
European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) promoted regional cooperation as a key element 
for the stabilisation of the area.  
The Dayton Accords62, whose primary purpose was to stop war in BiH gained 
importance regionally and not only in BiH thanks to the involvement of Croatia and FR 
Yugoslavia in the negotiation process and because “regional stability in and around former 
Yugoslavia” was identified as one of its goals (GFAP 1995, Article V, Annex 1B). The 
signing of the peace agreement, was made possible by the efforts of the US government 
and military commitment of NATO. Representatives of Clinton’s administration present on 
the ground and NATO’s air strikes on Serb positions provided a powerful impetus for 
change. The negotiations, held at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base on the outskirts of 
Dayton, Ohio, in November 1995, involved representatives from France, Germany, 
Italy, Russia, the United Kingdom, USA and the EU, and were headed by Richard 
Holbrook, the then US assistant secretary of state for European and Canadian affairs.63  
Among the DPA provisions, hard security was given a priority, which is exemplified 
by the inclusion of military aspects of the peace settlement into the first annex (GFAP 
1995). The Agreement also included proposals for arms control and confidence-building 
measures to diminish the risk of future conflicts, improve security relations between former 
adversaries and therefore promote reciprocity in the Balkans (McCausland 1997: 19). Thus, 
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in June 1996, the FRY, Croatia and BiH signed the Sub-Regional Arms Control 
Agreement64, known as Florence Agreement and provided for by Article IV, Annex 1A of 
the DPA, committing to reduce their weapons according to a 5-2-2 ratio, based on their 
respective populations and the FRY’s armament holdings (Boese 1999). As the agreement 
was negotiated between the parties under the external pressure65, it contained elements of 
both arms control and disarmament (McCausland 1997: 21). Although, it involved only 
three regional players, it is believed to have improved cooperation, transparency and 
predictability of security relations in South Eastern Europe (SEE) (OSCE 2016).  
The Regional Approach (RA) was launched by the EU in 1996 to supplement the 
Dayton Agreement and OSCE peace-building efforts (Papadimitriou 2001: 74). It was 
designed as a framework for political stabilisation and economic recovery of the Western 
Balkans. The RA offered these countries assistance under the PHARE66 and Obnova67 
programmes, autonomous trade preferences and Co-Operation and Association Agreements 
(Watanabe 2010: 131). It identified good neighbourliness and economic integration at the 
regional level as preconditions for accessing the EU policies68 (Bechev 2011: 45-46). The 
SECI was another strategy for the stabilisation of the region yet created by the USA. While 
having a broader geographical outreach than the Regional Approach (in additional to the 
Western Balkan states (apart from FRY), it covered other SEE states – Bulgaria, Greece, 
Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Slovenia and Turkey), it was considerably limited in scope. 
The SECI’s primary focus was to facilitate regional cooperation through combating trans-
border crime and promoting infrastructure development (Watanabe 2010: 131-132). 
While there were other regional initiatives, some of which – locally driven like the 
South East European Co-Operation Process (SEECP)69, it was the DPA, Florence 
Agreement, Regional Approach and to a lesser extent SECI that gained the most 
prominence. Through levers of conditionality and direct imposition they promoted the 
principles of regional cooperation, good neighbourliness, transparency and reciprocity, 
which could have turned the region into a security regime, had they been accepted and 
adopted by all regional players. There were three main reasons why the security regime did 
                                                          
64
 For further analysis of the initiative, see Boese (1999).  
65
 Negotiations were conducted by the OSCE that also oversees the implementation, but other external actors 
influenced the Agreement by supporting the DPA. 
66
 PHARE is a pre-accession financial instrument of the EU for cooperation with CEE countries, which was 
extended to South Eastern Europe.  
67
 The OBNOVA programme was the main channel of EU’s assistance to the Western Balkan states until it 
was integrated into CARDS in 2001. 
68
 For further analysis, see Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7.  
69
 For a detailed analysis of regional initiatives in South Eastern Europe, see Cottey (2012: 60-64) and Bechev 
(2011: 43-49).  
62 
 
not take root in the Western Balkans. First, the legacy of wars that displaced millions of 
people, caused thousands of deaths and ethnically cleansed many parts of the region 
remained mostly unaddressed70, making the emergence of reciprocity and trust between 
former adversaries extremely complicated. Second, the lack of agreement and coordination 
among external actors as to what constituted the Balkan region and how to approach it, 
reduced the effectiveness of the regional initiatives they were introducing. Third, in the 
immediate post-war period, the international community continued treating the Balkans as 
an area, different from the rest of Europe, whose stability could be achieved without long-
term commitment. As a result, peace in the Western Balkans turned out to be short-lived, 
while the pole of amity remained distant. Although the externally-led regional initiatives of 
1995-1999 did not establish a security regime in the Balkan subcomplex, they prepared the 
ground for the next stage of security transformation that started with the Kosovo conflict.  
The next section explains how in 1999-2000 the process of Euro-Atlantic integration 
substituted the policies of containment and intervention of the early and mid-1990s 
respectively and what impact it had on the security dynamics of the Balkan subcomplex.  
 
On the way to becoming a part of the European security community (1999-
2013) 
After a short period of peace, violence returned to the Western Balkans with the war 
in Kosovo, which lasted from February 1998 to June 199971. The conflict served as a 
turning point for the security evolution of the region. Instead of setting the Balkan 
subcomplex on the downward spiral back to the regional conflict formation, it offered the 
states of the region an opportunity to join the EU/Europe security community, which 
materialised thanks to the combination of external and internal factors. 
In terms of external factors, the strategy of integration, chosen by the EU and NATO, 
was of key importance. This work offers three explanations for its development.  First, 
Kosovo exposed limits of reactive and selective responses to the crises in the Balkans 
(Vucetic 2001: 116). Prior to 1999 it was widely believed that the region could be stabilised 
with the help of humanitarian aid and a plethora of externally-led initiatives, promising 
regional actors benefits for cooperation in various spheres, ranging from trade to security. 
These measures, often hastily arranged and poorly coordinated, were mainly concerned 
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with tackling the consequences of previous conflicts, without offering any long-term 
strategy for the development of the region. The fact that external actors could not agree on 
what constituted the region did not help matters either. The eruption of violence in Kosovo 
in 1998 and its escalation in 1999, which required another NATO intervention, highlighted 
limitations of the existing approaches to the Balkans and called for their urgent rethinking 
(Bechev 2006: 34). 
Second, the Kosovo crisis reiterated the interdependence of the Western Balkan states 
and emphasised the fragility of peace, established in the region (Bechev 2011:49). When 
Serbian forces launched operations aimed at the ethnic cleansing of the Albanian population 
in Kosovo in the spring of 1999 (Zakosek 2008: 592), it was not only Kosovo which 
suffered from these actions. The influx of refugees into neighbouring countries, mainly 
Albania and FYROM, placed their economies under huge pressure and in the case of 
Macedonia ignited inter-ethnic tensions (Bechev 2011:49). Moreover, regional trade and 
economy also sustained losses, because of the damages endured by Serbia, an important 
regional centre, as a consequence of NATO’s operation Allied Force (ibid.).  
Third, the re-emergence of conflict in the Western Balkans at the end of the 1990s 
provided a forceful push for the inclusion of the region into the EU’s area of responsibility. 
The geographical proximity of the region to the EU member states (Kavalski 2008: 77), 
media coverage of the Kosovo war in Western media (Buzan and Waever 2003: 387) and 
transnational nature of the consequences of the conflict, in particular in terms of refugee 
flows and networks of organised crime (Watanabe 2010: 145), were among the key reasons 
for the emergence of the Western Balkans as a part of Europe, part of “us”, the area, which 
Euro-Atlantic powers could not allow to descend into violence and cruelty (Buzan and 
Waever 2003: 387). By acknowledging the European identity of the region, after almost a 
decade of uncertainty and attempts to depict its problems and crises as foreign and non-
European, the international community signalled that the future of the Western Balkans was 
not only linked to the European zone of peace, but also belonged there. After the fighting 
in Kosovo was stopped with the help of NATO, the EU started assuming a more active role 
in the region72. Although slowly and cautiously, the EU became more open to the idea of 
formally including all Balkan states, and not just Bulgaria and Romania, into its realm. The 
model of integration, which had been used to stabilise Europe after World War II, was once 
again chosen as an instrument for peace, reconciliation and a guarantee of human and 
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minority rights (Solana 2000). It should be noted here that the EU’s intentions were not as 
much an altruistic endeavour as an attempt to protect itself and its members from the 
instability and conflict, spilling over from the turbulent region.  
The integration of the Western Balkans into the European security community 
became a possibility also thanks to some domestic changes. Of special importance were 
regime changes in Croatia and Serbia – the two largest states of the region. The death of 
Franjo Tudjman in 1999 and electoral defeat of Slobodan Milosevic in 2000 brought in new 
governments, which were open to reforms and more responsive to the demands for regional 
cooperation, coming from outside. By the end of 2000, all Western Balkan states expressed 
their commitment to the European integration (Vucetic 2001: 111), further strengthening 
the role of the EU in it.  
The first step towards the inclusion of the Balkan subcomplex into the European 
security community was made with the Stability Pact (SP) for SEE. Initiated by the German 
Presidency of the EU Council in the summer of 1999, the SP was a multilateral initiative, 
supported by a wide coalition of international financial institutions, such as the World Bank 
and European Investment Bank, international organisations, including OSCE, Council of 
Europe and NATO, and donor governments of many states, e.g. Japan, Russia, the USA, 
Canada as well EU member states (Busek and Kuehne 2010: 11). Overall, it represented a 
long-term proactive approach to conflict prevention (Watanabe 2010: 135), based on the 
combination of integration policy and cooperation at the SEE level (Bechev 2006: 34). 
Regional cooperation was in fact singled out as one of the key prerequisites for drawing the 
region closer to the perspective of full integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures (Busek 
and Kuehne 2010: 12). While being only one of the many broad goals of the policy, which 
among others included establishing lasting stability, encouraging democratisation, 
preserving multinational and multi-ethnic diversity, improving economic cooperation and 
combating organised crime in SEE (ibid.: 12-13), regional cooperation was presented by 
the Stability Pact as “both a recipe for interdependent growth and a generator of much-
needed political stability” (Bechev 2006: 34). In essence, the SP was an attempt on behalf 
of the international community to establish a regional security framework, which would 
foster amicable relations among the SEE states as well as between the latter and the outside 
world. It was also an expression of its commitment “to the idea(l) of one Europe” (Vucetic 
2001: 112). 
While having considerable advantages over many previous approaches to the 
Balkans, mainly in terms of offering a coordinated long-term policy with the prospect of 
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eventual integration into the EU structures, the Stability Pact also had several deficiencies, 
which prevented it from fully realising its security community-building potential.73 These 
deficiencies can be grouped into three main categories pertaining to finances, actors and 
goals. First, the SP was handicapped by the limited resources at its disposal, which were 
disproportionate to the grand objectives the scheme promised to achieve. Having no budget 
of its own, the SP was dependent on funds from its donors, notably the EU, its member 
states and international financial institutions, whose capacity and desire to assist varied 
greatly (Bechev 2011: 53). Second, the SP targeted all South Eastern European states, 
bundling together the Western Balkan states with Bulgaria and Romania, and inviting more 
advanced Hungary, Slovenia and Turkey to participate as non-beneficiaries. It is no wonder 
that there was a rather weak feeling of belonging to the stabilisation process in SEE (Vucetic 
2001:28). The ambiguity over the ownership of the initiative – placed under the umbrella 
of the OSCE, but in many respects led by the EU and perceived as an EU instrument by the 
regional actors – raised further questions regarding its value. Third, the broad goals outlined 
in the Stability Pact, largely remained abstract and distant, due to a lack of clarity as to the 
ways in which they could be achieved.  
The Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), launched by the European 
Commission in May 1999 as a supplement to the SP, was not susceptible to the deficiencies 
described above. As the initiative, funded and coordinated solely by the EU, and aimed at 
the Western Balkan states only, the SAP became the centrepiece of the EU’s policy towards 
the region already by 2001 (EC 2002: 9). With the SAP, the EU gave the Western Balkan 
countries the promise of “the fullest possible integration … into the political and economic 
mainstream of Europe” (EC 2003: 2) and the blueprint for reforms in the form of 
Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA). The SAP was designed as a 
simultaneously bilateral and regional approach: it seeks to create links between individual 
Western Balkan countries and the EU as well as to encourage regional cooperation between 
the countries themselves and with their neighbours in the region (EC 2002: 11). It is through 
the combination of these bilateral and regional relations that the EU has been drawing the 
Balkan subcomplex into the sphere of its influence and making it a part of the European 
security community. Apart from the SP, which in 2008 was substituted with the regionally-
owned Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), and the SAP, the EU has been using a variety 
of other instruments to encourage regionalisation within the Western Balkans and the 
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region’s integration into the EU. Among these: the Community Assistance for 
Reconstruction Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) programme, which gave way to 
the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) in 2007, the EU-Western Balkan summits, and an 
array of cooperation agreements and economic assistance programmes (Bechev 2011: 57-
58).  
As the arsenal of the EU tools for the Western Balkan states grew and possibility of 
a large-scale violence in the region diminished, the EU came to occupy centre stage in the 
affairs of the Balkan subcomplex. NATO continues to play an important role in the region 
through the Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP), Membership Action Plan (MAP), 
South East Europe Initiative (SEEI) as well as through the physical presence of its troops 
on the ground, e.g. in Kosovo, but no longer leads the efforts of the international community 
to stabilise the Western Balkans and to set the region on the path to peace, prosperity and 
democracy. This role has been taken over by the EU after it launched the SAP and extended 
the membership perspective to all Western Balkan states at the Thessaloniki summit of 
2003. Having said that, the impact of NATO and the US on the security situation in the 
Western Balkans should not be underestimated: these actors were instrumental for stopping 
the bloodshed in the region in 1995 and 1999. It was only through their efforts that the wars 
in Bosnia and Kosovo were stopped. Their subsequent engagement with the countries of 
the region contributed and keeps contributing to the strengthening of their political, 
economic and security situations.  
While recognising the significance of NATO and the US in the Western Balkans, this 
work, however, does not evaluate their roles in the process of extending European security 
community to the said region at length.74 This is because, as mentioned previously, the EU 
is in the centre of this research, and due to the fact that the impact of the US and NATO on 
the security situation of the Western Balkans has been extensively investigated elsewhere.75 
Although it is now widely acknowledged that the EU is the leading actor in the Balkan 
subcomplex (Bechev 2011: 57, Watanabe 2010), there are still considerable lacunae in the 
research literature on the subject, especially regarding the EU’s influence on the security 
situation of the region.76 This work attempts to remedy this deficiency by examining the 
EU’s role in security sector reform (SSR) in the Western Balkans. This involvement is seen 
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as an example of the EU’s attempt to change prevalent patterns of security interdependence 
in the region from negative to positive, which can shed light on the ways through which the 
elites of the Western Balkan states have been socialised to align their domestic and foreign 
policies with those of the EU.    
Socialisation, as was noted in Chapter 2, is a means used by external powers to 
promote peace and establish initial stages of security communities. It is a complex process 
through which norms, rules and values are transferred between international actors and are 
internalised as patterns of domestic policy-making and foreign policy-formation (Kavalski 
2008: 65). In the Western Balkans the EU came to exercise its socialising powers through 
bilateral and regional initiatives. These initiatives are meant to strengthen the statehood of 
local actors and make peaceful relations a norm in the region (ibid.: 95). The 
interconnection between two levels of the EU’s interaction with the Western Balkans – 
levels of states and the region – is both strong and complex. While each state is required to 
engage in regional cooperation and build good neighbourly relations to progress with the 
integration into the EU, the EU evaluates every state’s success on the individual basis. In 
many respects, amicable relations between Western Balkan states develop because of 
changes in domestic policies, which are often, but not exclusively, promoted by the EU 
through bilateral contractual relations, e.g. expressed in SAAs. On the one hand, 
considering the fragility of states in the region, the EU’s policies are aimed at building their 
capacity and improving the efficiency and efficacy of their institutions (security sector 
reform is an example of this approach). Such activities are sometimes interpreted as an 
effort at member state-building (Keil and Arkan 2015). The recent history of conflict in the 
region, on the other hand, prompts the EU to also focus on fostering the introduction and 
maintenance of peaceful foreign policy practices among regional members (Kavalski 2008: 
95).  The combination of these two approaches has initiated the emergence of security 
community in the Western Balkans, which forms the extension of the European zone of 
peace, i.e. it is not a separate security community but a part of the European one. Since the 
recipients of the EU’s policies tend to be mainly state elites, the Western Balkans currently 
represents an elite or, in other words, embryonic form of security community. Such a 
security community is based not on a common identity, but on elite cooperation (ibid.: 80-
81).  
As was noted in the previous chapter, according to Deutsch, the success of security 
communities depends on three essential conditions. The EU’s policies in the Western 
Balkans can be shown to foster their emergence, which, in turn, proves that there is potential 
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for the embryonic security community in the region to evolve further. The conditions in 
question are: the compatibility of main values among politically relevant strata, political 
responsiveness and mutual predictability of behaviour. The compatibility of the main values 
is pursued by the EU through its insistence through the SAP on the adoption by all the 
Western Balkan countries of “the values and models on which [the EU] is founded” 
(Council of the EU 2000: 54). The regional decision-makers commit to these values, which 
include social, economic and political rights and liberties, by adopting the EU’s acquis and 
choosing to follow the norms of peaceful interaction between each other. Political 
responsiveness is achieved by reforms aimed at improving the effectiveness and efficiency 
of state institutions, which, while carried out by domestic actors, are often initiated from 
outside. One of the tasks of these reforms is to bring the states that introduce them to 
compatible standards. SSR, as already mentioned, gains special importance in post-conflict 
environments and is one of the key reforms contributing to the development of the security 
community in the Western Balkans. Mutual predictability of behaviour is closely linked to 
the condition of responsiveness: it develops as a result of strengthening state institutions 
and presupposes that state elites display similar patterns of behaviour.  
It can be concluded that since 1999 the security situation in the Western Balkans has 
been steadily improving and this change has been consistently guided by the external effort. 
The next and final section will evaluate the role of the most active members of the 
international community in the evolution of the security dynamics in the region and explain 
why the EU is best placed to assist it on the way to peace, stability and prosperity. 
 
The role of external actors in shaping security patterns of the Western Balkans 
The analysis, presented in the current chapter, has shown that the security situation in 
the Western Balkans between 1991 and 2013 was shaped under the influence of internal 
and external factors. It has also demonstrated that the change of prevalent patterns in 
regional security relations has been guided by the international community. The turn from 
“ethnic strife, conflict and competition to cooperative engagement” (Bechev 2012: 72) was 
fostered by the USA/NATO and the EU, with the help of other external actors, among which 
the UN, OSCE, Russia and Turkey deserve a special mention. The transformation from a 
regional conflict formation, ridden with war and conflict, through a failed security regime, 
to part of the EU/Europe security community became possible thanks to a plethora of 
largely externally-driven regional initiatives, approached as peace-building projects (Solioz 
and Stubbs 2012: 23). Some of these initiatives, such as the Regional Approach, Stability 
Pact and Stabilisation and Association Process, were designed to bring the Balkan states 
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closer to the Euro-Atlantic institutions, and gradually to integrate the former into the latter. 
Because of the geographical proximity, exposure to the transnational threats emanating 
from the region, the need to repair a reputational damage sustained with the failure of its 
early efforts to stop violence and the USA’s attention increasingly being directed to other 
parts of the world, at the end of the 1990s the EU emerged as the leading actor in the 
Western Balkans. Since then it has been working towards making the region part of the 
European security community through the combination of regional and bilateral tools. The 
growing connection between the Balkan subcomplex and European RSC has prompted 
researchers to speak of it as “a microcosm of this larger whole rather than some separate 
‘other’” (Cottey 2012: 66). 
Alongside its stabilisation and accession policies and financial instruments mentioned 
above, the EU has been exerting its socialising powers on the Western Balkans through its 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), now Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP). It is symbolic that the region, which prompted the EU to develop the ESDP in the 
first place77, provided favourable grounds for testing this policy through military and 
civilian operations (Howorth 2007: 55-56). In January 2003, the EU took over the police 
and rule of law operation in BiH from the UN, staying there for almost ten years; in March 
of the same year it deployed EUFOR Concordia, its first ever military mission, to FYROM, 
and in December another police mission – EUPOL Proxima, also in FYROM. Since 2004 
the EU has overseen keeping peace in BiH, having substituted NATO’s stabilisation force 
SFOR with EUFOR Althea, and from 2008 it assumed responsibility for the rule of law 
reform in Kosovo with EULEX.78  
As can be seen, the EU has been learning to guide the transformation of the Western 
Balkans from the area, affected by the legacy of war, to a part of the conflict-free 
community.79 At the beginning of the 1990s, however, the bloc could not rise to the 
challenge as it “lacked the cohesion, determination and instruments to bring the crisis under 
control” (Lehne 2004: 111). The USA, who originally wanted to stay out of the Yugoslav 
conflicts and saw them as a European problem, had no choice but assume the leadership 
role in the international effort to stop the violence and stabilise the region. The US-led 
NATO interventions ended the wars in Bosnia in 1995 and in Kosovo in 1999. It is also 
important that peace negotiations between the warring parties of the Bosnian war took place 
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at a US Air Force base in Dayton, Ohio (ibid.), which gave the name to the peace accords. 
Although the US acted mainly through NATO, it also invested in regional schemes outside 
the NATO framework such as the already mentioned SECI and South Balkans 
Development Initiative (SBDI). Still, these initiatives had a limited focus (restricted to 
several spheres such as infrastructure and energy) and lacked inclusivity. The SECI, for 
instance, excluded rump Yugoslavia, which consisted of Serbia and Montenegro, while 
Croatia opted for an observer status in the scheme, and SBDI covered only three states – 
Albania, Bulgaria and FYROM (Bechev 2011: 44-45). NATO’s arsenal for the Balkans, 
which includes both generalised programmes like PfP and more specialised mechanisms 
like SEEI, allows the alliance to preserve its significance in the region.  
Like the EU, the US and NATO have been fostering the good neighbourly relations 
between the SEE states and transmitting their values into the practices of regional actors. 
PfP, for example, required commitment to the “protection and promotion of fundamental 
freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice and peace through 
democracy” (NATO 1994). These actors therefore have also been exercising their 
socialising powers in SEE, yet their capacity to promote change of the security 
interdependence is seen here as less powerful than that of the EU for at least three reasons. 
First, none of NATO and USA’s instruments target or have been specifically devised 
for the Western Balkans as a region. While the term “Western Balkans” is a construct of 
the EU-speak, it covers the countries, which are intrinsically linked to each other through 
the networks of potential or real conflict. Considering the region’s legacy of war, this work 
argues that it is essential for the region to receive a tailored approach, which aims to prevent 
any future outbreaks of violence and works as a roadmap for reforms. The SAP is an 
example of such an approach. Of course, it can be objected that the regional aspects of the 
SAP, are not nearly as effective as the bilateral contractual relations with the Western 
Balkan states or that members of the region do not necessarily share the feeling of belonging 
to it. These objections, however, miss the point. The EU’s regional approach is not 
competing with its bilateral agreements, nor does it try to create a separate Western Balkan 
region. The SAP offers the regional actors place in the EU and prepares them for the 
integration into its structures, while helping them with solving problems of poor 
cooperation and conflicts of the past.  
Second, the EU is the only international actor which offers the Western Balkan states 
a comprehensive programme for development. The SAAs, concluded with the states of the 
region, identify a range of political, economic and security objectives, as well as encourage 
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regional cooperation. NATO, although no longer exclusively preoccupied with traditional 
hard security issues, still predominantly focuses on the security sphere, while the US 
supports reforms in separate sectors. The two latter actors are therefore in a somewhat 
disadvantaged position compared to the EU when it comes to the areas of domestic and 
foreign policy of the Western Balkan countries they can influence.  
Third, the USA’s impact on the Western Balkans is subdued by its status as an extra-
regional actor. The region is connected to the EU geographically and politically. The EU 
can exercise its powers in the region not only as a global power, but also as the centre of 
the European RSC to which the Balkan subcomplex is attached. The USA, on the other 
hand, can exert its influence on the region as a superpower, which can, as explained in 
Chapter 2, transcend borders and distance, but being outside the region its impact is not 
comprehensive. What concerns NATO, while it has a stake in European security, its ability 
to shape security policies of actors diminishes if the latter do not seek accession to the 
organisation. With the memory of the 1990s conflicts and their resolution still fresh, many 
of the regional actors continue to look to NATO for security, yet not all of them consider 
pursuing its membership. For example, Serbia, the biggest state of the region, does not 
aspire to join NATO, having proclaimed military neutrality in 2008. Hence, the EU is better 
placed for guiding the security transformation of the Western Balkans than the US or 
NATO, although the latter two definitely continue to matter. 
In the studied period, the security situation in the Western Balkans was also 
influenced by the UN, the OSCE, Russia and Turkey. Yet their importance was not nearly 
as big as that of the US, NATO or the EU. It was widely believed at the end of the 1990s 
that the UN would become a leading security actor in the world (Carlsson 1992), which 
could foster a global security community (Rochester 1993), yet the Yugoslav crises 
revealed it did not have the potency to perform this role.  The UN, similarly to other 
members of the international community, was rather slow and reluctant to intervene in the 
conflicts. In 1991 it brokered a cease-fire in Croatia but was unable to foster a permanent 
settlement of the conflict (Daalder 1996: 60). In 1992 it deployed the United Nations 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to supervise the cease-fire in the country, which only 
contributed to the status quo. UNPROFOR’s mandate in BiH was considerably broader, but 
still lacked efficiency, as it focused largely on humanitarian relief, and not peace 
enforcement (ibid.).80 The creation of UN safe areas during the Bosnian war did not 
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improve the UN’s standing either: the fall of Srebrenica, the massacre of Bosniaks by Serb 
forces in July 1993 and the attack on the marketplace in Sarajevo in 1994 showed that it did 
not have the capacity or resources to manage the conflicts (Pugh, Cooper and Goodhand 
2004: 149). The ability of the UN to act quickly and forcefully was stifled by the consensus-
based decision-making processes of its Security Council. The UN’s poor performance in 
the region was one of the main triggers for NATO’s engagement in the conflict. Having 
failed at leading the international effort, the UN assumed a supplementary role to NATO 
and later the EU (Kavalski 1998: 100), which it has been performing through international 
missions, such as the law enforcement mission in Bosnia and the UN Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).  
The OSCE, similarly to the UN, was supposed to play a greater role in the Balkans 
but proved unable to do so. Having declared “a new era of democracy, peace, and unity” at 
its Paris summit in November 1990 (OSCE), it found itself unprepared to provide a solution 
to escalating conflicts in the Balkans only a year later. Like the UN, its ability to act was 
constrained by the decision-making procedures, demanding consensus. Even a special 
“consensus-minus one” policy, introduced in response to the Yugoslav wars, did not allow 
the OSCE to act decisively and bring order to the Western Balkans (Daalder 1996: 60). As 
a result, it resolved to influence the region through monitoring missions and overseeing of 
initiatives, set up by other actors, such as was the case with the Stability Pact or SECI. Its 
role, therefore, was also supplementary.  
Two remaining external actors, which influenced the security situation of the Western 
Balkans between 1991 and 2013 represent states, and not international organisations. The 
actors in question are Russia (a global player according to RSCT) and Turkey (an insulator). 
Russia became involved in the post-Yugoslav conflicts thanks to its close links to Serbia 
(Headly 2007). As Serbia’s long-time ally, it assumed the role of a mediator between this 
Balkan state and the international community. The mediation effort, however, was not 
always productive and often had the air of contradiction to the policies pursued by the 
Western actors. In 1994 and 1995 Russia opposed NATO’s bombing of Bosnian Serbs, 
arguing for the continuation of peace talks, and in 1999 was objecting to the air strikes 
against the rump FR Yugoslavia (Norris 2005: 13-15). Russia also obstructed the work of 
the six-nation Contact Group, which apart from itself included France, Italy, Germany, the 
US and the UK, and was set up to provide a response to the Yugoslav crises81. In 1999, 
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when the war in Kosovo escalated, it tried to persuade other members of the group that the 
conflict was an internal matter of Serbia.82 Russia’s actions therefore contributed, although 
indirectly, to Serbia’s aggression: seeing the support from its Slavic partner, Serbia was less 
likely to yield to the demands of NATO and the UN. Not all the Russian efforts, however, 
were obstructive. The Yeltsin administration’s mediation played an important role 
(alongside NATO’s intervention) in persuading Serbia to withdraw forces from Kosovo.  
The Russian troops also participated in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia as part of 
NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR), later turned into SFOR (although under a special 
US command rather than NATO’s) and in Kosovo. In the latter Russia provided the largest 
non-NATO contingent, which stood at around 1,500 troops (Nikitin 2004). In general, 
Russia showed it was still important for the security of the region but did not always act as 
a partner of other external actors.  
Finally, Turkey was brought into the Yugoslav crises through its historical ties with 
the region, going back to the Ottoman Empire. Its involvement in the conflicts was mainly 
motivated by the concern over “the breakdown of regional order and stability” (Sayari 2000: 
176), which was perceived as a threat to its own security. Despite emphasising the 
importance of the post-Yugoslav area for regional security, Turkey tried to minimise its 
involvement in the conflicts (Buzan and Waever 2003: 393). In fact, most of its contribution 
into improving the situation in the region was made through participation in multilateral 
initiatives, led by the USA, NATO, the UN or the EU. For example, in BiH Turkey 
supported military intervention by NATO, was part of the UN peacekeeping force and 
partner to the USA in providing military training to the new armed forces of the Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, one of the two entities making up BiH after Dayton (Sayari 
2000: 177-178). In addition to various multilateral initiatives, Turkey was also working on 
developing bilateral relations with individual states of the region, e.g. Albania and FYROM. 
While Turkey’s engagement with the regional actors was important, the country neither had 
the capacity to play a more active role, nor was willing to do so. From the point of view of 
RSCT, the relative restrain exercised by Turkey in the Western Balkans can be explained 
through its position as an insulator – a state situated between different security complexes. 
In the case of Turkey these are the European RSC, post-Soviet RSC and Middle Eastern 
RSC. Although Turkey keeps challenging this status through activities in neighbouring 
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regions, its inability to significantly change the regional balance of power proves it still is 
an insulator.83 
It should also be noted that external actors involved in the Balkan subcomplex in 
1991-2013 often engaged in cooperative activities. For example, NATO and the EU closely 
cooperated with the OSCE on the work of the Sanctions Assistance Missions that monitored 
the implementation of the UN sanctions against post-Yugoslav states. While the following 
chapters analyse the engagement of the EU with other members of the international 
community to promote SSR in the Western Balkans,84 the role of the international 
cooperation in the Yugoslav crises is discussed elsewhere.85 
 
Conclusion 
In 1991-2013, the Balkan subcomplex largely coincided with the area now defined as 
the Western Balkans, although its outer boundaries remained blurred, especially, in the 
early 1990s. During the studied period, the subcomplex developed two poles – one in Serbia 
and the other in Albania. However, the security situation of the region is not decided in 
either of them. It emanates from the core of the European regional security complex, to 
which the Balkan subcomplex is attached geographically, politically and economically. The 
place of the Balkan subcomplex in Europe has not always been a given. The EU and other 
external actors were reluctant to engage with the war-ridden area and pursued the policies 
of containment from 1991 to 1995. At this time, the subcomplex presented a case of regional 
conflict formation, i.e. a region, whose security situation is defined through a combination 
of closely interlinked conflicts, which cannot be easily untangled. Interestingly enough, the 
networks connecting the Western Balkan states were also responsible for bringing the 
region closer to the EU as they exposed the latter to many transnational threats, such as 
trafficking of drugs and persons, organised crime and illegal migration. Despite the 
strengthening connection of the Western Balkans to the EU, it was the USA and NATO 
that ended the period of containment by intervening to stop the war in BiH in 1995. The 
EU lacked the appropriate instruments, an effective security policy, military might as well 
as unity among its key members to stabilise the region.  
Starting from 1995-1996, under the influence of externally-driven initiatives such as 
the Dayton Accords and Regional Approach, the Western Balkans became more stable and 
achieved short-term peace. Although the international community used negotiation and 
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imposition to introduce the subcomplex to the principles of regional cooperation, good 
neighbourliness and reciprocity, its members did not stop considering war as a preferable 
means of settling disputes. The RCF therefore failed to transform into a security regime. It 
was the Kosovo conflict of 1998-1999 that brought about change. While it was again the 
efforts of the USA and NATO which ended the war, the EU claimed responsibility for the 
stabilisation and development of the region afterwards. The bloc emerged as the leading 
security community-building actor, which used its socialising powers to foster amicable 
relations among the Western Balkan states. Since 1999 the EU’s arsenal of instruments for 
the Western Balkans has been continuously growing and now includes a number of regional 
and bilateral tools, which are aimed at strengthening the statehood of local actors and 
making peaceful regional relations a norm. Bilateral and regional initiatives, pursued by the 
EU, should not be considered contradictory or competing, but complementing one another. 
Through bilateral agreements with individual Western Balkan states the EU attempts to 
make their institutions more effective and efficient and their state elites more open to the 
idea of cooperation. These initiatives foster congruence between the Western Balkan states 
and the EU, as well as among the regional actors, and make the extension of the European 
zone of peace to the region possible. Taking these considerations into account, it can be 
said that tracing the development of the bilateral relation between the EU and Western 
Balkan states, especially in the sphere of security, can provide important insights into 
understanding the mechanisms of security-community building. In this work this is done 
on the example of the EU’s impact on security sector reforms in BiH, Croatia and Serbia. 
In conclusion, it should also be added that the USA and NATO continue influencing the 
security dynamics of the Western Balkans, but no longer lead the effort of the international 
community in the region.  
Having established the leading role of the EU in shaping the security situation inside 
the Balkan subcomplex, Chapter 4 considers the EU’s engagement with the SSR concept 
in theory and practice. It demonstrates that SSR is one of the best tools for both scrutinising 
the evolution of the security situation in the Western Balkans and assessing the impact of 
the EU on the process.  
  
76 
 
Chapter 4 The approach of the EU to security sector reform (SSR) and 
the case of the Western Balkans 
 
Introduction 
Security sector reform (SSR) is widely recognized as an important tool of conflict 
prevention, peacebuilding, development, and even democratisation and state-building 
(Churruca Muguruza 2008; Gross 2013; Bailes 2010). The EU has been actively engaged 
in the conceptualisation and implementation of this reform since the 1990s. The current 
chapter discusses what constitutes the EU’s approach to SSR and how it has been applied 
to the Western Balkan region. The discussion is divided into three sections. Section one 
shows that SSR occupies an important place within a wide range of the EU policies. 
Following David Spence, it is argued that as part national, part transnational policy area, 
security sector reform provides a favourable context for regional application and 
“epitomises European integration” (2010: 93). It also demonstrates that the EU has been 
engaged in SSR-related activities for a long period of time, although without necessarily 
labelling them as such. SSR, due to its comprehensive nature, is approached by the EU not 
as a simple mechanical exercise aimed at reducing the number of troops or controlling 
military spending in third countries, but as a vehicle for transferring the EU norms and 
values. It will therefore be argued that security sector reform is intrinsically linked to the 
development of amicable security relations and the process of security community-
building.  
Section two analyses the policy framework, put together by the EU institutions over 
the years to support and promote SSR around the world. It focuses on the key documents 
which introduced SSR into the EU’s policies. Thus, it analyses the provisions of the 
European Security Strategy from 2003 alongside its implementation report from 2008, as 
well as two concepts by the Council and the Commission, released in 2005 and 2006 
respectively, which until recently remained the key sources of information on the EU’s SSR 
vision. In July 2016, the EC adopted the Joint Communication “Elements for an EU-wide 
strategic framework to support security sector reform”, which added an important 
dimension to the EU SSR framework by combining the previously separate visions of the 
European Commission and the Council.  
The final section of Chapter 4 evaluates the implementation of SSR strategies by the 
EU in the Western Balkans on the regional level. It looks at how the EU has been engaging 
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with the security sectors of the region, what goals it has been pursuing and what it has 
achieved so far.  
 
The EU as an actor of SSR 
The role of the EU as an SSR actor has been widely acknowledged in scholarly and 
policy literature. If some researchers maintain that the EU has the potential to become a 
leader of SSR (Churruca Maguruza 2008; Dursun-Ozkanca and Vandemoortele 2012), 
others study the EU’s policies and practice in the field, without trying to assess the level of 
its importance (Bailes 2010; Albrecht, Stepputat and Andersen 2010). There is also a view 
that the EU in itself represents a project of SSR as it was “built on broad transformation of 
national government including security and defence structures” (Ekengren 2010: 101). 
While the current work considers the idea of equating the EU to a project of SSR far-
fetched, it agrees with Ekengren that the EU is well-placed for promoting SSR around the 
world and has the potential for using the reform for changing security interdependence 
between states from negative to positive.   
Today the EU approaches SSR as a key element of conflict-prevention, peace-
building, democratisation, sustainable development and state-building (EC 2015: 2). Its 
SSR-related activities are aimed at the bodies that provide security to citizens, as well as at 
the institutions in charge of management and oversight of such bodies. In other words, the 
EU subscribes to a broad vision of SSR, which “goes beyond the notion of effectiveness of 
individual services … and instead focuses on the overall functioning of the security system 
as part of a governance reform policy and strategy of the public sector” (EC 2006: 3). SSR 
is a versatile instrument, which “sits at the centre of Europe’s foreign, security and 
development policies” (Spence 2010: 93).  
The first applications of SSR took place in the context of the post-communist 
transition of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in the 1990s, which until today, alongside 
Sierra Leone and South Africa, remains one of the most successful cases of SSR (Dursun-
Ozkanca and Vandemoortele 2012: 143). While many of the international efforts to improve 
the security situation in CEE came from NATO, the EU obtained experience in the reform 
through engagement with the states of the region, too. Thus, the EU helped these states 
improve their border security as part of the Schengen system of movement control and was 
the leading external contributor to the reform of judiciary (Bailes 2010: 75).  
The EU started engaging in SSR more proactively and systematically with the 
introduction of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) by the Treaty of 
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Maastricht in 1993 and its key element, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), 
now Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), established at the Cologne Council in 
1999. Since the early 2000s ESDP/CSDP has been providing the EU with a convenient 
foreign-security policy platform for the promotion of SSR (Faleg 2012: 171). SSR, as part 
of the “security-good governance-development paradigm” (ibid.), fit effortlessly into the 
framework of CSDP, designed to tackle new challenges to European security. It quickly 
became incorporated into a number of the EU’s missions and operations, deployed around 
the world to establish secure environments, based on the rule of law and respect for human 
rights. While only a handful of CSDP missions can be formally identified as SSR missions, 
e.g. EU SSR Guinea-Bissau86 and EUSEC RD Congo87, various aspects of security sector 
reform became part of the mandate of almost 30 other missions (Jayasundara-Smits and 
Schirch 2016: 2). Rule of law missions in Iraq and Georgia, police missions in BiH, 
Macedonia and Palestinian Territories, and the civilian security sector mission in Ukraine 
are just a few examples.  
It is important to note here that when the EU first launched these missions, it did not 
have a well-defined concept of SSR. The concept was developed and refined through 
practice, which, as already stated, spread through foreign, security and development 
policies. Today the EU is the most important development donor in the world, providing 
almost half of all the aid to developing countries (Law 2007a: 10). Starting from the 1990s 
it accepted the fact that its development aid could not be successful, unless coupled with 
efforts to improve the functioning and management of security systems of countries 
undergoing transitions and post-conflict transformations. Within the EU’s development 
framework, SSR has been approached as a component of good governance and part of a 
wider public-sector reform (Hänggi and Tanner 2005: 31). As mentioned in the 
Commission’s Communication “Governance and Development”, SSR is an instrument, 
which should be used “to create safe security environments and to keep the security sector 
permanently subject to the same governance norms as other parts of the public sector and 
military forces under the political control of a civilian authority” (EC 2003a: 8). Before the 
Council adopted the EU Concept for ESDP support to SSR in October 2005 and the 
Commission released “A Concept for European Community Support for SSR” in May 
2006, it was the EU policy documents on development that contained “the most elaborate 
conceptualisation” of SSR (Hänggi and Tanner 2005: 32).  
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The EU’s concept of SSR has undergone significant alterations and considerably 
matured over the years. Partly because the concept was still under development, partly 
because the EU was a new actor in security in the 1990s, the initial experience of the EU 
with SSR was timid and erratic. Thus, in CEE the EU advocated more professional police 
and border control authorities as well as the introduction of civilian oversight over these 
services, yet it neither had an overarching view for the development of the security sectors 
in the states of the region, nor a unified vision as to what those sectors stood for. Even in 
the Western Balkans, the first attempts of the EU to engage with SSR were limited. For 
instance, the working group on Security and Defence issues of the SP, initiated by the EU, 
defined SSR as “right-sizing, re-orientation, reform, and capacity-building of national 
defence forces” (Gourlay 2008: 82). In other words, SSR was equated with defence reform. 
As the concept kept gaining importance, the EU came to embrace SSR as a holistic 
approach, which could be applied not only to police forces, intelligence and army, but also 
management and oversight bodies, justice institutions and non-statutory forces (ibid.). 
SSR was not simply developing alongside the EU’s security toolbox but was among 
the main factors behind its evolution. As Faleg put it, SSR is one of the policy innovations, 
which contributed to “the EU’s commitment as a security provider” (2012: 162). By not 
restricting the security sector to traditional military spheres, where the EU could not and 
still cannot compete with NATO88, the concept of SSR allowed the EU to engage in projects 
of peace-building and stabilisation in many regions of the world. As part national, part 
transnational policy, SSR is applied by the EU as a tool of integration to bring the security 
sectors of neighbouring states, linked by common security problems and challenges, to 
shared standards, consistent with democratic norms and principles. While SSR does not 
dictate the number of troops or size of security budgets, it ensures that security systems 
function effectively and are governed democratically. The expectation is that the states and 
regions undertaking SSR, under the guidance of the EU, will “move in similar direction in 
the streamlining of security thinking into broad sectors of public administration, civil 
society and business” to meet threats of cross-border crime, terrorism, failing states and 
disasters (Ekengren 2010: 116).  
Through SSR the EU has been cultivating friendly regional relations, helping states 
choose cooperation over competition and peace over war. In this respect, SSR “epitomizes 
European integration” (Spence 2010: 93) as it is used as a tool of externalising the EU’s 
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internal success as the security community (Ekengren 2010: 103). By harmonizing the work 
of security systems in the third states SSR leads to regional integration and the emergence 
of amicable security relations. What is more, the application of SSR helps the EU to reduce 
differences between EU and non-EU countries, making sure all adhere to the same 
principles when it comes to the work and management of security services. In a world where 
the line between internal and external security is blurred, this is especially important. 
However, it is essential to understand that the EU’s SSR-related activities have not always 
had the potential to change the security dynamics of regions from negative to positive and 
be utilised as an instrument of security community-building. As will be demonstrated 
through the case study of the Western Balkan states, at first the application of SSR efforts, 
led by the EU in the region, was limited, much like the EU’s approach to the region in 
general. Yet by engaging in SSR and expanding its understanding of the reform, the EU has 
been learning through practice. As a result, it has become an active and credible actor in the 
field. To explain how it achieved this position, the remainder of this section discusses why 
the EU got involved in SSR, how it formed its approach to the concept, what advantages it 
has over other SSR actors and what limitations constrain its reform performance.  
The EU’s decision to engage in SSR can be explained through three main factors: the 
broadening of the concept of security, the emergence of a strong link between development 
and security communities and the EU’s desire to play a more active role on the international 
scene. First, a change in the nature of threats and conflicts in the post-Cold War period 
meant there was a need to look at security from a new perspective, beyond traditional 
defence issues and inter-state relations. Second, the struggles, faced by development actors 
in post-conflict environments highlighted the importance of effective security systems. A 
well-managed and transparent security sector has emerged as a key element of “socio-
economic development, conflict prevention and peacebuilding” (Faleg 2012: 167). Third, 
having acquired a foreign and security policy, the EU has become more assertive in trying 
to establish its importance and find an identity on the international arena (Churruca 
Muguruza 2008: 73). With the ambition to be a promoter of peace, stability and sustainable 
development globally, it needed to develop the toolbox of diverse and comprehensive 
instruments, which would be applicable to different contexts, ranging from post-conflict to 
developed countries. Over time, SSR has become an important instrument in this toolbox. 
The EU’s policy framework on SSR was formed in 2005 and 2006 with the release 
of the already mentioned concepts by the Council and Commission as well as the Draft 
Council Conclusions on a combined vision on SSR.  It was further refined with two 
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communications from the Commission in 2015 and 2016. It would be wrong to assume, 
however, that this is when the EU first engaged in SSR. The EU’s approach to the reform, 
which found formulation in its official documentation in 2005-2006, was the product of the 
previous work of the bloc and its member states. This work can be divided into two main 
strands: practice in SSR-related activities and involvement in the development of the 
concept in cooperation with third actors that included other international organisations, e.g. 
the OSCE, and non-governmental institutions active in the field, e.g. the Geneva Centre for 
the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). The Commission’s concept states that 
SSR “has been an integral part of EU integration, enlargement and external assistance for 
many years. Through Community instruments, the EU has supported reform processes in 
partner countries and regions in different parts of the world under a wide range of policy 
areas” (EC 2006: 3). Indeed, over the years the EU contributed to different aspects of SSR 
through a variety of activities, in particular through its missions, including those performed 
by the Western European Union (WEU)89. For instance, in 1987-1988, the WEU was 
involved in mine-clearing operations during the Iran-Iraq war and in 1994-1996 provided 
police support to the EU administration of Mostar in Bosnia (Eekelen 2008: 117).  After 
CSDP came into effect in 2003, SSR elements have become incorporated into many of its 
missions (Churruca Muguruza 2008: 90). The Western Balkans has been and remains one 
of the key geographical areas of the EU’s support for SSR (ibid.: 96). Since 2003 six CSDP 
missions were deployed to the region confirming that the Western Balkans not only 
provided the inspiration for the creation of CSDP, but also gave the EU an opportunity to 
test it in practice (Juncos 2013).  
The start of the EU’s involvement in the conceptualisation of SSR, like its practical 
engagement with the policy, dates to the beginning of the 1990s. Since then the EU has 
been actively cooperating with the OSCE, NATO, the Council of Europe and 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) to develop norms and best practices of SSR (Law and 
Myshlovska 2008: 10). While some of this cooperation was explicitly aimed at the 
formulation of the SSR agenda, other projects referred to a broader context of post-Cold 
War security relations, which pertained to SSR indirectly. The OSCE’s Code of Conduct 
on Politico-Military Relations, adopted in 1994, is an example of the latter category. The 
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EU was one of the main contributors to the Code, which called for the democratic control 
of all the security forces (ibid.) and contained many commitments regarding such areas as 
arms control, confidence-building, conflict prevention and crisis management (Hänggi and 
Tanner 2005: 22).  
It is notable that the European Commission and EU member states were among the 
contributors to the OECD DAC’s SSR documents, which later not only provided the basis 
for the EU’s concepts of SSR, but also became key points of reference for all SSR 
practitioners (Law and Myshlovska 2008: 11). Until today the guidelines on “Security 
System Reform and Governance” (2004) and “Handbook on Security System Reform” 
(2008), produced by the OECD DAC with the assistance of various actors, including the 
EU, remain the most influential documents in the sphere of SSR. The EU has also 
cooperated with non-governmental actors to develop its own approach to SSR. For 
example, the work, done by DCAF on SSR, had an impact on the formulation of the 
Concept for ESDP support to the reform (Faleg 2012:176).  
The contribution of individual member states to the development of the EU’s vision 
on SSR should not be underestimated either. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the UK has been 
one of the champions of SSR, being the first to prioritise the reform in its development aid 
and security endeavours abroad. The Netherlands has also been a promoter of SSR. In the 
early 2000s, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs in cooperation with the Clingendael 
Institute developed a SSR policy framework to be used in development work (Law and 
Myshlovska 2008: 10). Both states took an active role in the formulation of SSR concepts 
by the OECD and the UN, which later were “downloaded to the EU level” (Dursun-
Ozkanca and Vandemoortele 2012: 144). 
As an actor of SSR, the EU has at least three comparative advantages over other actors 
engaged in the field. First, it has a broad variety of foreign-policy instruments at its disposal, 
ranging from diplomacy to civil and military missions, for the advancement of SSR 
(Churruca Muguruza 2008: 75). These instruments can provide short-, medium- and long-
term assistance to all sorts of contexts, whether developed, developing or post-conflict. 
Second, the EU is the largest contributor of the development aid in the world with a global 
outreach and access to considerable financial resources. Over half of all development aid 
comes from the EU and its member states, and its spending on development keeps growing: 
if in 1970, the oversees development assistance from the EU amounted to $24 billion (Law 
and Myshlovska 2008: 16), in 2013, it reached €56.2 billion (EC 2014). While SSR is part 
of the development agenda, the EU, as the world’s largest donor, is well-positioned for its 
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promotion. Third, as a sui generis actor, the EU is committed to the advancement of SSR 
on both state and regional levels. As discussed previously, regional aspects of SSR are 
perceived as highly promising among SSR practitioners, scholars and policy-makers 
(Ekengren and Simons 2010: 3). A regional approach is seen as a possibility to make SSR 
efforts more effective and shape them in ways “that could also contribute to a change of 
individual states’ security and defence priorities by efforts including other partners in the 
region” (ibid.). The EU has not simply emphasised the importance of a regional dimension 
to SSR in its strategic documents, but also has been pursuing its implementation in practice. 
The Stabilisation and Association Process (1999), Cotonou Agreement (2000), European 
Neighbourhood Policy (2004) and the EU Strategy for Africa (2005) are all examples of 
regional policies, which include provisions on SSR (Jayasunara-Smits and Schirch 2016: 
4).  
The EU, therefore has considerable experience in SSR and several advantages over 
other actors in the field. This work, however, does not claim that the EU’s engagement with 
security sector reform has been flawless. There are, of course, some problems impeding the 
progress. First, there are serious discrepancies between the commitments on paper and the 
results on the ground. While in its concepts the EU promotes a comprehensive idea of SSR, 
in practice, it does not always use a holistic approach90. Secondly, there is a problem of 
coordination between all the EU actors, involved in SSR. The reform is attempted not only 
by the Council and European Commission, but also individual member states, whose 
governments do not necessarily coordinate their actions with the EU policies. Third, during 
the studied period the EU lacked a unified policy framework on SSR, which meant its SSR-
related activities and policies were not always used “in a coherent, coordinated and 
complementary way” (EC 2015: 2). With the adoption of the EU-wide framework on SSR 
in the summer of 2016, it made a step in the right direction, but the consequences of this 
step can only be assessed in a few years’ time.  
These deficiencies notwithstanding, the EU remains one of the leading SSR actors in 
the world. Security sector reform is incorporated into numerous EU policies, designed to 
prevent conflicts, manage crises and contribute to sustainable peace, state-building and 
development (EC 2015: 2). Because of its versatility and unique position in security, 
governance and development frameworks, SSR can serve as a “key to understanding the 
potential of the EU’s role as an international actor”, help assess claims about its approach 
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to international relations as being unique and contribute to the discussion about the EU’s 
ability to transfer its norms and values to other countries and regions of the world (Spence 
2010: 93). Since the early 2000s, the EU’s SSR-related activities have been used as a 
security-community building tool. Prior to that, however, the EU’s attempts to strengthen 
security sectors outside its territory were inconsistent and sporadic, as well as lacking in 
power to be the main force behind the transformation of negative security dynamics, such 
as found in the Western Balkans, when the region represented an RCF. The next section 
discusses the main provisions of the EU’s SSR vision to trace their application in the 
Western Balkans in the final part of the chapter. 
 
The EU’s policy framework of security sector reform 
Despite many years of engagement in SSR-related activities, the concept of the 
reform received its first formal recognition in the EU’s policy framework only in 2003 with 
the adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS).91 The ESS, prepared by High 
Representative Javier Solana, listed key global challenges and threats, identified the EU’s 
strategic objectives, underlining the importance of international order based on effective 
multilateralism, and outlined policy implications for the EU in the new security 
environment. SSR was mentioned in the final part of the document as one of the means to 
be employed by the EU to become more capable in the sphere of security and external 
action (European Council 2003: 12).  
The inclusion of SSR into the strategy determining the EU’s standing as an 
international and security actor, although as part of a brief paragraph, put the concept on 
the radar of the EU institutions and policy-makers. What is more, the ESS contributed to 
the development of SSR in two additional ways: by emphasising the link between security 
and development and shedding light on issues, the reform could help overcome. In the 
document, security was identified as a prerequisite of development and as the condition to 
be brought to third countries by the EU if it was serious about breaking the cycle of conflict 
and poverty (European Council 2003: 2).  By listing terrorism, regional conflicts, state 
failure and organised crime as new threats facing the EU and its member states, the 
European Security Strategy opened the discussion on finding the most effective ways of 
addressing these issues. In this context, security sector reform emerged as a comprehensive 
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instrument, ready to tackle the most difficult security and development challenges. Since 
2003, SSR has been consistently included into the strategic documents, framing CFSP and 
CSDP. In 2008, alongside the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 
(DDR), it was mentioned as a key component of post-conflict stabilisation and 
reconstruction in the Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy 
“Providing Security in a Changing World” (European Council 2008: 8). In the 2016 Global 
Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, it was listed as an integral 
component of the accession policy (European Council 2016: 24-25) and one of the main 
tools for building “inclusive, prosperous and secure societies” in the regions neighbouring 
the EU (ibid.: 25-26).  
While the above-mentioned documents provided the basis for the EU’s SSR vision, 
it is the communications by the Council and the Commission, which codified it. On 19 July 
2005 the Political and Security Committee of the EU invited the Council General 
Secretariat, in close cooperation with the Commission, to draft a concept for ESDP support 
to SSR (Council of the EU 2005: 6). The Council released the document in October 2005, 
with the Commission following closely with its own “Concept for European Community 
Support for Security Sector Reform” in May 2006. In preparation for the release of its 
communication, in the summer of 2005 the Commission conducted a survey to determine 
the policies and projects, through which the EU had been supporting SSR. The information, 
provided by this survey, was later included into the annexes to the Commission’s 
communication (Buxton 2008: 29). Together the concepts from the Council and the 
Commission form a “policy framework for EU engagement in security sector reform … 
recognizing the fact that SSR is a holistic, multi-sector, and long-term process 
encompassing the overall functioning of the security system as part of governance reforms” 
(Council of the EU 2006: 2).  
The Council and the Commission approach SSR from different angles, which reflect 
their respective fields of expertise. At the same time, these concepts also share some 
similarities, the most important of which include: using the OECD definition of SSR, 
emphasising human security, recognising the importance of regional dimension and 
advocating complementarity of the Council and Commission’s SSR-related efforts. Before 
looking at what makes the two concepts different, it is worth considering their similarities 
in more detail.  
Both the Council and the Commission subscribe to a broad and holistic vision of SSR, 
which comes from the OECD guidelines (2004). They see the security sector as a system, 
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which includes core security actors (e.g. armed forces; police; gendarmeries; intelligence 
services; customs authorities, etc.), security management and oversight bodies (e.g. the 
executive; parliament; national security advisory bodies; civil society), justice institutions 
(e.g. justice ministries; prisons; the judiciary; human rights commission and ombudsman), 
and non-statutory security forces (e.g. liberation armies; guerrilla armies; private security 
companies).  It is interesting to note that the list of actors included into each category is not 
identical in two documents. These discrepancies, however, are not substantial enough to 
say that the Council and the Commission have different definitions of SSR. All they do is 
highlight the perspectives, through which SSR is approached by the institutions in question: 
the Council looks at SSR as an integral element of CSDP, while the Commission sees it as 
part of the Community instruments.92  
According to the Commission, SSR “means transforming the security system, which 
includes all [security sector] actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, working 
together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is consistent with democratic 
norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributing to a well-functioning 
security framework” (EC 2006: 6). In a similar manner, the Council contends that SSR 
contributes to “an accountable, effective and efficient security system, operating under 
civilian control consistent with democratic norms and principles of good governance, 
transparency and the rule of law, and acting according to international standards and 
respecting human rights, which can be a force for peace and stability, fostering democracy 
and promoting local and regional stability” (Council of the EU 2005: 4).  As can be seen, 
both institutions approach SSR as a holistic concept, which cannot be reduced to the 
technical exercise of reforming the armed forces but requires attention to all security actors 
and their management systems.  
The focus on human security, incorporated in the two documents, demonstrates that 
the EU considers SSR to be equally important for internal and external security. As pointed 
out in the Council concept, SSR “concerns not only state stability of nations but also the 
safety and well-being of their people” (Council of the EU 2005: 9). The Commission’s 
Communication asserts that SSR is needed both to enable states to maintain peace and 
guarantee the strategic security interests of a country, and to ensure that lives, property and 
rights of its citizens are safeguarded (EC 2006: 4-5). In the context of the current work, the 
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recognition of the regional dimension of SSR is another important similarity between the 
concepts. The Commission insists that by contributing to regional aspects of SSR, e.g. 
through capacity-building activities directed at regional and sub-regional security 
organisations, the EU can “have a positive impact on SSR efforts at national level” (EC 
2006: 6). Similarly, the Council considers regional stability and security relations in 
neighbouring countries to be influential factors in the process of SSR (Council of the EU 
2005: 9). 
Most importantly, both documents underline that the visions of SSR contained in 
them are deliberately broad to provide for complementarity between SSR activities, 
undertaken by the EU (Council of the EU 2005: 6; EC 2006: 4). Neither of the concepts on 
its own reflects the EU-wide SSR strategy, which means they can only be considered to 
represent the EU’s SSR framework together. While this complementarity is important, it 
could not compensate for the absence of a single EU policy on SSR. The Draft Council 
Conclusions on a Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform (2006) presented an 
interim solution to this problem by reiterating key provisions from the Council and 
Commission concepts. Nonetheless, it did not provide an overarching guidance for the EU’s 
engagement in SSR, partly due to its provisional nature, partly due to the lack of detail on 
its three pages. Consequently, both the Council and Commission continued approaching 
SSR on the basis of their respective strategies until the release of an EU-wide SSR concept 
in 2016. The specifics of these strategies are to be discussed in the remainder of this section. 
The ultimate goal of the CSDP SSR activities is “to reach a situation where the 
security system is organised in a way which ensures an effective Security Sector, the 
protection of individuals as well as of sustainable state institutions through ensured 
democratic oversight, transparency and accountability in accordance with internationally 
recognised values and standards” (Council of the EU 2005: 10). In general, this vision ties 
in well with the Commission’s objectives but the Council approaches SSR is a more 
practical and action-oriented way.93 While including some theoretical provisions, e.g. on 
principles for CSDP support to SSR94, it pays considerably more attention to the 
implementation of SSR-related CSDP missions. In particular, the document distinguishes 
possible scenarios for CSDP action, activities related to different areas of SSR and core 
requirements for the deployment of CSDP missions (ibid.).   
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According to the Council, SSR can be supported through both military and civilian 
CSDP missions in three types of contexts: an immediate post-conflict situation, transition 
and stabilisation phase and stable environments (Council of the EU 2005: 12-13). Each of 
the scenarios will require different things from the EU and varying degrees of ownership 
over the reform. If in immediate post-conflict situations complex crisis management 
operations with the focus on DDR might be required, with an external actor holding 
responsibility not only for SSR, but also for political authority in general; in a stabilisation 
phase the emphasis can be placed on preventing the return of violence and ensuring that 
local actors can take over SSR from external actors. In stable situations, CSDP actions in 
support of SSR will be closely linked with other governance reforms, attempting to 
democratise third countries. To add more clarity to the discussion of areas of CSDP 
involvement, the Council also provides a detailed list of activities, through which the EU 
can offer support to SSR in third countries. These activities are grouped into reform areas, 
such as the defence sector, police, justice/ rule of law and border/ customs sector, each 
outlining types of assistance the EU could provide to (1) reform security institutions and 
(2) improve control mechanisms in the sphere of security (ibid.: 16). These dimensions are 
not formally separated from each other in the concept, but can still be seen as separate, 
although closely interrelated, strands of assistance.  
While the inventory of SSR activities, provided by the Council, is extensive, it does 
not cover the whole spectrum of EU support to SSR. The Commission’s concept is even 
less helpful in this respect: it emphasises the governance dimension of the reform but 
contains only scattered references to SSR activities and does not include any comprehensive 
list at all (EC 2006). Since this work studies the EU-wide impact on SSR in the Western 
Balkans, there is a need to use the inventory, which could capture SSR efforts of both the 
Council and the Commission. This is provided in Annex I: it is based on the Council and 
Commission’s Concepts for SSR, using the modified model of Hänggi and Tanner (2005: 
100-104). The latter is a detailed, yet not complete, list of activities related to the promotion 
of security sector governance, designed to help scholars and policy-makers assess how the 
EU and other international actors perform in SSR. This thesis adjusts the original model for 
its purposes instead of adopting it in its entirety because the original inventory was 
developed for all major SSR actors, such as NATO, the OSCE and the EU, and all security 
reform areas, meaning it offers a broader approach than needed here. It could also be applied 
to any state or region in the world. The model, presented in Annex I is adjusted to the 
context of the Western Balkans. It incorporates two levels of analysis that were introduced 
in Chapter 2. This is the political level that ensures countries, undergoing SSR, have 
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operational control and oversight mechanisms of their security systems and organisational 
level that studies SSR efforts aimed at building a professional security sector.95 Considering 
the focus of this work, the activities of the organisational level concern the defence sector, 
police and border control services, while the inventory is applied to analyse the impact of 
the EU on SSR in Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia.  
Finalising the revision of the Council’s document on SSR, a few words need to be 
said about the circumstances in which the EU could initiate CSDP action in support of SSR. 
According to the concept, such activity requires either a mandate from the UN’s Security 
Council or an invitation, coming from a third country, international, regional or sub-
regional organisation (Council of the EU 2005: 17). What is more, there is also a 
requirement for “a basic degree of security and order” (ibid.: 18), which could partially 
explain why the EU brought its CSDP missions to the Western Balkans after 2003, when 
the region was reasonably stable.96 
To complement the Council’s document, the Commission discussed the strengths of 
the EU support for SSR, projecting the future development of this sphere and providing 
recommendations for improving the EU’s record in the field (EC 2006). In addition, the 
Commission devoted a significant portion of its Communication to the concept itself, the 
rationale behind it and principles of the EU’s engagement with it. The main aim of releasing 
this document was to define the role, played by the European Community, then the first 
pillar of the EU, in supporting SSR and ensuring greater complementarity of different 
strands of the EU’s external action (ibid.: 4). As to the objective of the European 
Community’s involvement with SSR, it was “to contribute explicitly to strengthening of 
good governance, democracy, the rule of law, the protection of human rights and the 
efficient use of public resources” in partner countries (ibid.: 6).  
In addition to the three areas of engagement identified by the Council, which included 
an immediate post-conflict situation, transition and (relatively) stable environments, the 
Commission introduced a fourth area – “longer-term post-conflict peace building and 
reconstruction processes” (EC 2006: 6), thus recognising the complexity of real life 
situations, requiring SSR assistance. The guiding principles for SSR support, presented by 
the Commission were also in line with those of the Council, though differing slightly. It 
was the Commission’s list of principles that was later incorporated into the 2006 Council 
Conclusions on SSR policy framework. These principles included: nationally/regionally 
                                                          
95
 The corresponding categories in the original version of the model are labelled as governance and efficiency 
and effectiveness dimensions.  
96
 See sections on EUFOR and EUPM Bosnia in Chapter 7.  
90 
 
owned reform, addressing the core requirements of a well-functioning security system (e.g. 
the development of a national concept of security), addressing diverse security challenges 
facing states and their populations, accountability and transparency, and political dialogue 
with partner countries on the issues of human rights, development and security (ibid.: 7-8).  
By identifying perspectives on strengthening the EU support for SSR, the 
Commission admitted that the bloc has not been using its full potential in the sphere. To 
improve this situation, the document offered a number of recommendations, which ranged 
from more general suggestions, e.g. to strengthen overall implementation of EU support for 
SSR through better coordination and complementarity between all EU actors, to more 
specific advice (EC 2006: 10-12). The latter included recommendations to integrate SSR in 
country and regional strategy papers, action plans and programming tools, to broaden the 
pool of SSR experts and to develop specific training for the mainstreaming of SSR (ibid.).  
Summing up, it is possible to say that with the launch of the Council and 
Commission’s concepts and the adoption of the Draft Council Conclusions, the EU 
acquired a normative base for its SSR work, which it was conducting around the world for 
years. These documents were the culmination of efforts undertaken by individual member 
states, cooperation with other international actors and “the EU’s own experience in support 
of activities in different sub-sectors of the security system in various countries” (Buxton 
2008: 27). They helped the EU raise the profile of SSR and become a more visible and 
respectable actor in the field. Nonetheless, the initial inability to produce a single SSR 
framework, has been preventing it from maximizing its contribution into supporting peace, 
security and sustainable development on the global level (EC 2015: 2). The fact that at the 
period, covered by this research, the EU lacked a mechanism for bringing all of its SSR 
activities under one umbrella not only meant that its institutions ran the risk of duplicating 
their efforts, but also that countries and regions in dire need of reforming their security 
systems could not fully benefit from all of the advantages, possessed by the EU as an actor 
of SSR. An attempt to rectify this omission was made by the Commission in 2015, when it 
released the Roadmap for the development of an EU-wide strategy on SSR (EC 2015). This 
document set the goal of putting all EU SSR-related efforts, covered by diplomatic, 
developmental and CSDP/CFSP actions under one framework (ibid.: 1, 5). The goal was 
realised with the release of another Commission’s Communication in July 2016 “Elements 
for an EU-wide strategic framework to support security sector reform”. While presenting a 
promising area of research, this strategy remains outside the scope of the current work as 
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the thesis focuses on the period from 1991 to 2013. The final part of this chapter turns to 
the analysis of the EU’s engagement in SSR during this period in the Western Balkans.  
 
Operationalising SSR in the regional context of the Western Balkans 
Paraphrasing Hänggi and Tanner, the Western Balkans can be identified as one of the 
most exciting laboratories of externally assisted security sector reform in the world (2005: 
43). As a result of the conflicts of the 1990s, many of the countries of the region lost the 
domestic monopoly over their security sectors and were unable to disentangle the networks 
of conflict that turned them into an RCF without external help. Over time, the international 
community that had to intervene to stop the bloodshed singled out SSR not only as an 
instrument for restoring peace in the region and normalising life there, but also as a 
“fundamental building block of democratic transition” (DCAF 2006: 5). The EU was 
among the first to recognise SSR as an explicit reform agenda for the Western Balkans. If 
in the 1990s it was tackling SSR-related activities timidly, hoping that regional security 
sectors would reform eventually, mostly as a by-product of political and economic 
conditionality, from the early 2000s SSR was identified as an important policy area, which 
had to be pursued openly and comprehensively to bring about results (ibid.). The EU was 
also at the forefront of the international effort to advocate the regional approach to SSR. 
This section looks at how this approach was pursued by the EU in the Western Balkans 
between 1991 and 2013. To ensure consistency, it follows the periodisation introduced in 
Chapter 3, which defined the region as a regional conflict formation in 1991-1995, failed 
security regime in 1995-1999 and emerging security community since 1999.  
The analysis of the first period, however, will differ from that of the two that follow, 
and this is because the EU did not pursue SSR in the Western Balkans on the regional level 
from 1991 to 1995.97 Apart from being utterly unprepared to take on the task of SSR on the 
regional scale at this time, the EU was unable to engage with the reform due to the 
impossibility to conduct SSR during the time of open warfare. While there is a variety of 
contexts, where security sector reform can be applied, the conflict environment is not one 
of them. Even though the armed conflict did not affect all the Western Balkan countries at 
the beginning of the 1990s, the region was united by the prospect of conflict into a regional 
conflict formation, making the international community and the EU pursue the policy of 
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regional containment, not reforms.  Moreover, at this point in time the EU did not yet see 
the Western Balkans as a coherent region. Nonetheless, the period of 1991-1995 is still 
included into this study as it is crucial for understanding the full extent of the evolution 
undergone by the EU on the way to becoming a leading SSR actor in the Western Balkans. 
After initial hesitation, in the early 1990s the EU started actively searching for ways 
of containing and managing conflicts engulfing the Balkan subcomplex. Most of its 
activities at this period could be grouped under the headings of diplomatic effort and 
humanitarian assistance. At first the EU’s shuttle diplomacy in Former Yugoslavia was 
handled by a troika of Foreign Ministers, but from the autumn of 1991 it became the task 
of a special envoy. The position from 1991 to 1995 was held, at different periods, by three 
high-profile politicians: Lord Carrington, David Owen (both former British Foreign 
Secretaries) and the former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt. While each of the envoys 
had their own approach to the task entrusted to them by the EU, none of them managed to 
find a workable solution to the crises. Without any clear common strategy to guide them, 
they found themselves responding to events on the ground in an ad hoc manner. The 
slowness of the Brussels bureaucracy led many to accuse the EU of “contributing to the 
processes of Yugoslav disintegration” (Gordon, Sasse and Sebastian 2008: 9). The failures 
of the EU’s peace-making process, which were studied in detail elsewhere98, can be 
explained through the lack of ability and willingness to act. CFSP, which was introduced 
in the Maastricht Treaty, became fully ratified only in 1993, i.e. after the start of conflicts 
in the former Yugoslavia (ibid.: 8). In the absence of a common working framework, 
individual member states disagreed not only on the plan of action, but also on the nature of 
the problem (Peen Rodt and Wolff 2012: 140). For instance, France, an old ally of Serbia, 
was in favour of preserving Yugoslavia intact, but Germany, itself only recently unified, 
was supporting the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia’s independence. While some states 
favoured an intervention, whether through the UN or WEU, others preferred to stand back. 
In general, at the beginning of the 1990s the EU did not have a political will or capacity to 
act as a single actor.   
Regarding humanitarian aid, from early stages of the conflict the EU’s assistance was 
aimed at satisfying basic social needs, such as food, water and medicine (Bojicic-
Dzelilovic, Kostovicova and Randazzo 2016: 5). This type of assistance, directed by the 
European Humanitarian Office, which cooperated closely with the Red Cross, United 
                                                          
98
 See, for example, Edwards (1996), Gnesotto (1994), Kintis (1997) and Woodward (1995).  
93 
 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNICEF and the World Food 
Programme, played an important role in offering relief to refugees and displaced persons 
(ibid.). Another channel for the EU’s impact was the efforts of its individual member states. 
Many of them contributed forces to the UNPROFOR peacekeeping missions at first in 
Croatia and later in Bosnia, while Germany, the UK and France were also members of the 
Contact group, set up to negotiate peace between the warring parties.99 All these efforts 
notwithstanding, the EU could not stop the bloodshed in Bosnia in 1995, leaving it to the 
USA and NATO to bring the conflict to an end with the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). 
It is important to re-iterate that not all the Western Balkan countries went through war 
at this period. Albania and FYROM managed to stay peaceful, although remained 
connected to the more turbulent parts of the region, via a variety of networks, discussed in 
the previous chapter. Even in these countries, however, the EU did not engage in SSR. Its 
approach was quite patchy and inconsistent at best: a non-preferential trade and cooperation 
agreement with Albania was concluded in 1992, the same year the country became eligible 
for financial support under PHARE, but FYROM had to wait till December 1995 for the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with the Union100. Such lukewarm attitude is 
understandable as most of the EU’s attention in the region at the beginning of the 1990s 
was aimed at managing territorial conflicts between states and ethnic groups (Bechev 2011: 
108). This conflict management was reactive, ad hoc and ineffective. 
Despite all the shortfalls and failures, the Balkan wars of the early 1990s provided the 
EU with a steep learning curve. Following the signing of the DPA, the Union assumed a 
more active role in providing security to states of the region (Watanabe 2010: 130). In 
Bosnia, alongside economic assistance, it took on tasks of policing and administration 
support. In Albania, it was the EU’s intervention which prevented the crisis, caused by the 
collapse of pyramid saving schemes in 1997, from disintegrating into a prolonged conflict. 
Within the framework of the WEU, EU states also arranged a de-mining mission in Croatia. 
Even more importantly, since 1996 the EU started looking for ways to influence security 
systems of the Balkan states on the regional level. Traditionally, the studies of the EU’s 
SSR-related activities in the Western Balkans, go back to 1999 – early 2000s, but rarely 
earlier101. Here, scholars look at the SAP and the Stability Pact as the first platforms through 
which the EU promoted SSR regionally. The fact that SSR as a concept was formulated at 
                                                          
99
 See Chapter 3.  
100
 This was due to a dispute with Greece over the name that FYROM wanted to assume. For more, see 
Floudas (1996). 
101
 For example, see Edmunds (2007) and Caparini (2006).   
94 
 
the end of the 1990s is an important factor perpetuating this approach. The current work 
sees this vision as flawed: mainly because it fails to recognise SSR-related issues promoted 
by the EU through the Regional Approach.  Of course, the RA had its limitations. It was 
often said to lack “substance and concrete measures of support” (Uvalic 2003: 105). With 
a broad and ambitious objective, which can be summed up as “the successful 
implementation of the Dayton/Paris peace agreements and the creation of the area of 
political stability and economic prosperity, also by fostering the process of political and 
economic reforms and the respect of human and minority rights and democratic principles” 
(EC 1996:1), it offered modest rewards under the PHARE and Obnova programmes. For 
example, Croatia and the FRY received a little over 218 million Euro in 1996-1999 (Uvalic 
2003: 105).  
Nonetheless, the RA deserves attention in this thesis because it contained first 
regionally-aimed requirements from the EU on reforms of security sectors for the Western 
Balkan states. These requirements mainly concerned the police, border services, judiciary 
and, in the case of Bosnia, Croatia and the FRY, cooperation with the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The initiative also promoted regional 
cooperation on security issues, thus trying not only to stabilise the Balkan subcomplex, but 
also cultivate reciprocal relationships between its members and help it move away from the 
negative pole of security interdependence. The RA demonstrated the willingness of the EU 
to tackle elements of SSR, even before it had formally formulated its vision on the reform. 
Furthermore, it indicated the issues, the EU’s SSR support would prioritise in the future.  
The Regional Approach was the first initiative, which recognised that the Western 
Balkan countries formed a distinctive group, different from both CEE and other South-East 
European states. Based on the Royaumount Process, the RA aimed to promote stability and 
good-neighbourliness between BiH, Croatia, the FRY – all subject to obligations under the 
peace agreements – as well as Albania and FYROM (EC 1998: 1). It was launched on 26 
February 1996 but obtained financial mechanisms and a framework of conditionality later 
(Gordon, Sasse and Sebastian 2008: 11). Thus, the Obnova programme, which became the 
EU’s main financial tool for the Western Balkans, was introduced in July 1996, and political 
and economic conditions for the RA were established by the Council on 29 April 1997 
(ibid.). The conditions were divided into two categories: general, i.e. applying to all the 
countries covered by the RA, and specific. The former, among others, included democratic 
reforms, respect for human rights, return of refugees, economic reforms and regional 
cooperation (EC 1997a: 2). The latter were mainly designed to help three post-conflict 
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states of the region to become more stable and secure and were linked to their compliance 
with Dayton and Erdut Agreements102. BiH, for example, was required to establish common 
institutions, while Croatia – to dissolve Herceg-Bosna structures and assist BiH in ensuring 
the effective functioning of the United Police Force of Mostar (EC 1998a: 4).  
SSR-related requirements were included into both categories of conditionality and 
were applied to each Western Balkan country, whether affected by war or not. A strong 
emphasis was placed on policing, representation of minorities and fight against organised 
crime. For instance, in 1998 BiH was encouraged to put more effort into building 
independent judiciary and multi-ethnic police, FYROM was praised for achievements in 
the sphere of rule of law but berated for insufficient progress in the law enforcement reform 
and minority representation in security forces, while Albania was asked to become more 
active in fighting fraud and corruption (EC 1998b: 2-6). Additionally, the RA contained 
first and that is why rudimentary EU requirements for good governance of the security 
sectors in the Western Balkans (ibid.). It should be noted that Croatia and the FRY were 
least committed to the reform agenda, promoted by the EU. In fact, the efficiency of the 
Regional Approach suffered considerably because of these countries’ ambivalence and 
sometimes even hostility towards externally-induced reforms103. Moreover, the RA did not 
gain noticeable recognition among other members of the international community, e.g. 
NATO and the USA, that were engaged in promoting the stabilisation of the post-Yugoslav 
space, too but could not agree on what countries to cover under their policies. Poor 
coordination of efforts among external members in the post-conflict period can be seen as 
one of the reasons for the failure of the security regime in the Western Balkans and 
pacification of regional relations.  
While recognising the existence of SSR-related elements in the RA, it is important 
not to over-exaggerate their significance. References to issues, which are now included 
under the umbrella of SSR, were scattered around documents on the Regional Approach, 
without any clear indication that they could be considered part of the same package. This 
circumstance, combined with the lack of domestic and external support for the initiative, 
led to many wasted opportunities in the Western Balkans at the time when the needs for 
SSR were immense. Most states of the region were embarking on post-authoritarian and 
post-conflict transitions and were struggling with adjusting their security sectors, which in 
some cases, had been directly involved in violence and conflict, to new circumstances 
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(Dowling 2008: 174). The security systems of the Western Balkans states tended to be 
“fragmented, underdeveloped (although some sectors, typically the armed forces, [were] 
over-developed for peaceful conditions), over-politicized and structured along ethnic lines” 
(Caparini 2006: 9). The presence of non-state actors, such as guerrilla movements and 
paramilitary organisations, as well as low levels of civilian expertise within governments 
and parliaments on the issues of security, added further challenges to SSR in the region 
(Hänggi and Tanner 2005: 46-47). The EU’s regional response to the SSR needs of the 
Western Balkan states in in the post-conflict period were therefore disproportionate and 
underdeveloped. It is hardly surprising, as the EU was still ill-equipped to deal with security 
issues outside its borders: CFSP was still weak and CSDP was not yet introduced. The EU 
was also continuing to pursue a reactive policy towards the region, while not yet considering 
it even as a future member of the European zone of peace.  
The Kosovo war, as was outlined earlier, provided a powerful impetus for the change 
of the EU policies towards the Western Balkans. While the fighting in the region was once 
again stopped through the American and NATO intervention, it was predominantly the task 
of the EU to stabilise and normalise relations among the Western Balkan states afterwards. 
To achieve this ambitious task, the EU opted for a proactive approach and a combination 
of civilian and military instruments, “available under the CFSP umbrella alongside 
enlargement instruments specially tailored to address the legacy of armed conflicts” 
(Bojicic-Dzelilovic, Kostovicova and Randazzo 2016: 4). With the launch of the 
Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), the EU committed itself to assisting the 
region’s transformation from violence and instability to peace, while the Thessaloniki 
European Council in 2003 confirmed that the Western Balkans’ future was in the bloc (Butt 
2004: 7). Over time, six CSDP missions were deployed to countries of the region104 and 
generous donations were made available for their reconstruction first through the CARDS 
programme, which substituted PHARE and Obnova in 2000, and then through the 
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) that replaced CARDS in January 2007. 
Assistance to the region was also offered through both more specialised instruments, such 
as the Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA) or Special Accession 
Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development (SAPARD), and more general 
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financing tools such as the European Initiative for Democratisation and Human Rights 
(EIDHR).  
At this period the EU has come to acknowledge openly and explicitly the importance 
of security sector reform for the reconstruction, stabilisation and Europeanisation of the 
region. It was no longer hoped that security sectors would become effective and efficient 
by themselves after reforms of other sectors were completed. This shift in approaching SSR 
in the Western Balkans can be best summed up with an excerpt from the Food for Thought 
Paper, prepared for the EU Presidency Seminar on SSR in the Western Balkans, held in 
Vienna in February 2006. This document stated that  
“democratic change within, and modernisation of, security sector institutions 
[would] not necessarily come as an intrinsic by-product of political and economic 
reforms promoted through the process of EU integration. On the contrary, good 
governance of the security sector must be explicitly identified as a key component 
of the reform agenda. Failure to address security sector reform issues as an integral 
part of the overall democratisation and development process would risk impeding 
or even derailing the EU’s regional stability objectives and the enlargement efforts 
in the Western Balkans” (DCAF 2006: 5).  
After 1999, SSR became a vehicle for the transfer of EU norms and values to the 
Western Balkans. Through the reform, the bloc tried to help states of the region to improve 
internal and external security by demanding their security sectors to adhere to the principles 
of good governance, human rights, the rule of law and transparency. The Western Balkans 
offered the EU exceptionally favourable ground for the application of its comprehensive 
SSR policy. Even more, the region provided the bloc with several opportunities to hone its 
approach to the reform. In 2006, for example, two consecutive EU Presidencies held two 
high-profile events on SSR in the Western Balkans: on 13-14 February, a seminar “Security 
Sector Reform in the Western Balkans” was organised by the Austrian Presidency in 
cooperation with DCAF and the EU institute for Security Studies, and in December, a 
conference “Enhancing security sector governance though security sector reform in the 
Western Balkans – the role of the European Union” was held in Zagreb by the Finnish 
Presidency and DCAF. These events were organised not only to address the most urgent 
SSR needs in the Western Balkans, but also to discuss the future of the EU as an actor of 
SSR and determine the most effective ways of translating the newly-agreed SSR agenda 
into operational actions under the Council and Commission frameworks (Law and 
Myshlovska 2006: 13).  
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There were two main channels through which the EU attempted promoting SSR in 
the Western Balkans on the regional level at this period: the Stability Pact (SP) for South 
Eastern Europe and the SAP. Two initiatives were different in terms of ownership, outreach, 
approach and weight, attached to them both by the EU and the Western Balkan countries 
themselves. Although initially the SAP was presented as a supplement to the SP, within 
only a few years, it assumed primacy in the EU toolbox for the region, pushing the Stability 
Pact, which in 2008 was replaced by the Regional Cooperation Council, into the 
background. Despite the policy’s influence waning fast and the EU being only one 
stakeholder among many, the Stability Pact played an important role in raising the profile 
of security sector reform in South Eastern Europe in general and in the Western Balkans in 
particular. Established with an aim to transform the governance dynamics in the region 
(Bojicic-Dzelilovic, Kostovicova and Randazzo 2016: 6), the SP operated on the basis of 
three working tables, each presenting sectors “considered vital for the success of conflict 
prevention and peacebuilding” (Watanabe 2010: 139). Working Table I focused on 
democratisation and human rights, Working Table II was dedicated to economic 
reconstruction, development and cooperation, and Working Table III dealt with security 
issues, which were divided among two sub-tables: one on military security and the other on 
justice and home affairs (JHA). Security sector reform was seen as a “cross-sub-table 
issue”, cutting across both hard and soft security (Hänggi and Tanner 2005: 50).  
Within the SP, the lead on military issues was taken by NATO, while the EU assumed 
leadership in JHA. The latter emerged as an important tool for post-conflict reconstruction. 
Criminal networks, which emerged and proliferated during the conflicts in the 1990s, 
survived in the post-Yugoslav space even after the fighting ceased. By using the grey zones, 
characterised by “blurred responsibilities for the rule of law, transparent borders, displaced 
persons, unreturned refugees and populations living in dire social and economic conditions 
without tangible prospects”, these networks created fertile ground for the resurgence of past 
conflicts (Delevic 2007: 82). Moreover, they also spilled over to the EU countries, thus 
posing a tangible threat to the European security community, its norms and values. It was 
therefore of the utmost importance for the EU to encourage the Western Balkan countries 
to fight organised crime and adhere to European standards in JHA. The Stability Pact 
offered a useful platform to pursue these goals in a broader regional context, which while 
being superior to the previous attempts of the international community to stabilise the 
Balkans, was still in many ways deficient. One of the biggest deficiencies of the Pact105, 
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that from certain perspectives could also be its advantage, was its broad membership. SEE 
states, covered by the policy, did not represent a homogeneous group: the inclusion of 
Moldova, Bulgaria and Romania alongside the Western Balkan states made it very difficult 
for the EU, as well as other donors involved in the scheme, to engage with all the 
participating states equally, implement projects with universal appeal for every participant 
or achieve meaningful regional cooperation between all of them, especially in such a 
sensitive area as security. That is why, many of the regional initiatives launched under the 
framework of the Stability Pact, with time started focusing on the Western Balkans only 
(Bechev 2011: 123). The Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative (MARRI), 
formed in 2003 and still operational at the time of writing, is an example of such an 
initiative. With the mandate to promote closer regional cooperation and common, 
comprehensive and harmonized approach in areas of migration, asylum, border control, 
visa regime, integration and return of refugees and displaced persons, MARRI has been 
working to ensure the development and stability of the Western Balkans (MARRI n.d.). 
While under regional ownership, the initiative has benefited from close cooperation with 
the EU and its member states.  
The prioritisation of JHA issues within the SP allowed the EU to become engaged in 
SSR more deeply. The launch of the SAP, however, was even more important for the 
development of the EU’s SSR agenda and its application in the Western Balkans. While the 
Stability Pact emphasised the idea of regional cooperation as a prerequisite of achieving 
safe, secure and prosperous SEE (Watanabe 2010: 138), the SAP linked the stabilisation of 
the Western Balkans to the process of integration into the EU. SSR thus became one of the 
requirements for the countries of the region’s accession to the European Union. Without 
creating any new conditionality for the region, the reform of the security sector emerged as 
part of a broader agenda, introduced by the SAP (Pöysäri 2007: 34).  
The SAP took on the task of “regional stabilisation through more proactive peace-
building policies” that took into account the specifics of the post-conflict situation in the 
Western Balkans (Gordon, Sasse and Sebastian 2008: 10). It expressed the EU commitment 
to the economic and structural development of the region by offering financial and technical 
aid, and most importantly, eventual accession to the bloc in exchange for the adoption of 
principles of the rule of law, democratisation, free markets, building stable institutions and 
regional cooperation (Bojicic-Dzelilovic, Kostovicova and Randazzo 2016: 5). Through the 
SAP, the political elites of the Western Balkans are obliged to subscribe to the values, 
shared by the EU states, which would enable them to develop compatible norms and 
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principles among each other, thus switching from the competitive and aggressive behaviour 
to cooperation. Therefore, the SAP has been developing the compatibility of main values 
held by the elites inside the region and working on fulfilling one of the essential conditions 
for the development of a security community, identified by Deutsch. SSR was used by the 
EU as an important tool in this process. With the introduction of the SAP, it received a new 
application: in addition to being a tool of post-conflict stabilisation, peace-building, 
democratisation and sustainable development, it also became an instrument of EU 
integration and state-building or, to be more precise, member state-building. By 
emphasising capacity-building and efficiency of the security sector in the equal manner as 
the need for transparency, democratic and civilian oversight and accountability, the EU has 
been attempting to build effective states in the region, whose security systems would 
function according to the same principles and standards as security systems in EU member 
states. These actions can be interpreted as attempts to achieve political responsiveness and 
mutual predictability of behaviour in the Western Balkans – two other conditions of the 
security community.  
SSR in the Western Balkans can therefore be seen as a stepping stone towards 
functioning statehood, regional cooperation and European integration. Aligning the security 
systems in the region with the EU standards is meant to bring it fully into the European 
zone of peace, where war and conflict are matters of the past. The SAP does not try to 
cultivate a separate Western Balkan identity, but rather works on Europeanising the 
Western Balkans and making it part of the EU/Europe security community. However, the 
full integration of the region into the European security community did not take place by 
2013. Although a future in the EU was recognised as a goal by the ruling elites in all 
Western Balkan states, many of them struggled to deliver the reforms, including in the 
security sector, to fulfil the EU conditionality. Moreover, cooperation between the states 
was guided by desire to comply with EU demands, rather than trust. That is why the 
Western Balkan security community is still embryonic and is an extension of the European 
zone of peace.  
Although created as a policy for the region as a whole with an explicit focus on 
regional cooperation, the SAP has a distinct bilateral component. After all, each Western 
Balkan state is assessed on individual merit before it can progress within the Process. 
Bilateral relations find reflection in Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA), and 
negotiations leading to the signing of these agreements, agreed with each country 
separately. SSR issues feature prominently in annual country reports that monitor progress 
101 
 
in the sphere of the rule of law, democratic control of the armed forces, effective border 
management, anti-corruption measures and offer recommendations for further legal and 
institutional changes (Caparini 2006: 13). The level of the EU’s involvement in SSR and 
issues it prioritises differ from country to country, which is why it is important to 
complement regional analysis of the SAP with the study of the EU’s relations with 
individual Western Balkan states. While this is done in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, the remainder 
of this chapter analyses aspects of SSR the EU has been promoting through the SAP on the 
regional level. These aspects involve both soft and hard security issues.  
The area of soft security has been emphasised within the framework of the SAP since 
its early days. The break-up of Yugoslavia created new states and around 5,000 km of new 
borders, which prompted the EU to make border security in the Western Balkans the first 
official priority for its CARDS programme (Hänggi and Tanner 2005: 51). Furthermore, to 
establish effective border security in the region, the EU worked closely with other external 
actors. Thus, the EU’s approach for several years was embedded into the multilateral Ohrid 
Border Process. Launched at the 2003 Ohrid Regional Conference on Border Security and 
Management by the EU, NATO, the OSCE and Stability Pact, it acted as “a common 
platform for border security and management” in the Western Balkans (Cascone 2008: 
154). The Process, apart from identifying goals for border security of the region, also 
divided tasks between the organisations leading it (ibid.) The EU was leading the effort on 
the Integrated Border Management (IBM) for the Western Balkans (Caparini 2006: 17-18). 
The key objective of the IBM was to establish open but controlled and secure borders, and 
to improve the stabilization of the region through reinforcing the rule of law, institutional 
capacity and regional cooperation (IBM Guidelines 2007: 17). Even after 2007, when the 
Ohrid Process was successfully completed, the EU continued supporting the 
implementation of the IBM for the Western Balkans, and in certain cases started introducing 
regional states to the IBM strategy, used inside the bloc (EC 2008: 12).106 In 2008-2010, 
border reforms in the region were subordinated to the process of visa liberalisation. The 
introduction of visa-free regime for citizens of FYROM, Montenegro and Serbia in 
December 2009 (EC 2009) and for Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina in November 2010 
(EC 2010) were important achievements in this respect.107  
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Police reform is another area of soft security in the Western Balkans the EU has been 
supporting on the regional level. Since the launch of the SAP, trans-border approach to the 
sphere of policing has been consistently highlighted by the EU as instrumental for 
addressing security challenges facing the region, such as terrorism and organised crime (EC 
2006b: 18). As a result, the Western Balkans benefited from a number of projects aimed at 
improving regional police co-operation and capacities under both CARDS and IPA. In 
2001, regional CARDS project provided the basis for effective law enforcement 
cooperation between the Western Balkan states by developing the capacity of the Interpol 
National Central Bureaux (NCBs). Between 2001 and 2006 CARDS guided the 
development of international law enforcement coordination units, assisted Western Balkan 
states with the establishment of working connections between NCBs and remote access 
units at border crossings, and funded comprehensive assessment reports in JHA as well as 
an inventory of JHA assistance provided to each of the Western Balkan states by the EU 
and other donors (ibid.: 14). With time, the EU started paying more attention to coordination 
of efforts with other external actors present in the region to avoid duplication and repeating 
mistakes of the past. Other aspects of police reform, which benefited from the CARDS 
funds regionally included, but were not limited to training schemes (e.g. the 2002 Justice 
and Police Training Scheme for high and medium level decision-makers in the SAP 
countries), data-processing and information exchange projects (e.g. in 2006 the EU was 
engaged in implementing a monitoring instruments project to establish guidelines on 
collecting and interpreting police and judicial statistics), and assessments of corruption and 
crime in the Western Balkans (e.g. the 2006 CARDS project) (ibid.: 14-17). With the 
adoption of the Stockholm Programme “An open and secure Europe serving and protecting 
the citizens” in December 2009, the EU invited Western Balkan states to subscribe to the 
EU-wide framework for police and judicial cooperation, thus showing once again that the 
future of the region was in the bloc (EC 2011: 16).  
Under IPA, regional dimensions of SSR have been approached through Multi-
Beneficiary programmes. While the bulk of the EU assistance is provided to the Western 
Balkan countries through national programmes, IPA allocates around 10% of its funds to 
regional projects. For instance, in the period from 2007 to 2009, 4.401 million EUR was 
spent on multi-beneficiary aid )EC 2007 :4( ,and in 2011-2013 this assistance reached 521 
million EUR108 (EC 2011: 14). Although IPA covers the Western Balkans, Turkey and 
                                                          
108
 This amount includes transition assistance and institution-building help but excludes cross-border 
cooperation.  
103 
 
Iceland, it is the Western Balkan countries which benefit from multi-lateral programmes 
the most. This is because of the significance, attached to regional cooperation for the 
achievement of political stability, security and economic prosperity in the region at the EU-
Western Balkan summits in Zagreb (2000), Thessaloniki (2003) and Salzburg (2006) (EC 
2006b: 10). All programme documents on IPA Multi-beneficiary assistance highlight the 
importance of constructive regional cooperation between the Western Balkan states and 
recognise it “as a qualifying indicator of the countries’ readiness to integrate into the EU” 
(ibid.).  
Justice and Home Affairs sector under IPA Multi-Beneficiary Assistance received 
around 4.6% of the instrument’s budget between 2007 and 2013: in 2007-2010 the EU spent 
28.5 million EUR on these reforms and in 2011-2013 the spending reached 24 million EUR 
(EC 2011: 15). In the Western Balkans, the IPA funds were regularly spent on regional 
judicial, police and prosecutor cooperation. The Multi-Beneficiary Multi-Annual Indicative 
Planning Documents (MIPD) 2007-2009, 2009-2011 and 2011-2013 identified support for 
regional cooperation between law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities in the 
Western Balkans as essential instruments for fighting organised crime and terrorism (EC 
2007: 13-14; EC 2011: 16-17). Multi-beneficiary support in JHA was envisaged to 
“facilitate networking as well as the sharing of best practices and lessons learned in the 
region” (EC 2006b: 19). As a direct result of such support, countries of the region acquired 
International Law Enforcement Coordination Units (ILECU) and significantly improved 
cooperation in prosecution and investigation matters not only between each other but also 
with international actors. The ILECUs, set up under the IPA Multi-Beneficiary ILECUs I 
project that lasted from September 2008 till December 2012, are bodies that provide contact 
points and harmonise cooperation between both national actors, involved in the sphere of 
rule of law, such as Ministries of Interior, Ministries of Finance and the Prosecutors, and 
international law enforcement agencies, such as Europol or Interpol (EC 2011: 17). These 
units contributed to the development of well-functioning information and intelligence 
management environment in the region. Under the DET ILECUs II109 project (February 
2010 – January 2013), the EU allocated funds for improving police cooperation in the 
Western Balkans in the matters of illicit drug trafficking, financial crime and terrorism 
prevention (ibid.).  
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The Instrument for Pre-Accession Multi-Beneficiary (IPA MB ) programmes on JHA 
also focused on facilitating prosecutors’ networks (e.g. IPA 2010 MB project “Fight against 
organised crime and corruption: Strengthening the Prosecutors”), improving regional 
capacities for dealing with war crimes (e.g. IPA 2013 MB project “Strengthening Regional 
News Exchange from the International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court 
(ICC)”), fighting cybercrime (e.g. IPA 2010 MB project “Regional Cooperation in Criminal 
Justice: Strengthening capacities in the fight against cybercrime – CyberCrime@IPA”) and 
creating opportunities for enhancing the combat and prevention of organised crime (e.g. 
IPA 2012 MB project “Witness Protection in the Fight against Organised Crime and 
Corruption (WINPRO II)”) (EC 2013: 6-7). What is more, the IPA MB assistance financed 
many actions in the sphere of disaster risk management, which also falls into the category 
of security sector reform. With the help of such projects as the Disaster Risk Reduction 
initiative, the EU has been promoting regional response to natural disasters to ensure 
Western Balkan states could cope with these trans-border issues more effectively (EC 2007: 
15).   
In the sphere of hard security, the EU also made an impact. In the Western Balkans, 
unlike in any other region, the EU does not shy away from engaging in the defence and 
military dimensions of SSR (Hänggi and Tanner 2005: 52). Although defence reform has 
traditionally been NATO’s domain, the EU has come to appreciate the significance of the 
sphere in the region for itself. The European Commission’s reports referred to the progress 
in military reforms early on (Dowling 2008: 175-176), while annual stabilisation and 
association reports place a strong emphasis on the democratic governance of the defence 
sectors of the Western Balkan states (Hänggi and Tanner 2005: 52). According to these 
reports, the countries of the region are required to strengthen civilian and democratic control 
over their armed forces, demilitarise their borders, reduce military spending and ensure that 
procurement procedures in the defence sectors follow EU public procurement legislation. 
The EU’s impact on the defence sectors in the region can also be felt through its two military 
operations – CONCORDIA in FYROM and ALTHEA in BiH – launched under the 
framework of CSDP. In contrast to JHA, however, the EU’s engagement with defence 
matters in the Western Balkans on the regional level, has been much more subtle and 
indirect. It has also been predominantly carried out on a bilateral basis. This can be 
explained by the EU’s inexperience in the sphere.  
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The EU’s assistance to regional cooperation in the Western Balkans in general and 
hard security cooperation in particular has been increasingly provided through RCC, which 
since 2008 worked as the successor of the Stability Pact. With security cooperation being 
one of this regionally-owned organisation’s priority areas, the EU has many opportunities 
to support the development of regional networks. As already stated, the majority of the EU 
aid in this sphere is indirect: it comes through the provision of expert help for events 
organised by one of the initiatives in the domain of security cooperation (e.g. EU officials 
and SSR experts often participate in sessions held at the Centre for Security Cooperation 
RACVIAC or act as observers for South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the 
Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC)), through the funding of RCC’s 
work (the EU provided around a third of the running costs of the RCC’s Secretariat for the 
first three years of its existence (EC 2010a: 3))  or contribution into the development of 
RCC’s strategy (e.g. Strategy and Work Programme 2011-2013, adopted by RCC in 2010 
was prepared with the help of the EU (EC 2013: 3)). It should be noted that while the EU 
attempts a comprehensive approach to SSR in the Western Balkans, which covers both 
military and non-military aspects (Hänggi and Tanner 2005: 53), in the sphere of hard 
security its approach differs considerably from the approach to the area of soft security. 
These differences are linked to the focus and outreach of the EU assistance. On the one 
hand, the EU promotes defence and intelligence reforms in individual Western Balkan 
states (as evidenced in the stabilisation and association reports). On the other, it engages in 
security cooperation projects, supported by the RCC, in a broader context of SEE, which 
goes beyond the Western Balkans. What is more, the EU pays considerable attention to 
coordinating its efforts in defence matters with those of NATO. 
As can be seen, the EU has made substantial investment into various SSR-related 
projects in the Western Balkans on the regional level since 1999-2000. Having evolved as 
an international and security actor to an extent thanks to the events in the region, it 
developed a regional approach to the Western Balkans, which interlinks the processes of 
regional cooperation and European integration. By promoting regional cooperation in the 
sphere of SSR, the EU encourages new patterns of behaviour in the Western Balkan states 
and brings them closer to the standards of the European security community, which rejects 
the idea of states being self-sufficient. Of course, the number of projects launched or 
supported by the EU is not an indicator of their effectiveness. An in-depth study of the 
results achieved in each and all of the EU initiatives in the sphere is needed before one can 
assess how successful the EU has been in its endeavours. While such study is beyond the 
scope of the current project, the empirical evidence analysed here suggests that between 
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1999 and 2013, the EU used SSR for facilitating amicable relation between Western Balkan 
states through exposing their security sectors to values and norms, found inside the bloc, 
demanding better effectiveness from their border systems, police and armies and 
emphasising the importance of regional cooperation. Work, conducted by the EU in the 
regional SSR at this period, brought Western Balkan countries closer not only to each other, 
but also to the Euro-Atlantic security standards. Thus, contributing to the development of 
compatible values among state elites, political responsiveness and mutually predictable 
behaviour that are normally found inside security communities.  
 
Conclusion 
The EU has been engaged in the promotion of security sector reform around the world 
since the 1990s. In its toolbox, SSR has been applied as an element of conflict-prevention, 
peace-building, democratisation, sustainable development and state-building. It is a 
versatile instrument that combines elements of foreign, security and development policies 
to transform the overall functioning of ineffective security systems. In the Western Balkans, 
SSR has been used as a tool of integration, cultivating friendly neighbourly relations 
between previously warring parties. Security community-building-potential of SSR has not 
always been discernible but emerged thanks to many years of trial and error. The basis of 
the EU’s SSR policy framework was formulated in 2005 and 2006 with the release of the 
Council’s “EU Concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform (SSR)” and 
Commission’s “Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform”. 
The documents were informed by the practical work of the bloc and contributions of the 
Commission and individual member states into the discussions of SSR with third actors, 
involved in the reform’s conceptualisation.  
As an actor of sui generis nature and the world’s largest donor, which has a variety 
of foreign policy tools at its disposal, the EU is uniquely positioned for the promotion of 
SSR on state and regional levels. Its vision of SSR, apart from the already-mentioned 
concepts is also formulated in the Draft Council Conclusions on a Policy Framework for 
Security Sector Reform (2006) and two Commission Communications – Roadmap for the 
development of an EU-wide SSR strategy (EC 2015) and “Elements for an EU-wide 
strategic framework to support security sector reform” (EC 2016). According to these 
documents, SSR is defined as a multi-sector and long-term process, which is aimed at 
achieving accountable, effective and efficient security systems that operate under civilian 
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control and are consistent with the principles of good governance, transparency and the rule 
of law.  
Having prompted the EU to develop and test its security and defence policy, the 
Western Balkans created favourable ground for the application and evolution of the bloc’s 
SSR vision, too. If the early 1990s turned the region into a regional conflict formation, after 
the end of conflicts, it became one of the most exciting laboratories of externally assisted 
security sector reform in the world (Hänggi and Tanner 2005: 43). The EU was among the 
first actors to approach SSR in the Western Balkans on the regional level, although in 1991-
1995, it did not engage with the reform but mainly dealt with crisis management through 
diplomatic effort and humanitarian assistance. The diplomacy of the USA and Contact 
Group, backed up by NATO intervention, created an opportunity for change in 1995. The 
EU, having launched the Regional Approach, defined the Western Balkans as a distinctive 
region and communicated its first requirements for regional SSR. These requirements 
mainly concerned the work of the police, border services, judiciary and in case of Bosnia, 
Croatia and Serbia, cooperation with the ICTY. Additionally, the EU formulated demands 
for good governance of regional security sectors. Although the initiative promoted regional 
cooperation and good neighbourliness, it did not gain enough domestic or external support 
to foster reciprocity between regional players and turn the RCF into security regime. SSR 
in the RA was approached timidly and sporadically: requirements to fight corruption and 
organised crime or reform the police were disjointed and scattered around the RA 
documentation, instead of being presented as part of a coherent reform agenda. In general, 
the EU’s response to SSR needs in the Western Balkans in 1995-1999 was underdeveloped. 
The region was still seen as a separate area, foreign to the European security community.   
The Kosovo conflict changed this perception and persuaded the EU to abandon its ad 
hoc approaches in favour of proactive policies. With the introduction of the SP and SAP, 
SSR came to be acknowledged as an essential element for the stabilisation and 
Europeanisation of the region. With the Western Balkans receiving the promise of 
membership, the reform of security sector, in addition to being used as an instrument of 
peace-building, crisis management and democratisation, became a tool of member-state 
building. In an attempt to make security sectors of the region transparent, accountable and 
democratically governed, or in other words compatible with the principles and standards 
practiced in its own member states, the EU sponsored several high-profile events on the 
topic of SSR in Western Balkan states and launched a series of SSR-related regional 
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projects. Most of these projects tackle SSR-related issues without labelling them as such. 
Yet, in their objectives and envisaged results they are aligned with the bloc’s SSR vision.  
It is therefore possible to conclude that in 1999-2013, SSR was used by the EU to 
change the character of security interdependence in the Western Balkans from negative to 
positive as a security community-building tool. In 2013, the region was still far away from 
a “we-feeling”, described by Deutsch, but it was much more stable and secure than it was 
even a decade ago.  The EU’s SSR-related projects were mostly executed in the top-down 
manner, which means the security community emerging in the region is elite-driven. It is 
also an extension of the EU/Europe security community and not a separate formation.  
While the regional dimension of SSR is significant, it is important to understand that 
it can only amplify the work done on the state level. This is partly connected with the 
sensitivity of the security sphere, and partly with the way the EU has been managing its 
relations with the Western Balkan states. To understand the full extent of the EU’s impact 
on the security situation in the Western Balkans, it is therefore necessary to analyse the 
bloc’s engagement with SSR on the state level. Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia, as countries at 
different stages of integration into the EU, are used for this analysis in the next three 
chapters. 
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Chapter 5 The Impact of the EU on SSR in Croatia 
 
Introduction 
The security sector in Croatia is a product of the country’s war of independence (1991-
1995) and nearly a decade of President Franjo Tudjman’s semi-authoritarian rule110. Each 
branch of the sector was built from scratch in the context of the Homeland War111, and was 
initially engaged in countering an external threat and the process of simultaneous state-
building (Donais 2005: 227). With the end of the war, the focus shifted to the protection of 
the regime, established by Tudjman and the nationalist Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), 
which meant that rare attempts at SSR in 1995-1999 were sporadic and half-hearted. The 
political changes of 1999-2000, brought about by the death of Tudjman, defeat of the HDZ 
in parliamentary and presidential elections as well as the fall of Milosevic’s regime in 
neighbouring Serbia, created an opportunity for transforming Croatia into a democratic 
state and respected member of the Euro-Atlantic community. Security sector reform 
emerged as an important success indicator of the country’s transformation. With the help 
of external actors, which not only set the normative and technical criteria for the reform, 
but also increased its salience and urgency (Edmunds 2007: 191), Croatia made 
considerable progress towards making its security sector efficient, effective and 
democratically governed.  
This chapter aims to assess the role of the European Union in this process. It starts with 
an overview of the results achieved by the Croatian government in the sphere of SSR 
between 1991 and 2013 and continues with the analysis of the EU’s contribution to the 
reform. To ensure consistency, SSR in this as well as two chapters that follow is studied 
within the framework of three periods that correspond to the time when the Western 
Balkans presented a regional conflict formation (1991-1995), failed security regime (1995-
1999) and embryonic security community (1999-2013). Whenever possible, organisational 
and political levels of the reform are differentiated112, and attention is paid to both internal 
and external factors influencing SSR. Finally, regional dimension of the reform is 
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 While there is no agreement in the literature on the nature of the Croatian regime during the rule of 
Tudjman, in this thesis it is described as semi-authoritarian. This is because Croatia in the 1990s, with regular 
elections and state apparatus keeping the semblance of democracy, cannot be considered conventionally 
authoritarian. For further discussion, see Ottaway (2003: 109-130).  
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 This term is used to refer to the Croatian war of 1991-1995, without any normative judgement.  
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 Due to the rudimentary character of SSR in Croatia, as well as Serbia and BiH, in the 1990s, and the EU’s 
limited engagement with the reform during the first two periods, a detailed analysis of political and 
organisational levels of the reform is not always possible.  
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emphasised, yet observations regarding similarities or differences between responses to EU 
requirements on behalf of Croatia, Serbia and BiH, two other Western Balkan states chosen 
for the analysis, are reserved for the concluding chapter of the thesis. 
 
Security sector reform in Croatia: an overview 
The violent disengagement of Croatia from the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY) left a lasting impact on the organisation and management of its security 
sector. Having proclaimed independence in June 1991, Croatia found itself fighting an 
internal conflict with the breakaway region of Krajina and deterring military attacks of the 
JNA (Jovic 2006: 85). In 1993-1994 the country also got involved in the Bosnian war, 
supporting the secessionist Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna (ibid.). Even more, after 
regaining control over Western Slavonia and the Krajina region with Operations Flash and 
Storm in 1995, that helped to change the regional balance of power, the Croatian Army 
fought alongside the Army of BiH against the Bosnian Serbs113 (Goldstein 1999: 252-255). 
The first few years of the country’s existence were therefore spent in continuous conflict,114 
which is typical for an element of a regional conflict formation (RCF). The entire Croatian 
security sector was built for fighting the war, which meant there was no clear division of 
roles between different security actors. With an aim “to place the maximum number of men 
under arms to fend off Serb aggressors”, Tudjman and the HDZ government did not pay 
much attention to the issues of professionalism or governance when it came to the security 
sector (Dowling 2008: 188). Initially, the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) was the only 
institution with legitimacy to use force and therefore defend the country.115 In April 1991, 
understanding that the war was imminent, the Croatian parliament passed statutory changes 
to set up the Croatian National Guard (ZNG) as part of the police force (Ivkovic 2015: 98). 
Although legally within the structure of the MoI, the ZNG was at the same time put under 
the command of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to carry out military duties (Knezovic and 
Stanicic 2011: 11). When Croatia passed the Defence Act in September 1991, the ZNG 
became incorporated into the Croatian Army (HV) (Vukadin, Borovec and Ljubin Golub 
2013: 32). These changes notwithstanding, the Croatian police force continued to play an 
active role in the defence of the country until the end of 1992. Moreover, even after its war-
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 For the discussion of Croatia’s contribution to changing the regional balance of power in 1995 and its role 
in the final stages of the Bosnian war, see Ramet (2002: 230-232), Stoessinger (2001: 229-232). 
114
 For the history of Croatia’s emergence as an independent state and the role of war in the process, see 
Tanner (2010).  
115
 In the SFRY, the military was organised on the federal level, while the police forces were managed by the 
federal republics.  
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fighting role started subsiding, the police remained at least partially militarised until 1995 
(Edmunds 2007: 126).  
The absence of clear dividing lines between key security institutions in Croatia in 
1991-1995 was not surprising, given that powers of the executive, legislature and judiciary 
were not defined either. In such circumstances, it was easy for President Tudjman to exert 
unlimited power over all state institutions, including in the security sector. The closeness 
of Tudjman to the security sector provided the latter with a high degree of “nationalist 
legitimacy in Croatian society” (Edmunds 2007: 54). Security bodies were not simply seen 
as the defenders of the Croatian people, but also as the architects of the Croatian state itself 
(ibid.). Thanks to its role in the war, the heroic halo would be attached to the whole security 
sector, but with a strong emphasis on the army, for a long time.  
With the parliament unable to provide oversight, the president, as the Commander-
in-Chief, personally responsible for promoting the officer corps, and the HDZ penetrating 
all levels of army and the police, the security sector was highly politicised and 
overwhelmingly unprofessional. In addition, the speed with which the police (40,000 in 
June 1991) and army (200, 000 at the end of 1991) grew had negative effects on the quality 
of training of security personnel (Edmunds 2007: 123). It would be unfair, however, to see 
the period of 1991-1995 in a purely negative light. Given the circumstances in which the 
security sector was formed (i.e. during early stages of the state-building process, with 
ongoing conflicts on several fronts, the EU and UN arms embargoes in place and minimal 
continuity with the Yugoslav security institutions), its development is remarkable. The 
Defence Act and Law on Internal Affairs outlined the legal basis for the democratic 
practices of the country’s army and police respectively already in 1991 (ibid.: 55-56). 
Croatia’s border security system was also established in 1991 as part of the MoI and was 
one of the few examples of a non-militarised border service in the region (Tanner 2011: 
73). Of course, there was a big difference between the conceptualisation of security issues 
and their practical implementation, yet the fact that Croatia was trying to preserve at least 
a façade of democracy deserves mentioning.  
When in January1992 the UN-initiated ceasefire came into force, Croatia’s security 
sector started moving towards clearer delineation of roles between its key components. The 
HV gained enough potency to take over military tasks, while the police could shift their 
focus to public policing. Starting from 1993, discussions on democratic policing became 
common in the government and broader society. These discussions rarely went beyond 
rhetoric, but in some cases, they led to important changes, especially on the organisational 
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level. In 1993, the introduction of twenty administrative regions made the police less 
centralised (Edmunds 2007: 135). In 1994, the set-up of the Internal Affairs Office and the 
Office of Report Analysis and Development within the MoI emphasised the 
professionalization of the service (Ivkovic 2004: 188). Whilst important, these innovations 
had a limited effect on the work of the police because the code of silence and corruption 
that spread among all levels of the force in the absence of proper civilian and parliamentary 
oversight, were not easy to uproot. The army, on the other hand, did not experience even 
minor reforms at this period. With one-third of the territory still occupied and Croatian 
troops being engaged in the Bosnian war, the HV remained a highly centralised and 
politicised force, heavy on manpower and light on professionalism. In short, the period of 
1991-1995 was the time when Croatia built the security sector from scratch. Security bodies 
that were built lacked transparency, accountability and civilian control. With close links to 
the regime, they suffered from politicisation and absence of clear-cut roles. Overall, the 
Croatian security sector at this time displayed characteristic features of a security apparatus 
found inside a regional conflict formation. SSR efforts were extremely limited and 
noticeable only in the sphere of policing. 
The period from the end of 1995 to 1999, changed the situation only slightly: police 
reform intensified on both organisational and political level, but when it came to the army, 
which was renamed the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia (OSRH) in 1996, the 
reform was almost synonymous with downsizing. After the war ended in 1995116, the 
attention of the security sector started shifting from territorial defence to the protection of 
the regime. Tudjman and the HDZ government continued exerting unprecedented levels of 
control over security institutions, especially the army, and manipulating their heroic image 
to advance the regime’s interests (Dowling 2008: 188).  
In 1995, the OSRH was downsized to 100, 000 troops but was still too large for 
Croatia. By 1999, the number of troops was reduced further by 40,000, while their structure 
and high military budgets remained almost intact. The regime preferred to keep a large 
military force as a physical embodiment of the strength of the Croatian state and “a reminder 
… of the central role that Tudjman and the HDZ played in its creation” (Edmunds 2007, 
128). Except for several small-scale training programmes, supported by individual states, 
such as the USA, the UK and Germany, the army was mainly closed to external influence 
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 In 1995, two military-police operations, Flash and Storm, defeated the remaining Serb troops on the 
territory of Croatia. However, the full territorial integrity of the country was achieved only in 1998 with the 
peaceful reintegration of Eastern Slavonia. For more, see Gagnon (2004: 131-177). 
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(Wheaton 2000). The nationalist strategy, pursued by Tudjman led Croatia to “unofficial 
isolation” in the second half of the 1990s and strained relations with the EU, NATO and 
the ICTY117 (Jovic 2006: 86-89). These tensions were also manipulated by the regime to 
justify the need for a strong army.  
Nonetheless, police reform saw some progress during this period. Occupying a less 
prominent role in the country’s mythology, to a great extent, due to the spread of corruption, 
the service was more open to the prospect of change. The major focus in the mid-1990s was 
on depoliticisation, demilitarisation, professionalisation, demystification and downsizing 
(Ivkovic 2015: 98). The Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code were adopted in 1996 
and 1997 respectively to help the police adjust to the new political and social conditions. 
The sevice also benefited from external assistance: from 1996 to 1998, the UN Transitional 
Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) worked on 
a transitional police force in the Danube region. In 1998, it was succeeded by the UN 
civilian police support group (UNPSG), which mainly dealt with monitoring tasks, and in 
1998-2000 the OSCE became the main external actor involved in the country’s police 
reform (Mobekk 2005: 160-161). The semi-authoritarian nature of Tudjman’s regime, 
however, did not allow a deep reform. At the end of the 1990s, the police still lacked 
professionalism and specialisation. As “general practitioners”, police officers could carry 
out duties to protect public order one day and to ensure security of borders the other (Ivkovic 
2004: 190). The border service, although non-militarised, had neither enough staff, nor a 
specialised training programme. Thus, the Croatian security sector in the second half of 
1990s underwent only minor transformation, with limited effects on the size of the key 
security actors and slight democratisation of police practices. The inward-looking 
leadership of the country was not interested in building reciprocal relations with its 
neighbours, rendering the international community’s efforts at promoting a security regime 
in the region futile.  
2000 marked the beginning of a new era in the country’s history and SSR. Having 
redirected its foreign policy towards the West, the new Croatian government opened itself 
to external conditionality. By making transformation of the security sector one of the 
conditions for membership, NATO and the EU gave a real impetus to SSR in Croatia. This 
impetus was much needed, given that the first post-Tudjman years brought little change. 
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 Croatia’s application to join NATO’s PfP submitted in 1997 was rejected due to persisting semi-
authoritarian tendencies in the army. Moreover, the EU’s Regional Approach was met with hostility in the 
country, the same as the ICTY’s work.  
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There were, of course, some initial attempts to reform the security sector, but they rarely 
went beyond constitutional amendments (which reduced the presidential powers and 
strengthened legislature) and new legislation (e.g. the 2000 Police Law, the 2002 National 
Security Strategy, Defence Strategy, Defence Act and Law on Service in the Armed Forces) 
(Caparini 2006: 31). More legislative acts followed shortly, for example, the Strategic 
Defence Review (2005), Long Term Development Plan for the Croatian Armed Forces 
(2006), the Border Protection Act (2004), Development Strategy of the Border Police of 
the Republic of Croatia (2005) and the Ministry of the Interior Programme Guidelines for 
the period 2004 – 2007 (Ivkovic 2015: 99-100).  
These and some other documents prepared the background for the depoliticisation 
and modernisation of the army, restructuring and specialisation of police services, 
professionalisation of the border police, removing war criminals from the system, as well 
as increasing transparency and improving the oversight of the security sector as a whole. 
The pace of these reforms was uneven (with police reform going faster due to the work 
done previously) and depended largely on the pressure coming from outside. NATO, which 
accepted Croatia’s second PfP application in 2000, provided inspiration and guidance for 
defence reform (Donais 2005: 227), while the EU was instrumental for improving border 
security and galvanizing changes in the police. This was also the time when Croatia 
embraced (under external pressure) regional cooperation: for the first time since 1991, it 
started engaging with Serbia, Bosnia and other Western Balkan countries.  
By 2013, Croatia built a modern army, standing at 18, 600 strong (Howorth 2014: 77) 
and capable of participating in NATO118 and EU operations, achieved a professional and 
well-equipped border service and the slimmed-down police, consisting of 20, 700 officers 
(Vukadin, Borovec and Ljubin Golub 2013: 37) as well as satisfied all major requirements 
of the ICTY. On the surface, the country’s security sector is professional and democratically 
governed, yet a closer look discloses some problems: there are still discrepancies between 
legislation119 and its implementation in practice, lack of civilian expertise on security 
issues, persisting issues of corruption and poor accountability. SSR therefore cannot be 
considered fully complete in the country. Nonetheless, Croatia achieved the biggest 
progress in the area among all Western Balkan states. The next section will analyse the 
EU’s role in the process. 
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 The country joined the Membership Action plan in 2002 and became the member of NATO in 2009. 
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 In addition to the legal acts mentioned above, during the studied period Croatia also released the Law on the 
Police Activities and Rights (2009), Law on Police (2011) Defence Strategy (2013) and Defence Law (2013). 
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The role of the EU in transforming the security sector of Croatia 
 
The EU and Croatia’s security in 1991-1995 
With the start of hostilities in Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, which marked the 
beginning of the SFRY’s disintegration, the EU, then still the European Community (EC), 
found itself at the forefront of the international effort to contain violence in the region. 
Despite a variety of instruments, deployed by the EC, which inter alia included Troika 
visits, a peace conference, arms embargo, economic and trade sanctions, a monitoring 
mission and Arbitration Commission, the European intervention failed. Starting from 
January 1992, other external actors, namely the USA and NATO, took over the leadership 
role in the Balkans. The EC had to step back as it was not ready for the crisis in the region 
in the early 1990s: in the absence of military strength and a working foreign policy, it had 
to rely on predominantly diplomatic tools, set up in the rigid framework of the European 
Political Cooperation (EPC). The EPC, which was substituted by the CFSP after Maastricht, 
was characterised by slow pace and consensual nature of decision making (Caruso 2007: 
12). Apart from inadequate preparation, the EC also demonstrated a lack of unity. 
Germany’s unilateral decision to recognise the independence of Croatia exposed this 
deficiency and proved the fragility of European diplomacy. Having failed to make a 
difference in the region initially, the EC/EU did not withdraw from the area entirely but 
continued looking for ways of influence. There were at least three reasons why the region 
remained of importance for the EC/EU. First, the war and continuing instability in the 
Western Balkans exposed EU member states to the problem of refugees and asylum seekers. 
Between 1991 and 1995, around 200, 000 Croatian Serbs left the country, and as a result of 
operations Flash and Storm, this number grew by 190, 000 (PACE 1999). While not all of 
these ended up in the EC/EU, the pressure on the bloc, especially taking into account 
refugee flows from other Western Balkan states, particularly Bosnia, kept mounting. 
Second, with Austria nearing the accession, the EU was about to share its external border 
with a turbulent region. It was therefore in its interest to pacify the Western Balkans. Third, 
Germany’s decision to recognise the independence of Croatia and Slovenia, forced the 
European Community to play a more active role in the regional affairs.  
In Croatia, in 1991-1995, the EU did not engage in SSR directly but influenced the 
country’s security situation through the European Community Monitoring Mission 
(ECMM), Arbitration Commission and arms embargo. This work would later have an 
impact on the bloc’s role in Croatia’s SSR. The ECMM was established by the Brioni 
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Agreement on 7 July 1991 as a monitoring mission to observe the withdrawal of the 
Yugoslav Army from Slovenia (Landry 1999: 2). Already on 29 July 1991, the mission’s 
mandate was extended to include Croatia, the situation in which was deteriorating daily 
(Caruso 2007: 22). Organised by the EC/EU, the ECMM received backing from the OSCE, 
which could not summon enough support for sending its own observer mission to the region 
(Blockmans 2007: 129). The tasks, performed by the ECMM monitors, which were dressed 
in white and had EC logos on their clothes and vehicles, expanded quickly. If at first the 
EC teams monitored the implementation of ceasefires and the withdrawal of troops, as of 
1992 they were actively engaged in preventive diplomacy and confidence-building 
activities (Landry 1999: 3). Thus, the ECMM set up hot lines between the warring parties, 
conducted mediation tasks, assisted with the exchange of prisoners and protected minorities 
(ibid.). With the deployment of UNPROFOR, it also became responsible for monitoring the 
so called “pink zones”, i.e. areas in Croatia, controlled by the JNA and populated by Serbs, 
but outside the UN jurisdiction (Caruso 2007: 22). At the end of 1992, after the no-fly zone 
was declared above Bosnia, the ECMM was asked to observe the military air traffic at 
Croatian airports (MDNL 2007). 
Most importantly, the ECMM was responsible for collecting information about the 
security situation in Croatia. Daily reports were sent out not only to Brussels and individual 
EU member states, but also to the OSCE, UN, Council of Europe and other agencies 
(Caruso 2007: 22). The intelligence from the mission was important for understanding the 
situation on the ground.120 With headquarters in Zagreb and several coordination centres 
around the country, the ECMM was the key source of information on the Croatian war. In 
the context of the EU’s role in Croatia’s SSR, the ECMM’s value was two-fold: first, it 
provided the EU with direct access to information on security in the country and second, it 
offered the bloc flexibility. Having a diplomatic monitoring mission in Croatia during the 
conflict allowed the EU to access actors and areas inaccessible to others. The information 
collected by the ECMM was not used for SSR efforts immediately, but it gave the EU a 
unique perspective on the country, whose semi-authoritarian regime would soon lead it to 
the international isolation. Moreover, many of the former ECMM staff would later return 
to work on different externally-funded projects of SSR, especially in the sphere of border 
security and police.121 The flexibility and adaptability of the mission allowed the EU to 
expand its mandate and get involved in practical tasks in defence and policing (e.g. 
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monitoring airfields and  patrolling areas with minority populations) without resorting to 
formal reviews of memorandums of understanding, which made the work of the ECMM 
possible.  
These positive features notwithstanding, the ECMM had a limited effect in Croatia 
and other countries where it was deployed122. As a preventive mission with a small budget, 
it did not have a real leverage to improve the security situation on the ground. It is 
understandable therefore that its role was later overshadowed by the UN and NATO 
(Landry 1999: 1). Despite being an EU-level mission, until 2000 it was predominantly used 
as an instrument of member states. Its work was guided by the EU Presidency, which not 
only decided on its main tasks, but was also responsible for the budget allocation that was 
later reimbursed by individual member states (Blockmans 2007: 131). This changed in 
2000, when the ECMM was transformed into the EUMM and firmly put into the framework 
of the CFSP. From the point of SSR in Croatia and the EU’s involvement in the process, 
however, the ECMM’s work in 1991-1995 should not be dismissed. As will be shown 
below, the EU started providing substantial influence on SSR in Croatia in the early 2000s. 
These endeavours to transform the functioning and governance of Croatia’s security sector 
were not entirely new: they were based on the work conducted by the EU in the country 
during the 1990s. The ECMM was one of the first EU efforts to shape Croatia’s security 
environment. The information, gathered by the mission in 1991-1995, provided the EU with 
first-hand knowledge on security challenges and needs in Croatia. The ongoing conflict 
made it impossible for the EU to apply this knowledge instantly, yet it laid the foundation 
for its future SSR work.  
Another early EU effort to influence Croatia’s security situation is linked to the work 
of the Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia, known as the Badinter Commission, after 
its chairman Robert Badinter. The Badinter Commission was established on 27 August 
1991 by the EC as part of the Conference on Yugoslavia to arbitrate between Yugoslavian 
authorities on the issues pertaining to the country’s fragmentation (Radan 2000). In the 
Croatian case, the Commission’s decisions were not always followed: the country’s 
independence was recognized by the EC under Germany’s pressure even though the 
Badinter Commission concluded that Croatia did not fully implement all necessary 
provisions to protect its minorities. Nonetheless, some of the rulings were crucial for the 
establishment of the country. One of such rulings, released on 11 January 1992 as Opinion 
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No 3, was on the topic of border delimitation.123 In Opinion No 3, the Badinter Commission 
was asked to determine whether internal boundaries between Yugoslav republics could be 
regarded as international borders. It delivered an affirmative answer. The SFRY’s internal 
borders were to become frontiers protected by international law on the basis of the 
principles of respect for the territorial status quo and uti possidetis “upon the recognition of 
statehood of a seceding federal unit” (ibid.). It is worth mentioning that the principle of uti 
possidetis, which proclaims respect for borders existing at the moment of independence, 
was first used in Latin America on decolonisation issues, and later applied in Africa (Pellet 
1992: 180). Its application in the Balkans was a way to exercise control by the EC in the 
circumstances of escalating violence. By choosing to recognise internal borders between 
Yugoslav republics as international boundaries, the EC/EU, and the international 
community after it, separated territoriality from ethnicity and, as a result, denied statehood 
to the autonomous territories of Kosovo and Vojvodina, the same as the self-proclaimed 
Serbian Krajina in Croatia and Croatian Herzeg-Bosna in BiH (Blockmans 2007: 147).  
The Badinter Commission’s opinion on borders decided the shape of Croatia as well 
as confirmed its eligibility for the international personality as a state. This decision is of 
profound importance for the country’s SSR and understanding the role of the EU in it. The 
EU as a convener of the Arbitration Commission set the criteria for determining the 
country’s international borders and therefore its existence as such. It is important to 
understand, however, that Opinion No 3 had some limitations. It neither solved Croatia’s 
border disputes with other countries nor made borders unchangeable. The EC distanced 
itself from border disputes in the Western Balkans by adopting a joint EPC Statement on 
31 December 1991, which stipulated that recognition by the European Community and its 
Members States should not be seen as an acceptance “of the position of any of the republics 
concerning the territory which is a subject of a dispute between two or more republics” 
(quoted in Blockmans 2007: 145). Although the Commission forbade states to acquire 
territory by force, it allowed modification of frontiers by agreement (Pellet 1992: 180). 
Consequently, Croatia found itself engaged in a number of border disputes, some of which 
threatened to jeopardise its EU membership at a later stage.124  
The third and final area of the EU activities in Croatia in the first half of the 1990s, 
which is important from the point of SSR, relates to the arms embargoes, imposed on 
Yugoslavia. It is often forgotten that the first embargo on armaments and military 
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equipment applicable to the whole of Yugoslavia was adopted by the EC on 5 July 1991. 
This embargo, which fell under the jurisdiction of member states, was enforced by the 
EC/EU and upheld on Croatia until November 2000. Apart from this, the EC/EU also 
supported the arms embargo, established by the United Nations Security Council on 25 
September in Resolution 713. To assist the UN with the implementation of its Resolution, 
the EU cooperated with the OSCE and NATO. For example, it contributed naval forces 
through the WEU to monitor the costal lines of former Yugoslav republics in 1992 (Caruso 
2007: 17).  
The imposition of the arms embargo on the Yugoslav republics in 1991 was one of 
the key factors causing the surge in organised crime and war economies in the Western 
Balkans, leading the area to develop into a regional conflict formation between 1991 and 
1995. These sanctions also unintentionally led to the spread of illegal practices in the 
security sectors in the region. Forced to create its security forces from scratch in the hostile 
environment of Serb-led aggression, Croatia was badly hit by the arms embargoes, imposed 
by the EC/EU and UN. To obtain armaments, the state and security elites colluded with 
regional warlords and sought access to Western black-markets. The illicit channels for 
obtaining weapons were coordinated on the highest levels. Gojko Susak, who headed the 
MoD between 1991 and 1998, was personally responsible for finding arms for the HV 
abroad and bringing them to Croatia (Lukic 2008: 198). He was also behind the rise to 
prominence of diaspora officers and the creation of parallel chains of command in the army. 
The latter allowed Tudjman to send troops to Bosnia without a formal order from himself 
or the approval from the Parliament (ibid.).  
It would be wrong to assume that these negative effects resulted from the EU-initiated 
arms embargo alone. Arguably, the UN embargo had a bigger impact on the situation in the 
former Yugoslavia and in Croatia as it was supported by a bigger number of actors. The EU 
arms embargo and its efforts to assist the UN, however, were among the factors, 
contributing to the spread of illicit practices in the Croatian security sector and organised 
crime firming up its grip over the country. This side of the arms control efforts is easy to 
ignore, but important to acknowledge to understand the complexity of Croatia’s security 
situation in the early 1990s. 
 To conclude, it is possible to say that although in 1991-1995 the EU was not directly 
involved in SSR in Croatia, partly because of the extremely limited nature of reform efforts 
in the country during this period, partly because it was preoccupied with a bigger task of 
handling Yugoslavia’s dissolution and lacked the appropriate instruments, it still managed 
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to influence Croatia’s security situation. The ECMM provided the EU with first-hand 
information on developments in the country and an opportunity to monitor (sometimes 
mediate) the interaction between warring parties; the Badinter Commission determined the 
major shape of independent Croatia through its opinion on borders and the arms embargo 
unintentionally contributed to the criminalisation of the security services in the country. At 
this period, the EU was not in the position to dictate the development of the country’s 
security sector, nor could it do so after the war. Nonetheless, 1995-1999 saw the EU’s first 
attempts to tackle SSR-related issues in Croatia.  
 
The EU’s impact on SSR in Croatia in 1995-1999 
After the Croatian war ended in 1995, the EU switched its focus to the stabilisation 
of the country and bringing it back to normality. To achieve these goals, it continued some 
of the earlier efforts, like the ECMM and extension of its arms embargo, as well as 
introduced new channels of influence. In the context of SSR, of special importance were 
the EU’s de-mining activities and its attempts to bring changes to Croatia’s security sector 
through the Regional Approach.  
In 1995-1999, the ECMM in Croatia was mainly preoccupied with monitoring the 
implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement125 and the Erdut Agreement126. In 1997, 
the mission moved its headquarters from Zagreb to Sarajevo as the situation in BiH was 
less stable and required bigger international presence and attention. The EU arms embargo 
remained in place even after the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 1021 of 
22 November 1995, which lifted the UN restrictions (Blockmans 2007: 153). The bloc’s 
decision was motivated by a desire to ensure safety of international personnel present in 
Croatia, but also in BiH and Serbia. Since 1998 the equipment that could be used for internal 
repression or terrorism was embargoed as well (SIPRI 2012). Through these activities, the 
EU contributed to the arms control in Croatia, trying to reduce the number of weapons 
available, and thus promoting the pacification and stabilisation of the country. Nonetheless, 
the illegal channels for arms acquisitions did not disappear, and clandestine structures 
continued their work. Yet the absence of open warfare and therefore urgency to obtain 
weapons led criminal networks to reduce the intensity of their activities.  
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These are the circumstances in which the EU undertook first steps to reform the army, 
police and border security in Croatia. In the sphere of defence, the EU first and foremost 
tried to deal with the immediate legacy of conflict. On the one hand, it meant reducing the 
threat to local citizens emanating from the remnants of war and encouraging returns of 
refugees and displaced persons, thus – the engagement in de-mining activities, on the other, 
ensuring that the country’s defence system functioned in compliance with international 
standards, hence – criticism of the state’s influence over the defence sector and emphasis 
on the need for the system’s overhaul.  
The EU started contributing to Croatia’s mine clearing action in 1998. It was the year, 
when Croatia ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production 
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, known as the Ottawa 
Convention, confirming its determination to eliminate a post-conflict landmine threat (EC 
2010b: 5). It was estimated that around 103, 000 mines and other unexploded military 
supplies were spread around the country after the end of the Homeland War (ibid.). On 9 
November 1998, the European Council requested that the WEU “implement actions 
consisting of coordination, supervision and training of mine clearance specialists and mine 
clearance instructions in Croatia” (Novota et al 2009: 14). The Western European Union 
Demining Mission (WEUDAM) became operational in May 1999. Between 1998 and 1999, 
the EU spent 1.5 million EUR on the mine action in Croatia. It was a way to help the country 
to remove one of the biggest obstacles preventing its citizens from returning to normal life 
as well as contributing to solving an economic, ecological, infrastructure and safety 
problem (EC 2010b 2010: 5). While creating a safer environment for the people of Croatia, 
the EU-sponsored mine action also raised the level of professionalism of the Croatian 
defence sector. Over time, the army personnel developed high levels of expertise in de-
mining and dealing with explosive remnants of the war. This expertise Croatia was later 
able to offer to other countries recovering from conflict through the framework of NATO 
or EU external action, even before joining the bloc in 2013. Furthermore, when the EU 
granted funds for scientific research into mine action to the Croatian mine action centre 
(CROMAC), it contributed into the development of the civilian expertise on the subject. 
Additionally, the EU tried to deal with the post-conflict legacy within the context of 
Croatian defence reform through the Regional Approach, which contained a series of 
references to SSR. In the context of the defence sector, the RA emphasised cooperation 
with the ICTY, which was also important for the political level of the reform. The EU saw 
cooperation with the tribunal as essential for the country’s stabilisation. Although the 
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Parliament of Croatia adopted the Constitutional Law for Cooperation with the ICTY on 19 
April 1996, which recognised the court’s jurisdiction over the war crimes committed in the 
former Yugoslavia, the country’s authorities showed limited interest in assisting the tribunal 
with the indictment of Croatian and Bosnian Croat war criminals (Pavlakovic 2008: 451). 
Instead, the Tudjman regime obstructed the tribunal’s work, especially in relation to the 
1995 operations Storm and Flash that became an integral element of the myth of the sanctity 
of the Homeland War (ibid.). The EU used RA reports to criticise poor cooperation of the 
Croatian government whith the ICTY and expressed dissatisfaction with contradictions 
existing between commitments on paper and in reality (EC 1997a: 10; EC 1998: 11). The 
only achievement commended by the EU in this area was Croatia’s agreement to extradite 
several Bosnian Croats, indicted by the ICTY in 1997 (EC 1998: 11). Despite having many 
grievances about Croatia’s obstructions of the ICTY’s work, the EU did not use coercion 
to change the country’s behaviour.  It did, however, keep the suspension of PHARE, 
enacted in August 1995, in place.  
EU efforts to influence police and border reforms in Croatia through the RA were 
similarly limited. In the sphere of policing, the EU focused predominantly on raising 
professionalism of the police staff and eliminating non-transparent and criminal practices 
from their work, mainly in reference to refugee returns. Thus, the police were regularly 
criticised for creating bureaucratic obstacles for Serb returnees, while offering privileged 
treatment to Croat refugees and displaced persons. The criticism was equally directed at 
regular police and Transitional Police Force within the UNTAES region (EC 1997a: 8). 
Like in mine-clearing action, EU efforts were guided by a desire to normalise life in the 
country. In contrast to de-mining, however, the EU’s rhetoric was not supported with 
finances: at the time, the Union quite gladly let the UN, working through the UNPSG, and 
the OSCE lead the reform of the police. The EU’s emphasis on this sphere increased 
manifold with the launch of the SAP.  
In border reform, the EU’s emphasis was on restoring and establishing border controls 
and crossings between Croatia and its immediate neighbours. Specifically, the EU actively 
supported Croatia in (re)opening border control points (BCPs) with different parts of BiH 
according to international standards, which posed a big challenge not only because of the 
length of the border between the two states, but also due to problems of post-conflict 
reconciliation. The Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna, though formally disbanded in 1996, 
continued its activities in some of Bosnia’s cantons even in 1998, while relations with the 
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Republika Sprska (RS)127 remained tense. Most of EU efforts in this area were guided by 
the DPA, which imposed obligations on Croatia regarding the establishment of the customs 
border and agreements with the RS (GFAP 1995). In the immediate post-conflict phase, 
there was visible imbalance between the sides: while Croatian citizens enjoyed free travel 
through the RS, Serbs (including Bosnian Serbs) were required visas to enter Croatia and 
were subject to restrictive customs regimes (EC 1998: 11). From the second half of 1998, 
these imbalances became less pronounced: visas were no longer required from holders of 
new BiH passports and less strict customs regulations were introduced on border crossings 
between Croatia and the RS. The EU also tried to harmonise relations between Croatia and 
BiH regarding access to the Port of Ploce. The latter, although located on the territory of 
Croatia, was of strategic importance for BiH. The EU hailed as an achievement the 
initialling of the 1998 agreement granting transit rights and free unrestricted use of the port 
to BiH (EC 1998c: 11). The Agreement did not have any legal effect, however, because 
Croatia refused to ratify it. In border reform, similarly to the reform of the police, the EU 
settled for a supporting role to other international actors. For instance, in March 1998, the 
European Commission sent a Customs Assistance Mission to Croatia, where it assisted the 
OSCE in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Slavonia with confidence-building and 
monitoring activities (ibid.). This supporting position was reconsidered in the early 2000s. 
Apart from aiding different areas of Croatia’s security sector, the EU attempted to 
influence the political level of the reform, mainly through criticising the HDZ’s pervasive 
regime and the country’s lack of cooperation with the ICTY. Namely, the EU expressed 
dissatisfaction with the lack of separation of powers in Croatia and continuous influence of 
the HDZ over the command structures of army and the police (EC 1998c: 8). The strained 
relations between the EU and the Croatian government at this period and the limited 
leverage the bloc had over the country, meant that this criticism did not result in any real 
change in the way Croatia was run and exercised control over its key security institutions.   
In brief, the EU’s SSR efforts in Croatia between 1995 and 1999 were directed at 
stabilisation and pacification of the country. While lacking an overarching strategy, they 
were meant to normalise Croatia and bring its defence, police and border services closer to 
international standards. The EU did not try to lead in any of the security sector areas, but 
merely supported timid national endeavours or assisted other international actors. 
Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge that the bloc attempted to influence SSR in the 
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country even prior to the establishment of its security and defence policy, and before the 
concept of SSR was codified. While at that stage the CFSP was only a few years old, the 
basic character of the EU’s involvement in security sector reform of Croatia in 1995-1999 
is not surprising. One should not forget that the undemocratic context of the Croatian 
political system and Tudjman’s semi-authoritarian regime at the time did not create 
favourable conditions for SSR either (Edmunds 2007: 193). The EU-Croatia relationship 
took a downturn in 1997 when the EU started promoting the Regional Approach. The RA, 
its conditionality (including on SSR), and even the concept of the Western Balkans were 
met with hostility in Croatia as the regime saw them as an attempt to create a neo-
Yugoslavia. To show its opposition to the RA, Tudjman’s government even amended the 
Constitution by adding an article that prohibited Croatia’s participation in any association 
that could lead to the recreation of Yugoslavia (Jovic 2006: 86). Although technically 
Croatia remained part of the RA, in practice it did little to satisfy its conditionality, which 
severely restricted the efficiency of the EU’s efforts in the sphere of SSR. Croatia’s hostility 
towards the outside world and regional cooperation contributed to the failure of the security 
regime, promoted in the Balkans by the international community in the post-war period. 
Despite existing limitations, EU activities to reform the Croatian army, police and border 
services between 1995 and 1999, prepared a foundation for a more active engagement of 
the bloc in Croatian SSR with the launch of the Stabilisation and Association Process for 
the Western Balkans. 
 
The EU’s impact on SSR in Croatia in 1999-2013 
When the SAP was revealed in June 1999, Croatia barely showed interest in the 
initiative. It was only after Tudjman’s death in December 1999 and the establishment of a 
new coalition government at the start of 2000 that the country became more open to the 
idea of European integration (Tull 2003: 138-139). Croatia confirmed its commitment to 
the process by initialling the Stabilisation and Association Agreement in May 2001, the 
negotiations on which started in the autumn of 2000. From this moment forward, it started 
moving swiftly, though not without obstacles, towards the EU membership. On 29 October 
2001, the SAA was signed, in February 2003 the formal application for EU membership 
was submitted and in June 2004, the country was confirmed as a candidate state (Edmunds 
2007: 200). The SAA entered into force in February 2005 and the membership negotiations 
officially launched in October 2005, after the initial suspension over poor cooperation with 
the ICTY in March the same year.  
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The reorientation of Croatia’s foreign policy and evolution of the country’s relations 
with the EU had a three-fold effect on security sector reform. First, SSR was placed in a 
wider context of democratisation and Europeanisation processes. The EU, as an actor of 
SSR, was concerned not simply with bringing the security sector of the country in line with 
the principles of good governance and rule of law, but also with adjusting it to the EU-
specific requirements, which would enable Croatia to become a functioning member state. 
SSR, therefore, became a tool of member state-building and security community-building. 
Hence, the focus on strengthening cooperation between Croatian security institutions and 
EU security agencies (e.g. European Police Office (Europol)), adoption of the EU acquis 
and pre-accession involvement of Croatian security personnel in the development of EU 
security-related initiatives (e.g. battle groups and CSDP missions). Second, SSR received 
unprecedented levels of attention due to its connection with the process of Euro-Atlantic 
integration. Croatia’s achievements in police, border and even defence reforms were 
meticulously tracked by the EU in annual progress reports, with new goals and benchmarks 
set out periodically. As noted by Edmunds, thanks to EU and NATO conditionality, “the 
Croatian security sector has found itself, almost by accident, at the vanguard of an 
integrationist process whose implications are far wider than defence and security issues 
narrowly defined” (2007: 200). Third, by pursuing SSR within the SAP framework, the EU 
strengthened the regional dimension of the reform. While in the SAP each Western Balkan 
country is assessed on the merit of its individual successes, regional cooperation is 
identified as one of the policy’s key priorities. In the sphere of security, this focus is 
particularly strong. As a result, SSR in Croatia is linked to SSR efforts in the region.  
While there was no single programme for SSR in Croatia promoted by the EU, 
references to the reform occupied a prominent place in the SAP. SAAs, adjusted to the 
specific requirements of each Western Balkan state, contained political and economic 
objectives to be met to bring the region in line with EU standards, including in the sphere 
of security. In Croatia’s SAA the information relevant for SSR was included in Articles 75-
80, dedicated to JHA, as well as dispersed around more general provisions, for instance, 
concerning political dialogue with the EU (Art. 7-10) or regional cooperation (Art. 11-14) 
(SAA 2005). With the start of accession talks in October 2005, the EU began tracing 
progress in the country’s SSR and setting benchmarks for the reforms of police, border 
services and, to a lesser extent, army through the political component of the Copenhagen 
criteria, Chapter 24 on Justice, Freedom and Security, which in the context of this work is 
analysed through provisions relevant to the spheres of policing and border security, and 
Chapter 31 that focuses its attention on CSDP and some broader aspects of EU security 
126 
 
policies.128 The political criteria, that require an accession country to achieve “stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities” (EC 2016a) are important for promoting the political level of SSR, 
i.e. the level that ensures civilian, parliamentary and public control over the security sector. 
Chapters 24 and 31, on the other hand, provided guidance for transforming the functioning 
of the police, border control services and army, or in other words, the organisational level 
of SSR.  
Additionally, in 1999-2013, the EU promoted change in the work of Croatia’s 
security sector with the help of financial instruments, such as CARDS National Programme 
2001-2004, CARDS Regional programme 2001-2006, PHARE National Programme 2005-
2006 and IPA 2007-2013 (Novota et al 2009: 28-38). Through CARDS, the EU supported 
the modernisation of security institutions and systems as well as worked towards 
introducing Croatia to key European values, such as respect for the rule of law and human 
rights. Regional CARDS was used to promote good neighbourly relations between the 
Western Balkan states and improve cooperation between their security services. Under 
PHARE, funds were spent on strengthening institutions and human capacity for speeding 
up not only the harmonisation of the Croatian legislation with the EU acquis, but also the 
practical application of the EU norms. The Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, which 
replaced a series of the EU financial tools for candidate states and potential candidates in 
2007, was similarly used for providing organisational support to the country’s security 
sector through allocations to training and technical assistance.  
As can be seen, compared to the previous two periods, the EU’s SSR toolbox 
expanded considerably since 1999. But what effect did this have on the execution of 
security sector reform in Croatia? To answer this question, I analyse how the EU 
approached two key objectives of SSR: the objective of ensuring operational control and 
oversight over the security sector, i.e. the political level of the reform, and the objective of 
developing professional and effective security actors, i.e. the organisational level.  
The EU’s contribution to the political level of SSR in Croatia can be divided into 
three areas: management and oversight of the security sector, cooperation with the ICTY 
and regional cooperation. All of these spheres became more receptive to the EU’s influence 
after the death of Tudjman and the change of government in the country. When the Social 
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Democrat-led coalition introduced constitutional changes in November 2000 and March 
2001129, the power of the president significantly decreased, and the power of the legislature 
increased (Dowling 2008: 188). As a result, the regulation of the security sector became 
more balanced: with the president losing a substantial part of the authority, the government 
and parliament acquired new responsibilities in the sphere of security, “producing among 
them a real system of checks and balances” (Knezovic and Mahecic 2012: 79). The EU was 
largely satisfied with the new parliamentary system established in Croatia after 2000, which 
contrasted sharply with regular criticism of the poor separation of powers in the country in 
the mid-1990s. In the sphere of security, the updated Constitution allocated specific, though 
sometimes overlapping roles to the parliament, government and president of the republic. 
The Croatian parliament monitors the implementation of national security policy and 
development of the military through its supervision powers over the government and public 
administration offices (ibid.). It also decides on the matters of war and peace and adopts the 
Strategy of National Security and the Strategy of Defence (Knezovic and Stanicic 2011: 
27). The president is the Commander in Chief of the Croatian Armed Forces and therefore 
has final authority over the army during war, while the government controls budget, 
planning and personnel issues of the defence sector in the time of peace (ibid.: 29). In many 
cases, defence decisions cannot be enacted unless they are approved by both the president 
and prime minister: this somewhat awkward arrangement was introduced to avoid a 
situation where a single actor had too much authority over the army (Knezovis and Mahecic 
2012: 81).  
While the EU did not have direct input into the amendment of the Croatian 
Constitution, it used changes introduced in the post-Tudjman period to assist Croatia on the 
way to democratisation and European integration. In the sphere of security, this meant 
support for the establishment and reform of governmental bodies, responsible for the 
civilian oversight of the sector, demanding adjustment of legislation on the security 
expenditure or legal advice to parliamentary bodies dealing with security issues. Thus, the 
EU contributed to the institution-building processes in the MoI by financing the 
development of a national border management information system and the architecture, 
necessary for its implementation (EC 2002b: 10) and assisted with the restructuring of the 
MoD and General Staff in view of ESDP/CSDP activities (EC 2007a: 5). Apart from 
engaging with the traditional ministerial bodies, involved in the area of security, the EU 
also monitored the work of other relevant ministries. For instance, to help with the reform 
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of the border service and ensure its alignment with the EU legislation and Schengen acquis, 
the EU followed the development of the Ministry of Finance (in particular, the Customs 
Administration), the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water management, the Ministry 
of Health and Social Welfare and the State Inspectorate (EC 2006c: 6). The civilian 
oversight of the security sector in Croatia was also strengthened thanks to EU demands for 
accountability in the public procurement. Not only general procurement legislation was 
changed in Croatia to fit in with the EU requirements, but specific legal acts were adopted 
for the security sector as well. In 2012, for example, the Croatian Government approved 
the Regulation on public procurement for security and defence purposes to comply with 
relevant EU legislation130 (GRC 2012).   
In general, however, direct action aimed at the improvement of the civilian, 
parliamentary and public oversight of the security sector in Croatia was rare on the EU’s 
part131. In most cases, the EU contributed to this area through broader activities, designed 
to enhance the overall transparency of the state administration.132 Specifically, the EU’s 
continuous emphasis on the work of the Office for the Prevention of Corruption and 
Organised Crime (USKOK)133, and Office of the Ombudsman, helped to make Croatian 
security bodies more transparent and accountable. For instance, the Commission’s progress 
reports often focused on cooperation of the USKOK with the police (EC 2005: 94, 
EC2006d: 56, EC 2009a:10). In a similar way, Croatian parliamentary committees dealing 
with security issues, namely Committee for Internal Policy and National Security, 
Committee for Foreign Affairs, Committee for Finance and Budget and the Council for 
Civilian Oversight of Security and Intelligence Agencies, benefited from the EU’s support 
through generalised projects, not specific to the security sector. The twinning project 
“Support to the Parliament of Croatia for the Preparation for EU Accession”, funded under 
the IPA 2007, would be an example of such an initiative. The project contributed to 
strengthening the institutional framework and administrative capacities of the Parliament, 
by training not only MPs but also staff working in the committees.  
Despite minor criticisms, the European Commission expressed its general satisfaction 
with the level of civilian and parliamentary control of the army already in 2005 (EC 2005: 
13). A year later, in 2006, it also commended the level of external supervision over the 
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 Namely, Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the 
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 Interview, conducted by the author with a security expert in Zagreb in September 2016.  
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 Ibid.  
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 A department of the State Attorney’s Office set up to investigate and prosecute corruption. 
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police, provided by the parliamentary committees, NGOs and by the public (EC 2006c: 10). 
Nominally, Croatia has had civilian and parliamentary control of the security sector in place 
since independence, as it was enshrined in the country’s 1990 Constitution (Lukic 2008: 
205-206). While this control was not exercised in practice in the 1990s, its sheer presence 
allowed Croatia to speed up the implementation of the political level of the security reform 
after the regime change. A strong constitutional base134, updated in the early 2000s to 
strengthen the country’s democratic standing, was one of the reasons for a rather limited 
level of interest, displayed by the EU in the oversight of the Croatian security sector. Apart 
from several mentions in progress reports and a few studies, commissioned by the EU 
bodies135, the EU left the issue to be tackled within the NATO accession process. Most of 
the EU influence on the development of parliamentary and civilian control of the security 
sector in Croatia therefore had an indirect nature. A similar situation could be observed in 
the area of the public control. The EU supported public scrutiny over the security sector by 
investing into the development of independent media and civil society more generally, for 
example, through such projects as the IPA-financed “Civil Society Facility - Enhancing the 
capacities of the civil society sector for the monitoring of implementation of the EU 
acquis”, or by promoting access to public information. The adoption and implementation 
of the Freedom of Information Act, Data Secrecy Act as well as the constitutional changes 
in 2010136, were a direct response to EU conditionality. Additionally, in the final stages of 
the accession process, the EU engaged directly with the CSOs working in the security 
sphere, by inviting them to participate in discussions of Chapters 23, 24 and 31. While it is 
difficult to evaluate to what extent such activities by the EU had an impact on the security 
sector, it is without a doubt that they contributed to the improvement of the transparency 
and accountability of the state apparatus as a whole, influencing security bodies almost 
unintentionally.  
The second area through which the EU influenced the political level of SSR in Croatia 
was the cooperation with the ICTY137. With the launch of the SAP, full cooperation with 
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 The Constitution of Croatia states that the Constitution and the law shall regulate the organization of 
defence, command, administration and democratic control over the armed forces of the Republic (Art. 7), and 
that the realization of the civil control over the armed forces and the security services is within the 
competences of the Parliament of the Republic (Art. 80) (Closa Montero 2007: 5). 
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 The work of the ICTY influenced the organisational level of SSR in Croatia, too, for instance, by 
contributing to the democratisation and professionalization of the country’s army and police through the 
removal of war criminals from their ranks. However, the role of the tribunal goes beyond the organisational 
level of the reform, which is acknowledged in the part of the thesis that follows.  
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this ad hoc UN tribunal, set up in 1993 to contribute to the restoration and maintenance of 
international peace (Kerr 2014: 103), was identified as one of the key political conditions 
for Croatia’s integration into the EU (Obradovic-Wochnik 2013: 94). The work of the 
tribunal had a direct link to SSR in the country.138 This is because large numbers of security 
personnel, including those of the highest rank, were embroiled in war crimes. Furthermore, 
the indictments, coming from The Hague, faced opposition movements from the army, 
intelligence and the police, showing the lack of democratisation and professionalization of 
Croatia’s core security actors. Ensuring effective cooperation with the ICTY was therefore 
of utmost importance for the transformation of the country’s security sector and achieving 
a break with the past.  
As mentioned above, in the 1990s, the tribunal was vilified as a biased, anti-Croatian 
institution that tried to present the defenders of Croatia’s independence as war criminals 
(Pavlakovic 2008: 453). As the result of Tudjman’s anti-ICTY stance and regime-sponsored 
propaganda, the new coalition government that came to power in 2000 found it hard to 
approach the task of cooperation with the tribunal effectively. Headed by Ivica Racan and 
comprising of representatives of the Social-Democratic Party (SDP), Croatian People’s 
Party (HNS) and Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS), the government announced its 
readiness to fulfil commitments before the ICTY already in April 2000 (ibid.). Yet, nearly 
a year later in February 2001, the Racan’s cabinet faced its first major crisis when veteran 
organisations, right-wing parties and even elements of the Catholic Church organised mass 
protests against the possible extradition to The Hague of General Mirko Norac (ibid.: 454). 
Although Racan managed to keep the premiership and resolved the situation by convincing 
the ICTY that the Croatian judiciary could handle the case of Norac, accused of war crimes 
in Gospic and Medak, he failed to obtain popular support for cooperation with The Hague. 
Even the second Racan cabinet, formed without HSLS in July 2002, was ineffective in this 
area. Its biggest ICTY-related challenge occurred in September 2002, when it received an 
indictment for Janko Bobetko, Chief of Staff of the Croatian Army during the Medak Pocket 
operation that led to the killing of Serb civilians in 1991 (Edmunds 2007: 203).  
The Bobetko case presented a predicament for Racan for two main reasons. On the 
one hand, he was faced with growing resentment at home since Bobetko was a highly-
respected war hero and the most senior military person in Croatia, who fought not only in 
the Homeland War, but also in World War II (Jovic 2006: 96). On the other hand, the EU 
was starting to doubt Croatia’s commitment to the processes of democratisation and 
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European integration. The failure of Racan’s government in summer 2001 to apprehend 
General Ante Gotovina, another national hero who was in charge of Operation Storm as the 
Commander of the Split Military District (ibid.) was an important factor feeding these 
doubts. The ICTY’s lack of enforcement powers encouraged other external actors to exert 
pressure on Croatia in connection with the Bobetko case, to avoid the repetition of the 
situation with Gotovina (Obradovic-Wochnik 2013: 94).  The EU, having made progress 
within the SAP conditional on cooperation with the ICTY, warned Croatia that its refusal 
to serve Bobetko’s indictment could jeopardise its prospects for membership (Pavlakovic 
2008: 457). To make matters worse, the UK and Netherlands refused to ratify the SAA, 
signed in October 2001, until the Bobetko case was resolved (Jovic 2006: 97). The Racan’s 
government, although initially standing by Bobetko, had to agree to arrest and extradite him 
to The Hague. This agreement, however, materialised only after it had lost the appeals 
against the extradition both at the Croatian Supreme Court and the ICTY (Pavlakovic 2008: 
457). Bobetko died in Zagreb in May 2003, without ever making it to The Hague, but the 
Gotovina case remained an important obstacle on Croatia’s way to the EU (and NATO) for 
several more years (Jovic 2006: 97).  
In late 2003, it fell to the HDZ, which had returned to power under the leadership of 
Ivo Sanader, to handle the Gotovina case. Sanader confirmed his government’s 
commitment to the course of the European integration in general and cooperation with the 
ICTY in particular (Pavlakovic 2008: 461). While being in a stronger position than his 
predecessor thanks to the fact that the new opposition, now led by the SDP, was in favour 
of the said cooperation, Sanader could not resolve the issue quickly. To a great extent, this 
could be explained by the persistently strong anti-ICTY sentiment in the Croatian 
society139, which placed the government in a precarious position and made it balance 
between the international pressure and local discontent. While performing this balancing 
act, Sanader tried to shift the blame for unpopular decisions onto the international 
community and especially the EU. Instead of educating the public and promoting the idea 
that the ICTY’s work was aimed at achieving reconciliation and strengthening peace, 
Sanader presented cooperation with the tribunal as something required to gain access to the 
EU. As a result, the popular support for the European integration was waning, with the 
numbers opposing the EU membership more than doubling between the middle of 2004 (20 
per cent) and the middle of 2005 (48 per cent) (Franc and Medjugorac 2013). 
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Euroscepticism, largely inspired by the EU’s ICTY conditionality, as well as poor 
understanding of the bloc, remained high until the end of the accession process.140   
Nonetheless, the EU played a key role in resolving the Gotovina crisis. By suspending 
membership talks that had to start with Croatia in March 2005, the bloc forced Sanader to 
step up efforts to locate the fugitive general by developing and implementing a special 
Action Plan and accepting the help of European intelligence agencies, aimed at identifying 
and disrupting networks of Gotovina’s support, especially in the security sector (Jovic 
2006: 100). The ease with which the general escaped captivity in 2001, when the indictment 
was issued, and problems experienced by the government with locating him since were 
widely seen at the time as a sign of unreformed and corrupt security apparatus (ibid.). New 
efforts allowed the Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY Carla Del Ponte to declare that Croatia 
was fully cooperating with the tribunal in October 2005, which consequently led to the 
official start of the EU membership negotiations with the country that same month 
(Edmunds 2007: 206). Gotovina was arrested in Spain in December 2005 and convicted in 
The Hague in 2011. Although the conviction was overturned by the Appeals Judgement in 
November 2012, the Gotovina case still demonstrates the importance of EU pressure for 
establishing a working relationship between Croatian elites and the tribunal (Kerr 2014: 
109).  
By refusing to ratify the SAA over the Bobetko case and postponing negotiations over 
Gotovina, the EU made a sizeable contribution into changing attitudes and behaviours 
among the political leadership of the country (Obradovic-Wochnik 2013: 98; Edmunds 
2007: 206). Although begrudgingly and with varying degrees of reluctance, Croatian elites 
accepted that cooperation with the ICTY was a necessity. This change did not automatically 
find a reflection in wider society, which preserved a largely negative view of the tribunal 
(Obradovic-Wochnik 2013: 98). This could be partly explained by the vilification of the 
ICTY, perpetuated by the media (Vukusic 2014: 161), and partly by the sanctity of the 
Homeland War and its key figures in the country’s nationalist mythology, promoted and 
supported by certain political parties, e.g. the HDZ, and influential interest groups. Of 
course, the EU was not the only external actor that had an impact in this sphere: e.g. in 
2002, the USA suspended financial aid to Croatia’s judicial reform (Jovic 2006: 97) and 
NATO warned the country that its unwillingness to apprehend Bobetko put its membership 
bid under threat (Edmunds 2007: 204).  Yet while others engaged with the issue 
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sporadically, the EU continued monitoring Croatia-ICTY relations consistently. After the 
arrest of Gotovina, who was the last Croatian high-profile fugitive, the Commission’s key 
concerns in relation to ICTY matters were linked to ensuring security guarantees to 
witnesses and informants (EC 2006d: 13-14) and providing the tribunal with access to the 
military documents, relating to cases of generals Gotovina, Cermac and Markac141, all of 
whom were accused of crimes against Serb civilians during and after Operation Storm (EC 
2008a: 16; EC 2009a: 16).  
In short, by assisting the ICTY with the prosecution of war crimes committed by 
members of the Croatian armed forces and police, the EU left an impact on the country’s 
state apparatus in general and SSR in particular. Compelling Croatia’s leadership to 
cooperate with the ICTY contributed to making the entire Croatian security sector more 
professional, transparent and democratic. Although, the EU’s ICTY-related pressures led 
to attitudinal changes only on the elite level, they were not insignificant. On the contrary, 
the emphasis of the EU on cooperation with the tribunal can be seen as one of the factors 
behind behavioural changes of political leaders in Croatia but also in BiH and Serbia, and 
therefore behind the emergence of the elite security community in the region.  
Regional cooperation is the third and final area where the EU’s influence on the 
political level of Croatian SSR was felt the most. As already discussed, the SAP is not 
simply a bilateral policy but also a regional one, as it puts a strong emphasis on cooperation 
between the Western Balkan states. The EU’s commitment to strengthening regional ties in 
the Western Balkans is reflected not only in the SAAs, but also financial instruments, 
supporting the post-conflict development and democratic transition of the region, e.g. 
regional CARDS programmes and Multi-Beneficiary assistance under IPA (EC 2002a: 6). 
In the sphere of security, the EU continuously promoted regional cooperation starting from 
1995, which was described at length in the previous chapter. Attempting to avoid 
duplication of what was already discussed, this section highlights the requirements for the 
regional dimension of SSR, directed specifically at Croatia. In a similar manner, regional 
conditions for SSR will be analysed in reference to Serbia and BiH.  
The regional focus in the context of Croatia’s SSR in 1999-2013 was most visible in 
the spheres of police cooperation, dealing with the legacy of war and border management. 
With the start of membership negotiations with Croatia in 2005, the EU started emphasising 
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the importance of cross-border cooperation between the police and border services of 
Croatia and its neighbours, especially those belonging to the Western Balkans region, but 
not only. For instance, the EU welcomed the conclusion and implementation of agreements 
on police cooperation with Serbia, BiH, but also Hungary, Germany and Poland (EC 2008a: 
17; EC 2009a: 58; EC 2010c: 57). Such agreements were meant to contribute to capacity-
building processes and development of professional police networks. Thanks to the 
agreement with Serbia, for example, the Croatian government was able to identify and arrest 
a suspect in the killing of a prominent Croatian journalist in October 2008 (EC 2009a: 58). 
Cooperation was specifically encouraged to prevent illegal migration and combat organised 
crime. Already in 2005, the collaboration between Croatian and Serb-Montenegrin police 
agencies on the prevention of illegal migration and smuggling was seen by the EU as a 
success story (EC 2005: 31). In November 2008, Croatia signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with Albania, Bosnia, FYROM, Montenegro and Serbia to establish a 
system for the exchange of statistical data on illegal migration and participate in regional 
early warning system (EC 2009a: 56). Nearly two years later, in October 2010 Croatia 
concluded another agreement with the same Western Balkan neighbours to set up a regional 
office on fighting organised crime (EC 2010c: 57). Regional cooperation on matters relating 
to war crimes was highlighted by the EU not only to improve relations with the ICTY, but 
also promote collaboration on domestic war trials. Finally, cooperation in the area of border 
security in Croatia was promoted through joint training sessions, common actions and 
information exchanges to prevent and combat cross-border crime (EC 2005: 91). 
Additionally, the EU closely monitored border disputes between Croatia and its neighbours, 
particularly those with Serbia, BiH, Montenegro and Slovenia142. It should also be 
mentioned that the EU saw military cooperation between Croatia and other Western Balkan 
states as beneficial (EC 2010c: 17), yet this matter did not receive as much of the bloc’s 
attention as regional relations in policing and border security.  
In brief, the regional aspect of SSR in Croatia was promoted by the EU as part of the 
regional element of the SAP, incorporated into the political criterion of the membership 
negotiations. By encouraging Croatia to cooperate with other Western Balkan states and 
wider neighbourhood in the sphere of security, but predominantly police and border 
matters, the EU worked towards improving the good governance and professionalism of 
the country’s security sector (EC 2008: 19-20) as well as harmonising security relationships 
between former adversaries. All three areas, discussed above – management and oversight 
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of the security sector, cooperation with the ICTY and regional dimension of SSR – were 
fostered by the EU to assist Croatia with ensuring political control over the security sector 
and improvement of its democratic and good governance. While aimed at similar 
objectives, EU activities in these fields were not pursued as a single SSR policy, rather they 
were part of a much broader process of European integration. Whether the EU could have 
had a bigger impact on the political level of the reform, had it had a comprehensive strategy 
in place, remains an open question. Nonetheless, it is possible to say, that even without such 
a strategy, the EU helped Croatia to adjust the practices of its governmental and 
parliamentary bodies, involved in the oversight of the security sector, to democratic norms 
and principles. 
The absence of an overall SSR strategy did not stop the EU from influencing the 
reform on the organisational level either. In contrast to the previous period, the EU showed 
more interest in the sphere of defence. If previously, it was only the mine clearing action 
and cooperation with the ICTY (in terms of removing compromised personnel from the 
army) that attracted the EU’s attention, in 1999-2013 the sphere of the bloc’s involvement 
in Croatia’s defence matters expanded considerably. The EU provided the military with 
policy advice, training opportunities as well as technical aid and post-conflict assistance. 
Nonetheless, the driving force behind defence reform in the country was NATO. Though 
the first three post-Tudjman years left the military largely unchanged due to political games 
and power struggle between the SDP and HSLS (Lukic 2008: 202), Croatia started moving 
towards NATO already in 2000, when it joined its Partnership for Peace (PfP) Programme 
(Baric 2006: 2). In May 2002, only a few months after the parliament hastily approved the 
first National Security Strategy and Defence Strategy, Croatia entered the Membership 
Action Plan (MAP). Under the MAP, the country started reassessing its military capabilities 
and defence budget, and gradually adjusted them to NATO planning requirements (ibid.). 
Since 2002, NATO played a key role in determining priorities and long-term plans of the 
Croatian armed forces (CAF). For instance, its officials were closely consulted during the 
preparation of the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) in 2005 and Long-Term Development 
plan (LTDP) of the CAF in 2006 (Pietz 2006: 36). Relying on NATO’s assistance, Croatia 
downsized its active military personnel, modernized the army and turned it into a flexible, 
interoperable force. In recognition of these reform efforts, NATO accepted Croatia as a 
member at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit in April 2009 (Knezovic and Stanicic 2011: 49). 
In certain aspects, the EU benefited from NATO’s assistance, too. For instance, Croatia’s 
contributions for the EU Battlegroups and ESDP/CSDP missions were possible thanks to 
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the training and equipment provided through NATO (Pietz 2006: 37). Overall, the EU and 
NATO’s SSR-related activities in Croatia complemented each other. 
Having started assisting Croatia with de-mining in 1998, the EU increased its level of 
post-conflict support exponentially when the country started moving towards membership 
in the bloc. Even more, with time, it chose to allocate funds for de-mining programmes 
directly to Croatia. Between 2001 and 2005, de-mining projects financed by the EU were 
administered by the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims (ITF), located 
in Slovenia (EC 2010b: 9). This could be explained by inadequate level of local expertise 
in the area143, high levels of corruption in Croatia and lack of trust to local institutions on 
the EU’s part. Since 2006, the Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC) gained enough 
experience to be deemed capable of administering EU funds that were coming first under 
the framework of CARDS, and then under IPA. The total contribution to mine clearing 
action through CARDS 2002, 2003, 2004 and Cross-Border programmes that were 
conducted between 2001 and 2008 amounted to just over 13 million EUR 144 (ibid.: 10). 
IPA provided around 6.2 million EUR between 2009 and 2013145 (CROMAC n.d.).  The 
EU-funded projects, coordinated by CROMAC, often received additional funds from the 
Croatian state budget, though the bloc on average covered 70-80 % of the expenses (ibid.). 
As before, the EU provided grants for mine clearance activities to support the return of 
refugees and internally displaced persons, enhance economic and social conditions in war-
affected areas, speed up reconstruction of infrastructure and improve the overall security 
situation in the country.  
Even when membership negotiations were nearing to a close, the EU continued 
supporting Croatia in its efforts to remove the mine threat. In 2013, the country secured 3.3 
million EUR for de-mining, while still having 637 square km of its territory classified as 
Suspected Hazardous Area (APMBC 2013). Thanks to the continuous EU support, a big 
part of the Croatian territory has become safer. Moreover, Croatia developed valuable 
expertise in de-mining, which its military personnel as well as civilian actors could share 
with the UN, NATO and the EU via CSDP missions. The EU’s contribution therefore had 
an important impact on the capacity-building of Croatia’s defence sector, helping its staff 
to develop knowledge and skills that could be applied to post-conflict environments inside 
and outside the country. 
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The EU also provided Croatia with policy and legal advice on defence reform. While 
NATO was guiding the country strategically and helped it devise such important documents 
as the above-mentioned SDR and LTDP, the EU focused on less comprehensive, yet still 
important, issues. The arms control was one of them. In 2002, Croatia subscribed to the EU 
Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (EC 2006d: 63) and with the start of membership 
negotiations in 2005 started aligning the national legislation as well as institutional practices 
to EU standards regarding the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
(EC 2007a: 4). The EU’s emphasis on the issue of small arms and light weapons (SALW) 
has also been instrumental for the development and implementation of the National Strategy 
and Action Plan for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (ibid.). The EC closely 
monitored Croatia’s progress in joining non-proliferation and arms control regimes, such 
as the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Preparatory Commission for the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation and the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (ibid.). While the Union regularly expressed concern over a discrepancy between 
the commitments to arms control, undertaken by the Croatian government legally, and its 
performance on the matter, it did not exercise much pressure to change the situation (EC 
2006d: 63). In general, the EU’s aim was to ensure that Croatia adhered to the same 
principles as its member states.  
With the help of EU funds and through the United Nations Development 
Programme’s (UNDP) administration, Croatia worked to raise public awareness of the 
threat posed by SALW possession (SEESAC 2010). In 2010-2012, the EU supported the 
UNDP-coordinated “Fewer Weapons, Fewer Tragedies” campaign, that was part of the EU 
regional project "SEESAC146 arms control in the Western Balkans" (GRC 2012a: 339). In 
fact, in the sphere of SALW, it was often UNDP that administered projects, at least partially 
funded by the bloc (ibid.).  Along with the policy, post-conflict and technical aid, the EU 
supported defence reform in Croatia through training assistance. While a lot of Croatia’s 
military personnel benefited from NATO exchange programmes (Pietz 2006: 36), the EU 
invested resources in preparing Croatia to be part of its own security infrastructure, 
particularly CSDP and the Battlegroups. Croatia declared its “willingness to support, 
participate in, and contribute to” ESDP/CSDP early in the negotiation process (EC 2005: 
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106). To prepare relevant personnel, the EU responded with training and administrative 
capacity-building activities for Croatian officials working in the MoD and General Staff 
(EC 2007a: 5; EC 2010c: 65). It also offered support with upgrading IT infrastructure and 
arranging study visits to Brussels for defence staff (EC 2007a: 6). To prove its commitment 
to CSDP, Croatia started sending its personnel to both military and civilian missions before 
becoming an EU member state, which was an important form of knowledge exchange, too. 
Thus, Croatia contributed a 15-member reconnaissance team to the EU’s military operation 
in Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA); several representatives 
of the CAF were also sent to participate in EU NAVFOR Somalia – ATALANTA operation 
off the Somali coast and were involved in providing logistical support to EUFOR Althea in 
Bosnia (EC 2009a: 66; GRC 2012a: 335). Participation in the EU operations not only 
provided the army with an opportunity to gain valuable experience in conflict and crisis 
management, but also allowed it to share the expertise it had received through the EU’s 
(and NATO’s) assistance for SSR.  This expertise mainly lay in the areas of mine clearance, 
reconciliation, transitional justice and SSR itself (EC 2007a: 6). As a small country, Croatia 
made “a relatively limited but not insignificant contribution to EU’s ESDP capacities” 
(ibid.: 7).  
In a similar manner, Croatia was involved in the development of the EU Battlegroup 
concept. For the first time, it participated in the Nordic Battlegroup that was on stand-by 
from January to June 2011 (GRC 2012a: 336). Here, Croatia mainly contributed equipment 
and medical teams. The following year, it joined the Battlegroup led by Germany on a much 
bigger scale, which required nearly 250 Croatian soldiers to undergo specialised training 
(ibid.). While involvement with the EU Battlegroups contributed to further 
professionalisation and modernisation of the CAF, it is worth noting that at the time of 
writing none of these Battlegroups was used on the battlefield.  
As can be seen, the EU considerably expanded its efforts to assist Croatia’s defence 
reform after 1999. If in the previous period, it was mainly preoccupied with de-mining and 
promoting cooperation with the ICTY, in 1999-2013, its area of engagement grew to 
include policy and legal advice and training activities, mostly linked to its own security 
infrastructure. The focus was on preparing Croatia for challenges of the future membership 
in the bloc, which means defence reform was used by the EU as a member state-building 
tool. Although major changes in the military sphere occurred under the influence of NATO, 
which accepted Croatia as its member in 2009, the EU is still widely recognised as an 
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important contributor to the country’s defence reform (Pietz 2006: 38; Knezovic and 
Stanicic 2011: 32-33).  
In policing, the EU played even a bigger role. This is because police reform, just like 
the reform of border services, is covered under the umbrella of Justice and Home Affairs 
(JHA), one of the priority areas within the SAP and throughout the accession process. With 
immediate post-conflict problems having been addressed by the UN agencies and OSCE, 
the EU chose to focus on assisting Croatia with developing a “professional, reliable and 
efficient police organisation” that was properly equipped to implement the EU rules and 
principles (EC 2005: 91). In the European Commission’s view, poor law enforcement was 
posing a threat for the socio-economic development in a state, undermining respect for 
human rights and provision of human security (EC 2004: 14). To make the Croatian police 
an effective, modern and democratic service, the EU focused on legislative alignment, 
capacity building and technical support. Special attention was paid to developing policing 
capabilities for tackling organised crime and corruption that were widespread not only in 
the Croatian society in general but also in the police. As Croatia progressed in the 
negotiation process, the EU requirements grew more detailed and specific, but initially the 
bloc focused on technical aspects and human resources development.  
Thus, the first EU projects directed at policing in the post-Tudjman Croatia were 
financed under CARDS 2002 and 2003 and aimed at developing an effective Central 
Intelligence System. The system was to strengthen the capacity of the MoI and General 
Police Directorate to tackle transnational organised crime, money laundering, trafficking in 
human beings, drugs and weapons, and illegal migration (EC 2002b: 9). Early on, the EU 
also supported the set-up of specialised crime analysis units in each of Croatia’s twenty 
police districts and provided advice on developing training programmes for police officials 
and IT specialists working in them (EC 2003b: 18). These efforts established a foundation 
for the development of intelligence-led policing in Croatia, which from 2008-2009 allowed 
for a more efficient prosecution of criminal offences in corruption and organised crime 
(Vukadin, Borovec and Ljubin Golub 2013: 44).   
When Croatia introduced its present administrative territorial division, that breaks the 
country into twenty counties and the capital city of Zagreb, in 1997, the Ministry of Interior 
was among the first state institutions to be reorganised (Ivkovic 2004: 186). As a result, the 
police were given a three-tier system: with the MoI and the General Police Directorate on 
top, twenty police administrations in the middle and 175 police stations at the bottom (ibid.: 
187). While, on the one hand, this reorganisation meant that the Croatian police became 
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decentralised and therefore more independent from the centre, on the other – it created a 
disconnected system of law enforcement agencies. With the start of the membership 
negotiations in October 20005, the EU quickly identified this latter issue as an obstacle on 
the way to achieving a well-integrated and professional police organisation. An internal 
network that could link the headquarters of the General Police Directorate with twenty 
police districts and 175 police stations was required from the government as a matter of 
priority (EC 2005: 93; EC 2006d: 56). These changes of infrastructure were needed to 
strengthen the administrative capacity of the country’s police: transparent procedures, 
effective channels of communication and modern equipment were necessary to enhance the 
information exchange and inter-agency cooperation inside a three-tier system (EC 2005: 
95). Another way of strengthening administrative capacity, singled out by the EU, was 
through improving the staffing and training policies, implemented by the MoI.   
Although the Croatian government proclaimed professionalization of police as an 
objective in the mid-1990s, the country’s law enforcement still lacked a well-defined 
Human Resources policy and working training system nearly a decade later (Ivkovic 2004: 
182-183). Even more, the process of European integration added another dimension to 
police reform requiring police officials to familiarise themselves with EU-specific 
standards and best practices, especially those referring to the free movement of people, 
goods and services and police cooperation (EC 2002a: 49). Through such projects as 
PHARE 2005 “Strengthening Human Resources Management, Education and Training at 
the Ministry of the Interior - Police Academy” and “Preparation for the implementation of 
the Schengen Acquis”, the EU contributed to enhancing the professional capacity of the 
country’s police service. Similarly, a project on community policing, implemented by the 
MoI in 2002 with EU support, helped to transform an outdated, repressive police system 
into a citizen-oriented public service (EC 2005a: 1). It was later recognised as one of the 
success stories of the EU’s engagement with Croatia’s police reform (MWH Consortium 
2008: 21).   
While the work of Croatia’s police was for a long time determined by the historic 
context of war and collapse of Yugoslavia, it is not surprising that professionalization of 
the service was taking a long time. Nonetheless, the dedication of the post-Tudjman era 
governments to the course of European integration and preliminary work conducted by 
internal and external actors on policing practices in the second half of the 1990s allowed 
Croatia’s police reform to progress relatively fast, especially compared to other states in the 
region. That is why soon after the introduction of IPA in 2007, the EU supplemented its 
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assistance for the development of general professional policing capacity in Croatia with 
specialised support to prepare the national law enforcement for tackling a range of specific 
contemporary threats such as cybercrime, terrorism or corruption. Many of the IPA-funded 
projects combined technical support with a training element. The IPA 2009 project on 
"Capacity Building in the Field of Fight against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse of 
Children, and on Police Assistance to Vulnerable Crime Victims", that ran from 2011 till 
early 2013, is an example of such initiatives. Under this project, the Croatian police were 
introduced to best practices in investigating sexual exploitation and abuse of children and 
vulnerable victims, as well as provided with cutting-edge IT equipment for criminal 
investigations on mobile devices and computers (MoI RC 2011: 8). An earlier IPA 2007 
project ˝Strengthening Capacities of Ministry of the Interior to combat Narcotic Drugs 
Trafficking and Drug Abuse˝ was implemented between February 2010 and July 2011. 
Through Twinning and supply components, it contributed to strengthening the ability of the 
Croatian MoI to supress organised production and resale of drugs.  
The overarching theme for these two initiatives as well as for an overwhelming 
majority of EU-funded projects in the sphere of policing implemented in Croatia from the 
early 2000s was the fight against organised crime. Lack of progress in tackling organised 
crime in the country and the Western Balkans more broadly was seen by the EU as a major 
source of concern (Strazzari and Coticchia 2012: 155). Trafficking in drugs and persons, 
money laundering, corruption and other criminal activities were perceived not only as 
factors preventing the emergence of effective states in the region, but also as a direct threat 
to the area of freedom, security and justice inside the bloc (ibid.). To improve the situation, 
the EU provided the Croatian police with specialised training and technical support through 
projects like the above-mentioned IPA 2007 and 2009, as well as CARDS 2004 “Combating 
Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives”, IPA 2008 “Strengthening 
Capacities of the MoI for Crime Prevention” and IPA 2009 “Supply of IT Equipment for 
Police Stations” (MUPRH 2017). It also exposed the police to the EU best practices in the 
field, e.g. through developing links with the EU’s law enforcement agency Europol. The 
Croatian Parliament ratified the operational agreement with the agency in June 2006 and 
set up a Europol section within the Department for International Police Cooperation shortly 
after (EC 2006d: 55; EC 2007c: 53). This allowed the government to post a Liaison Officer 
to Europol headquarters in February 2008 (EC 2008a: 59).  
Given the transnational nature of organised crime, to further strengthen the capacity 
of the Croatian police, the EU promoted interagency cooperation and regional initiatives. 
142 
 
For example, training on human trafficking were organised not only for Croatian police 
officers, but also representatives of the social welfare system, health care, tourism and civil 
society organisations (EC 2009a: 58), while the Croatian Ministry of Interior was involved 
in the realisation of numerous regional projects such as Regional CARDS 2004 
“Strengthening Capacities of the Police in Fight Against Organised Crime in the Southeast 
Europe” and Regional IPA 2010 “Strengthening capacities in the fight against cybercrime” 
(MUPRH 2017). By complementing national programmes with regional efforts, the EU 
was trying to break up criminal networks that spread through the Western Balkans in the 
1990s and engender trust among states of the region. To further demonstrate the country’s 
commitment to regional cooperation in the sphere of policing and the rule of law, Croatia 
participated in several CSDP missions in neighbouring countries. For instance, it provided 
logistical support to the EUPM in BiH and contributed police personnel to EULEX in 
Kosovo147 (GRC 2012a: 335). Participation in civilian CSDP missions, just like in military 
operations, was also an important opportunity for knowledge exchange. It is important to 
note that even after Croatia became a member state of the EU in July 2013, Brussels 
continued investing in strengthening the country’s capacity to tackle organised crime. 
Several projects were implemented in Croatia after accession to the bloc, e.g. 
“Strengthening Capacities of Ministry of Interior to Combat Cybercrime” under IPA 2011, 
and “Enhancing administrative and operative capacities of the National Police Office for 
Suppression of Corruption and Organized Crime” IPA 2012 (MUPRH 2017).  
Finally, while preparing to join the EU, Croatia received policy and legislation advice 
from the bloc. As a result, it had to revise key legislation on policing, e.g. the Criminal 
Code, the Police Act and the Secrecy Act (EC 2007c: 53) and sign cooperation agreements 
with EU agencies, e.g. the Europol and Eurojust, and EU member states, e.g. with France 
and Austria (EC 2008a: 59). Moreover, Croatia had to set up several new policing bodies, 
such as the National Police Office for the Fight Against Corruption and Organised Crime.  
Overall, the EU’s engagement with police reform in Croatia was aimed at creating an 
effective institutional and legislative framework that could be compatible with demands of 
a modern, democratic state that could become a fully-functional EU member. The EU 
tracked the development of administrative capacity of the Croatian police, its legislative 
and regulatory framework, as well as invested into its education system and infrastructure 
(EC 2002a: 49). It did so to make the three-tier police system of the country accountable, 
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professional, and most importantly sensitive to the EU-specific requirements. The reform 
therefore was guided by the process of European integration and used as a tool of member 
state-building. As it had a regional dimension, it was also used for harmonising relations 
with other Western Balkan and SEE states, promoting cooperation and good 
neighbourliness. The link between police work and JHA raised the profile of police reform 
in Croatia considerably. The same thing happened with border reform.  
The EU placed a strong emphasis on reorganisation of Croatia’s border police soon 
after the country’s government announced its commitment to the process of European 
integration (Trauner 2011: 71). Already in 2002, the European Commission stated there 
was a need for Croatia “to establish greater security at international borders that will 
diminish cross border crime and illegal migration, and at the same time facilitate cross 
border movement of people by developing and implementing asylum and migration 
policies” (EC 2002a: 54). Border security was of utmost importance for Croatia due to the 
unusual length of its external borders and unresolved border issues with some of its 
neighbours, including Serbia and Bosnia. For a small country with the population of around 
4.5 million (World Bank n.d.), controlling and safeguarding the state border of 3, 332 km, 
with 950 km of sea border and a large number of border lines drawn over difficult terrain 
(MoF and MoI RC 2010: 5), was quite a challenge. Border disputes and post-conflict 
tensions in the region did not make the task any easier. As Croatia was moving closer to 
becoming an EU member, the salience of border reform kept growing. The EU was adamant 
to ensure that Croatia was ready to secure the external borders of the bloc (which were to 
coincide with the borders of the country in 2013) and was able to “assume greater 
responsibility” in preventing illegal migration before it was granted the membership 
(Trauner 2011: 104).  
In comparison to military and police reforms, the EU’s engagement with border 
reform represented the most comprehensive effort. When the first CARDS project 
“Integrated Border Management: Border Police” was launched in Croatia in 2002, it 
resulted not only in creating the strategic basis for the development of the Croatian border 
police, but also outlining the framework for future EU projects in the sphere (EC 2006e: 6). 
The project, implemented by twinning partners from Germany and Slovenia in 2002-2003, 
involved a detailed assessment of the Croatian border police to determine its needs in 
“legislation, general organisation and human resources, technical equipment and IT 
structure, as well as training and education” (ibid.).  It should be noted that it was not the 
first external attempt to assess the state of Croatia’s border security: the EU project followed 
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closely the Stability Pact initiative "National Action Plan for the Republic of Croatia with 
a View of Development and Long-Lasting Stabilisation of the Areas Pertaining to Asylum, 
Migration and State Border Surveillance" that finished in 2002 (MoF and MoI RC 2010: 
7). To a certain extent, the EU disregarded the work conducted within the previous project, 
which led to the repetition of activities and inefficient use of funds (Trauner 2011: 72). 
Nonetheless, the first CARDS project still had important implications: it defined the 
structure and personnel concept for the newly created Border Police Directorate within the 
General Police Directorate (EC 2006e: 2) and, as already mentioned, laid the foundation 
for several strategic documents on the topic of border security. The Border Police 
Development Strategy was drafted first, which opened the way for the development of the 
National Strategy for Integrated Border Management (IBM), produced in the framework of 
the CARDS 2001 Project "Integrated Border Management – Interagency Cooperation", 
completed in 2004-2005 (MoF and MoI RC 2010: 7).  
In recognition of interconnectivity between border management issues facing Croatia 
and the rest of the Western Balkans, the EU insisted that the country developed and 
implemented a comprehensive IBM strategy, aligned with the Integrated Border 
Management guidelines formulated for the region in 2004 within the Ohrid Process. Using 
these guidelines as a foundation, the Croatian IBM strategy, released in 2005, established 
mid- and long-term goals for enhancing cooperation within national border services, as well 
as improving interagency and international cooperation of all agencies involved in 
managing the national borders (MoI RC 2010: 3). The agencies in question included the 
Ministry of Interior – Border Police Directorate, the Ministry of Finance – Customs 
Directorate, the Ministry of Agriculture – Veterinary Directorate and Directorate for Food 
Safety and Phytosanitary policy, the Ministry of Health – Directorate for Sanitary 
Inspection and State Inspectorate (ibid.: 8). For the EU, the IBM was not simply about 
ensuring an effective border control, but also about trade facilitation and cross-border 
cooperation (Trauner 2007: 8). Additionally, in other Western Balkan states, but not in 
Croatia, it was about the demilitarisation of borders. The IBM was envisaged as a tool for 
combatting all types of cross-border crime, such as illegal migration, terrorism, human 
trafficking and drug smuggling, on the one hand, and for promoting “legitimate cross-
border activities, such as tourism, trade and trans-border cooperation”, on the other (ibid.). 
To assist Croatia with the implementation of the IBM strategy, the EU allocated substantial 
funds through CARDS, PHARE and IPA to introduce modern equipment into the country’s 
border surveillance and control as well as customs surveillance system, build a National 
Border Management Information system (EC 2004: 15), develop working IT structures and 
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install databases in numerous state border agencies (MoF and MoI RC 2010: 8-9). For 
instance, the EU allocated nearly 10 million EUR for the development of the National 
Border Management Information system (NBMIS) through projects within CARDS 2002, 
CARDS 2003 and IPA 2007 that were implemented between 2005 and 2012 (MUPRH 
2017).  
As can be seen from these early attempts, the EU tried to assist Croatia with designing 
a border security system that would be well-coordinated on national and regional levels. 
Neither police nor army reform were receiving the same level of attention from the bloc. 
This was because the EU was rather inexperienced when it came to reform these sectors. 
And in many respects, it was learning by doing. Border security, however, was already a 
familiar topic for the Union from the time of the fifth enlargement, when the CEE countries 
had to adjust their visa, asylum and migration policies to gain EU membership. Of course, 
the Western Balkans was different, as it required the EU to address the post-conflict legacy 
of the region. Overall, however, it was easier for the EU to approach border reform because 
of its previous experience. Compared to other states in the region, Croatia was in a much 
stronger position to respond to the EU requirements: its borders were never controlled by 
the military and it started the reorganisation of the border system even before the 
negotiation process with the EU was launched. Despite this position of relative strength, 
the Commission was regularly dissatisfied with the progress of border reform in the 
country. It often criticised staff shortages, limitations in training, inappropriate 
infrastructure and lack of equipment at headquarters and numerous BCPs (EC 2005: 91; EC 
2008a: 58; EC 2010c: 56). The Croatian government was struggling to find the necessary 
funds for strengthening the control of and surveillance over the country’s long land and sea 
borders and bringing border security in line with the EU requirements. The Croatian case 
was not helped by the fact that the EU’s comprehensive approach to border security kept 
evolving and becoming more demanding. For instance, as a result of a peer review mission 
to Croatia in 2010 and 2011, it became evident that the country’s National IBM Strategy 
needed further adjustment to comply with the EU IBM concept, which was different to the 
one applied to the Western Balkans (MoI RC 2010: 3). The EU’s concept was closely 
connected with the creation of the borderless Schengen zone, while the IBM concept in the 
Western Balkans was an integral ingredient of SSR aimed at establishing a working system 
of well-coordinated national and regional agencies, involved in border management 
(Marenin 2010: 18-19). To bridge the gap between the two and help Croatia move closer to 
the EU standards, more funds were directed to the country through such projects as IPA 
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2010 “Support to the alignment of the Croatian IBM Concept with EU IBM Concept” 
(MUPRH 2017).  
The Croatian border agencies and bodies responsible for their oversight have also 
benefited from the EU training assistance. Aside from practical assistance with basic and 
specialised training, for example, for the border police in using new equipment to perform 
border surveillance and checks according with the international standards (MoF and MoI 
RC: 10; EC 2008a: 56), the EU also had an impact on the development of training strategies 
for the country’s key border agencies. For instance, within the PHARE 2006 project “Blue 
Border Surveillance”, implemented in 2008-2010, Croatia drafted the Maritime Police 
Development Strategy that defined “the organisation and training of the maritime police” 
(MoI RC 2010: 5). Under the EU’s influence, the MoI also developed educational manuals 
in the field of asylum and refugee work (EC 2009a: 56). Even more, the professionalism of 
Croatia’s border security staff as well as their number kept growing thanks to the continuous 
monitoring by the EU.  
Having facilitated the adoption of the Border Police Development Strategy and 
National Strategy for IBM, the EU started steering Croatia towards implementing the 
Schengen acquis. The Border Police Development Strategy was, in fact, the first document 
to clearly define the reform guidelines for the Croatian border police from the point of view 
of the EU accession (Trauner 2011: 74). Croatia was required not only to considerably 
update its IT systems and equipment used for the provision of border security, design a 
working financial plan for the reorganisation of the border police into a modern and 
independent service within the structure of the general police, but also to ensure the 
legislative alignment with the acquis. This latter process progressed at a moderate pace, to 
prepare Croatia properly for taking the responsibility for the protection of the external EU 
borders (EC 2012: 13). In early 2007, Croatia adopted the Schengen Action Plan that 
offered the overview of activities the government had to complete until 2012 (Trauner 2011: 
75). To give Croatia impetus to start implementing this action plan, the PHARE 2005 
project “Preparation for the Implementation of the Schengen Acquis” was implemented in 
2007-2009 (MoI RC 2010: 5).  
From the point of view of the EU, border security in Croatia was not possible to reach 
until the country developed effective asylum, migration and visa policies that were aligned 
both with the bloc’s standards and respective policies of other Western Balkan states. This 
meant that the EU carefully traced the evolution of national legislation on asylum and 
migration (often requiring amendments and revisions of laws to eliminate discrepancies 
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between the Croatian approach and its own vision148), paid close attention to the 
improvement of reception and accommodation facilities for asylum seekers in the country 
and provided assistance for Croatia’s participation in the Dublin and EURODAC 
regulations149 that were at the heart of the EU asylum system (Trauner 2011: 86-95). While 
Croatia was predominantly viewed as a transit country for asylum seekers and irregular 
migrants, its status as a country of destination was becoming clearer, the closer it 
approached the EU (EC 2008a: 56). In terms of visa policies, Croatia had to fulfil numerous 
obligations, too, although it did not need to go through the visa liberalisation process like 
the rest of the region150. This is because it was never placed on the negative list151 and its 
citizens could freely travel to the EU. Nonetheless, it still had to align its national visa policy 
with the EU’s positive and negative lists, adjust its travel documents and visa forms to the 
acquis requirements and pursue favourable visa regimes with the Western Balkan 
neighbours (EC 2010c: 55). Thus, the EU was instrumental in achieving a visa-free travel 
between Croatia and Serbia as well as BiH (Trauner 2011: 83). Although, Serbia and BiH 
were for a while on the EU’s negative list, Croatia was encouraged to allow travel of these 
countries’ citizens to its territory without visas as a way of improving cooperation and 
resolving tensions in the region. The EU’s approach to border reform in the region was 
therefore another way for promoting amicable relations and positive security 
interdependence between regional players.  
Arguably, one of the biggest challenges in the sphere of border security for Croatia 
was the issue of border delineation. Since gaining independence, Croatia had border 
demarcation issues with several of its neighbours, including Slovenia, Serbia, Montenegro 
and Bosnia. The EU was reluctant to get involved in these disputes, preferring to treat them 
as bilateral issues, separating them from the process of European integration. The sensitive 
nature of the disputes and the fact that they involved EU member states did not allow the 
bloc to avoid dealing with the problem entirely. A border dispute with Slovenia is a case in 
point. While Croatia had several border-related issues to settle with Slovenia, it was the 
drawing of the maritime border that proved to be most publicised and challenging to settle. 
The two countries could not agree where to draw a sea demarcation line in the Piran Bay. 
While Croatia insisted on dividing the Northern Adriatic in the middle, thus splitting it 
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between itself and Italy, leaving Slovenia without access to international waters, Slovenia 
argued for the creation of a corridor between the Croatian and Italian zones (Trauner 2011: 
79). Croatia’s intention to create an ecological and fishing protection zone (ZERP), that 
would prohibit foreign exploitation of the Croatian part of the Adriatic Sea, made the issue 
even more heated. When in 2008 ZERP came into effect, despite earlier commitments to 
suspend it for EU member states (EC 2008a: 16), Slovenia and Italy blocked any further 
negotiation progress for Croatia. It took the mediation of the Council of the EU to resolve 
the issue temporarily, by convincing Croatia to fulfil its earlier obligation regarding putting 
a break on ZERP for EU countries (Trauner 2011: 80). Nonetheless, Slovenia kept 
threatening to derail Croatia’s accession talks unless a viable solution of the maritime 
border dispute was found (Lang 2012: 13). These threats only stopped when both countries 
signed an agreement on 9 November 2009 to settle the dispute via international arbitration 
(ibid.). The EU, that had to supervise the progress, was relieved to decouple this argument 
from the accession process. When Croatia joined the bloc on 1 July 2013, the first hearing 
of the arbitration tribunal had still not happened, though the procedural meeting had been 
held in April 2012152 (EC 2012a: 9). It is sometimes argued that the EU lost an opportunity 
to contribute to settling the dispute before finishing the negotiations. This argument is 
somewhat flawed, however, as the bloc does not have special acquis on border delineation, 
which is why candidate countries are encouraged to reach agreement either bilaterally or 
through international arbitration (Trauner 2011: 78).  
The EU had a similarly limited effect on the border disputes with Serbia and BiH. 
Serbia had disagreements with Croatia regarding the border demarcation around two islands 
near the town of Vukovar and at the Danube river (EC 2006d: 17-18), which the 
Commission monitored through progress reports without offering a lot of assistance for 
their resolution. In the case of BiH, the biggest problems related to the Croatian Port of 
Ploce that had strategic significance for Bosnian economy and the Bosnian town of Neum, 
which separates the southernmost part of Croatia, including Dubrovnik, from the rest of the 
country (Lang 2012: 13). As explained above, the EU was eager for Croatia to solve these 
disputes with BiH soon after the signing of the DPA, yet, like in the case with Slovenia, it 
preferred to treat the issues as bilateral and not link them to the accession talks. Nonetheless, 
the bloc did not stand completely aside. In fact, it played a key role in getting Croatia and 
BiH to sign agreements on border management on 19 June 2013. These agreements obliged 
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the countries to implement the EU standards for border controls, customs and transit traffic 
as well as defined the rules for using the port of Ploce and the Neum corridor by both sides 
(EC 2013a). While this was only a temporary solution, which would need to be reviewed 
in the future, it would not have been possible without the EU guidance (ibid.).   
In short, Croatia’s border security in 1999-2013 underwent significant changes thanks 
to the impact of the EU. The latter contributed to the reorganisation of the border police, 
modernisation of the equipment and IT systems used at border crossing points, rise of 
professional standards, changes of national legislation, development of closer ties between 
a range of state agencies involved in border management through the IBM concept, and 
reaching at least temporary solutions of border disputes between Croatia and its neighbours. 
Attempting a comprehensive approach to border reform, the EU not only placed it in the 
regional IBM framework, applicable to the rest of the Western Balkans, but also closely 
coordinated its efforts with other conveners of Ohrid Process, within which the concept was 
devised.  
 
Conclusion 
It should be reiterated that Croatia went through a colossal transformation between 
1991 and 2013: from a country fighting for its independence to a member state of the 
European Union.153 The evolution of Croatia’s security sector within the same period is 
equally impressive. Created practically from scratch in the flames of war, the country’s 
security bodies can currently be seen as largely professional, modern and democratically 
governed. Of course, some problems persist, e.g. discrepancies between legislation and 
practice or lack of civilian expertise on security issues have not been eradicated, yet the 
progress achieved in the transformation of the security sector over the studied period is 
undeniable. SSR in Croatia had a slow start: after the end of the war in 1995, police and 
border control services underwent minor reorganisation, while army structures remained 
mainly unreformed. The only visible change in the defence sector was the reduction of the 
number of troops. It was only after the death of Tudjman in 1999 and the emergence of new 
pro-European coalition government, that SSR truly gained prominence. Under the influence 
of external actors, it was quickly identified as one of the major indicators of the country’s 
transformation on the way to democracy and Euro-Atlantic institutions. The EU, who by 
that time mostly recovered from the failure of “the hour of Europe”, made SSR part of the 
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European integration process. The Croatian case illustrates the evolution of the bloc as an 
actor of SSR particularly well. The EU has come a long way from an observer and 
peripheral actor, which in 1991-1995 was side-lined by other external actors and influenced 
Croatia’s security situation through the ECMM, arms embargo and Badinter Arbitration 
Commission to an agent of SSR in the early 2000s. Relying on the foundation, laid in 1995-
1999 through technical assistance, humanitarian work and the Regional Approach that were 
meant to stabilise and pacify the country, the EU started actively promoting the reforms of 
police, border services and to a lesser extent the army, when it became clear that Croatia’s 
future lay in the bloc.  
The EU’s first attempts to transform the work and management of Croatia’s security 
sector were timid and sporadic. De-mining activities, assistance with restoring border 
controls and resolving visa issues with the neighbouring states can hardly be defined as a 
comprehensive approach to SSR. When assessing the EU’s early activity in this sphere, 
however, one needs to take into account a broader context. In the post-war country under 
the semi-authoritarian regime, where the EU’s failure to manage the conflict was still 
vividly remembered and any external attempt to promote regional cooperation was 
perceived as a step towards the reconstruction of Yugoslavia, the chances of any significant 
influence on such a sensitive sphere as security were slim. Moreover, it should not be 
forgotten that at that point the EU was still lacking a working security and defence policy 
or a clearly defined concept of SSR. Nonetheless, it still tried to promote good neighbourly 
relations and reciprocity through SSR-related activities. With the launch of the SAP, that 
almost coincided with the change of government and foreign policy direction in Croatia, 
the situation changed dramatically. The EU became an active promoter of different aspects 
of SSR, paying attention to both political and organisational levels of the reform. Having 
provided a detailed overview of its engagement in the defence, police and border reforms 
in Croatia between 1991 and 2013154, five observations can be made about the EU as an 
actor of SSR in the country.  
First, the EU has become more confident in promoting SSR with time. Choosing to 
tackle technical issues at the start, it slowly moved on to providing legal and policy advice 
on generic and specialised security issues as well as offering training activities to Croatian 
security personnel. While it demonstrated varying levels of interest in defence, police and 
border reforms, giving preference to the latter two and settling for a supporting role to 
NATO in the defence sector, it did not leave any of them without attention.  
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Second, despite subscribing to the idea of the comprehensive SSR in theory, the EU 
approached the reform in Croatia in a manner that cannot be described as well-defined or 
coordinated. Among the three aspects of SSR studied in this chapter, only border reform 
was more or less comprehensive: it started with a careful assessment of needs and 
challenges facing the actors involved in border management, and included a range of 
technical, strategic and policy elements. What is more, it was also aligned with the EU’s 
approaches to other Western Balkan states. In the defence sector and police, the 
comprehensive approach was more difficult to discern. While the EU supported many 
dimensions of these reforms, there was no single policy or framework to underpin its 
approach.  
Third, the EU was reluctant to use negative conditionality or coercion while facilitating 
SSR and touch upon sensitive issues relating to it. Croatia’s accession talks were threatened 
twice155: first time over the issue of poor cooperation with the ICTY and second time over 
the maritime border dispute with Slovenia, by that time an EU member state. In both cases, 
the EU persuaded the Croatian elites to find a solution, though not necessarily a permanent 
one. It was not common for the EU to resort to punitive measures to achieve desired changes 
in the work of the Croatian security sector. This was partly because the Croatian 
government was mostly willing to cooperate, partly because the sphere of security remained 
an inter-governmental, rather than a supranational policy, in the EU.  
Fourth, by promoting SSR, the EU was working not simply towards improving the 
security situation in Croatia, but also towards preparing the country for the membership in 
the bloc, for joining the European security community. By investing resources in creating 
a professional police service in Croatia, developing a modern and aligned with the EU 
principles and standards border management system and democratically-governed armed 
forces, the EU was attempting to build an effective member state. That is why, on many 
occasions, the priorities in SSR, e.g. tackling organised crime in police reform or 
developing and implementing the IBM strategy in border reform, were defined according 
to the concerns of the EU, not Croatia’s needs. The latter were not fully ignored, e.g. the 
de-mining assistance that has been provided by the EU since the late 1990s was a direct 
response to the needs of the post-conflict country. Yet, the general EU’s approach to the 
reforms of police, army and border services was dictated by demands of the European 
integration process. SSR was therefore used a tool of member state-building and a vehicle 
for sharing with Croatia values and norms found inside the EU.  
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Fifth, SSR in Croatia, as promoted by the EU, had a clear regional dimension. The EU 
attempted to improve Croatia’s relations with its Western Balkan neighbours both 
bilaterally and regionally. Croatian soldiers were encouraged to join the CSDP missions in 
Kosovo and BiH, while police officers, border and customs officials took part in joint 
trainings with their colleagues from Serbia, FYROM or Montenegro. This cooperation was 
not based on mutual trust but guided by the elites that shared the vision for the future of the 
region as part of the European Union. The regional SSR initiatives were explicitly promoted 
by the EU in Croatia since the mid-1990s and were closely linked to the national SSR 
endeavours to substitute negative patterns of interdependence found in the region in the 
early 1990s for positive cooperation, typical for a security community.  
  
153 
 
Chapter 6 The Impact of the EU on SSR in Serbia 
 
Introduction 
Security sector reform (SSR) in Serbia can be described as a highly inconsistent and 
politically charged affair. In the studied period, it encountered many obstacles, three of 
which deserve a special mention. First, the country’s SSR suffered over the unresolved 
issue of statehood (Ejdus 2010: 9). Between 1991 and 2013, Serbia existed in four different 
configurations: until April 1992 within the SFRY, in 1992-2003 within the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), in 2003-2006 as part of the State Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro (SCG), and from 2006 as an independent state. This means that until 2006, 
Belgrade did not have full control over the security sector, having to share security 
responsibilities with Podgorica. The unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo in 
2008 created further uncertainty around Serbia’s statehood, placing another burden on the 
country’s security sector.  
The second factor that presented a major obstacle to Serbia’s security sector reform 
in the studied period is the country’s image as an aggressor. Having engaged in four armed 
conflicts in the 1990s,156 Serbia has been treated with considerable suspicion by its 
neighbours and the international community alike. This led to prolonged isolation of the 
country and heightened tensions over its reluctance to cooperate with the ICTY. Although 
during the wars of Yugoslavia’s dissolution atrocities were committed by all sides157, the 
scale of crimes and violence perpetuated by the Serbian side in Croatia, BiH and Kosovo 
far exceeded those committed by its adversaries (Gow and Zverzhanovski 2013: 126). As 
a result, the legacy of war left a lasting imprint on Serbia’s security sector. The continuing 
unwillingness of the Serbian elites to cooperate with the ICTY after the ousting of 
Milosevic further complicated the already difficult process of SSR. While Croatia, albeit 
reluctantly, shared security files with the tribunal and worked together with European 
intelligence agencies to transfer its war criminals to The Hague, Serbia was unable to locate 
Ratko Mladic, the Bosnian Serb military commander during the Bosnian war, and Radovan 
Karadzic, the former Bosnian Serb leader, for 16 and 13 years respectively (Pond 2013: 
11). Since elements of the security sector were implicated not only in committing war 
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crimes in the 1990s, but also in harbouring fugitives from the ICTY in the early 2000s, SSR 
in Serbia was significantly affected by the country’s war crimes legacy. 
The third obstacle to transforming Serbia’s security sector has been linked to the 
country’s slowness in committing to the path of democratisation and Euro-Atlantic 
integration. Partly because of the internal power struggle between the two strongest actors 
– the Democratic Party (DS) and Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) – inside the Democratic 
Opposition of Serbia (DOS) that came to power in the immediate post-Milosevic period, 
partly because of strained relations with the international community, SSR in Serbia was 
delayed (Ejdus 2010: 9-10). By the time the infighting stopped, and EU membership 
became tangible158, valuable time, that could have been spent on reforming the country’s 
security sector, damaged by years of war and semi-authoritarianism, had been wasted. This 
waste becomes even more evident if one looks at the progress achieved in Croatia at the 
same time. Having rejected semi-authoritarianism at nearly the same time as Serbia, Croatia 
committed to the path of Euro-Atlantic integration much sooner and managed to transform 
its security sector into an effective player, equally respected by European and American 
partners.  
The current chapter analyses the impact of the EU on Serbian security sector reform. 
Following the structure used for the case study of Croatia, it starts with an overview of SSR 
in the country in 1991-2013 and continues with the investigation of the EU’s contribution 
to the reform during the same period. Before starting the analysis, it should be mentioned 
that although Serbia used to be part of larger entities in the studied period, this work studies 
SSR only in the republic itself, leaving out Montenegro and Kosovo159, as the process of 
the reform took different forms there and therefore requires separate studies.  
 
Security sector reform in Serbia: an overview 
It has become customary to examine security sector reform in Serbia starting from 
2000, after the ousting of Milosevic. While the pace and depth of the reform intensified in 
the post- Milosevic period, it is still important to analyse the security situation in the 1990s, 
to understand what preceded this development. Serbia’s security sector had its beginnings 
in the security apparatus of the SFRY. Unlike Croatia who had to build an army from 
scratch in the midst of conflict, Serbia had a strong military almost instantly. When 
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Yugoslav republics started announcing their independence, the Yugoslav People’s Army 
(JNA), de facto became a Serbian army (Popovic et al 2011: 14). Yet together with 
infrastructure, equipment and a large percentage of personnel, Serbia also inherited the 
JNA’s strong traditions of autonomy and allegiance to communism (Edmunds 2007: 153). 
In the SFRY, through its close ties with the Communist Party, honed by Tito, the army 
acted as a pillar of the socialist system (Popovic et al 2011: 14), which meant that Milosevic 
had to reform it before using it by his own regime. The task was not simple, for the military 
was a federal institution, over which Milosevic, as the president of Serbia, had no direct 
control. Nonetheless, by using the combination of formal and informal tools, the JNA 
slowly transformed into the nationalist regime’s ally. With the creation of the FRY in 
1992160, Belgrade found it easier to control the federal politics in general and military affairs 
in particular, since the Montenegrin government and the ruling Democratic Party of 
Socialists (DPS), consisted of Milosevic’s close associates from the Yugoslav League of 
Communists (Hadzi-Vidanovic and Djuric 2007: 16) and the Montenegrin presidency, then 
held by Momir Bulatovic, also a Milosevic sympathiser, was nearly powerless (Bieber  
2003:17).  
To further strengthen his grip over the army, Milosevic turned to the process of 
Serbianisation. With many soldiers and officers leaving due to the SFRY disintegration, the 
number of Serbs in the JNA was rising substantially. Moreover, in the JNA, the officer 
corps, at least at the junior and middle level, was predominantly Serbian, making it easier 
for Milosevic to ensure that armed forces supported the Serbian side first in Croatia and 
later in Bosnia (Gow and Zverzhanovski 2013: 28). The Serbianisation was galvanised 
when the JNA split into three armies: the army of the FRY (VJ), the army of the Republika 
Srpska (VRS), and the army of Serbian Krajina (SVK), i.e. forces of the Serb breakaway 
state in Croatia (ibid.). The division of the JNA was part of the strategy to distance Serbia 
from the Bosnian war (Edmunds 2007: 153). While the VRS with 67, 000 soldiers kept 
fighting in BiH, Milosevic could tell the international community that the VJ had nothing 
to do with the conflict (ibid.). The reality, however, was different: Belgrade continued 
supporting the VRS with personnel, weapons and intelligence until the end of the Bosnian 
war (Gow 2003: 59-60), and even paid its officers’ wages until 2002 (Gow and 
Zverzhanovski 2013: 124). The VJ, that was 135,000 strong after the separation from the 
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VRS and SVK (Edmunds 2007: 153), went through several purges in 1992 and 1993 that 
led to the dismissal and retirement of many in the officer corps, leaving only nine generals 
from the JNA in place in 1993 (Gow and Zverzhanovski 2013: 29). These purges were 
targeting non-Serb personnel with an aim to build a loyal and trustworthy Serbian security 
sector (ibid.). 
In fact, most endeavours to reform the army in 1991-1995 pursued this goal, even the 
elements compatible with the concept of SSR. For example, decommunisation, completed 
in 1993, did not result in depoliticisation of the armed forces but conditioned them to be 
more receptive to the nationalist ideology, promoted by Milosevic’s Socialist Party of 
Serbia (SPS) (Gow and Zverzhanovski 2013: 37). Similarly, the process of civilianisation 
of the MoD that started in 1992 with the appointment of Panic, the first civilian Minister of 
Defence (Gow 2003: 64), “was nothing more than a front” (Gow and Zverzhanovski 2013: 
57). There was no democratic control over the VJ either. Without any formal strategy, the 
functioning of the VJ was regulated by the 1992 FRY Constitution, which obliged the army 
to defend the “sovereignty, territory, independence and constitutional order” of the country 
(Art 133).  The inclusion of the provision on constitutional order created a pretext for using 
the army in internal conflicts (Popovic et al 2011: 15). Moreover, the Constitution 
introduced the Supreme Defence Council (VSO), that looked like a democratic tool of 
control but was manipulated by Milosevic to exercise control over the VJ. The VSO, that 
was composed of the federal, Serbian and Montenegrin presidents, had a poorly defined 
decision-making process and lacked accountability (Edmunds 2007: 86). Such ambiguities 
allowed Milosevic, even as the President of Serbia, to use the VJ to his own advantage. In 
addition, his regime benefited from establishing alternative chains of command in the army 
(ibid.). Although for the most part of the 1990s, the army leadership found its relationship 
with the state uncomfortable, it eventually chose to cooperate with it, to preserve the 
position of privilege it enjoyed during the Tito era (Hadzi-Vidanovic and Djuric 2007: 7).  
Nonetheless, until 1997-1998 Milosevic did not fully trust the army. Instead he turned 
his attention to the police that as a republican institution was much easier to control. Under 
a new Law on Internal Affairs (1991), the police were centralised and organised as a section 
of the Ministry of Interior (Edmunds 2007: 156).  The Serbian MoI held operational control 
also over the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo that had lost their policing 
powers (ibid.). By offering police officers higher salaries, better equipment and training, 
Milosevic was building the force loyal to his regime. Militarisation of the police was 
therefore the next logical step. The police gradually received a military appearance 
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(Popovic et al 2011: 16), military equipment and military education (Weber 2001: 44). The 
Police Academy, established in 1993, with military subjects, military-style uniforms and 
military training followed the model of the Belgrade Military Academy (Bakic and Gajic 
2006: 11). In 1995, an 18-level military ranking system made the police even more like the 
army (Trivunovic 2004: 243). With such preparations, police officers were regularly given 
rotating shifts in war zones in Croatia and BiH (Rose 2011: 41).  
In 1993, there were 80,000 police officers in Serbia, yet even that was not enough 
(Rose 2011: 41). Additionally, Belgrade established several specialised police forces and 
developed extensive links with paramilitary units as well as networks of organised crime. 
For instance, in 1992 the Serbian Security Service (RDB) and Special Police Anti-
Terrorism Unit (SAJ) were centralised and placed under the MoI control (ibid.: 40). By 
financing paramilitary groups, such as the Serbian Chetnik Movement and Serbian Guard, 
Milosevic not only strengthened his position at home but also gained an instrument for 
fighting wars in Croatia and BiH (Edmunds 2007: 154-155). As can be seen, changes in the 
police work in 1991-1995 were regressive and completely devoid of principles promoted 
by SSR.  
Border security in the FRY was ensured by the federal-level army and navy, while 
the Serbian MoI was also involved in controlling certain border crossing points (BCPs) 
(Bakic and Gajic 2006: 23). In the circumstances of war and international sanctions, many 
border officials were involved in the state-sanctioned smuggling of arms and various 
commodities (Andreas 2005: 342). Overall, in 1991 – 1995 the army, police and border 
services were bent to serve the nationalist regime to support its war activities in 
neighbouring states. The politicisation and criminalisation of key security bodies in Serbia 
at the start of the 1990s were typical of a unit, forming part of a regional conflict 
formation161. Yet Serbia, then part of the FRY, was not an ordinary unit of the Balkan 
subcomplex, but one of its poles, as discussed in Chapter 3.162 As such, its policies had a 
direct bearing on the security situation in Bosnia, Croatia, Montenegro and Kosovo, and 
left a significant imprint on other units of the subcomplex. It should be reiterated that the 
prevalent environment of this period was that of war: after suffering a defeat in Slovenia, 
the JNA became openly involved in military action in Croatia and BiH. Although after the 
introduction of the international sanctions, Milosevic suspended formal ties with the Serb 
leaders in the two countries, he continued providing them with financial and military aid 
                                                          
161
 Serbia’s development during this period can also be seen within the framework of state failure clusters, see 
Wolff (2011).  
162
 Albania represents the second pole.  
158 
 
covertly (Hadzi-Vidanovic and Djuric 2007: 5). The war dominated not only Serbia’s 
regional discourse, but also its domestic policies. It was skilfully used by the regime to 
suppress opposition and gave prominence to ultra-nationalist leaders, such as Vojislav 
Seselj163, leader of the Serbian Radical Party (SRP) (Ostojic 2014: 25).  The divisions 
between Serbian opposition parties and support of the nationalist ideology among many of 
them are two main reasons that for a long time made Milosevic the only legitimate 
interlocutor in the eyes of the international community (ibid.).  
After the wars in Croatia and BiH ended, Milosevic briefly toyed with the role of 
peace-maker to improve his relations with the international community (Popovic et al 2011: 
7). While keeping the semblance of democracy, he used the security sector to consolidate 
his power, which meant that there was not much room for SSR in 1995-1999 either. With 
no more external conflicts to fight, the country’s security apparatus had to be reduced in 
size. The reduction was achieved mainly by disbanding various paramilitary groups 
(Edmunds 2007: 155) as well as cuts and purges in the army (Ramet 2002: 341). Still, such 
actions did not bring substantial results, as in 1999, the army was nearly 110, 000 strong. 
In 1996, the VSO released the “Model of the Yugoslav Army”, that promised to transform 
the VJ into “a modern … organisation” (Sikavica 2001). Unfortunately, the plan was not 
fully implemented, and only led to a reduction of regiments (Gow and Zverzhanovski 2013: 
74). Having become the president of the FRY in 1997, with a weak MoD and practically 
non-functioning VSO (ibid.: 42), Milosevic brought the army under his full control by the 
end of 1998, right in time for the Kosovo conflict.   
Nonetheless, the police kept their position of prominence. The process of 
militarisation continued as it was a way of sidestepping the Dayton-induced arms control 
measures (Edmunds 2007: 156). As the international community monitored any changes in 
the levels of armament of the VJ, Belgrade kept investing in the military training and 
equipment for the police. During the Kosovo conflict around 40, 000 regular police (ibid.: 
183) and 50, 000 special police forces and army troops were involved in fighting (Ramet 
2002: 319), confirming the importance of the force for Milosevic. The failure of the 
Rambouillet peace plan and plight of hundreds of thousands of Albanian civilians164 
prompted NATO to start a 78-day bombing campaign in March 1999 (Edmunds 2007: 157). 
Launched without the UN approval, Operation Allied Force initially targeted Serbian forces 
in Kosovo, but quickly expanded to include strategic targets in the FRY (Ramet 2002: 327). 
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In such circumstances165, SSR was among the last things on the mind of the Belgrade elites. 
The situation with border security was not any better: borders were still militarised and the 
reinstatement of a weapons embargo against Serbia in 1998 by the UN as well as 
introduction of additional sanctions by the EU in 1998-1999 (Ramet 2002: 318) meant that 
a large proportion of border guards continued engaging in illegal activities.  
In short, in 1995-1999 Serbia’s security sector saw minimal changes, with the country 
slipping further into illiberalism, and only keeping up the appearance of democracy. The 
main difference from the previous period was in the inward-looking trajectory, pursued by 
the security actors, as they were now directed by the regime to focus on the internal situation 
in the country. War stopped dominating Serbia’s security landscape for only a few years 
and returned in 1998 with the violence in Kosovo. By initiating a campaign of ethnic 
cleansing against Kosovo Albanians, Serbia rejected the principles of reciprocity, regional 
cooperation, good neighbourliness and transparency, promoted by the Dayton Accords, 
Regional Approach, Sub-Regional Arms Control Agreement and other external initiatives. 
The security regime that started emerging in the Western Balkans after 1995, collapsed 
because of Belgrade’s inability to stick to the peaceful path. Croatia and Bosnia did not fall 
back to violence, however, and the sub-region started moving towards the European 
security community as the result of domestic political changes (as demonstrated by the fall 
of Tudjman and Milosevic) and change in the EU’s approach to the Western Balkans in 
1999, seen in the support for the Stability Plan and launch of the SAP. Yet, in 1995-1999, 
Serbia, overwhelmingly perceived by the international community as an aggressor and 
pariah state (Mladenov 2014), was still isolated. The FRY’s security sector did not receive 
any substantial external support. On the contrary, it suffered from the NATO bombing that 
significantly damaged the country’s security infrastructure166 and the UN and EU sanctions 
that nearly led the country to economic collapse (Hadzi-Vidanovic and Djuric 2007: 17).  
The end of the Kosovo conflict in 1999 and electoral defeat of Milosevic in October 
2000 offered an opportunity for change. In the Serbian security sector, however, this 
opportunity was not seized immediately due to at least three reasons. First, Serbia remained 
part of the FRY, and any attempt to reform federal institutions that included the army and 
border security was challenged by the Montenegrin ambivalence and sometimes outright 
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hostility167. Even after the FRY was transformed into the State Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro in 2003, the task of conducting SSR remained difficult. Montenegro continued 
to ignore or sabotage shared policies in anticipation of the referendum of independence, set 
by the Union’s constitutional Charter for 2006 (Dowling 2008: 183). Second, the non-
violent transfer of power in 2000 was achieved through negotiation with the security sector 
leadership, which prevented a clean break with the past. Because Vojislav Kostunica, the 
new FRY President, struck a deal with the then Chief of Staff Nebojsa Pavkovic and Zoran 
Djindjic, the future Prime Minister of Serbia, made an agreement with Ulemek Lukovic, 
commander of the Special Operations Unit (JSO), the old Milosevic cadre remained in 
place, hindering the prospect of a quick SSR (Ejdus 2010: 10). Third, SSR was postponed, 
due to a continuing power struggle between two strongest members of the DOS coalition. 
While Kostunica’s DSS and Djindjic’s DS were arguing over spheres of influence, the 
country’s security sector continued to stagnate.  
The first post-Milosevic years achieved very little in terms of transforming the 
military. It was not until 2003 that the army started seeing substantial changes. Boris Tadic, 
the new Minister of Defence, released a ten-point plan of reform to create a modern armed 
force under strict civilian control (Gow and Zverzhanovski 2013: 61). On his orders, in May 
2003 the previously independent General Staff was subordinated to the civilian control of 
the MoD, transferring to the latter its responsibilities for the personnel, education and 
procurement (ibid.: 62). Cooperation with the ICTY was also improving, but slowly. Even 
when cooperation with The Hague was included into the DPA and the FRY signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the tribunal in 1996, the ICTY remained highly 
unpopular in the country (Ostojic 2014: 58). The Law on Cooperation with the ICTY was 
passed only in April 2002, introducing a regulatory framework into Belgrade’s relationship 
with The Hague. Nonetheless, the legacy of war crimes remained a sensitive issue in Serbia. 
The country’s leadership continued to resist ICTY demands, while its security sector was 
involved in harbouring The Hague indictees, including Mladic and Karadzic. It was the 
pressure of the USA and the EU, which linked the issue to the progress with PfP and EU 
membership respectively, that brought about the emergence of a more cooperative stance 
in Serbia starting from 2005-2006 (Gow and Zverzhanovski 2013: 142). Still, the 
relationship remained strained and was slow to bring results: Milosevic, arrested in 2001, 
died in 2006 before the completion of his trial; Karadzic, arrested in 2008, was sentenced 
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to forty years in prison in March 2016 on accounts of genocide, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity (ICTY 2016), while Mladic, caught in 2011, was sentenced to life 
imprisonment after being convicted of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity 
only in 2017 (ICTY 2017). Consequently, SSR in the country suffered as the key security 
agencies struggled to deal with the legacy of war that tainted their ranks.  
Except for the adoption of several minor strategic documents, not much was achieved 
in the defence reform by 2006, when the SCG peacefully dissolved. The Strategic Defence 
Review (SDR), adopted in June 2006 based on the 2004 National Defence Strategy, 
outlined the vision for the Serbian Armed Forces (SAF) and promised to create a lean, 
modern force until 2015 (Watkins 2010: 9). While the SDR adoption was an important 
milestone, defence reform in Serbia was led more by a difficult economic situation than by 
strategic documents (Kusovac 2002). It is no wonder therefore that downsizing the army 
emerged as one of the key priorities. First attempts in this area were implemented through 
a UK-funded PRISMA initiative and via the Defence Reform Fund, launched in 2004 
(Edmunds 2007: 168). Eventually, the SAF shrank to 28, 150 in 2013 (World Bank 2016). 
Additionally, Serbia’s mandatory military service was phased out by 2010 (Gow and 
Zverzhanovski 2013: 79, 82).  
Unlike in Croatia, NATO played a limited role in defence reform in Serbia. Treated 
with suspicion and unease over its bombing campaign in Kosovo in 1999, NATO provided 
mainly technical assistance for modernisation of the army through the PfP programme, 
which Serbia joined in 2006. Any closer cooperation and the question of membership 
became unfeasible with Serbia releasing a declaration of military neutrality in December 
2007 (Popovic et al 2011: 35). Adopted in anticipation of Kosovo’s independence, this 
vague and underdeveloped resolution, significantly slowed down the course of Serbia’s 
defence reform. In the absence of NATO’s leadership, the EU had to become more active 
in the reform. Thus, several strategic documents on defence, such as the Law on Defence, 
Law on Armed Forces, National Security Strategy and a new Defence Strategy, all released 
in 2009, were developed under the EU’s guidance (Milic 2014: 21; Ejdus 2010: 19). These 
documents reiterated Serbia’s commitment to the rule of law, transparency and democratic 
civilian control. Their value, however, was undermined by the fact that they were adopted 
without a systematic plan and full harmonisation with the constitution (Ejdus 2010: 19).  
A lack of comprehensive approach was evident in police reform, too. Prime Minister 
Djindjic, who was believed to have co-opted police leaders to support the peaceful transfer 
of power, approached the reform selectively (Rose 2011: 44). Driven by budget needs, he 
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prioritised areas that could improve the country’s economic situation. The fight against 
organised crime was among the first issues he tackled. In 2002, the parliament adopted a 
new Criminal Procedure Law and Law on Organised Crime that set up a series of new 
bodies, including a special prosecutor’s office and a new police unit for combating 
organised crime (ibid.: 45). Efforts were also made to make secret services, notorious for 
their links with organised crime in the 1990s, more accountable and transparent. The 2002 
Law on Security Information Agency, for example, transformed the RDB into a security 
information agency (BIA), separated it from the MoI and put it under the government 
control (Watkins 2010: 10). The assassination of Djindjic on 12 March 2003 highlighted 
both the importance of work started, and the shallowness of results achieved. Operation 
Sabre launched by the government in the aftermath revealed complex and deep connections 
between organised crime and security sector (Popovic et al 2011: 30). Scores of police 
officers and military personnel were investigated and indicted for links with organised 
crime, while the JSO, implicated in the murder, was disbanded (Edmunds 2007: 95; 
Caparini 2006: 18-39).  
An impetus for the reform was given by the Law on Police (2005) that emphasised 
demilitarisation, depoliticization and professionalisation of the service (Milic 2012: 2). As 
the result, military ranks were abolished (Popovic et al 2011: 31) and political influence on 
appointments and promotion in the police was reduced (Ejdus 2010: 14). The separation of 
police from the MoI and requirement for the Chief of Police to be civilian further improved 
the service.  Other notable changes included the reduction of personnel, that in 2006 
dropped to 26, 527 of uniformed officers and 42, 720 MoI employees (Rose 2011: 73), 
reform of police education, provided by the Academy of Criminalisation and Police Studies 
from 2006 (ACPS n.d.), and strengthening of civilian and democratic oversight. The latter, 
not without problems, is provided through several new and reformed bodies, such as the 
parliamentary Defence and Security Committee that also oversees defence matters and the 
Internal Affairs Sector of the MoI (MoI RS n.d.). The 2011 Law on Police and 2013 Law 
on Private security provide evidence that Serbia’s police reform was not finished in 2005-
2006. 
It is important to note that the reform of police attracted a more active participation 
of external actors than defence reform. The OSCE, supported by the EU, assisted with the 
development of the Multi-Ethnic Police Element (MEPE) and community policing after the 
insurgency of ethnic Albanians in South Serbia in 2000-2001 (Bakic and Gajic 2006: 3-6). 
The first reform programmes in the sphere of policing, the so-called Monk and Slater 
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reports, were prepared by the OSCE and Council of Europe, and not by the government 
(Trivunovic 2004: 245-246). Still, while help provided by external donors was useful, it 
failed to shape the reform because it followed a project-based, rather than comprehensive 
approach (Watkins 2010: 11). With time, police reform has become one of the key areas of 
negotiation in Serbia’s membership talks with the EU (Popovic et al 2011: 36).  
Border reform in Serbia was externally-driven, too. After plans to set up a Border 
Police Service in 2000-2001 by the Federal MoI fell through due to Montenegro’s 
ambivalence, the first strategic documents on transferring border security from the military 
to the police were released with the assistance of the OSCE, DCAF, the Stability Pact and 
the EU’s European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) (Bakic and Gajic 2006: 23-24). 
Moreover, following the Ohrid Process, Serbia committed to implementing the Integrated 
Border Management, developed by the EU to promote legitimate cross-border activities 
and eradicate illegal ones (Watkins 2010: 11). The Border Police directorate assumed 
control over the first border posts along the Hungarian border in October 2005, finalising 
the transfer in December 2006 (Rose 2011: 98). Yet, the demilitarisation of borders was 
only completed in 2008, with the adoption of the Law on Protection of the State Border 
(ibid.: 70).  
Overall, by 2013 SSR in Serbia had some important achievements: most legal 
provisions regulating the work of security bodies were harmonised with international 
standards; the rule of law, transparency and accountability were recognised as key values 
in the sector; the police and army were put under democratic and civilian control, and border 
security was demilitarised. The progress is considerable, especially looking at the starting 
point in the 1990s, when Milosevic used the security sector to fight wars in the 
neighbourhood, oppress opposition and increase his grip over the country. In 2013, Serbia 
was no longer a piranha state, but a member of the developing security community in the 
Western Balkans, attached to the EU core.  
Nonetheless, SSR in Serbia has not been smooth. Due to the unresolved issue of 
statehood, the legacy of four wars, continuous power struggle between political elites, the 
Kosovo problem and strained relations with external actors, SSR posed many challenges 
for the Serbian government. Thus, with the institutional framework for democratic 
governance of the security sector largely in place, there have been problems with practical 
implementation of their tasks, while many legal acts, such as the Law on Defence and Law 
on Police required amendments. Moreover, only border reform went through a 
comprehensive reform, led by an IBM strategy. Military and police reforms, on the other 
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hand, were approached selectively, responding to the requirements of the market and 
external actors, meaning that in 2013 SSR in the country was far from complete. The 
remainder of the chapter looks at SSR in Serbia in more detail but from the point of the 
EU’s impact on it.   
 
The role of the EU in transforming the security sector of Serbia (1991-2013) 
 
The EU and Serbian security in 1991-1995 
With Serbia providing support to its para-states in Croatia and Bosnia in 1991-
1995168, the EU’s engagement with the country had a predominantly punitive character169. 
In the absence of SSR-related activities on the EU’s part, it is still important to analyse the 
engagement of the bloc in Serbian security during this period for at least three reasons. First, 
to ensure consistency of the research that distinguishes three main periods within the 1991-
2013 timeframe both on regional and national levels of analysis. Second, to appreciate the 
evolution of the EU as an actor of SSR, and third, to better understand the scale of transition 
the Serbian security sector underwent in the studied period. While SSR rarely starts from a 
blank sheet, it is crucial to look at the past to fully comprehend the factors that enabled and/ 
or hindered the change of behaviours, norms and values of key security actors in the country 
(Gow and Zverzhanovski 2013: 22). This section differentiates three main ways through 
which the EU affected the security situation in Serbia as part of the SFRY/FRY in 1991-
1995, namely: the introduction of independent EU sanctions against Yugoslavia, support 
for the implementation of the UN sanctions and work of the Arbitration Commission. 
On 5 July 1991, the EC and its member states imposed an embargo on armaments and 
military equipment applicable to the whole of Yugoslavia and called on other international 
actors to follow suit (EPC 1991). The USA joined the EC embargo on 8 July, the OSCE on 
4 September 1991, while the UN Security adopted resolution 713 on 25 September 1991 
(Blockmans 2007: 114). Instead of stopping or at least limiting Serb aggression, the arms 
embargoes set the balance of military power in Serbia’s favour (Lopez 2000: 74). Having 
kept the majority of the JNA assets, Serbia was least affected by these punitive measures. 
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The EC/EU left a much stronger impact on Serbia through its economic sanctions. 
Frustrated with the Yugoslav republics’ failure to uphold a series of ceasefires and accept 
a peace plan presented at the Conference on Yugoslavia at The Hague in October 1991, the 
EC unilaterally suspended the trade concessions provided for by the 1980 Cooperation 
Agreement between the European Economic Community (EEC) and the SFRY on 11 
November 1991 (Council of the EU 1991). The Agreement became inactive on 26 May 
1992 (Blockmans 2007: 119). Additionally, the EC suspended the generalised System of 
Preferences benefits, PHARE assistance, food aid and financial cooperation (Ginsberg 
2001: 66). On 2 December 1991, backdating the decision to 15 November 1991, the EC 
restored trade concessions and financial aid to all Yugoslav republics, but Serbia and 
Montenegro170 (Council of the EU 1991a). In May 1992, to punish the FRY for its 
offensives against Bosnia, the EC imposed a trade embargo on the country. These actions, 
while isolating Serbia and Montenegro and hurting the state economically, contributed to 
the consolidation of the Milosevic regime. They also significantly dampened the 
relationship between Belgrade and Brussels, giving Milosevic pretext to portray the EC as 
an untrustworthy and biased mediator (Ginsberg 2001: 77).  
It should be mentioned that at the time, sanctions were one of the few tools used by 
the EC/EU that was yielding results. Serbia was acting as a pariah state (Mladenov 2014) 
by providing covert help to Bosnian and Croatian Serbs and relying on illicit networks, 
closely linked with organised crime, to finance the Milosevic regime. The EU therefore 
needed a way to demonstrate such behaviour would not be tolerated. After several failed 
attempts at stopping Yugoslavia’s disintegration through diplomatic measures, it turned to 
economic instruments as means of influencing the warring parties. With the first sanctions 
launched before the emergence of the CFSP, the EC showed remarkable level of 
cooperation, considering that the arms embargo was the competence of its member states 
(Blockmans 2007: 117). Later, when the violence erupted in Kosovo, the EU would resort 
to sanctions again, which can be interpreted as a sign of it believing in their effectiveness. 
The choice can also be explained by the lack of alternatives in the EU’s foreign policy 
toolkit. After all, CSDP would only be developed in the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict. 
Apart from implementing its autonomous sanctions, the EC/EU also supported the 
UN sanction regime. The UN Security Council imposed comprehensive sanctions on the 
FRY in resolution 757 on 30 May 1992. This document provided the foundation for all later 
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sanctions that were extended to inter alia target Yugoslav assets abroad and limit its goods 
transshipments (Lopez 2000: 74). To assist the UN with the monitoring and enforcement 
of the regime, the EU worked through the Sanctions Assistance Missions (SAMs) and the 
WEU operations. The SAMs were set up by the OSCE in seven Eastern and South-East 
European states in 1992 and 1993 and relied heavily on EU contributions. The European 
officers worked together with Americans and Canadians at border posts throughout the 
region, feeding back information to the SAM Communication Centre in Brussels, financed 
and partly staffed by the EU (Caruso 2007: 88). In July 1992, the WEU171 embarked on an 
operation in the Adriatic to supervise the implementation of the UN arms embargo against 
the former Yugoslavia (WEU 2000: 15). NATO conducted its own operation in the area, 
until in June 1993 it was decided to combine these efforts with the WEU for Operation 
Sharp Guard (ibid.). Both the SAMs and WEU actions, as well as the UN sanctions, were 
terminated after the signing of the Dayton Agreement (ibid.). The EU arms embargo, 
however, remained in place. 
Although the primary goals of sanctions, implemented by the EU in the early 1990s 
were to stop violence, persuade Milosevic to exert pressure on Bosnian Serbs172 and uphold 
human rights (Portela 2005: 98), they unintentionally led to the criminalisation of the FRY. 
The EU and UN sanctions were therefore part of the enabling environment173 for 
criminalisation that manifested itself in state-sponsored organised crime, flourishing 
underground economy, society-wide tolerance of smuggling and regional clandestine 
networks, typical of regional conflict formations (Andreas 2005: 336-337). The security 
sector, due to its closeness to the Milosevic regime, played a special role in institutionalising 
organised crime in the country. Military leaders were engaged in smuggling oil to Serbia 
and Montenegro, and arms to Croatian and Bosnian Serbs, while the state security apparatus 
and MoI oversaw and coordinated the state-sponsored embargo-busting system (ibid.: 342). 
Although it is difficult to measure to what extent the criminalisation of the FRY was enabled 
by the international sanctions in general and the EU contribution in particular, the 
(unintended) link between comprehensive sanctions and criminalisation of the state cannot 
be denied (ibid.: 337-338).  
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Finally, the EC/EU influenced the trajectory of Serbia’s development via the work of 
the Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia. For the purposes of this study, Opinions 2 and 
3 of the Commission are of most importance as they can be said to have shaped Serbia 
(initially, within the FRY) and consequently its security sector174. When the Serbian 
population in Croatia and BiH was not granted the right of self-determination under 
international law in Opinion 2175, Milosevic’s aspirations for a Greater Serbia suffered a 
blow. Primarily, however, this decision meant that Serbian para-states in Croatia and 
Bosnia could not be given international recognition. Opinion 3, which is analysed in detail 
in the previous chapter, cemented this view by admitting that only former internal 
boundaries that were used between SFRY republics for administrative purposes could be 
regarded as international borders (Blockmans 2007: 146). To prevent escalation of violence 
and deter warring parties from redrawing borders by force, the EU used a principle of 
boundary delimitation as the principal tool for determining not only the shape of new 
territorial entities176 but also their international personality as states (Craven 1996: 390). As 
a result, Kosovo and Vojvodina remained parts of Serbia and did not get a chance to become 
independent. It should be noted, however, that Serbia and Montenegro decided to remain 
together due to the workings of the Milosevic regime, rather than under EU pressure177. 
The latter would be crucial for the emergence of the SCG in a decade’s time.  In short, the 
Arbitration Commission’s work effected Serbia’s international standing, its personality as 
a state and the position of its external borders; it also contributed to deepening the anti-EU 
sentiment in the country. Although formally an independent body, it was convened by the 
EC, which meant Serbia’s dissatisfaction with the decisions of the Commission turned into 
dissatisfaction with the EC’s mediation effort (ibid.).  
Overall, the EU-Serbia relations in the early 1990s were strained. While remaining 
committed to peaceful solution of the Balkan conflicts, the EU gave preference to punitive 
measures in its relations with Belgrade. These measures, having no military backing, while 
weakening the FRY’s economy, did not stop violence in the region and to a certain extent 
aggravated the situation. The arms embargo against all Yugoslav republics, gave Serbia, in 
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charge of the JNA, a military advantage, while support to the UN comprehensive sanctions 
aggravated criminalisation of the state and its security sector. The Badinter Commission 
prepared a legal framework that regulated the dissolution of Yugoslavia (Craven 1996: 
335), further alienating Milosevic. These negative dynamics, propped up by Belgrade’s 
distrust of Brussels, did not allow the latter to have a tangible effect on Serbia’s security 
sector. The ending of Croatia’s war and cessation of hostilities in BiH in 1995 offered the 
EU new opportunities of influence, or so it at first seemed. 
 
The EU’s impact on SSR in Serbia in 1995-1999 
In 1995-1996, Milosevic appeared to be embracing the role of regional peace-maker. 
Having enforced a comprehensive set of UN sanctions178 against the Bosnian Serbs in 
August 1994 (Lopez 2000: 75) and signed the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) on behalf 
of the FRY and the Republika Srpska in December 1995, he was portraying himself as a 
guarantor of peace in the region (Ostojic 2014: 27). His intentions seemed genuine when 
the FRY, together with BiH and Croatia, concluded the Sub-Regional Arms Control 
Agreement, provided for by Article IV, Annex 1B of the DPA, on 14 June 1996. To reward 
this behaviour, the UN formally ended its sanctions on the FRY on 2 October 1996 
(Associated Press 1996), and the EU granted it with autonomous trade preferences in 1997 
(Papadimitriou 2001: 74). Still, the reciprocity and regional cooperation, brought to the 
Western Balkans through a combination of negotiation and external imposition did not take 
hold. In early 1998, as the situation in Kosovo was flaring up, Serbia179 chose to resort to 
violence, abandoning the peaceful path and tilting security balance in the region towards 
the negative pole of interdependence again. The fragile security regime in the Western 
Balkans started crumbling due to the actions of a single member, which according to the 
theory of regimes was not that uncommon (Jervis 1982: 359). Although violence was 
contained in Serbia, it had reverberations throughout the Western Balkans: Albania and 
FYROM were flooded with refugees180, tensions in BiH were running high (ICG 1999), 
while Croatia and Montenegro, as well as the region more widely, suffered economically 
from the damage to trade routes and plummeting investor confidence (IMF 1999).  
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It was envisaged that from 1996 the EU-FRY relations would be mostly regulated 
through the Regional Approach that was introduced to support the implementation of the 
DPA and promote regional cooperation. Given Serbia’s response to the Kosovo Liberation 
Army’s (KLA) rebellion, which was interpreted as disregard for the fundamental principles 
of democracy and human rights, the EU froze nearly all contractual relationships with the 
FRY in 1998 (EC 1998a: 2; Papadimitrou 2001: 76). It is noteworthy that from this time 
forward, the EU started making a distinction between Serbia and Montenegro, commending 
the latter for its commitment to democratic reform and reprimanding the former for the 
open conflict in Kosovo (EC 1998b: 4). In the circumstances of the Kosovo war, the RA 
was ignored by Serbia/the FRY. Nonetheless, the EU continued using RA documentation 
to monitor the situation in the country and highlight policy issues that required 
improvement, including in the security sector. Specifically, the EU focused on cooperation 
with the ICTY, police practices, regional cooperation and the issue of state power, which 
had importance for the political level of SSR.  
In terms of the ICTY, the European Commission criticised the FRY for failing to 
bring known indicted war criminals to The Hague and influence the RS to fulfil its Dayton 
obligations (EC 1997a: 15). The only exception was the transfer of one Croat serving in the 
Bosnian Serb army (ibid.). By reiterating the idea that extradition of indictees would violate 
the FRY constitution, Yugoslav officials advocated war trials at home (EC 1998: 18). The 
EU, like other members of the international community at the time (Stojanovic 2009: 82), 
did not go beyond criticism and was unable to make the FRY change its stance. It handled 
the issue of police brutality in Serbia in a similar way. When the police used violence to 
disperse protests against manipulation of the November 1996 local elections and applied 
force against thousands of students and academic staff protesting against a new university 
law in 1997, the Commission expressed concern over the violation of the right of peaceful 
assembly but did not provide help to change the police ways in the country (EC 1997a: 13; 
EC 1998b: 15). Given Milosevic’s disdain for the EU and a worsening situation in Kosvo, 
it is likely that such help would be rejected, yet it is important to emphasise that support for 
the Serbian security actors was not something the EU considered in 1995-1999.  
Regional cooperation was promoted by the EU as a means of stabilising the Western 
Balkans and achieving return to normality. From the point of view of SSR, the EU’s 
preoccupation with normalising border relations deserves special attention. Thus, the EU 
reacted favourably to the news of the FRY making progress on restoring border traffic and 
BCPs with Croatia as part of a broader package of inter-state cooperation (EC 1997a: 15; 
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EC 1998: 18). The deterioration of relations with Albania over the Kosovo issue and mutual 
accusations about the violation of air space and border areas, on the other hand, were met 
with concern (EC 1998b: 18). As with the issues of the ICTY cooperation and police 
violence, however, the EU limited itself to mildly indignant remarks, without offering any 
credible solution to the problems.  
Finally, by shedding light on the FRY’s lack of respect for democratic principles, the 
EU touched upon some issues of relevance for the political level of SSR. Although the 
security sector was not mentioned directly in the RA reports when they discussed a 
widening gap between the FRY and Serbia’s legislation and their practical implementation, 
these documents should not be ignored as they demonstrate the bloc’s commitment to 
helping the Western Balkans get closer to international and European standards of 
democratic governance, which is of utmost importance for SSR. Specifically, Serbia was 
criticised for poor government accountability and absence of effective separation of powers 
(EC 1997a: 12). The imbalance between federal and republican competences, with Serbia 
considerably overpowering Montenegro, was perceived as a constraint for the democratic 
development of the country (EC 1998b: 13). Later, when Serbia, first as part of the SCG 
and since 2006 on its own, started pursuing the European membership, the EU would 
emphasise the need for a democratic and civilian oversight of the security sector more 
explicitly.  
As can be seen, the Regional Approach had only indirect significance for Serbia’s 
SSR. Given little interest in the initiative in the FRY, it was mainly used as a monitoring 
tool by the EU, and not as a reform instrument. Although, the monitoring process via the 
RA could not provide the EU with the same amount of information as it received from the 
ECMM missions in Croatia and BiH, it was still an important way of demonstrating the 
bloc’s interest in stabilising the FRY and the region as a whole. It was also the first attempt 
on behalf of the EU to set conditions and standards for the FRY that touched upon aspects 
of the security sector’s work and management. The Kosovo war precluded the Union from 
developing this conditionality further and prompted it to bring back the policy of sanctions.  
In 1998-2000, the EU imposed a series of autonomous sanctions against the FRY that 
included an arms embargo, travel restrictions, an oil embargo and a range of financial 
restrictions181. The first three categories had special significance for the FRY’s security 
sector and therefore require further analysis. It is important to acknowledge that the EU 
sanctions followed mostly from the decisions of the Contact Group on Yugoslavia and were 
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independent from the UN Security Council. Frustrated with Russia’s slow decision-making 
within the group and hesitation in the UN, the EU members of the Contact Group decided 
to act through the CFSP (Buchet de Neuilly 2008: 3).  The decisions were reached relatively 
fast due to a vague language that remained open to interpretation182. The degree of unity 
demonstrated by the EU member states in responding to the Kosovo conflict was still 
notable. Here, the CFSP that was not around during the start of conflicts in Croatia and BiH, 
was put to use rather quickly. Another point to make is that the objectives of the EU 
sanctions changed over time (de Vries 2002: 90). In the spring of 1998, they were aimed at 
prompting the FRY to stop the oppression of the Albanian population in Kosovo. Towards 
the end of the year the goal was to persuade Milosevic to negotiate a political solution to 
the war (ibid.). Finally, the EU ramped up the severity of its restrictive measures to oust the 
Milosevic regime to make such a solution possible (ibid.). Additionally, the sanctions were 
aimed at bringing peace and lasting stability to the region (Council of the EU 1999).  
The EU sanctions were not comprehensive, but aimed at various sectors, including 
the security sectors of the FRY and Serbia. The arms embargo was targeting them most 
directly. While the UN embargo was suspended in November 1995 and lifted in October 
1996, the EU with the 1996 Common Position 96/184/CFSP kept its own restrictions on 
arms, munitions and military equipment against the FRY, BiH and Croatia in place (Council 
of the EU 1996). When the situation in Kosovo deteriorated, there was no need for the 
introduction of a new arms embargo183: on 19 March 1998, the EU simply reaffirmed its 
embargo from 1996 with Common Position 98/240/CFSP and supplemented it with the 
prohibition on export to the FRY of equipment that could be used for internal repression or 
terrorism (Council of the EU 1998). Although it is problematic to assess the effectiveness 
of the EU arms embargo, the same as its sanctions on the FRY over Kosovo more generally, 
as they were implemented alongside the UN sanctions (de Vries 2002: 88), it is still possible 
to make some observations about their effect on the country’s security sector.  
Under the 1996 Sub-Regional Arms Control Agreement, the FRY was required to 
reduce holdings in five categories of traditional armaments to approximately 75 per cent of 
its 1996 levels (OSCE 2014: 2). Although, it was a substantial reduction in its military 
power, the FRY kept the highest number of arms in the region. The introduction of the EU 
arms embargo in 1998 therefore could not disadvantage the country too much. It did, 
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however, put the Kosovo side in a precarious position as it was subject to the sanctions, 
too184. Additionally, Milosevic was not that worried about the arms embargoes because he 
could rely on illicit networks, tried and tested during the wars in Croatia and BiH and 
because for years he had been investing in militarising the police (Ramet 2002: 318-19, 
339). Taking this into consideration, perhaps the biggest result of the EU arms embargo and 
its sanction regime more generally, was exacerbation of the anti-EU sentiment among the 
Serbian state and security elites. The travel restrictions185 which inter alia introduced a visa 
ban on the FRY and Serbian representatives with clear security responsibilities, implicated 
in repressive action in Kosovo, is especially well placed for demonstrating this effect. 
Initially, by adopting Common Position 98/240/CFSP on 19 March 1998, the EU 
identified only ten high-profile security officials from the FRY for non-admission in the 
territories of its member states. The document stipulated, however, that the list would be 
extended to other officials if they refused to respect demands of the international 
community. After releasing a second list with the names of persons who acted against the 
independent media in December 1998186, the EU took around six months to formulate the 
position that imposed visa restrictions on Milosevic, his family, all ministers and senior 
officials of the FRY and Serbian governments as well as leaders of the military, police and 
security services (Council of the EU 1999a). By identifying the security sector leadership 
as a separate group, the EU recognised its strong link with the Belgrade regime. It also made 
itself widely unpopular among the security top brass. In 2000, more police and army 
personnel were added to the list, which grew to nearly 800 names187 (Blockmans 2007: 
159-160). After the removal of Milosevic from office in October and parliamentary 
elections in December 2000, the list of visa restrictions was significantly reduced to include 
Milosevic himself, his family members and several persons indicted by the ICTY, among 
the latter – Dragoljub Ojdanic, Former Minister of Defence and Vlajko Stojilkovic, Former 
Minister of the Interior (Council of the EU 2001). The travel restrictions inconvenienced 
high-ranking security personnel from the FRY and Serbia by preventing them from 
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travelling freely to the EU, yet there is not enough evidence to suggest they were effective 
in making the persons they targeted change their behaviour (Blockmans 2007:170).   
The effectiveness of the oil embargo raised questions, too. Introduced by Council 
Regulation (EC) 900/1999, which became effective on 1 May 1999, it banned the sale, 
supply and export of petroleum and petroleum products to all parts of the FRY188, primarily 
to deprive the VJ of means to conduct military operations and repressive action in Kosovo 
(de Vries 2002: 95). It is widely believed that the imposition of the oil embargo by the EU 
provided substantial support to NATO’s bombing campaign and was among the factors that 
convinced Milosevic to withdraw from Kosovo (Hoist 2000; de Vries 2002: 95; Blockmans 
2007: 170). From this perspective, the restrictive action was quite effective; on the other 
hand, some critics argue that the continuation of the oil embargo after the end of the military 
intervention contributed to further criminalisation of the economy as the regime profited 
from smuggling gasoline and other petroleum products (Hoist 2000; Blockmans 2007: 170). 
This “second round of oil embargo”, launched on 4 October 1999, eased petroleum 
restrictions for Kosovo and Montenegro, reflecting the EU’s determination to bring about 
the change of regime in Belgrade and its commitment to achieving regional peace and 
stability (Council of the EU 1999e; Portela 2005: 110). It was partially suspended in March 
2000 and fully lifted in October 2000, following the electoral defeat of Milosevic (de Vries 
2002: 96).  
To sum up, despite initial optimism over Milosevic’s role as a guarantor of peace in 
the region, the EU did not engage in SSR in Serbia in 1995-1999 directly.  It attempted to 
set conditions for certain aspects of the security sector via the Regional Approach, but with 
Serbia opting for a military solution to the conflict in Kosovo that threw the region back to 
the negative pole of security interdependence, was unable to convince Belgrade to 
cooperate. As a result, the RA provisions on cooperation with the ICTY, policing, border 
security and requirements for effective separation of powers remained ignored by the 
Milosevic regime. With violence returning to the Western Balkans, the EU was quick to 
utilise the CSFP to reinstate sanctions against the FRY and Serbia. The security sector was 
mostly targeted through the arms embargo, travel restrictions and oil embargo. Although 
these restrictive measures had mixed results, they contributed to the weakening of the 
Milosevic regime by isolating Serbia, even from its FRY partner, Montenegro. They also 
unintentionally led to the aggravation of the anti-EU sentiments among the Serbian security 
                                                          
188
 Exceptions applied to humanitarian action and diplomatic/consular missions, including NATO aircraft, see 
Council of the EU (1999d). 
174 
 
leadership. These feelings of unease and distrust of the EU would continue in the post-
Milosevic era, making the task of SSR even more challenging. 
 
The EU’s impact on SSR in Serbia in 1999-2013 
Although the ousting of Milosevic created a favourable environment for Serbia’s 
transformation, the reform processes in the FRY were not smooth. Relations with the EU 
remained strained due to virtually non-existent cooperation with the ICTY, a highly 
fragmented domestic political scene, the unresolved Kosovo question and uncertain future 
of the Yugoslav federation itself (Edmunds 2007: 216). In such circumstances, security 
sector reform did not receive as much attention from the EU as it deserved. Nonetheless, as 
Serbia worked on improving its relationship with the bloc, the EU started promoting the 
SSR agenda more forcefully.  
The framework for the EU’s engagement with Serbia’s SSR, just like in Croatia, was 
provided by the Stabilisation and Association Process. The SAP signalled the end of an era 
of sanctions and start of the process of European integration (Pippan 2004: 220). The 
normalisation of political situation in Serbia was seen by the EU as crucial not just for the 
recovery of the country, but also for bringing lasting peace to the Western Balkans.189 
Unlike Croatia, Serbia was unable to progress quickly towards signing the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement, although the FRY expressed commitment to the SAP already in 
November 2000 at the Zagreb Summit (Tocci 2007: 90). The growing disagreement 
between Montenegro and Serbia was among the factors holding back the FRY. To avoid 
the resurgence of violence and discourage other independence movements in the Western 
Balkans, the EU employed the diplomacy of the High Representative for the CFSP, Javier 
Solana, to convince Podgorica and Belgrade to stay together (Caruso 2007: 80). On the 
promise of a more favourable road to EU membership (Noutcheva 2012: 70), on 14 March 
2002, the leaders of Serbia, Montenegro and the FRY signed the “Belgrade Agreement”190 
which transformed the federal Yugoslavia into a union of semi-independent states with 
shared defence and foreign policies, but separate economic systems (Caruso 2007: 80). 
Having received a positive outcome on the Feasibility Study for accession (EC 2005b), the 
State Union began negotiations on the SAA in November 2005, but already in May 2006 
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the EU suspended them over insufficient cooperation with the ICTY (EC 2006f: 4-5). 
Shortly after this decision, Montenegro voted for independence in the referendum.   
Following improvements in Belgrade’s relations with The Hague, the SAA talks were 
resumed in June 2007. Serbia signed the SAA with the EU on 29 April 2008, applied for 
EU membership on 22 December 2009 and received the candidate status on 1 March 2012 
(EC 2016b). The SAA entered into force in September 2013, while the European Council 
approved the accession negotiation framework for Serbia in December 2013 (ibid.). A 
nearly five-year gap between the signing and implementation of the SAA can be explained 
by Serbia’s reluctance to ensure full cooperation with the ICTY and complication of 
relations with Kosovo that unilaterally declared independence in February 2008. The door 
to membership was only opened when Serbia arrested and transferred to The Hague two 
remaining ICTY fugitives, Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic in 2011, and when it showed 
commitment to the EU-facilitated dialogue with Pristina, signing the ‘‘First agreement of 
principles governing the normalisation of relations” in April 2013. Except for an armed 
insurgency in South Serbia in 2001 and the 2003 assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic, 
the security situation in Serbia after 1999 was largely stable. A peaceful split of the SCG in 
May 2006 and Belgrade’s preference for legal and diplomatic measures to contest Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence191 confirmed that the Serbian elites saw the country’s future 
defined by peace and cooperation rather than war and confrontation. Security sector reform 
was one of the tools that prompted this realisation.  
The EU’s role in Serbia’s SSR in 2000-2013 has been described as 
compartmentalised and inconsistent192, but at the same time pragmatic, transformative193 
and constantly evolving194. This variance of opinion can be partially explained by the lack 
of a single, EU-facilitated, SSR programme for Serbia. Like in Croatia, in Serbia EU 
requirements for SSR need to be distilled from a variety of sources, such as the SAA and 
accession negotiations. The SAA touches upon elements of defence, police and border 
reforms in Articles 80-87 that are united under Title VII “Justice, Freedom and Security” 
as well as in more general sections under Title II “Political Dialogue” (Art. 10-13) and Title 
III “Regional Cooperation” (14-17) (SAA 2013). Before the SAA was enforced, however, 
demands for change in the work and management of Serbia’s security sector could be 
                                                          
191
 February 2008 saw some violent clashes over the declaration of independence by Kosovo, yet the Serbian 
government vowed to use only peaceful means to contest the issue (EC 2008b: 50-51).   
192
 Interview of the author with a representative of Serbian civil society working on SSR issues, conducted in 
September 2016. 
193
 Interview of the author with an OSCE official involved in SSR activities in Serbia, conducted in September 
2016.  
194
 Interview of the author with a security expert working at the Serbian MoI, conducted in September 2016.  
176 
 
derived from the European Partnership, adopted in 2004 and updated in 2006 and 2008, that 
defined short- and medium-term reform priorities for the country. The European 
Commission’s annual progress reports scrutinised changes in the Serbian security sector 
through sections on political criteria and European standards in Justice, Freedom and 
Security195. From 2011, when the Commission released its Opinion on Serbia’s application 
for EU membership, benchmarks for SSR were included into the political criteria, which 
apart from the stability of institutions, required Serbia to commit to regional cooperation 
and comply with the ICTY requirements, and Chapters 23, 24 and 31. As this thesis focuses 
only on the army, police and border services and omits judiciary, Chapter 23 is left out from 
the analysis.  
By framing SSR in Serbia through the SAP, the EU offered financial assistance to the 
country in general and its security sector in particular through the CARDS National 
Programme 2001-2006, CARDS Regional Programme 2001-2006 and IPA in 2007-
2013196. Within CARDS, projects on JHA and IBM had direct significance for SSR, while 
IPA offered SSR support through projects within the sub-components of Political 
Requirements and European Standards, as well as the component of Cross-border 
Cooperation. Through all these instruments the EU pursued a broad range of goals in SSR 
that inter alia included the achievement of civilian control over Serbia’s security sector, 
democratisation and depoliticisation of the army and the police, tackling the legacy of war, 
attainment of effective and efficient border controls and strengthening of security 
cooperation on the regional level. In short, the SSR activities attempted by the EU between 
2000 and 2013 were targeting both political and organisational levels of the reform.  
Like Croatia, Serbia experienced the EU’s impact on the political level of SSR in 
three areas: oversight of the security sector, cooperation with the ICTY and regional 
cooperation. The constitutional and legal uncertainty surrounding the FRY and SCG 
prompted the bloc to also pay attention to the questions of state consolidation, which 
introduced another dimension to the reform in Serbia. Thus, the EU emphasised the 
question of separation of power, not just between the legislative, executive and judicial 
branches but also between the federal/State-Union and republican level. In the security 
sector, shared competences in defence and border security were of particular concern for 
the EU (EC 2005c: 52). The disintegration of the SCG in May 2006 removed this extra 
layer and allowed the Union to refocus its attention in Serbia on the same issues that it 
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prioritised throughout the Western Balkans (EC 2008b: 3). Nonetheless, in 2008, the 
Kosovo issue brought the state-consolidation agenda back into spotlight.  
The oversight of the security sector in Serbia was monitored by the EU through the 
work of the parliament, government and independent regulatory bodies. Additionally, given 
problems with statehood in the country, the bloc traced changes to the Constitution, pointing 
out discrepancies with European standards (EC 2007d: 6; EC 2012b: 6). Security 
institutions were identified as an important part of the state infrastructure that instead of 
supporting the country’s transition to democracy and the rule of law was obstructing it (EC 
2005c: 9-10). To change the situation, the EU insisted on the establishment of democratic 
control over the army, police and security forces more generally. As a result, progress 
reports of the European Commission regularly included a section on the civilian control of 
the security sector197. Although these sections are often criticised as superficial (Milic 2014: 
53-54), they should not be disregarded as the EU used them to highlight weaknesses in the 
oversight mechanisms of the security sector in Serbia throughout the entire researched 
period, and if taken together they can be seen as an EU guide on the democratic security 
governance.  
The basic structure of the security governance in the country was introduced with the 
2006 Constitution, yet legislative and institutional changes continued to be added later, even 
after the final year of analysis. The Constitution granted security-related responsibilities to 
the National Assembly, i.e. parliament, executive actors, including the president who is the 
Commander in Chief of the SAF, judiciary198, independent regulatory bodies and the public. 
The EU engaged with each branch of the security sector governance in Serbia, albeit neither 
comprehensively nor consistently. The parliament, according to Article 99 of the 
Constitution, decides on war and peace, supervises the work of security services and adopts 
strategic documents, such as the Defence Strategy. It also adopts legislation regulating the 
functioning of the security sector and approves its budgetary resources (Milic 2014: 74). 
As a traditionally weak institution in the Serbian political system (Ejdus 2010: 15), the 
parliament was closely monitored by the EU. Its security functions were regularly 
characterised as limited, weak and inconsistent (EC 2006f:9; EC 2009b: 8; EC 2011a: 11).   
When the Committee for Defence and Security was constituted in 2007, the European 
Commission started expressing concern over its limited resources, lack of specialist staff 
and broad jurisdiction, covering defence, internal affairs and intelligence issues (EC 2007d: 
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9; EC 2010d: 9). In a way, the division of this body into the Defence and Internal Affairs 
Committee and Security Services Control Committee, in 2010, was a response to the EU 
criticism (EC 2011a: 23). While the split was welcomed by the EU, the parliamentary 
oversight in Serbia in 2013 was still modest (EC 2012b: 9; EC 2013b: 10). Apart from 
advising the National Assembly on organising the work of its security committee(s), the 
EU influenced parliamentary control of the security sector in Serbia indirectly through 
activities aimed at strengthening the country’s parliamentary democracy. For example, it 
advised on changes to key legislation to harmonise it with European standards199 and 
created opportunities for MPs and parliamentary staff to participate in study visits to 
Brussels and Strasbourg (Milic 2014: 59-60). It should be noted that in most cases staff of 
parliamentary committees on security issues were not targeted specifically but benefited 
from EU support alongside their colleagues from other parliamentary bodies (ibid.).   
Executive bodies responsible for the civilian control of the security sector in Serbia 
were targeted by the EU even less consistently. The Ministry of Defence, Ministry of 
Interior and National Security Council (NSC) as key governmental bodies overseeing 
security matters received varying degrees of EU attention. The MoD that was mostly non-
functional during the Milosevic era and for at least three years after was approached by the 
EU mostly regarding three issues: internal organisation, financial management and 
preparation for future membership. The former two points, pursued, for instance, through 
demands to integrate the office of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and the budget 
and procurements departments into the MoD (EC 2007d: 9) were meant to increase the 
transparency of the military. To assist Serbia with the preparations for challenges of the 
membership, the EU encouraged the establishment of new sections in the MoD such as a 
specialised CSDP Unit within the Directorate for Security Policy (EC 2011a: 127). Overall, 
however, the EU did not have a comprehensive approach to the MoD. 
Initially, it looked as if the Serbian MoI, whose role was strengthened by the 2005 
Law on Police, would be approached in the same way. At first, the EU monitored changes 
in the internal organisation of the MoI (EC 2007d: 41) and criticised poor coordination of 
its policies with other ministries (EC 2008c: 10). Yet from 2008, the EU started increasingly 
emphasising flaws in the internal control of the police, provided by the MoI, and demanding 
the Ministry to overhaul its practices to become a normal part of the public administrative 
system (EC 2012c: 3-6). Eventually, it combined forces with other key external actors in 
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the Serbian police reform, such as Norway, Sweden and DCAF, to assist the country with 
the reform of human resource management in the MoI, which if implemented successfully, 
“can completely alter the work of the police forces in Serbia” making them more 
transparent, accountable and professional (Elek, Tasik and Djordjevic 2015: 23). At the 
same time, the NSC, a coordinating body set up in direct response to the EU’s ICTY 
conditionality in 2006, barely received any attention from the EU despite numerous 
structural flaws200 (EC 2007d: 9). 
The EU also contributed to the civilian oversight of the security sector in Serbia by 
supporting independent regulatory bodies, such as the Ombudsman and Commissioner for 
Free Access to Public Information (EC 2008c: 11) and development of a working anti-
corruption policy. The work of the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA), a body responsible for 
corruption preventive measures including in the police, for example, benefited from the 
European Commission’s support that incorporated training, sharing of best practices and 
help with IT systems (EC 2013c: 8). Additionally, the EU left impact on the management 
of Serbia’s security actors through advice on amending the public procurement legislation 
(ICLG 2017).  
In terms of public oversight of the security system, until recently the EU’s 
contribution was mostly indirect. The European Union used CARDS and IPA to develop 
independent media and enable civil society’s participation in governmental decision-
making processes (Aigner, O‘Connor and Kacapor-Dzihic 2013: 60). It also pressured the 
Serbian government to be more transparent with the public through legislative practices, 
e.g. it played an important role in the adoption of the 2009 Law on Confidentiality of Data 
(Ejdus 2010: 24). In other words, by investing in the growth of Serbia’s civil society and 
pushing the government for openness, the EU indirectly aided growing public interest in 
the security sector that had operated under the veil of secrecy for decades. When Serbia 
received a membership status, however, the EU started influencing civil society 
organisations (CSOs) working in the security sphere more directly, thus contributing to 
enhanced public expertise in security issues. For example, in 2013, CSOs with interest in 
security issues were involved in screening exercises for Chapters 23, 24 and 31 and invited 
to briefings with the EU negotiating team (OCCS 2014: 1-3). These activities were 
organised by the Office for Cooperation with Civil Society, opened in 2011, in response to 
EU pressure. Even more, in May 2013 a group of six Serbian NGOs created the coalition 
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“prEUgovor” to monitor Serbia’s progress with the political criteria and Chapters 23 and 
24 (PrEUgovor n.d.). This network, while closely observing the Serbian government 
responses to the EU SSR-related conditionality and offering it recommendations on areas 
of improvement, often goes beyond EU requirements and picks up on issues, omitted by 
the Commission reports201. In short, between 1999 and 2013 the EU influenced Serbia’s 
security governance through a variety of direct and indirect activities and policies, without 
a single comprehensive SSR strategy in place. Nonetheless, its engagement with this area 
of the reform, became more refined with time, just like its focus on cooperation with the 
ICTY.  
The issue of war legacy goes to the heart of SSR in Serbia, although its overall 
significance is broader202. While the security top brass, closely linked to the paramilitary, 
shared responsibility for the development of the strategy of war crimes on the territory of 
former Yugoslavia with the political leadership of the country (Vankovska and Wiberg 
2003: 249), the security sector as a whole was implicated in its execution (Gow and 
Zverzhanovski 2013: 127). Despite the presence of the war crimes legacy in Croatia and 
BiH, the Serbian case stands out due to the extent of the crimes on both temporal and 
territorial scales (ibid.: 152). In 1991-1995 Serbia was involved in the conflicts in Croatia 
and BiH, and after a short break, it returned to violence in Kosovo in 1998-1999.203  
The EU acknowledged the importance of war crimes legacy for Serbia early on, 
calling on Belgrade to cooperate with the ICTY nearly from the moment of the tribunal’s 
emergence (Dobbels 2009: 7). Yet until the early 2000s, these calls were mostly left 
unanswered. Although the RA made contractual relations with the EU conditional on 
cooperation with the ICTY in 1997, Milosevic ignored the requirement, much like the 
policy itself. It was not until the launch of the SAP and promise of membership that the EU 
got important leverage over Serbia in this respect. Even then, the Union waited several 
years before starting to demand Serbia’s compliance with ICTY conditionality more 
forcefully. It was the USA that urged the arrest of Milosevic, indicted by the ICTY in 1999 
for his role in the Bosnian and Kosovo wars and called for the adoption of a law on 
cooperation with The Hague (Stojanovic 2009: 63). The EU’s unwillingness to deal with 
the war crimes legacy can be partly explained by the sensitivity of the issue and partly by 
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the Union’s focus on a bigger picture, namely trying to keep Serbia and Montenegro 
together.  
The EU made its first serious attempt to change Belgrade’s relationship with the 
ICTY in late 2004, soon after a post-DOS government, headed by Kostunica, introduced 
the policy of “voluntary surrender” that combined bribes and blackmail to convince those 
accused by the tribunal to surrender (Gow and Zverzhanovski 2013: 154). Brussels threated 
Serbia and Montenegro with a negative decision of the Feasibility Study, that could leave 
the country behind other Western Balkan states in the SAP. Combined with the US financial 
pressure, the EU’s threat provided Kostunica with enough motivation to convince 16 war 
crimes suspects to hand themselves to The Hague between October 2004 and April 2005 
(Dobbels 2009: 21-22). In April 2005, the SCG received a positive Feasibility Study as a 
reward from the EU, but by autumn the same year Belgrade’s policy of “voluntary 
surrender” reached a dead end, unable to persuade the remaining six suspects with links to 
Serbia204 to surrender. With the Croatian general Gotovina captured in December 2005, 
Serbia became the only Western Balkan country failing to commit to cooperation with the 
ICTY (ibid.). Even the adoption of a long-awaited law on freeze of assets of ICTY indictees 
in April 2006 failed to persuade the EU of Belgrade’s commitment to the issue, leading it 
to suspend the SAA talks with the SCG in May 2006 (EC 2006f: 15). The EU’s decision 
was announced only a few weeks before the Montenegrin referendum, giving Podgorica’s 
push for independence more validity (Popovic et al 2011: 29).  
Serbia’s poor results in dealing with The Hague in this period can be mostly explained 
by three factors: the manipulation of the issue by political elites, rudimentary character of 
SSR in the country and weak coordination among external actors. With the ICTY being 
highly unpopular among the Serbians205, many political actors manipulated the issue to 
revive anti-Western sentiments and boost their own popularity (Spoerri and Freyberg-Inan 
2008: 358-362). Given the high political cost of the ICTY issue as demonstrated, for 
example, by the demise of Djindjic206, the political elites explained cooperation with the 
tribunal as something required by external actors, not as a way towards reconciliation in the 
Balkans (Gow and Zverzhanovski 2013: 154). Moreover, without a comprehensive SSR, 
cooperation with the ICTY was a challenging task even for the elites willing to deal with 
the war crimes legacy as they simply did not have full control over the entire security sector. 
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Finally, the Serbian leadership felt that it could get away with non-compliance since the 
international community was unable to speak with one voice on the issue, especially in 
2000-2005. For instance, when the USA refused to release 100 million USD of aid to Serbia 
in March 2004 due to its poor cooperation with The Hague, the EU provided Belgrade with 
279 million EUR the same month (Edmunds 2007: 228).  
When the EU suspended the SAA negotiations with the SCG in May 2006, it quickly 
became clear that Serbia, instead of coming closer to the ICTY, was moving farther away 
from it. With the dissolution of the SCG, start of negotiations over the status of Kosovo and 
death of Slobodan Milosevic in The Hague, the country saw the resurgence of radicalisation 
and nationalism, led by the SPS and SRS that vocally opposed any kind of cooperation with 
the tribunal and denounced EU conditionality as extortion (Ostojic 2014: 98). To prevent 
further radicalisation of the country, and avoid destabilisation of the region, the EU had to 
soften its position. Instead of the arrest of Mladic, the initial key requirement for resuming 
the SAA talks, Brussels asked Belgrade to demonstrate a substantial improvement in 
cooperation with The Hague (B92 2007). Proof of such improvement was found in the 
Action Plan on cooperation with the ICTY, the National Security Council (NSC), both 
created in 2006, and arrest of Zdravko Tolimir, a Bosnian Serb military intelligence leader 
in May 2007. Acknowledging progress made by Belgrade, Brussels reopened the SAA 
negotiations with Serbia on 13 June 2007.207  
Although the Action Plan was a deficient formality (EC 2006f: 15), two other 
measures proved crucial for establishing a working relationship with the tribunal. If the 
NSC, set up as a coordinating body for police and all four branches of the Serbian 
intelligence community208 under the supervision of the president, was a sign of strengthened 
civilian control of the security sector, the arrest of General Tolimir signalled the start of 
break-down of clandestine protection networks for ICTY fugitives (Gow and 
Zverzhanovski 2013: 157). The EU was partly behind these improvements as it refused to 
move forward with the SAA until all the suspects were moved to The Hague (hence, the 
delay with the ratification of the document even after the capture of former Bosnian Serb 
President Karadzic in 2008) and proactively pushed for a shift of power over the security 
agencies from Prime Minister Kostunica, by that time cautiously pro-European, to President 
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Tadic, an open proponent of reforms (Ostojic 2014:103). Having obtained control over the 
Security and Information Agency (BIA) through the NSC, Tadic who held the presidential 
office since 2004, managed to arrest five remaining indictees between 2007 and 2011. This 
was a slow and painful process that demanded a significant weakening of the Military 
Security Agency (VBA), which until 2008 provided formal, although ostensibly 
unsanctioned by the government209, protection to Mladic and other war crime suspects 
(Gow and Zverzhanovski 2013: 156-160). The last two fugitives, Ratko Mladic and Goran 
Hadzic were transferred to The Hague in 2011, opening Serbia a door to EU candidate 
status. Yet after 2011, the ICTY issue did not disappear: the EU continued monitoring 
Serbia’s cooperation with the tribunal, focusing on investigations of support networks that 
had harboured the fugitives and access to information and witnesses (EC 2012b: 18; EC 
2013b: 11).  
By 2013, cooperation with the ICTY produced some important results: 46 war crimes 
suspects, including high-profile army and police officers were transferred to The Hague 
(Ostojic 2014: 58) and most Serbian elites (except for the rump SRS, whose most prominent 
members set up a pro-European Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) in 2008), came to terms 
with the need to cooperate with the ICTY (ibid.: 106). While the views of the public did 
not improve significantly210, the political leadership no longer openly opposed the tribunal’s 
work. Moreover, one of the biggest achievements of ICTY conditionality, that was actively, 
though inconsistently promoted by the EU since the end of 2004, was the establishment of 
full democratic and civilian control over the security sector (Gow and Zverzhanovski 2013: 
166). The removal of criminal elements implicated in the war crimes from the security 
sector and break-down of support networks in the intelligence community eliminated the 
last obstacles on the way to democratic security governance in the country. The polarisation 
of the Serbian political scene and the Kosovo issue introduced extra complexity to the issue 
in Serbia, yet the progress achieved is not insignificant, and the EU played an instrumental 
role in it. Working alongside other external actors, most notably the USA and NATO, the 
EU contributed into making Serbia’s security sector more professional, transparent and 
accountable. There is still, however, work to be done, e.g. security archives need to be 
opened and a regional dialogue to be reinvigorated. According to experts, the EU has the 
                                                          
209
 The question whether the political leadership of Serbia knew about the protection provided to ICTY 
indictees by the security apparatus after 2002 (and to what extent) remains open. For further discussion, see 
Gow and Zverzhanovski (2013: 156-170). 
210
 According to the 2012 opinion poll of the OSCE, 40 % of respondents perceived the ICTY as anti-Serb, 
while 66% believed the establishment of the tribunal was unnecessary (BalkanInsight 2012).  
184 
 
potential and right tools to play a constructive role in this process, however, until now it 
has been unable to summon the will to do so.211  
The final area through which the EU influenced the political level of SSR in Serbia 
is regional cooperation. To highlight the importance of this issue for Serbia, which the EU 
views as a country playing a key role in the Western Balkans (EC 2008b: 9), the regional 
dimension was incorporated into the sections of annual reports examining progress made 
by the country in meeting the Copenhagen political criteria. In SSR, regional dimension 
was most visibly encouraged by the EU in four spheres: police cooperation, border security, 
war crimes legacy and Kosovo question.  
The emphasis on police and border cooperation materialised relatively early, when 
Serbia was still part of the SCG. It was one of the ways for the EU to facilitate capacity-
building in the region, especially to fight organised crime, while also working towards 
building trust and reciprocity among former adversaries. Financial aid for regional 
cooperation in the JHA area was initially provided under regional CARDS programmes, 
and from 2007 through Multi-Beneficiary assistance under IPA. An example of an early 
regional initiative that included Serbia was the 2004 CARDS project “Policing systems, 
police co-operation and the enhancement of the fight against main criminal activities”, 
implemented and co-financed by the Council of Europe (DEURS 2004). The EU also 
placed value on the development of formal relations between the Serbian police and police 
services in neighbouring countries of the Western Balkans and further afield. For instance, 
signing and enforcement of agreements on police cooperation and cooperation in the fight 
against organised crime with Albania, Austria, BiH, Croatia, the FYROM, Hungary, 
Montenegro (EC 2009b: 22; EC 2010e: 8; EC 2011a: 108), and establishment of a joint 
contact centre for police and customs cooperation with Bulgaria and Romania were seen as 
positive developments (EC 2010d: 21). Additionally, the EU supported Serbia’s 
commitment to police cooperation via non-EU regional initiatives, such as the Regional 
Strategic Document and Action Plan on Justice and Home Affairs 2011-2013 developed 
within the framework of the SEECP (EC 2011a: 35). In terms of border security, the EU 
prioritised the prevention of illegal migration and development of an effective border 
management system within the regional, and from 2012, EU-wide IBM concept (DEURS 
2004). Apart from regional actions already mentioned in previous chapters, the EU put 
strong emphasis on joint border patrols alongside the common borders with such 
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neighbours as FYROM, Montenegro, BiH and Croatia as well as alongside the 
Administrative Boundary Line with Kosovo (EC 2010d: 50).  
Concerning the war crimes legacy, the EU’s main focus was on addressing the 
“regional impunity gap” (EC 2010e: 57) by monitoring domestic trials and encouraging 
Serbia to exchange information on war crimes with other countries and players of the 
region, such as Croatia, BiH and EULEX (EC 2009b: 20). With BiH and Croatia instigating 
two separate law suits for genocide against the FRY in the Criminal Court of Justice (ICJ) 
in 1993 and 1999 (Ostojic 2014: 87), it was important for the EU to ensure Serbia was 
willing to look past disagreements and could cooperate with its neighbours on the sensitive 
issue of war crimes. The inclusion of Kosovo into regional security cooperation was another 
area of contention in the Western Balkans. Having refused to recognise Kosovo’s unilateral 
declaration of independence in 2008, Serbia opposed its participation in regional meetings 
and projects, including in the area of security. In such circumstances, the EU’s first task 
was to get Serbia to subscribe to the inclusiveness of regional cooperation, which it did in 
the run-up to the March 2012 European Council that granted Serbia candidate status (EC 
2012b: 19). Consequently, the focus shifted to technical security cooperation, such as 
integrated management of border/boundary crossing points (ibid.).  
The overall aim of the EU’s emphasis on the regional dimension has been the 
facilitation of trust and reciprocity among the Western Balkan states. In a way, all three 
elements of the political level of SSR supported by the EU were pursuing this goal. 
Unfortunately, the efforts to improve the transparency of Serbia’s security sector, deal with 
the legacy of war crimes and build working regional relations were not attempted by the 
EU as a single programme or strategy, which diminished their value. The uncertainty 
surrounding Serbia’s statehood and lack of stability on the internal political scene did not 
help matters either. Furthermore, the Kosovo issue raised more questions for Serbia’s SSR. 
With Belgrade making state territorial integrity central for all its policies and taking the 
decision of military neutrality that limited NATO’s impact on defence reform, SSR took a 
back seat in the government priorities. The EU-moderated dialogue with Pristina improved 
the situation slightly in 2013 by delivering the “First agreement on principles governing the 
normalisation of relations”, complemented with a comprehensive implementation plan. 
Until the issue of Kosovo is resolved fully, however, the uncertainty will keep surrounding 
both the country’ future and the development of its security sector.  
In terms of the political level of SSR, Serbia has gone a long way: it achieved full 
democratic and civilian control over the security sector and built a system of security 
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governance based on extensive legal documents and numerous institutions, that have been 
honed to meet (though not always successfully) standards set by the EU. In 2013, however, 
as well as at the time of writing there was still a gap between theory and practice: 
parliamentary control over the military was rather limited, system of human resources 
management in the MoI – underdeveloped and public scrutiny of security matters – 
insufficient. This meant further engagement of the EU in the political level of Serbia’s SSR 
was needed after 2013. The remainder of the section will determine if the situation was any 
different with the organisational level of the reform. 
Defence reform in Serbia, as explained above, was delayed due to a power struggle 
inside the DOS coalition and uncertainty over the future of the FRY/SCG as the army was 
one of the federal/State Union level institutions. Moreover, the Kosovo conflict contributed 
to strained relations with NATO, eliminating the possibility for the Alliance to play a 
leading role in the reform like it did in other states of the region. Although NATO supported 
defence reform through PfP, the country never experienced the full scale of its assistance. 
Serbia’s decision to pursue military neutrality in February 2008 gave the EU a unique 
opportunity to spearhead military reform. Nevertheless, the bloc was not ready to take on 
such responsibility, given its relative inexperience in the sphere. Moreover, the absence of 
a clear break with the previous regime in the armed forces212, Serbia’s reluctance to deal 
with the ICTY and continuation of ties with the army of the RS made the prospect of dealing 
with defence reform in the country unattractive for the EU (Edmunds 2007: 214). At the 
same time, the persistence of nationalist sentiment and rise of radicalism in Serbia 
prevented it from committing fully to the idea of European integration, and as a result 
excluded the country from participating in CSDP structures until it received the candidate 
status in 2012. Even more, the recent intensification of military cooperation between Serbia 
with Russia added more wariness to the EU – Serbia relations (Milic 2014: 62).  
Despite all of this, the depth and breadth of the EU’s engagement with the Serbian 
defence sector has been growing and is most visible in four areas: legal advice, post-conflict 
aid, technical assistance and training and sharing best practices. The EU has been tracing 
the development of Serbia’s defence legislative framework since the moment it identified 
defence reform as one of the priorities for the SCG in the first European Partnership 
(Council of the EU 2004). To confirm its interest in the reform, the EU included it under 
short- and mid-term priorities into European Partnership 2006 (Council of the EU 2006a) 
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and 2008 (Council of the EU 2008) for Serbia, after its separation from Montenegro. 
Initially, the EU encouraged Serbia to adopt strategic documents such as a defence strategy 
and national security strategy, which were released in October 2009213 (EC 2010d: 9), and 
fundamental laws on defence, required by the constitution, such as the Law on the Army of 
Serbia, Defence Law, both adopted in December 2007, the Law on the Military Security 
Agency and the Military Intelligence Agency, Law on Civilian Service and Law on the Use 
of the Army and other Defence Forces in Multinational Operations outside Serbia, all from 
October 2009 (EC 2011a: 22). The European Commission expressed satisfaction with the 
state of Serbia’s legislative framework for defence reform only in 2010 (EC 2010d: 9). At 
a later stage, the EU placed more emphasis on the adoption of legislation enabling the 
country’s integration into CSDP and harmonisation of its position with EU standards in 
such areas as trade in arms and military equipment/ dual use goods/ small arms and light 
weapons (SALW), non-proliferation and arms control regimes, etc (EC 2012b: 63; EC 
2013b: 59). In this respect, by 2013 Serbia achieved mixed results. On the one hand, it 
adopted several key acts allowing it to participate in CSDP missions214, exchange classified 
information with the EU215 or cooperation with the European Defence Agency (EDA)216, 
accepted principles of the 1998 EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (SEESAC 2010a) 
and released a new law on dual-use goods in 2013 (EC 2014a: 62). On the other, at the end 
of 2013 it was still lacking a new law on trade of arms and military equipment, and its 
application for joining the Wassenaar Arrangement on export controls for conventional 
arms and dual-use goods and technologies was pending (ibid.). These issues, however, are 
closely monitored under Chapter 31, and are likely to be resolved when it is opened by the 
Commission. According to a former MoD employee and leading security expert in Serbia, 
legislative changes is one of the biggest achievements of the EU and process of European 
integration as a whole in the defence sphere 217.  
Post-conflict and technical assistance, provided by the EU to the Serbian military was 
mostly linked to the issue of SALW and development of the country’s capacities in the 
CSDP framework. Additionally, the EU provided minor support to Serbia with de-mining, 
but its contribution to tackling the problem was less significant than in many other Western 
Balkan countries. For instance, the European Commission allocated 2 million EUR 
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specifically for mine clearing action in Serbia for the first time only in 2006, while in 
Croatia it first got involved in de-mining in 1998 (GICHD 2008: 35).  Such low engagement 
on part of the EU can be explained by a smaller scale of the problem in Serbia, persisting 
perception of the country as an aggressor responsible for regional violence of the 1990s and 
the fact that most of the burden for mine-clearing activity was undertaken by the Slovenia-
based ITF (ibid.: 21).  
The problem with proliferation of small arms in Serbia was much more acute than 
with mines, and hence demanded larger assistance. The number of SALW on the territory 
of the SFRY prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 1991 was more than six million (Griffiths 
2010: 184). Although there are no official data confirming the amount of SALW available 
on the territory of Serbia after the Kosovo conflict, it is believed that nearly four million 
illegal weapons were circulating in the Western Balkans at the time, most of them in Serbia 
(Bjelotomic 2017). Even in 2013, it was estimated that there were between 200, 000 and 
900, 000 of SALW in the country (Centar 2015). It is not surprising therefore that the EU 
was eager to assist Serbia with tacking this problem. Although initially the EU offered 
SALW assistance to Serbia directly (Poitevin 2013:7), with time it switched to working 
through SEESAC218 that holds a mandate from the UNDP and RCC (SEESAC 2017). 
Cooperation between SEESAC and the EU has been developing since 2002219 in the 
EUSAC framework220, and in Serbia has been mainly focused on planning and conducting 
activities of SALW controls for the purposes of collection or seizure and destruction and 
creating conditions for the safe disposal of state-owned surplus SALW stockpiles (SEESAC 
2010a). It should be mentioned, however, that many actions under EUSAC had a regional 
dimension as the EU considers SALW to be a regional problem. Another important point 
to make is that the EU has been one of many external actors involved in SALW action in 
Serbia. The USA and NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency also offered considerable 
support (Griffiths 2010: 181). 
What concerns developing Serbia’s capacities for participating in the CSDP, these 
activities intensified after the country received the candidate status in 2012. Since then, 
Serbia was given many opportunities to improve its defence capabilities in the field of crisis 
management and learn more about CSDP (MoD RS 2014). An important role in this respect 
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was played by the EDA that signed the Administrative Agreement with the Serbian MoD 
in December 2013. Unfortunately, the activities implemented under this agreement fall 
outside the scope of this study as Serbia joined the first EDA project only in 2016 (EDA 
2016). Still, Serbia managed to benefit from some defence training and exchange 
programmes offered by the EU before 2013. Besides, the SAF was offered numerous 
training opportunities by other actors. For example, it participated in the partnership 
programme with the Ohio National Guard, ongoing since 2006, NATO’s PfP (MoD RS 
2016) and bilateral exchanges with individual EU member states (IHS 2016). Serbia has 
also been developing relations with partners from the East such as China that signed the 
Military Cooperation agreement with the country in 2008 and Russia, Serbia’s long-
standing partner (Pavlicevic 2011: 9).  
The EU’s training opportunities were different to those offered by other external 
actors, as they were aimed at preparing Serbia to be part of its own security infrastructure. 
Thus, Serbia was given a chance to participate in CSDP missions, which it joined in 2011 
by sending two members to the EU NAVFOR Somalia – ATALANTA and EUTM Somalia, 
in the development of the Battlegroup concept, the conference on which it attended in 
March 2012 for the first time, and given access to key EU military bodies, such as the 
European Union Military Committee, that opened its meetings to representatives of the 
Serbian MoD since 2012 (EC 2012b: 63). The opening of CSDP to Serbia was described 
by Catherine Ashton, the then EU High Representative on Foreign Policy, as “a sign of 
mutual trust” between the EU and the country (Euractiv 2011).  
In short, the EU’s impact on Serbia’s defence reform in 1999-2013 was mostly felt in 
the legislative sphere, post-conflict and technical assistance and CSDP-specific activities. 
While showing only limited interest in the strategic side of the reform, the EU focused on 
preparing Serbia for membership and making it a functional state – a goal, unlikely to be 
achieved without finding a solution to the Kosovo problem. Moreover, over the past years, 
Serbia has been developing close military cooperation with Russia by signing a series of 
agreements on security and defence (Milic 2014: 63), joining the Russia-led Collective 
Security Treaty Organisation as an observer in 2013 (EC 2013b: 59) and holding regular 
joint military exercises (Glavonjic 2014). Most security experts interviewed in Serbia for 
this thesis expressed concern over these developments and called on the EU to challenge 
this cooperation more forcefully, fearing that it could further delay Serbian accession to the 
bloc.221  
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Police and border reforms in Serbia, both part of Justice and Home Affairs in the 
SAP, were approached by the EU less cautiously yet, given the strained relationship with 
the security elites, somewhat reluctantly. The leading role in police reform was initially 
taken by the OSCE that commissioned the “Study on Policing in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia” in 1991 (Monk 2001) and organised follow-up activities on the basis of six 
priority areas, identified by the study222 (Downes 2004: 7). As Serbia progressed in its 
membership talks, the EU assumed a more active role in its police reform, and even started 
offering the country strategic guidance on policing. The latter was the result of the 2011 
Council decision to place the rule of law at the centre of enlargement policy (EC 2012d: 4) 
and growing frustration in Brussels with the lack of results in the reform despite nearly a 
decade of support.  
From the times of the FRY and onwards, the EU framed police reform in Serbia as 
an element of reform of the public administration, thus insisting that police work should 
follow the same standards as the rest of public administration – an idea central to the concept 
of SSR (EC 2002c: 7). In 1999-2013, the EU’s impact on the Serbian police reform was 
felt most through technical assistance, post-conflict support, legislative advice and training. 
Like elsewhere in the region, the EU chose to start with technical support, avoiding 
sensitive areas and often acting as a supporting actor to other external players. Thus, in 
2001-2002 the bloc, through its monitoring mission EUMM223, provided logistical support 
to the OSCE mission to the FRY while the latter was training officers for the MEPE in 
South Serbia (Caruso 2007: 82-83) and from 2002, through the CARDS programme, began 
funding projects aimed at rehabilitating Serbia’s police infrastructure, damaged in the wars 
(Particip GmbH 2009: 52). For instance, under CARDS 2002, law enforcement agencies 
were given around 4.7 million EUR for technical assistance and under CARDS 2004 they 
received nearly 2.7 million EUR for infrastructure and forensic equipment (ibid.). The 
initial aim of the EU’s technical assistance was to strengthen the administrative and 
professional capacity of the Serbian police service by contributing to its demilitarisation, 
and modernisation of its work (EC 2005c: 50; EC 2008b: 50; EC 2009b: 10).  
The EU’s capacity-building activities in this sphere have become more refined with 
time as the Union started promoting better coordination and specialisation in the police. 
The reorganisation of the service that was slowly implemented after 2000 not only led to 
the removal of certain elements (e.g. the disbandment of the JSO) and creation of others 
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(e.g. the Gandermerie in 2001), but also to the emergence of a more decentralised structure. 
This structure that included the MoI and General Police Directorate at the top, 48 regional 
command police centres in the middle and 161 police stations at the bottom (Rose 2011: 
73), was characterised by poor coordination and connectivity, which the Commission saw 
as a major obstacle to dealing with organised crime, corruption and war crimes (EC 2008c: 
51). It called for legislative action to clarify the division of responsibilities between 
different law enforcement services and units of the Directorate (ibid.: 52) and advised the 
government to develop an IT system linking the police with the courts and prosecution (EC 
2013b: 51). The reform of human resource management in the Serbian MoI, actively 
promoted by the EU alongside other donors, has the potential to improve the coordination 
and transparency of the police, yet at the time of writing it was still far from completion. 
Specialisation can also boost the service. The EU has been promoting it by focusing on the 
development of specialised services of the criminal police, e.g. services for combating 
organised crime, financial investigations and high-tech crime (EC 2010d: 52; EC 2013b: 
51) and enhancement of investigative capacity in war crimes (EC 2011a: 33).  The CARDS 
2004 project “Prevention of economic crime”, also known as PACO Serbia, and 2010 IPA 
Project “Against Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing in Serbia” are examples of 
the EU initiatives aimed at improving specialisation of the police in cooperation with other 
relevant institutions such as the Ministry of Finance (EC 2010f: 1, 11). Two general 
observations can be made about the EU’s technical assistance to the Serbian police. First, 
it was predominantly geared towards capacity-building in the areas of corruption, organised 
crime and war crimes; and second, it was provided in an ad hoc manner, without a clear 
strategy in place. Unsurprisingly, at the end of the studied period the European Commission 
was only partially satisfied with the level of cooperation and information flow between 
Serbia’s law enforcement agencies and identified a number of problem areas with 
specialised services, e.g. it criticised the underdevelopment of intelligence-led policing in 
the country (EC 2012b: 54; EC 2013b: 51).  
The second observation was also true for the EU’s engagement with the Serbian 
legislation on policing and its role in the country’s police reform more broadly until 2011, 
when the Union started prioritising a comprehensive approach. It took Belgrade five years 
of post-Milosevic period to adopt the Law on Police (2005) and several attempts to adjust 
it to the EU standards. Nonetheless, neither in 2013 nor at the time of writing the work on 
the law was completed. Apart from emphasising the deficiencies of the main legal 
document regulating the work of the police in annual progress reports (EC 2008c: 51; EC 
2010d: 52), the EU offered Serbia financial support and policy advice to amend it through 
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IPA. Still, even the 2016 version of the Law, that resulted from projects funded by the EU 
and Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) (Elek, Tasik and 
Djordjevic 2015: 20), was not yet fully harmonised with the EU requirements (Poznatov 
2016).  
The EU’s assistance proved more effective in relation to laws in the sphere of 
organised crime. Thus, the EU influenced the adoption of the National Anti-Corruption 
Strategy in 2005 and its updated version in 2013, the National Strategy for combating 
trafficking in human beings in 2006, the National Strategy to Fight Organised Crime in 
2009, the Criminal Code in 2006 and its amendment in 2009, and the Criminal Procedure 
Code in 2011 (PrEUgovor 2013: 4; EU 2007d: 43; EC 2011a: 108). More broadly, a long-
awaited Law on Private Security, adopted in 2013 was also a response to the EU demands 
(Petrovic and Milosevic 2017; CEAS 2013). After granting Serbia the status of a candidate 
state, the EU has been relying on Chapter 24 to harmonise the country’s legislation on 
internal affairs and direct police reform as a whole. Until then, however, the EU’s approach 
to legislation in the sphere was sporadic and led by desire to eradicate organised crime and 
corruption from the country and its police service. While the focus on organised crime 
remained strong after 2011, the EU significantly strengthened the emphasis on human 
resources, operational capacities and police cooperation with the start of membership 
negotiations (MoI RS 2016: 126).  
Finally, the European Union attempted to influence police reform in Serbia trough 
training and sharing best practices. In the early post-Milosevic period, training was 
provided to improve the level of professionalism among police officers and enhance their 
digital literacy. Like in Croatia, many supply contracts offered by the EU contained a 
training element. For example, the 2004 CARDS programme provided the Criminal Police 
in Serbia with forensic equipment and training on its use (EC 2004a: 11). A strong emphasis 
in this respect was placed by the EU on regional projects as they were believed to help 
Serbia find a common language with its neighbours. Such initiatives as “Development of 
reliable and functional policing systems and enhancing combating main criminal activities 
and police cooperation”, funded under CARDS 2002/2003 and “Regional cooperation in 
Criminal Justice: Strengthening capacities in the fight against cybercrime”, part of the 2010 
Multi-beneficiary IPA, were implemented to harmonise police practices in the Western 
Balkans (EC 2010f: 11-12).  
Still, EU efforts to enhance police education in Serbia were not very visible as a 
variety of courses, seminars and workshops on ethics, human rights and modern security 
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threats were organised by the OSCE as well as many local and international NGOs 
(Trivunovic 2004: 254-255). Moreover, until 2004-2005 the reform of police education was 
tackled in Serbia on a piecemeal basis. Only after the MoI opened a directorate for 
professional education in 2004 and drafted a Strategy for developing the education and 
training police system in 2005, did noticeable changes start to occur (Petrovic 2006: 10). 
Thus, the Police High School in Sremska Kamenica, Vojvodina was transformed into the 
Basic Police Training Centre, open to men and women from all ethnic backgrounds, in 2006 
(Ristovic 2007), the Advanced School of Internal Affairs and Police Academy were 
integrated into the Academy of Criminal and Police Studies later that year (ACPS n.d.) and 
the curricular for both establishments were modernised and demilitarised (Rose 2011: 87-
88). These changes224 were impelled and coordinated by the OSCE, whereas the EU was 
involved in the process mostly indirectly as membership in the bloc provided an 
overarching stimulus for police reform.225 Thus, the OSCE training courses were aimed at 
introducing the Serbian police to EU standard practices (ibid.), while the efforts to overhaul 
police education were meant to change the police culture in the country, helping it absorb 
social values and human rights principles, respected by EU member states (Downes 2004: 
7).  
With the OSCE guiding the transformation of Serbia’s police education system, by 
2008 the EU shifted its attention to the improvement of internal control in the MoI and law 
enforcement agencies. The IPA 2007 project “Police Reform: Internal Control”, for 
example, implemented in 2008-2010, targeted the MoI’s Section of Internal Control of 
Police to share the EU best practices to promote professionalism and prevent misuse of 
power in the service (EC 2012c: 5). A training element was also included into the 2012 IPA 
project “Modern concept of Human Rights Management in the Ministry of Interior of the 
Republic of Serbia” that was part of a more strategic approach undertaken by the EU in 
conjunction with other donors to enhance professional development and institutional 
capacity of the police after 2011 (ibid.). According to an expert on the Serbian police 
reform, this latter project, which ended in 2016, gave the Serbian MoI tools to manage the 
HR system effectively and efficiently, yet the Ministry did not yet make full use of its 
results226. Another way employed by the EU to assist the Serbian police in achieving 
transparency and accountability, found inside the bloc, was the promotion of cooperation 
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and information exchange with Europol, the EU law enforcement agency, and CEPOL, the 
EU Agency for Law Enforcement Training. Unfortunately, in the studied period the 
cooperation with the former was minimal and with the latter non-existent. Officially, Serbia 
started engaging with Europol after signing a strategic cooperation agreement in 2008, 
however, the relationship lacked substance until 2014 when an operational agreement was 
concluded (EC 2014a: 54). CEPOL included Serbia into a first exchange programme only 
in 2014, while a working agreement between the two was still missing in mid-2017 (ibid.; 
CEPOL n.d.).  
Additionally, it is worth highlighting that police reform in Serbia was influenced by 
the Kosovo question. As part of an effort to normalise relations between Belgrade and 
Pristina, the EU made police cooperation one of the focal points of the Dialogue it 
moderated between the two sides. Progress in the area was slow as initially the Serbian MoI 
was refusing not only any direct contact with Kosovo police structures, but even the 
recognition of the EULEX mandate (EC 2008b: 51). Although Serbia signed a special 
cooperation protocol with EULEX in 2009, cooperation between the actors was restricted 
to the areas of combating organised crime and cross-border issues (Elek 2015: 9).  “The 
First Agreement on Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations” signed by 
Belgrade and Pristina in April 2013, brought the EU another small but important victory: 
Serbia agreed to dismantle parallel security institutions it was keeping in northern 
municipalities of Kosovo and cooperate with Pristina regarding the integration of the 
security personnel into the Kosovo structures (Guzina and Marijan 2014: 8). Moreover, in 
December 2013 Serbian and Kosovar leaders agreed that the role of an acting regional 
police commander for Kosovo’s northern municipalities should be given to a local Kosovar 
Serb (Andric 2013). Overall, in 2013 Serbia and Kosovo were only starting to cooperate on 
police issues.  
Still, compared to the reform of the army, police reform in Serbia in 1999-2013 
experienced a stronger EU influence. Although initially the EU gave preference to non-
sensitive, technical issues, with time it became more comfortable engaging in more 
complex areas. After 2011, when the focus of the enlargement policy was placed on the 
rule of law, and the country received a membership status, the bloc searched for more 
comprehensive solutions to remaining problems. With many external players active in the 
Serbian police reform, the European Union did not lead it per se, but provided a stimulus 
for transformation through the membership perspective. As one of the security experts 
interviewed for this thesis put it, “the EU is the reason why we are doing (all) these 
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[reforms]”227. By 2013, the police reform in Serbia achieved a lot, but was still incomplete. 
On the one hand, the institutional framework for law enforcement and fight against 
organised crime was mostly in place and legislation largely harmonised with the EU 
standards. On the other, skill shortages in specialised police services and gaps in inter-
agency and regional police cooperation persisted (EC 2013b: 51).  
Border reform, which represents the final aspect of SSR in Serbia studied here, 
experienced even stronger EU impact, although the process of the reform was not smooth 
either. In the FRY and SCG, border security was a joint responsibility of the federal/State 
Union army and republican police and was therefore affected by tensions between Belgrade 
and Podgorica until 2006. Border delineation disputes with neighbours, including BiH and 
Croatia, and poor conditions at most border crossing points (BCPs), where infrastructure 
was either severely outdated or destroyed by the NATO bombing campaign, made the task 
of improving border security in Serbia additionally difficult (Bakic and Gajic 2006: 24). 
The unresolved status of Kosovo added another obstacle, which became graver with 
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in 2008. Given the geo-strategic 
importance of Serbia for the stability of the region and its location on the Balkan route that 
exposed not only Balkan countries but also EU states to dangers of organised crime, border 
reform in the country was identified by the EU as an early and urgent priority (EC 2002c: 
27). Working alongside other external actors, such as NATO, the OSCE, Stability Pact and 
DCAF, the EU emerged as the leader of the reform since all externally promoted efforts in 
the area were geared towards preparing the FRY, SCG and eventually Serbia for EU 
membership. Starting from 2003, when Serbia subscribed to the Ohrid Process on Border 
Security, the overarching framework of the reform was decided by the EU’s Integrated 
Border Management concept, formally adjusted to the context of the Western Balkans in 
2004 (Bakic and Gajic 2006: 24). The IBM Guidelines obliged Serbia to develop effective 
systems of border control, trade facilitation and cross-border cooperation to ensure the 
country had “open, but controlled and secure borders” (Trauner 2007: 27). The EU also 
insisted on the demilitarisation of borders since border security in the bloc was seen as an 
area of policing, rather than defence (Council of the EU 2006b: 3; Bakic and Gajic 2006: 
24). Given the JNA/VJ’s history with violence and war crimes, the salience of border 
demilitarisation in Serbia was even greater than in many other Western Balkan countries. 
The withdrawal of the military from border control points in Serbia, however, did not 
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happen immediately: the process was protracted, chiefly thanks to uncertainties 
surrounding Serbia’s statehood.  
Although strategic documents on demilitarisation were prepared by the Serbian MoI 
with the assistance of external donors, including the EU’s EAR, in 2001-2002, the police 
started assuming control of the country’s BCPs only in 2005 (Rose 2011: 96, 98). It is 
notable that the first control posts to be demilitarised were those on the border with 
Hungary, the only border Serbia shared with an EU member state at the time. From there, 
the focus shifted onto BCPs along borders with pre-accession countries, Romania and 
Bulgaria, and only afterwards to borders with other Western Balkan states such as Croatia 
and BiH (ibid.: 98). Such sequence was not accidental but determined by the EU’s 
prioritisation (EC 2002c: 29) as the IBM concept was meant not only to enable the Western 
Balkan states approach border issues in a coordinated manner, but also to improve the 
security of the EU’s external borders (IBM Guidelines 2007: 13, 18).  
Despite having an overarching framework for border reform, the EU chose to 
approach it from a technical aspect first. On the one hand, it was a way of supporting Serbia 
in dealing with some of the biggest gaps in its border control without impinging on any 
sensitive issues. On the other, it was an opportunity to rehabilitate key European transport 
routes, ruined by years of neglect and war. The Serbian part of the so-called Corridor X, for 
example, an important route running between Austria and Greece, was restored not just for 
the benefit of the country, but also for the normalisation of passenger and goods flows in 
Europe. Moreover, it is worth remembering that while the IBM concept promotes a 
comprehensive vision of border management, it is mostly technical in nature (IBM 
Guidelines 2007: 2). After all, in the EU the control of external borders is a responsibility 
of individual member states, and not a supranational policy (Council of the EU 2006b: 3). 
This meant that Serbia, while required to adhere to the same values and standards in border 
management as EU member states, had the freedom to decide on the specifics of its border 
security system228.  
In 2001-2006, 73% of the CARDS budget allocated to border issues in Serbia, was 
spent on infrastructure projects, with the rest going towards supply contracts and 
supervision contracts for infrastructure measures (Particip GmbH 2009: 53). In 2001, 2002 
and 2004 the EU launched projects to restructure and upgrade BCPs at Horgos, Batrovci 
and Presevo, all affecting the Serbian part of Corridor X and in 2007 started supervising 
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renovation works of border crossing facilities at Dimitrovograd railway station, also along 
Corridor X (EC 2008d: 10). In 2005, the EU invested in the restructuring of veterinary and 
phytosanitary services, assisting the latter with the adoption of legislation, training of staff 
and provision of equipment for BCPs (ibid.: 11). The emphasis of the EU’s assistance 
shifted from technical issues to a more comprehensive approach in 2006229, when Serbia 
and Montenegro parted their ways. Apart from the fact that Belgrade achieved full control 
over issues that previously required Podgorica’s approval, there were two main reasons for 
this change. First, in 2006 Serbia adopted a national IBM strategy and corresponding Action 
Plan that defined the country’s border management framework, roles and responsibilities 
of border services, and their goals and priorities (IBM Strategy 2006). These documents 
were meant to make Serbia a functional state, fully in control of its borders and able to 
assume responsibilities of EU membership. The EU provided help not only with drafting 
the IBM strategy, but also with its implementation. Thus, within the 2006 CARDS project 
“Implementation of Integrated Border Management Strategy”, it conducted analysis of the 
country’s legal framework on border issues, assisted with the design of a new Human 
Resources Management System, carried out training of key personnel and developed 
curricular for staff involved in the IBM activities (EC 2012e: 7). Second, a more diverse 
approach to border security in Serbia materialised because of an improved understanding 
of the regional context by the EU. Having implemented “The Regional CARDS Programme 
for Western Balkan – Multi-Year Indicative programme 2002-2006”, the EU established 
not only that Western Balkans lacked a comprehensive approach to border management, 
but also that their border problems were inextricably linked (EC 2008d: 11). As a result, 
the question of Serbia’s border security, became integrated with the border security of the 
region. To preserve stability in the Western Balkans and boost the region’s economic and 
political development, the EU urged Serbia to improve cooperation in the field of border 
management with its neighbours and resolve existing border disputes (IBM Strategy 2007: 
9). While Serbia agreed to these demands in principle, it did not hurry to deliver on them. 
This was not only because the country’s government still struggled to reconstruct border 
control infrastructure in many areas, but also because its attention was directed towards 
other burning issues such as the worsening of situation in Kosovo. 
By 2008, Serbia’s borders were demilitarised and fully under control of the border 
police, coordinated by a restructured Border Police Directorate within the MoI. Despite 
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these achievements, more progress was needed in relation to legislation, technical 
capacities of agencies involved in border management, staffing, provision of equipment to 
the border police and border disputes with neighbours (EC 2008c: 48; EC 2009b: 51). To 
provide the country with an incentive to tackle these issues and prevent it from falling 
behind other Western Balkan states, Serbia, alongside Albania, FYROM and 
Montenegro230, was invited to start a dialogue with the EU on visa liberalisation in January 
2008 (EC 2008e: 2). As a result, for the next two years border reform in the country was 
dominated by the visa liberalisation process. The Roadmaps on visa-free travel for Western 
Balkan states identified four areas requiring change: document security, illegal migration, 
public order and security, and external relations issues connected to the movement of 
persons (EC 2008f). For Serbia, this inter alia meant introduction of biometric travel 
documents and improvement of document security; adoption and implementation of 
asylum, migration and visa policies, aligned with the EU standards; functional policies to 
fight organised crime, corruption and terrorism and improved judicial and law enforcement 
cooperation with EU member states, Balkan neighbours and relevant international agencies 
(ibid.). Serbia fulfilled the formal requirements of the roadmap by the end of 2009 and 
received the right of visa-free travel to the Schengen area in December 2009 (EC 2010d: 
49). Although the country aligned its legislation on border control with the Schengen 
Border Code, its border control and management systems remained underdeveloped (ibid.). 
Their weaknesses were exposed, for example, by significant rise of unfounded asylum 
applications by Serbian citizens after the opening of Schengen borders, which prompted the 
Commission to introduce a post visa liberalisation monitoring mechanism (EC 2012b: 52). 
To fully understand the relative slowness of border reform in Serbia, one needs to 
acknowledge the gravity of situation in the field. After four wars, infrastructure at border 
crossing facilities, professionalism of staff ensuring border security, as well as relevant 
legislation were in a dire state that could not be transformed quickly. Unsurprisingly, 
Belgrade remained dependent on external aid and guidance, which the EU continued to 
provide throughout the studied period and beyond. Having addressed the most acute 
infrastructure and equipment needs of Serbian BCPs with CARDS, the EU continued to 
support the development of administrative and operational capacity at border control 
facilities with IPA, yet with a stronger emphasis on the three pillars of the IBM, i.e. 
improving intra-service, inter-agency and international cooperation. Thus, thanks to the 
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IPA 2008 project “Development of the Information System for Border Crossing Control”, 
Serbia updated infrastructure for border crossing checks and started developing an 
integrated information system for the Border Police Directorate (EC 2012e: 7). It was also 
under the influence of the EU that a cooperation agreement in the field of IBM was signed 
between the MoI, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water 
Management in 2009 (MoI RS 2016: 76). On the international level, the European 
Commission insisted on connecting all border crossings in Serbia to the Interpol system (I-
24/7) and improving cooperation with Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard 
Agency. Since 2009, Frontex has been engaging Serbian border staff in joint operations, 
regular exchanges of information and best practices as well as training activities, trying to 
raise their professionalism (EC 2012b: 53).  
Training opportunities were offered to the border police through other channels, too. 
The first specialised training was offered by a precursor of the Border Police Directorate, 
Directorate for Border Police, Aliens and Administrative Affairs in 2003 (Rose 2011: 104). 
An important contribution into the development of curricular for educating staff involved 
in the IBM activities was made through the CARDS 2006 project, “Implementation of 
Integrated Border Management Strategy” which not only provided training for key 
personnel but also offered guidance on updating the Human Resources Management 
System of the border police (EC 2012c: 5). Overall, there were two areas of training 
prioritised by the EU in this area: training border personnel to work with modern 
technologies and to remove corruption from the border control and management service 
(ibid.).  
Like in other aspects of SSR, legal approximation in border security was highly 
valued by the EU. After Serbia adopted the IBM Strategy under the EU guidance, as part 
of the visa liberalisation process, it adopted many other important documents, such as the 
Law on Protection of State Border (2008), Law on Foreigners (2008), Law on Travel 
Documents (2008), Migration Management Strategy (2009) and Law on Migration 
Management (2012) (MoI RS 2016: 78). As mentioned above, effective asylum, migration 
and visa policies were demanded by the EU in Serbia as part of the process, too. In fact, 
Serbia had to fulfil the same requirements as Croatia and other Western Balkan states with 
respect to these areas231. While the requirements were predominantly the same, Serbia did 
not have the capacity to address them quickly. Thus, in 2013 it struggled to implement its 
asylum policy, formulated in 2007, as there was still no adequate asylum processing, the 
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Asylum Office operated on an ad hoc basis and the list of safe non-EU countries was not 
fully aligned with the acquis (EC 2013b: 50). Although migration and visa policies were 
relatively more advanced, they were still below the expected standard (ibid.). Serbia was 
also behind Croatia in terms of implementing the IBM strategy. In November 2012, the 
Serbian government adopted a new version of the strategy to accommodate the 
Commission’s conditions for a stronger IBM Coordination body (ibid.). Yet even that 
strategy was still based on the Western Balkans IBM Guidelines, and not harmonised with 
the EU IBM concept (MoI RS 2016: 77), meaning that more changes can be expected in 
the area in the future. 
Finally, border reform in Serbia was affected by several border demarcation disputes. 
Serbia disagreed with Croatia over the border at the Danube river and two small islands 
near the town of Vukovar, and over the border along the Drina river with BiH (Milekic and 
Zivanovic 2017). In 2008, it paused the process of border delineation with Montenegro in 
protest of the latter’s decision to recognise Kosovo’s independence, while FYROM’s 
border demarcation agreement with Kosovo was met with a dose of hostility (EC 2011a: 
36). The European Commission monitored these disagreements through annual progress 
reports urging Serbia to solve them, but not willing to interfere otherwise in what it saw as 
bilateral issues (EC 2006f: 17-18; EC 2011a: 36; EC 2013b: 13). With no aquis on border 
delineation, the EU avoided drawing a link between Serbia’s border arguments and its 
progress in the membership talks. As a result, disputes with Croatia and BiH remained 
unresolved in 2013, and at the time of writing. Yet looking at Croatia’s experience, it is 
likely that the EU will display more interest in this matter as Serbia gets closer to the 
prospect of membership. The question of managing the boundary232 between Serbia and 
Kosovo, however, could not wait that long. Border cooperation has been identified by the 
EU as one of the priorities of the Belgrade – Prisitina Dialogue. Thanks to exposing the 
parties to consistent pressure and keeping negotiations technical, the EU received first 
tangible results by 2013. Not only did Belgrade and Pristina opened joint interim crossing 
points, but their respective Border Police Departments became the only law enforcement 
units cooperating directly (Elek 2015: 9). Both developments were achieved through 
signing the IBM agreement in December 2012 and its associated implementation protocol 
in February 2013 (Kursani 2015: 8). Prior to that, all exchanges on border issues between 
the two sides were mediated by EULEX. While significant, these achievements did not 
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solve all problems: the IBM agreement was yet to be implemented, permanent BCPs to be 
established and border patrols to be transferred from regular police to the border service 
(Elek 2015: 9).  
In short, border reform in Serbia was approached by the EU in a most comprehensive 
manner, which materialised with a slight delay in 2006. By encouraging Serbia to adopt a 
national IBM strategy, based on the IBM Guidelines for the Western Balkans, it steered the 
country towards the same benchmarks as the rest of the region. It promoted intra-service, 
inter-agency and international cooperation. Thanks to financial help under CARDS and 
IPA, Serbia updated infrastructure and equipment at most BCPs, developed information 
exchange networks between the border police and all other agencies involved in border 
management and control, introduced changes into national legislation to bring it closer to 
EU standards and raised the level of professionalism of border guards and staff at the Border 
Police Directorate. The EU also played a key role in establishing direct communication 
channels between the border police in Serbia and Kosovo. Nonetheless, in 2013 border 
reform was not complete: asylum, migration and visa policies were still underdeveloped, 
border disputes with Croatia and BiH unresolved and the IBM strategy, even updated, not 
aligned with the EU IBM concept. 
 
Conclusion 
In the period from 1991 to 2013, Serbia went from an aggressor, causing havoc in its 
neighbourhood, to a candidate state for EU membership, often presented by the EU as a 
leader of reforms in the Western Balkans.233 The transformation it underwent, although 
remarkable, is still unfinished, much like security sector reform that in many ways reflects 
the country’s development. The Serbian security sector, largely inherited from the SFRY, 
was manipulated by Milosevic to support goals and policies of his semi-authoritarian 
regime. Between 1991 and 1995 the army, police, security agencies and various 
paramilitary units were used in the Slovenian, Croatian and Bosnian wars, including the 
design and implementation of ethnic cleansing strategies. The rare attempts to bring change 
to the work and management of the FRY and Serbia’s security structures such as 
Serbianisation and decommunisation of the army or militarisation of the police were aimed 
at bringing them closer to the regime, and further from standards found in democratically-
governed states. With Milosevic and his allies sponsoring illicit economic and military 
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networks to side-step the UN and EU sanctions, Serbia as one of the poles of the Balkan 
regional conflict formation, spread animosity and instability in the Western Balkans. 
Although after the end of hostilities in Croatia and BiH, Milosevic tried to position himself 
as peace-maker and was seemingly committed to principles of reciprocity, regional 
cooperation and good neighbourliness, promoted by international initiatives, peace in the 
region did not last. With the outbreak of violence in Kosovo in 1998-1999, the fragile 
security regime in the Western Balkans collapsed. In 1995-1999, the VJ and Serbian police 
saw minimal change, mostly linked to reduction in numbers of personnel and minor 
restructuring of forces. The NATO bombing campaign as well as the UN and EU sanctions 
not only weakened the country’s security sector but also led to anti-Western sentiment 
among its leadership that added another obstacle to externally-led SSR efforts after the 
electoral defeat of Milosevic in 2000.  
As a result of uncertainty surrounding Serbia’s statehood, the severity of the war 
crimes legacy and internal power struggle, Serbia grappled with initiating change in the 
security sector for several years after the ousting of Milosevic. Despite a slow take-off, by 
2013, SSR in the country has seen some important results: legal frameworks on the military, 
policing and border security were largely harmonised with international and EU standards, 
the security sector as a whole was put under democratic and civilian control, the army was 
slimmed down and professionalised, the police were depoliticized and modernised, borders 
demilitarised, cooperation with the ICTY recognised as satisfactory and relations with 
Kosovo, at least in the areas of policing and border security, started gaining definition. 
While these achievements do not mean that the country’s SSR is complete, they signal that 
Serbia is ready to move away from the status of a pariah state and willing to change to join 
the EU/Europe security community. By 2013, the Serbian political and security elites have 
not only formally committed to the values of rule of law, transparency and accountability, 
shared by the EU member states, but also started demonstrating the first signs of political 
responsiveness and predictability of behaviour which Deutsch recognised as essential 
conditions of a security community. These signs became more recognisable after 2008, 
when the nationalist movement was weakened by a split in the Radical Party and European 
integration recognised as a key goal by most influential political players.  
The commitment to the European idea of the country’s political leadership inter alia 
has strengthened the EU’s role in Serbia’s SSR. As between 1991 and 1999, except for 
some brief periods, the EU relations with Serbia were characterised by a punitive character, 
it was not easy for the bloc to get involved in the reform. Having introduced independent 
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sanctions against the FRY, supported the UN sanctions and NATO bombing campaign, and 
delivered a blow to the Milosevic plan for Greater Serbia via the Arbitration Commission, 
the EU chose to approach sensitive issues like security cautiously. Besides, the lack of real 
change in the immediate post-Milosevic period, resurgence of nationalism and cumbersome 
structure of the SCG that emerged as a direct result of EU pressure meant that domestically 
there was little appetite for SSR, too. After overcoming initial hesitation, the first steps of 
the EU in Serbia’s SSR were directed at technical issues such as rehabilitating the 
infrastructure at border crossings and updating police equipment. With time, the scope of 
the EU’s influence has grown considerably: not only did it frequently engage in military, 
police and border police reforms, but it made a significant contribution into the political 
level of SSR and finding a solution to the issue of war crimes. Bearing in mind the content 
of this chapter234, the EU’s involvement in Serbia’s SSR between 1991 and 2013 can be 
summarised in five points. 
First, the EU did not settle into the role of an SSR actor in Serbia easily. This was not 
only because Brussels did not get a chance to initiate change in security sector in the 1990s 
or continued to treat Belgrade with suspicion even after the Bulldozer Revolution, but also 
because Serbian political elites were not fully committed to the idea of Euro-Atlantic 
integration until at least five years after the departure of Milosevic.  
Second, SSR in Serbia, just like in Croatia, was used by the EU as a member-state 
building tool. The pressure on Serbia to bring its army, police and border police under 
democratic and civilian control, as well as in line with international, and often EU-specific, 
standards increased as the country made progress in the accession talks. Yet, the EU was 
unable to help Serbia reach the level of security found inside the bloc, hence the offer of a 
candidate status and not membership in 2012. Apart from disagreements with Montenegro 
over the future of their partnership and strong nationalist sentiments, Serbia’s progress (in 
accession process as well as SSR) was slowed down by its reluctance to cooperate with the 
ICTY and the Kosovo question. If the former issue was mostly resolved in 2011 with the 
last two ICTY fugitives been transferred to The Hague, the latter was still open in 2013 and 
at the time of writing. It is widely believed that without reaching a mutually favourable 
agreement on the status of Kosovo, Serbia cannot become a fully functional state nor 
complete its security sector reform235.  
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Third, despite having a unique opportunity to lead military reform in Serbia, the EU 
dealt with the strategic elements of the reform reluctantly, choosing to focus on the same 
aspects of the reform, as elsewhere in the region, where such opportunity was denied by the 
strong presence of NATO. It therefore confirmed its preference to dealing with soft security 
issues over hard security. 
Fourth, the EU showed varying levels of interest and involvement in three elements 
of SSR studied in the thesis, with border reform receiving the most consistent and 
comprehensive attention from Brussels, police emerging as a firm priority towards the end 
of the studied period, and defence issues being tackled from the point of CSDP 
infrastructure. It is interesting that even those experts interviewed for this thesis that were 
critical of the EU admitted that the EU had the tools for approaching SSR in Serbia 
comprehensively, but was lacking the will to do so236.  
Fifth, the regional dimension of SSR in Serbia was approached by the EU extra 
carefully due to the importance of the country for the stability of the Western Balkans and 
its influence over Kosovo’s participation in regional initiatives. The Serbian political elites 
were encouraged to make security cooperation with their neighbours a priority on bilateral 
and regional levels. Although there is still a long way to go before the Western Balkans can 
be seen as a tension-free zone, the security situation in the region in 2013 was mostly 
peaceful, and Serbia, as one of the regional poles, under the guidance of the EU, played a 
significant role in achieving this point.  
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Chapter 7 The Impact of the EU on SSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina  
 
Introduction 
Already in 2002, security sector reform (SSR) in BiH was described as “an 
unprecedented experiment” (King, Dorn, and Hodes 2002), yet even fifteen years later, this 
experiment was not complete. This chapter discusses the EU’s contribution to SSR in 
Bosnia, following the approach undertaken to the case studies of Croatia and Serbia. Before 
proceeding with the analysis, however, I discuss several key factors that have shaped the 
reform in the country.  These include: the legacy of war, the structural framework 
introduced by the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA), strong international presence and 
divergent visions of the state’s future among the political elites of the two entities making 
up BiH.  
The Bosnian war, that lasted from April 1992 to November 1995, was the bloodiest 
of all conflicts fought on the territory of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s (Bassuener 
2005: 102). It displaced more than 2 000 000 and left around 100, 000 dead (Ahmetasevic 
2007). During the war, military forces, paramilitary actors and the police of all three sides– 
the Bosnian government, the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats – routinely engaged in 
human rights violations and war crimes (King, Dorn, and Hodes 2002: 8). Some actors were 
also complicit in ethnic cleansing237 that already in 1992 was identified as a goal, not a 
consequence of the Bosnian war238 by the UN envoy Tadeusz Mazoviecki (Caruso 2007: 
34). After the violence stopped, Bosnia’s security sector was “fragmented, overpoliticised 
and structured along ethnic lines” (Perdan 2006: 180), and therefore in dire need of dealing 
with the legacy of war, which could not leave SSR unaffected.  
The DPA, concluded in November 1995, provided both an enabling and restricting 
framework for SSR. While it included requirements for certain elements of the reform, such 
as military confidence-building measures and police restructuring, it ignored others, e.g. 
issues of border security, judiciary, and intelligence (King, Dorn, and Hodes 2002: 9). 
Moreover, by creating a weak state with two strong entities, the DPA introduced limitations 
on the level of change accessible to SSR. Security sectors of the two entities, the Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter Federation or FBiH) and Republika Srpska 
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(hereinafter RS), existed in parallel to each other with minimal contact. With time, the 
international community realised that this fragmentation not only wasted money, but also 
threatened the stability of the country and security of the wider Europe. This led to the rise 
of centralising approaches, which brought about a single army and state-level Ministry of 
Defence and built the unified border police. The police reform, however, ran into 
unsurmountable difficulties when the international community, by that time led by the EU, 
could not justify requirements for centralisation of the service neither with the DPA 
provisions, nor through the acquis. SSR in BiH, therefore, has been affected by tensions 
between the decentralised system of security governance developed by the DPA and 
centralising approaches favoured by the international actors (Marijan 2017: 10). It can be 
argued that nowhere in the region the link between SSR and state-building is as clear as it 
is in BiH. 
Similarly, the international role in Bosnia’s SSR has been unprecedented. Thanks to 
the institutional structure, established by the DPA, and political divisions among the 
leadership of two entities, external actors were driving forward not just some, but all 
reforms in the security sector (Vetschera 2005: 37). NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) 
and Stabilisation Force (SFOR), the OSCE, the High Representative (HR)239, his Office 
(OHR), and the UN Mission in BiH (UNMIBH) were all given mandates to engage in SSR-
related activities. Although the EU had no special role under the DPA, it still tried to 
contribute to the improvement of the security situation in the country, and in the early 2000s 
assumed a leadership role in SSR. Although the external pressure brought some important 
results in Bosnia’s SSR, the extent of external involvement in the reform attracted a lot of 
criticism. The international community is often blamed for poor coordination of its efforts, 
inadequate mechanisms of accountability, politicisation of the reform, and disregard for 
local ownership (Marijan 2017: 9-10, 38; Weller and Wolff 2006: 5).  
Finally, SSR in Bosnia has been affected by continuing tensions between the two 
entities. With the Federation seeking closer integration, and the RS refusing to give up the 
idea of joining a Greater Serbia or achieving independence, the development of security 
agencies on the state- and entity-level has been closely connected with the question of the 
BiH’s statehood. Since the country announced its intention to join the EU, the political 
elites on both sides have tried to develop a common vision of the country’s future, yet by 
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2013 these attempts failed to obtain substance. Considering everything said above, this 
chapter takes a closer look at SSR in BiH. It starts with an overview of changes in the 
security sector in 1991-2013 and continues with the analysis of the EU’s contribution into 
the process.  
 
Security sector reform in BiH: an overview 
Following the periodisation of regional development, developed in Chapter 3, the 
analysis of Bosnian SSR starts with the time when the Balkan subcomplex represented a 
regional conflict formation. Before the war, Bosnia’s security sector was part of the bigger 
security structure of Yugoslavia. This meant that BiH did not have its own army as defence 
was handled by the JNA. On the other hand, the republic had a Territorial Defence Force, 
that was used as a base for forming the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina (ABiH) in May 1992 
(Kaldor 2012: 46-48). The Patriotic League, set up by Alija Izetbegovic in 1991 as an organ 
of self-defence, and numerous paramilitary units were also incorporated into the ABiH in 
1992; the army command was centralised only in 1993 under the leadership of Prime 
Minister Haris Silajdzic (ibid.; Caruso 2007: 33).  
In fact, none of the three ethnic factions had consolidated forces when the war broke 
out in April 1992 (Hadzovic, Dizdarevic and Kapidzic 2011: 12). The Serbian side, that 
established Serb autonomous regions in September 1991 and announced independence of 
the Serb Republic of BiH on 7 April 1992, relied on an armed militia, created by the Serbian 
Democratic Party (SDS BiH) and direct support from the JNA (Caruso 2007: 33; Ramet 
2002: 205). Formally, the JNA withdrew from the territory of BiH in May 1992, but nearly 
70, 000 of its troops transferred to the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS), which was set up in Pale 
on 12 May (Kaldor 2012: 47). The Croatian Defence Council (HVO) became the official 
military of Herceg-Bosna, when the latter proclaimed independence on 3 July 1992, and 
was formed out of militia set up by the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ BiH) (ibid.). All 
three armies were heavily reliant on paramilitaries and foreign mercenaries, and none of 
them had the monopoly of force on the territories they controlled. The forces became more 
regularised and centralised towards the end of fighting (ibid.). According to different 
estimates, between 175, 000 and 430, 000 people were recruited for the war effort in BiH 
(Pietz 2006a: 156-157). The discrepancy can be explained by fluctuations of troops during 
different stages of fighting240 and the inclusion or exclusion of non-regular forces. Thus, in 
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1994 the VRS consisted of around 100,000 men, including professionals, volunteers and 
mercenaries from Bulgaria, Russia and Ukraine (Heinemann-Grüder, Pietz and Duffy 2003: 
9). In 1994-1995, the HVO had around 50,000 fighters and could rely on 15,000-20,000 
soldiers seconded by the Croatian Army, while the ABiH had around 90, 000 troops, not 
counting nearly 3, 000 Islamic fighters at the end of the war (ibid.). The number of 
paramilitaries was especially difficult to estimate, but they were used by each of the sides.241 
Such a mixture of regular and irregular forces and proliferation of clandestine 
networks, developed to overcome sanctions imposed by the EC/EU and UN, contributed to 
criminalisation of life in Bosnia and turning the country into a typical element of an RCF 
in the first half on the 1990s. Criminal networks were used by all sides of the conflict to 
acquire military equipment and weapons, though Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats were 
dependent on them more. This is because the VRS inherited equipment from the JNA and 
controlled most of the JNA’s weapon stores in BiH (Kaldor 2012: 48). The VRS and HVO 
could also count on mostly covert, but still substantial support from the rump Yugoslavia 
and Croatia respectively. The situation in Bosnia was not helped by the chaotic nature of 
fighting, where parties were alternating between cooperation and hostilities (Hadzovic, 
Dizdarevic and Kapidzic 2011: 12). At the start of the war, Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats 
fought together against the Bosnian Serbs, yet after the release of the Vance-Owen Plan in 
1993, that suggested the division of BiH into ethnically-based cantons, Croats and Bosniaks 
turned against each other (Kaldor 2012: 47). This war within the war formally ended in 
March 1994 with the signing of the Washington Agreement, which established a Bosniak-
Croat Federation (Caruso 2007: 37).  
Police played an important part in the conflict, too. The blurred division of 
responsibilities between security actors in BiH between 1991 and 1995 is another factor 
that qualifies the country as part of an RCF. During the war and immediately after, the 
police were split into parallel structures along ethnic lines (Wisler 2005: 140). The Bosniak 
police were based in Sarajevo and responsible for the central districts of Bosnia; the 
Bosnian Croat police controlled the Western parts of the country, the territory of the 
Croatian Herzeg-Bosna Republic, while Bosnian Serbs had their headquarters in Pale and 
controlled the rest of the country (ibid.). With the division between the police and military 
being fluid, tasks carried out by both forces were often interchangeable (ICG 2005: 7). The 
militarisation of the police and rapid increase in their size (in 1995, there were 45,000 police 
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officers in the country) led to the loss of professionalism in the forces (Wisler 2005: 148; 
Perdan 2006: 186).  
Borders in BiH during this time were porous and used by each side (sometimes, in 
cooperation with others) for smuggling and trafficking activities (Kaldor 2012: 51). Before 
the war, Bosnia had neither an international border, nor a border force, that is why during 
the war border security was a joint responsibility of the police and army (Hills 2006: 198). 
For instance, already in 1991, the border of the Serb autonomous regions in BiH were 
secured by the JNA, and later by the VRS (Ramet 2002: 205).   
In short, between 1991 and 1995, the security situation in BiH was dominated by pre-
war and war contexts. After the start of hostilities in April 1992, the military and police 
were split along ethnic lines and played a key role in supporting the strategic goals of the 
warring factions. For Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats this was the removal of other ethnic 
groups from the territories they secured to attach the latter to respective homelands, i.e. 
Serbia and Croatia (Caruso 2007: 34). For the Bosniaks, it was the preservation of Bosnia’s 
integrity (ibid.). Through their engagement in the war effort and criminal, sanction-busting 
activities, the armed and police forces of all three sides contributed to the spread of military, 
political and economic networks that turned the Western Balkans into a highly unstable and 
dangerous regional conflict formation.  
The war had a devastating effect on the country and its security sector(s). It was 
stopped by the Dayton Peace Accords, formally the General Framework Agreement for 
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP), initialled on 21 November 1995 at Dayton, 
Ohio, and signed several weeks later in Paris. The DPA established a highly decentralised 
state consisting of two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika 
Srpska (GFAP 1995). The Federation was further divided into ten cantons, each with 
considerable autonomy, while the RS adopted a central constitutional model (Wisler 2005: 
139). Both entities were “ethnically derived” and held most powers usually found in a state, 
such us defence, taxation and justice (Bassuener 2005: 103). The DPA contained 11 
annexes that provided a starting point for several areas of reform in BiH, including reform 
of the security sector242. Given the circumstances in which the Agreement was negotiated, 
i.e. “at a point when no party had either fully achieved its war aims or had been 
comprehensively defeated in military terms” (Weller and Wolff 2006: 3), it provided only 
minimal requirements for SSR. The immediate post-war goals were to preserve the unity 
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of BiH and prevent the relapse into violence (King, Dorn, and Hodes 2002: 8). Therefore, 
in 1995-1999, SSR was restricted by the stabilisation and confidence-building agenda of 
the international community.  
Military reform was conceived by the DPA “in terms of a division and balance of 
power” between the entities (Caparini 2006: 24). NATO’s 60,000-strong IFOR was tasked 
with the separation of entities’ forces and overseeing the withdrawal of heavy weapons to 
cantonment areas to prevent a resumption of hostilities (GFAP 1995). It was given a broad 
mandate to monitor and ensure BiH’s compliance with the DPA’s military aspects, included 
into Annex 1A. Although it could get involved in public security issues such as arresting 
war criminals, IFOR preferred to stay away from these tasks (Bassuener 2005: 104). SFOR 
that replaced IFOR in 1996 with 32,000 troops and stayed in the country till the end of 
2003, developed a more proactive approach, reflected among other things in better 
coordination of its activities with the OHR (Bassuener 2015: 85). To address the military 
imbalance in the country, measures were taken to build capacity of the Federation’s Army 
and improve arms control in both entities. Thus, the Train and Equip Programme, 
implemented by the US private military company Military Professional Resources 
Incorporated (MPRI), between 1996 and 2003, strengthened the Army of the Federation by 
updating its equipment, sharing best practices and reducing tensions between Bosniaks and 
Bosnian Croats (Pietz 2006a: 162). By targeting only one entity, however, the programme 
polarised the state militarily, spreading mistrust among Bosnian Serbs and undermining 
integration process (Caparini 2006: 25). It should also be mentioned that after the signing 
of the DPA, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs continued receiving financial support and 
intelligence from Croatia and the FRY respectively, making balanced relations between the 
armed forces in BiH more challenging (Pietz 2006a: 158).  
The arms control issues were mostly coordinated by the OSCE under Annex 1B. It 
negotiated the Agreement on confidence and security-building measures in BiH under 
Article II of the Annex in January 1996 (Vienna Agreement), and the Agreement on Sub-
Regional Arms Control under Article IV in June 1996 (Florence Agreement) (Caruso 2007: 
52). The Vienna Agreement, signed by the Bosnian state and two entities, was aimed at 
achieving military transparency and cooperation in the country (Vetschera 2005a). The 
Florence Agreement, discussed in Chapter 3, introduced limitations on heavy weaponry and 
military strength not only of BiH and its two entities, but also of Croatia and the FRY 
(ASAC 1996). It was one of the steps undertaken by the international actors to foster a 
security regime in the Western Balkans. Although, all sides showed commitment to the 
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Agreement initially, the FRY withdrew its support during NATO’s bombing campaign in 
March 1999 (Boese 1999). By the time it resumed its participation in the initiative in July 
1999, the incipient regional security regime had failed. Despite this, the two agreements, 
implemented under the vigilant supervision of the OSCE, were largely seen as a success 
(Vetschera 2005a). Together with the IFOR and SFOR activities, they provided the first 
building blocks for defence reform in Bosnia (Marijan 2016: 18).  
Nonetheless, external actors did not cover all urgent needs of the post-war defence 
sector. For example, there was no comprehensive strategy for the demobilisation of 
combatants (King, Dorn, and Hodes 2002: 10). As a result, sporadic actions were taken to 
reduce the military forces in the entities, yet numbers of soldiers mostly fell due to the 
disintegration of armies rather than a controlled process of demobilisation (Pietz 2006a: 
157). Hence, by June 1996, nearly 100, 000 left the ABiH, 45, 000 – the HVO243 and 150, 
000 – the VRS (World Bank 1996: 1). In the five-year period after the war, around 370, 
000 combatants were demobilised (Pietz 2006a: 157).  
Overall, most attempts to initiate change in defence matters between1995 and 1999 
were concentrated on the level of entities as the Constitution of BiH, contained in Annex 
IV of the DPA, did not define defence as a state competency. The only state-level institution 
envisioned by Dayton and established in June 1997 was the Standing Committee on 
Military Matters (SCMM)244 (Vetschera and Damian 2006: 29). Consequently, defence 
reform in BiH at this period was limited. Considering the international community’s 
preoccupation with preserving peace in the country, and the political leadership of the 
entities focusing on the consolidation of their powers, this is hardly surprising (Bassuener 
2005: 101). It is important to note that, despite the constitutional changes brought about by 
the DPA, the political elites in the country remained largely unchanged. Three major 
nationalist parties – the Bosniak Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Serbian 
Democratic Party (SDS BiH) and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ BiH) – that won 
the first free elections in 1990 and led their respective ethnic groups during the war, won 
all, but the 2000, post-conflict elections until 2002 (Koneska 2014: 83). The dominance of 
nationalist parties, exacerbated divisions among the two entities and three ethnic groups 
further. In such environment, refugee returns and cooperation with the ICTY remained low 
(Bassuener 2005: 106). The situation was not helped by slow police reform.  
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After the war, the entities structured their police forces according to two different 
models (Padurariu 2014: 3). In the Federation, the police were decentralised, with every 
canton having its own Ministry of Interior. These bodies were highly autonomous and 
powerful, while the Federation MoI had limited competences for organised crime, inter-
cantonal cooperation, anti-terrorism and VIP protection (Wisler 2005: 140). The RS, on the 
other hand, chose a centralised model with a single MoI that was in full control of the crime 
prevention and law enforcement in the entity (ICG 2002: 9). When in March 1999, the 
Arbitration Tribunal in Vienna gave the city of Brcko a status of a district within BiH, but 
not subject to either entity (Hadzovic, Dizdarevic and Kapidzic 2011: 57), the number of 
police forces in Bosnia rose to thirteen (Wisler 2005: 140). With a few exceptions, these 
police forces were ethnically homogeneous, highly criminalised and boasting close links to 
local political parties (Berg 2016: 23). To assist BiH with maintaining “civilian law 
enforcement agencies operating in accordance with internationally recognized standards”, 
Annex XI of the DPA tasked the UN with setting up an International Police Task Force 
(IPTF) (GFAP 1995). Originally, the IPTF was given a limited mandate, which allowed it 
to monitor activities of the police, advise and train personnel, as well as assess threats to 
public order and advise government bodies on effective law enforcement (ibid.). As a non-
executive mission, without coercive power245, it could not significantly change police 
practices in the country (Donais 2006: 175).  
This mandate was extended in 1996 with UNSC Resolution 1088 that allowed the 
mission to investigate or assist with investigating human rights abuses among the law 
enforcement personnel (NATO1997). Its work was further improved when the Bonn 
Conference of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) on 9-10 December 1997 granted 
additional powers to the High Representative (GFAP 1995). The PIC’s decision that came 
to be known as the “Bonn powers” recognised the HR as “the final authority in theatre 
regarding interpretation” of the DPA’s provisions on civilian aspects of peace 
implementation (OHR 1997). In such circumstances, the IPTF became more confident and 
started to acquire some real authority (Donais 2006: 177). From 1996, it focused its efforts 
on three main elements of the reform: restructuring of police forces, vetting police officers 
and promoting minority recruitment.  
Given different approaches to policing in the entities and varying openness of their 
leadership to reforms, the IPTF had to move at different speeds in the Federation and RS. 
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In the former, with the 1996 Bonn-Petersberg Agreement, it demanded the reduction of 
police force from 32, 750 to 11, 500, and set quotas for minority recruitment at 28 per cent, 
which reflected the pre-war 1991 census (Donais 2006: 177-178). In the latter, the 
Framework Agreement of Police Restructuring, Reform and Democratization was signed 
only in December 1998. It stipulated the need to cut down the numbers of police officers 
from 12, 000 to 8, 500, and set the targets for non-Serb recruits at 20 per cent, based on the 
turnout of minorities in the first local elections of 1997 (Bieber 2010: 9-10). While the 
reduction of forces was achieved in both entities within a few years, the targets for minority 
recruitment remained unattainable. The Agreements also allowed the IPTF to conduct a 
certification programme that screened police officers for involvement in war crimes or 
repeated cases of misconduct, and de-authorised those that were found guilty of these 
offences (Donais 2006: 177).  
Speaking about police reform in BiH, two special cases need to be mentioned 
separately: Mostar and Brcko. In Mostar, from 1994 till 1996, the WEU police contingent 
was deployed to assist the EU unify the city after the end of conflict between the Bosnian 
government and Bosnian Croats (Bieber 2010: 10). Although, the WEU mission had to 
create a single police force, it achieved limited results by the end of its mandate.246 In Brcko, 
that was under full international protectorate since 1997 and received a special status in 
1999, the IPTF and OHR had more freedom to reform the police, which allowed them to 
achieve a multi-ethnic and diverse police force by 1999 (ibid.: 10-11). Apart from the IPTF, 
police reform in Bosnian was also promoted by other external actors such as the Council of 
Europe, European Commission, OSCE, UNHCR, and Stability Pact (ICG 2002: 7). 
Unfortunately, the quantity of aid programmes did not translate into quality, as most of the 
time donor actions were uncoordinated (Wisler 2005: 148).  
Despite difficulties in initiating change in Bosnia’s numerous police agencies, police 
reform in the country between 1995 and 1999 achieved considerably more than border 
reform. After the war, state borders in BiH were controlled by the MoI of the RS and 
Ministries of Interior at entity and cantonal levels of the Federation (Hadzovic, Dizdarevic 
and Kapidzic 2011: 22). Thirteen ministries altogether oversaw Bosnian border control. The 
infrastructure at border crossings was very poor because the country had no external borders 
as part of Yugoslavia, while the cooperation and exchange of information between different 
Ministries was practically non-existent due to the legacy of war (Hadzovic 2009: 42). This 
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made Bosnia vulnerable to trans-border and organised crime, which threatened the rest of 
Europe, too (King, Dorn, and Hodes 2002: 20). Due to the complexity and sensitivity of 
border issues, the international community preferred to focus on technical matters first. For 
example, the EU worked with the OHR through the Customs and Fiscal Assistance Office 
(CAFAO) to develop customs systems in BiH, compliant with European standards (ibid.: 
21). It was not, however, until 1997 that the question of state border police was raised (Hills 
2006: 196). At the Bonn Conference, the PIC invited the OHR and IPTF to assist local 
Bosnian authorities in preparing legislation on a state border agency (Hadzovic 2009: 42). 
Although the RS initially resisted the idea, as it feared this legislation could be used to 
revise the BiH constitution, in November 1999 under international pressure all three 
members of the BiH Presidency signed the “New York Declaration”, thus proclaiming their 
support for the establishment of a unified State Border Service (SBS) (ibid.: 42-43).  
To sum up, BiH saw first attempts at SSR immediately after the signing of the DPA. 
Efforts in this area were led by external actors, entrusted with specific peace-building tasks 
at Dayton. Given the degree of devastation left in the country by the war and ethnic 
cleansing, the international community first focused on preservation of peace and 
decreasing tensions between the three dominant ethnic groups (Hadzovic, Dizdarevic and 
Kapidzic 2011: 41). Unsurprisingly, the military aspects of the DPA initially received more 
attention and support, yet with the increase of the HR’s powers in 1997, civilian aspects 
started gaining more prominence.  
After the initial stability in BiH was secured, the international community started 
prioritising the strengthening of common institutions, while SSR emerged as one of the key 
elements of state-building. It was employed as a political tool for transforming decentralised 
Dayton structures and bringing Bosnia into the Euro-Atlantic institutions (Marijan 2016: 
7). A confluence of several factors in the early 2000s, among which – the change of regimes 
in Croatia and Serbia, appointment of a strong-minded HR and the increased role of the EU 
in the country – created conditions for introducing important changes into the work of 
Bosnian security actors. In defence, to help the Federation and RS achieve smaller, more 
affordable armies, in 2001-2002, SFOR carried out and the OSCE supervised a downsizing 
exercise (Marijan 2016: 18), which reduced the number of soldiers in the country to 19, 000 
(Perdan 2006: 189). Nonetheless, two separate armies kept draining the budget, costing the 
state five per cent of GDP yearly (Caparini 2006: 25). When the financial concerns were 
coupled with the requirements for joining NATO’s PfP Programme, it became clear that 
BiH had to establish state-level defence institutions (Koneska 2014: 87). An opening for 
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this change occurred in August 2002247, when Serb military leaders were found to be 
involved in illegal arms transfers from the aircraft factory ORAO to Iraq, thus violating the 
UN embargo (Vetschera and Damian 2006: 32). In response, in May 2003, HR Paddy 
Ashdown established the Defence Reform Commission (DRC) that brought together 
representatives of both entities and international community to discuss ways of establishing 
state command and control of Bosnia’s armed forces (OHR 2003).  
The Commission finished work and published its report in September 2003 
(Vetschera and Damian 2006: 34). Based on the report, the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH 
adopted the Defence Law on 1 December 2003 that assigned supreme operational and 
administrative control and command over the armed forces in BiH to the Presidency and 
established a state MoD (ibid.). Nonetheless, the entity MoDs were not abolished and 
remained in charge of most military matters (Koneska 2014: 90). Although the results 
achieved by the DRC were modest, they made further changes possible. When in December 
2004, EUFOR Althea that substituted NATO’s SFOR, discovered evidence of the VRS 
harbouring Ratko Mladic from the ICTY, Ashdown revitalised the reform (ibid.: 91-92). 
He brought back the DRC and tasked it with drafting the legislation for establishing a single 
army (ibid.). He also emphasised cooperation with the ICTY, which was unsatisfactory in 
the country (ICG 2005: 3). The DRC released the final report on 18 July 2005, which led 
to the transfer of responsibilities for defence from the entities to the state of BiH, the 
abolition of entity MoDs and compulsory military service from January 2006, and the 
creation of the unified Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH) (ibid.: 77, 79). 
The new army’s strength is mandated at 10, 000 active duty soldiers, 1,000 civilians and 5, 
000 reservists (Bassuener 2015: 91). In recognition of the gained results, NATO invited 
BiH to join PfP in 2006 and the Membership Action Plan (MAP) in 2010 (NATO 2017). 
NATO’s pull is widely recognised as one of the main factors explaining the success of 
military reform in BiH (Koneska 2014: 94). Other reasons included: the informal setting of 
the DRC; the achievement of compromise as a final arrangement, which did not allow either 
of the entities to tilt the balance of power in its favour; consensus among all Bosnian 
political elites that the reform was necessary (ibid.: 90) and the ability of the international 
community to act in unison (Marijan 2016: 20).  
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While considerable progress was achieved by 2006, in 2013 the country did not yet 
assume full responsibility for its defence. In December 2004, EUFOR Althea took over the 
role of enforcing Annex 1A of the DPA (Bassuener 2015: 89). Since 2010 it has also been 
providing confidence-building and training support to the AFBiH, while contributing to a 
safe and secure environment in BiH (EUFOR BiH 2016). EUFOR is responsible for tactical 
aspects of defence reform in the country, while NATO, that kept small headquarters in 
Sarajevo, oversees the strategic elements248. After the focus shifted from defence reform, 
Bosnia witnessed a slowed down progress in this area (Bassuener 2015). Politicisation, 
dealing with the legacy of war crimes and unresolved property ownership issues between 
the state and entities remained a source of concern. Compared to the starting point in 1995, 
however, the achievements of defence reform in BiH are undeniable. Police reform, on the 
other hand, was less transformative.  
The IPTF remained the leader of police reform until the end of 2002. It dedicated its 
final years to promoting democratisation and depoliticization of the police forces, as well 
as finalising the certification process249 (Padurariu 2014: 4). The latter de-authorised 
between 1,500 and 2,000 officers, 190 of whom were suspected of committing war crimes 
(Koneska 2014: 120). As the process was finished in a rush (Bieber 2010: 9) and was not 
followed up with UN-sanctioned criminal proceedings, it did not lead to considerably 
higher levels of popular trust in the police (Collantes-Celador 2005: 371). It was still an 
important step towards overcoming the legacy of war and making the police forces in both 
entities more professional. The depoliticization and democratisation agenda250 of the IPTF 
in 2000-2002 was pursued through the appointment of independent police commissioners 
and police chiefs, co-location at senior levels (Wisler 2005: 151) and the accreditation of 
police agencies according to democratic policing standards (Padurariu 2014: 4). 
Additionally, the IPTF contributed to building first state-level law enforcement institutions 
in BiH – the State Border Police (SBS) in 2000 and the State Information and Protection 
Agency (SIPA)251 in 2002 (ibid.). Both became operative under the HR’s decisions and 
were initially weak. When the IPTF finished work, and declared the police in BiH “fit for 
Europe” (UNMIBH 2002), it achieved some important results: the police in the Federation 
and RS were “pacified” and no longer seen as a major public threat (Donais 2006: 173); 
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they were also slimmed down and introduced to modern standards in policing through 
trainings and reopening of police academies in Sarajevo and Banja Luka (Perdan 2006: 194; 
Padurariu 2014: 6). Still, the biggest challenges of police reform were left unanswered: the 
political control over the policing system was not removed, and the fragmented structure 
left untouched (Muehlmann 2009: 142). 
The European Union Police Mission (EUPM)252, which substituted the IPTF in 
January 2003, had too weak a mandate to tackle the reform on its own (EEAS 2012). Hence, 
the restructuring effort was initiated by HR Ashdown, who by that time also acted as the 
EU Special Representative (EUSR). He set up the Police Restructuring Commission (PRC) 
in July 2004, asking it to develop “a single structure of policing” for BiH (OHR 2004). 
Headed by the former Belgian PM Wilfred Martens, the commission also tried to bring BiH 
closer to the fulfilment of the three principles of policing set by the EU for starting SAA 
negotiations. These required: (1) exclusive state-level competence for all police matters; (2) 
no political interference in policing; and (3) local policing areas (LPA) designated 
according to technical and functional criteria (ICG 2005: 5). 
Without a political opening, such as presented by the ORAO affair in defence reform, 
the PRC was unable to bring domestic elites to support centralisation of the police253. 
Marten’s report, released after the PRC ended in December 2004 concluded that no 
consensus was reached on the issue. In October 2005, thanks to a watered-down proposal 
by RS President Dragan Cavic that in essence was “a deal to make a deal” (Bassuener 2015: 
90), the EU conceded that enough progress was achieved in the reform to start SAA 
negotiations. Although Cavic’s agreement envisioned the establishment of a Directorate for 
Police Restructuring Implementation (DIPR), it did not contain any other executive 
provisions or commitment to re-designing the LPAs so that they could cut across the inter-
entity boundary line (IEBL) (Koneska 2014: 125). For two years, the reform efforts, 
championed by the HR/EUSR and the EU, were blocked by senior politicians from both 
entities, most notably by then RS PM Milorad Dodik and Bosniak member of the BiH 
Presidency Haris Silajdzic (Bassuener 2015: 90). Only in October 2007, when the Mostar 
Declaration was signed, the stalemate ended. The Declaration and a follow-up Action plan 
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led to the adoption of two laws on policing254 and establishment of seven new state-level 
agencies (Berg 2016: 28). This allowed the EU to sign the SAA with BiH in 2008 (ibid.). 
Police reform, however, remained unfinished255: instead of creating a leaner policing 
system, resistant to politicisation and conducive to inter-entity cooperation, the police 
structure in the country became even more cumbersome (Koneska 2014: 133). 
After changes of 2007-2008, the EU continued attempts to bring change to the 
Bosnian police, but the reform was transferred into local ownership (Hadzovic, Dizdarevic 
and Kapidzic 2011: 85). The EUPM provided technical and legislative support until 2012. 
After that, the EU Delegation/Office of the EU Special Representative took over the 
assistance with the fight against organised crime, regional cooperation and police-criminal 
justice system relations (Padurariu 2014: 7-8). The Delegation has also been placing a 
strong emphasis on preparing Bosnia for EU membership256, a theme, which is even more 
clearly discernible in relation to border reform.  
Having laid the foundation for the state-level border police at the end of the 1990s, 
the international community did not ease pressure on BiH until the service became fully 
operational (King, Dorn, and Hodes 2002: 21). Although the DPA did not contain 
provisions on border security, the OHR used Article III of Annex 4, which allows the 
establishment of additional institutions to support the country’s international character, to 
justify border reform (Hadzovic 2009: 43). The SBS became operational in June 2000 
(Hadzovic, Dizdarevic and Kapidzic 2011: 58), and took full control over the BiH borders 
in December 2002 (BPBiH n.d.). While responsibility for setting up the SBS was given to 
the UNMIBH, the work of the new border service was based on “the EU-style norms, 
structures and objectives” from the start (Hills 2006: 196). With the launch of the Ohrid 
Process in 2003, Bosnia subscribed to the Integrated Border Management strategy, 
developed by the EU for Western Balkan countries (Trauner 2011: 27). When created, the 
SBS was under the civilian oversight of the Ministry of Civil Affairs and Communication 
(Arndt 2000: 36), yet in 2004 with the adoption of the new Law on State Border Service, it 
was put under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Security (MoS) of BiH, set up in February 
2003 (BPBiH n.d.). Already within a few years of its deployment, the SBS had noticeable 
impact on border security: it considerably reduced the levels of illegal migration and 
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increased customs revenues (King, Dorn, and Hodes 2002: 22). As a multi-ethnic service 
that adheres to the requirements for ethnic representation (Hadzovic 2009: 45), the 
SBS/border police also contributed to raising the profile of the law enforcement agencies 
in the country (Donais 2006: 179). In 2008-2009, it implemented important reforms in 
strengthening the rule of law, combating organised crime, illegal migration and corruption, 
and applying Schengen-style border management, as the result of which BiH was granted 
a visa-free regime with the EU in 2010 (Council of the EU 2010). Despite certain 
challenges, such as dependence on external support and politicisation of rule of law in the 
country, it is widely accepted that border reform has been the most successful of all security 
sector reforms in Bosnia (Marijan 2016: 29; Collantes-Celador and Juncos 2012: 216).  
To conclude, it is possible to say that Bosnia’s SSR produced mixed results by 2013. 
On the one hand, the country established a unified professional army under the control of 
the state-level MoD, set up the Ministry of Security, developed the multi-ethnic border 
police and adopted key security legislation. The level of cooperation achieved in defence 
and border security would have been inconceivable immediately after the war. On the other 
hand, the police forces in the entities remain politicised and highly divided. Although, they 
were “pacified”, professionalised, trimmed and introduced to democratic standards of 
policing, the law enforcement agencies from the Federation and RS find it difficult to 
cooperate or coordinate their activities. Moreover, the introduction of several state-level 
bodies, such as SIPA or DIPR added more complexity to the already cumbersome system. 
The overview of SSR in BiH suggests that the state only partially meets the essential 
conditions of an element in a security community, defined by Deutsch. Although leaders of 
both entities formally subscribe to the values of democracy, human rights, the rule of law 
and future in the EU257, in practice they resist the implementation of reforms that could lead 
to their attainment. Efficiency and effectiveness, which Deutsch labelled as responsiveness, 
do not yet characterise the country’s security sector, or three of its elements studied here. 
Finally, with the leadership of three ethnic groups struggling to find a common language, 
mutual predictability of behaviour is still weak. Problems with SSR contributed to the 
slowing down of Bosnia’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic institutions. Having joined the 
PfP in 2006, BiH made practically no progress with the MAP (Bassuener 2015a: 5). 
Although the EU signed the SAA with BiH in June 2008, in 2013 the country was only a 
potential candidate after launching the High-level Dialogue on the Accession Process in 
2012. It was therefore behind not only Croatia, by that time member of both NATO and the 
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EU, but also Serbia that achieved the candidate status in 2012. The next section will analyse 
the EU’s impact on SSR in BiH to compare its performance in all three studied Western 
Balkan states in the final part of the thesis.    
 
The role of the EU in transforming the security sector of BiH (1991-2013) 
 
The EU and BiH security in 1991-1995 
As discussed in previous chapters, the European Community, found itself in the 
vanguard of the international effort to manage the Yugoslav crises. By the time the war 
broke out in Bosnia, the EC’s leadership was waning, and the UN came to play a more 
prominent role in negotiating peace between the warring parties (Hill and Smith 2000: 360). 
As the situation in the Western Balkans “grew too complex and dangerous” to be solved 
through civilian diplomacy (Ginsberg 2001: 76), the EU-UN partnership was side-lined by 
the US and NATO258, whose combined efforts stopped the violence in Bosnia in late 1995. 
Nonetheless, between 1991 and 1995, the EC/EU had an impact on the security situation in 
Bosnia, and, unlike in Croatia and Serbia, managed to get directly involved in reform of the 
country’s security sector259. This impact was uneven, inconsistent and flawed, yet by no 
means insignificant (ibid.: 59). Without trying to fully assess the EU’s response to the wars 
of Yugoslavia’s dissolution260, this section will focus on those aspects of the EU action in 
1991-1995 that are most relevant for Bosnia’s SSR261, either due to their influence on 
Bosnia’s statehood, security situation or security bodies. This action includes: the Badinter 
Commission and recognition of BiH as an independent state, the arms embargo, the 
deployment of the ECMM and the European Union administration of Mostar (EUAM).  
When on 17 December 1991, the EC invited the Yugoslav republics seeking 
recognition to submit their applications by 24 December (Blockmans 2007: 116), it 
effectively signalled the acceptance of Yugoslavia’s dissolution and emboldened Bosnia 
(and Macedonia) to declare independence (Ginsberg 2001: 78-79). It was the task of the 
Arbitration Commission, chaired by Robert Badinter, to assess these applications and 
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present authoritative, yet non-binding opinions on several issues, ranging from statehood to 
succession (Craven 1996: 333-334). Opinion No 4 stipulated that BiH was not yet entitled 
to the recognition as a sovereign and independent state because “the will of the peoples of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina” was not “fully established” (CoY AC 1992). This decision, informed 
by the absence of support for the application262 from the Bosnian Serbs (ibid.), was not an 
outright rejection as the Commission recommended holding a national referendum if BiH 
desired the assessment to be reviewed (ibid.). Thus, the EC did not deny Bosnia recognition, 
but delayed it and by doing so prevented Sarajevo from obtaining the international support 
in the face of imminent war (Ginsberg 2001: 81). The Arbitration also deepened the tensions 
between different ethnic groups in Bosnia. By ruling that the Serbian population in Bosnia 
(as well as in Croatia) did not have the right to self-determination in Opinion No 2 and 
recognising internal boundaries between the Yugoslav republics as frontiers under 
international law in Opinion No 3 (CoY AC 1992), the Badinter Commission, angered 
Bosnian Serbs and their patrons in the Belgrade, on the one hand, and gave the Bosnian 
government encouragement to push for independence, on the other. Therefore, like in 
Croatia, the EC as a convenor of the Arbitration Commission, determined Bosnia’s general 
shape and international personality as a state.  
The referendum in BiH was held on 29 February and 1 March 1992: out of 64 per 
cent of the population who voted, 99.7 per cent supported the independence, while 31 per 
cent (mostly Bosnian Serbs) boycotted the plebiscite (Ginsberg 2001: 81). The EC had no 
choice but recognise the independence of BiH, which it did on 7 April (ibid.: 83). Once 
Bosnian Serbs realised the recognition was forthcoming, they decided to fight for territory, 
fearing the minority status in a new sovereign state (Andreas 2006: 72). It can be argued 
therefore that the Badinter Commission’s decisions and the EC’s subsequent actions on 
recognition invigorated Sarajevo’s push for independence and hastened the coming of war 
to Bosnia (Ginsberg 2001: 81). Additionally, by recognising Bosnia as a sovereign state, 
the EC helped turn the conflict from a civil war to an interstate one (ibid.: 79), making it 
impossible for the international community to ignore it (Gow 1997: 36).   
If the recognition of BiH by the EC defined Bosnia’s statehood, the arms embargo 
influenced the distribution of military power among the warring parties and contributed to 
the criminalisation of Bosnia’s key security players. Having introduced the arms embargo 
against Yugoslavia in July 1991, the EC/EU member states put a strong emphasis on 
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keeping it in place during the war in Bosnia, despite the USA’s insistence on lifting the 
embargo for the Bosniak side (Ginsberg 2001: 77). The EU also supported the 
implementation of the UN arms embargo, introduced in September 1991 (Lopez 2000: 73), 
by cooperating with the OSCE and NATO263. Measures, undertaken by the EU and UN to 
reduce the flow of arms in the region were first aimed at the prevention and then at limiting 
violence, instead they disproportionately disadvantaged the Sarajevo government and set 
the balance of military power in favour of Bosnian Serb and, to a lesser extent, Bosnian 
Croats (ibid.: 74).  
The RS could rely on the JNA’s armaments and covert networks in Belgrade, while 
Bosnian Croats were supported by Croatia (Andreas 2006: 73). The Bosnian government 
was hit by the EU and UN arms embargos the most, due to its landlocked geographic 
position and weak financial standing (ibid.). It had to build its military arsenal practically 
from scratch and almost exclusively through illegal networks. Most weapons had to enter 
Bosnia through Croatia that not only charged substantial transhipment fees, but often acted 
as a supplier itself (Andreas 2005: 352). Other sources of illegal weaponry for the Bosnian 
government originated in the Middle East, in such countries as Iran, Sudan, Saudi Arabia 
and Libya (Pomfret 1996).  Although Bosniaks struggled to acquire certain types of 
weapons, e.g. armour and artillery, through clandestine channels, by 1994-1995 they 
amassed enough strength to tip the military balance in their favour264 (Andreas 2006: 83-
84). Underground networks that allowed the Bosnian side to avoid defeat, while being 
disadvantaged by the EU and UN arms embargos, did not disappear with the end of conflict, 
but spread further to economy and society265 (ibid.). Like in Croatia and Serbia, therefore, 
the EU’s activities in support of the arms embargoes, introduced by its member states and 
the UN, unintentionally contributed to the criminalisation of the Bosnian state. It would be 
unfair to say, however, that the EU’s position on the arms embargo had exclusively negative 
impact. There is evidence to suggest that lifting of the embargo could have led to the 
escalation of violence and made the Bosnian government less inclined to support a 
diplomatic solution to the conflict (National Intelligence Council 1994).  
Two remaining aspects of the EC/EU action in BiH in 1991-1995 considered here – 
the deployment of the ECMM and EUAM – involved the bloc’s active engagement on the 
ground. The ECMM was brought to BiH, after opening operations in Slovenia and Croatia, 
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on 1 October 1991 (Blockmans 2007: 129). Its work followed the same principles and faced 
the same difficulties as in Croatia266, creating “a real and symbolic link” (Ginsberg 
2001:69) between Bosnia and the Western Balkans, on the one hand, and the EU and 
international community, on the other. Although unable to stop the conflict, the ECMM 
demonstrated that Bosnia mattered to the outside world. The mission’s work provided the 
EU with first-hand information on the situation in the country shaping the bloc’s policy 
towards Bosnia and the region (EU Council Secretariat 2007). The mission’s monitors came 
in close contact with the Bosnian security actors during the war, thus collecting valuable 
experience for post-war SSR. This experience in many cases was put into use when former 
EC monitors joined international institutions in BiH working on bringing change to the 
country’s security sector, e.g. SFOR, EUPM or European Delegation to BiH267. ECMM’s 
work in 1991-1995 therefore contributed to Bosnia’s SSR, although mostly indirectly. 
A more direct link can be established between SSR in Bosnia and the activities of the 
EU administration of the town of Mostar268, which was the first major action under the 
CFSP. When in May 1994 the EU formally accepted the invitation of the parties to the 
Washington Agreement to help with the unification and reconstruction of Mostar (Court of 
Auditors 1996: 3), the historic capital of Herzegovina, it also took on the task to unify the 
town’s divided police forces (Blockmans 2007: 182-183). This task was entrusted by the 
Council of the EU to the WEU Police Force (WEUPOL), deployed to Bosnia in September 
1994 (Yarwood et al 1999: 7). The mission was also mandated to monitor the 
demilitarisation of Mostar with UNPROFOR, restore and maintain public order together 
with the local police and provide the latter with training (Court of Auditors 1996: 14). From 
the start, the WEUPOL faced difficulties in fulfilling its mandate partly caused by the lack 
of resources (Reichel 2000: 15), partly by the opposition to unification in the Bosnian Croat-
controlled West Mostar (Court of Auditors 1996: 4). Nonetheless, by the end of 1995, it 
achieved first results. It established a joint operations centre, improved police 
communications and organised patrols on the demarcation line between two parts of the 
city with the East Mostar police and the West Mostar police (ibid.). No joint patrols were 
taken by West and East Mostar police forces together, despite an agreement signed on 18 
September 1995 (ibid.).  
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Most of the WEUPOL’s achievements were therefore of technical character. The 
objectives set for the mission and EUAM more broadly were incredibly ambitious: 
achieving unification of Mostar and its police forces within two years would have been 
challenging even for a more experienced actor with access to military instruments. The EU 
had neither the appropriate experience in crisis management, nor military tools to back up 
its requirements (Juncos 2013: 108). The WEUPOL’s deployment and implementation was 
still important for both Bosnia and the EU. Bosnia received a clear signal that it had a 
partner in the EU, while the EU gained experience in crisis management that informed the 
development of its civilian CSDP missions, the first of which was deployed in Bosnia in 
2003.  
Overall, in 1991-1995 the EC/EU had uneven impact on BiH. Initially, it worked to 
prevent violence in the country, while later focused on finding a peaceful solution to the 
conflict and managing its consequences.  Through opinions of the Arbitration Commission 
and recognition of Bosnia as an independent state, the EU not only confirmed Bosnia’s 
statehood, but also hastened the coming of war to the country and made it impossible for 
the international community to stand aside. Having given up the leadership position when 
the war took a grip of BiH, the EU continued influencing the security situation on the 
ground through the arms embargo, ECMM and administration of Mostar. Although the 
embargo disadvantaged the Bosnian government and unintentionally led to the 
criminalisation of the security sector and life in the country, it also arguably prevented the 
escalation of violence. The ECMM and EUAM established a direct link between Bosnia 
and Brussels, giving the latter an opportunity to learn crisis management and conflict 
resolution through practice. Moreover, the WEUPOL as an element of the EUAM allowed 
the EU to gain experience in SSR.  
 
The EU’s impact on SSR in BiH in 1995-1999 
Although the DPA gave Brussels no mandate in the post-conflict BiH, the EU, “as 
part of equitable burden-sharing” chose to contribute to the implementation of civilian 
aspects of the peace agreement and continue its humanitarian aid in the country (European 
Council 1995). There were three main reasons that prompted the EU to remain engaged in 
the country, despite its earlier failures. First, the EU wanted to assist with the normalisation 
of life and post-conflict reconstruction in Bosnia to speed up the return of 750, 000 Bosnian 
refugees its member states accepted during the war (EC DGIA 1998).  Second, it was a way 
of bolstering its credibility in the country and region after failing to prevent the violence in 
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the early 1990s, and third, an attempt to prevent the spread of instability and animosity from 
the Western Balkans to the EU member states. Thus, the EU covered part of the costs for 
the establishment and running of the Office of High Representative269 and used its 
Presidency and the Commission to influence the work of the PIC (GAC 1995). In 1995-
1999, the EU engaged with Bosnia’s SSR by continuing the initiatives launched in the 
previous period, such as the arms embargo, the ECMM and WEUPOL, and starting some 
new endeavours, such as de-mining and the Regional Approach.  
The EU embargo on arms, munitions and military equipment, as discussed in previous 
chapters, remained in place towards BiH, Croatia and the FRY, even after the end of the 
Bosnian war and lifting of the UN embargo (Blockmans 2007: 153). In July 1999, the EU 
lifted the embargo on exports of small arms to the police in BiH and transfers of de-mining 
equipment (SIPRI 2012) but kept the ban on other types of arms and military equipment in 
BiH till 2006. By maintaining these restrictive measures, the EU contributed to the arms 
control and confidence-building activities, promoted by the OSCE under the Sub-regional 
arms control agreement (McCausland 1997), and therefore to the incipient security regime 
in the Western Balkans, which sadly failed in 1998-1999. In the post-war period, the 
ECMM was also meant to contribute to confidence- building in Bosnia and reciprocity in 
the Western Balkans. Its mandate was expended to supervise the implementation of the 
DPA provisions concerning the return of refugees, protection of human rights and other 
inter-ethnic issues (Juncos 2013: 70). In 1997, the mission’s headquarters were moved from 
Zagreb to Sarajevo, reflecting the importance placed by the EU on normalisation of the 
situation in Bosnia (Oliver 2005: 175). With missions in neighbouring countries closing, 
the ECMM in Bosnia had the biggest representation of monitors, spread around the country 
in five coordination centres (ibid.). However, the ECMM’s role in the country remained 
limited due to continuing problems over its management (it was still run by the EU 
presidency and had no permanent coordinating body) and the inability of Brussels to clearly 
identify the direction and position of the mission among other bodies of the international 
community (ibid.: 177). This led, to the ECMM being used mainly for collecting 
information on the security situation in BiH, without having a leverage to impact the latter.  
After 1995, the WEUPOL managed to bring the police in Mostar closer together, yet 
only after the EUAM considerably reduced its ambitions for the unification of the town 
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under the pressure of Bosnian Croats. The Rome agreement, signed on 18 February 1996, 
significantly diminished the size of the central zone in Mostar and opened doors for first 
joint patrols between the police forces from western and eastern parts of the town (ICG 
2000a: 9-10). Joint patrols started in March 1996, the Joint Police Headquarters opened in 
late April (Winn and Lord 2001:92), and in August the WEUPOL published a plan for the 
Unified Police Force of Mostar (UPFM) of 380 officers (Juncos 2013: 106). When on 15 
October 1996, the WEUPOL finished its operation, Mostar had three police agencies: East 
and West Mostar Police and the UPFM (Winn and Lord 2001: 92-93). Although the latter 
was given the mandate to act throughout the town, it operated only within the central zone 
(ibid.). The unified police, created by the WEU contingent, was therefore different to the 
promised goal of a service capable of ensuring public safety and freedom of movement in 
a unified city (Cameron 1999: 53). Having established the UPFM and improved police 
infrastructure, the WEUPOL achieved limited success. Apart from the ambitious goals, set 
by the EUAM, the WEUPOL’s modest record can also be explained by the EU’s insistence 
on taking a technical approach to a politically-charged question of police unification in the 
divided town. Moreover, the EUAM was the first major CFSP joint action and coordination 
of the UPFM was the first task delegated by the EU to the WEU after signing the Maastricht 
Treaty (Blockmans 2007: 185). That is why the mission suffered from poor coordination 
and lack of strategic guidance. It was still an important experience for the EU, not least 
since it used elements of SSR as a tool of post-conflict transformation.  
One of the new SSR-related tasks undertaken by the EU in Bosnia after the end of 
war was de-mining. Although the responsibility for a mine action programme fell to the 
UNMIBH, the EU found ways to contribute to the UN effort, as well as provide help to 
local actors directly. The bloc was the main donor of the United Nations Mine Action 
Centre (UNMAC), opened in June 1996 and put under the BiH government ownership in 
July 1998 (EC DGIA 1998: 5). It also continued supporting the Bosnia Herzegovina Mine 
Action Centre (BHMAC) that substituted the UNMAC in 2002 (BHMAC n.d.). Moreover, 
the EU was the only external actor that directly engaged with the Civil Protection Authority 
(CPA), that dealt with civilian bomb disposal in BiH under the supervision of the military 
(Mansfield 2017: 21). In 1997, it provided equipment and trained 18 clearance teams and 9 
explosive ordnance disposal teams through cooperation with the CPA (ICRC 1998). The 
Union also allocated nearly 1.5 million USD to the work of two de-mining NGOs – HELP 
and Oktol to help with the reconstruction of water supply and infrastructure in several 
residential areas (ibid.). In 1998, in cooperation with the World Bank the EU produced the 
“Bosnia and Herzegovina – National Mine Action Plan” that outlined the key priorities of 
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de-mining in the country (Mansfield 2017: 22). Like in Croatia, in BiH, the EU saw mine 
clearance as a prerequisite for returns of refugees and displaced persons, as well as a way 
of making land safe for agriculture, reconstruction and development (ibid.). Also like in 
Croatia, the EU’s efforts contributed to the development of defence and civilian expertise 
in de-mining among local actors.  
On the regional level, SSR elements were introduced via the Regional Approach 
(RA). In BiH, the RA placed a special emphasis on the political level of the reform, as well 
as certain aspects of police and border reforms, touching upon defence reform superficially. 
Introduced in 1996, the RA’s primary objectives were to assist the successful 
implementation of the DPA and Erdut Agreement and “create an area of political stability 
and economic prosperity” (EC 1999). The DPA envisioned a decentralised state with a few 
common institutions and policy areas270 (GFAP 1995). The EU used the RA to monitor the 
development of these institutions and policies, seeing them as a prerequisite for 
consolidated statehood, which Bosnia was lacking (EC 1999a: 13). It is interesting to note 
that while the EU was not directly involved in the formation of common institutions271, it 
often provided funding for institution-building programmes, e.g. for the Council of 
Ministers (EC 1998c: 7). In terms of the security sector, the Union singled out control of 
the military and police by “democratic political means” as a fundamental requirement for 
democratisation process in the country (EC 1998: 2).  
The police, border services and the army were given varying degrees of attention by 
the RA. Having recognised the IPTF’s leadership in police reform, the EU still chose to 
closely monitor the area. It observed the restructuring and training of the police forces in 
both entities (EC 1998: 2), denounced the inefficiency of law enforcement services in 
fighting organised crime, deplored human rights violations by police officers (EC 1998c:4) 
and argued for the application of the principle of equal protection by law (EC 1997a: 4). In 
the sphere of border reform, the EU insisted on BiH determining official border crossings 
with Croatia and the FRY (EC 1998c: 6), advocated the removal of unauthorised check-
points that obstructed the freedom of movement between the entities (EC 1998: 3) and 
pressed for increasing the efficiency of border controls (EC 1999a: 5). Additionally, the EU 
supported the work done by the OHR and IPTF on introducing the state border police to 
Bosnia and developing a whole-state customs system via the CAFAO project (EC 1997a: 
4; EC 1998c: 7). Defence reform, that at the time was linked to the military dimensions of 
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the DPA, was seen by the EU as a success (EC 1999a: 5). However, cooperation with the 
ICTY that bore importance not only for the military but for SSR in general, was largely 
perceived as sub-standard, especially in the RS (EC 1997a: 5). Although limited progress 
could be observed in the country after 1998, with SFOR taking on a more active role in 
arresting the indictees, the EU was not satisfied with Bosnia’s cooperation with the tribunal 
(EC 1998c: 7). Still, it was unwilling to apply negative conditionality to invigorate the 
process. Just like in Croatia and the FRY, the Regional Approach in Bosnia was mainly 
used as a monitoring exercise rather than a transformative tool. If in the former two cases, 
the implementation of the initiative was obstructed by the regimes, suspicious of the EU, in 
BiH, it was side-lined by other efforts of the international community to build peace in the 
war-torn country. Despite discussions of the EU assuming the leadership of post-conflict 
crisis management in Bosnia, including through WEU-led military and police missions272, 
the bloc settled for a supplementary role to actors entrusted with peace-building credentials 
by the DPA.  
In short, in 1995-1999 the EU, although without a clear mandate from the DPA, 
focused on the normalisation of life and post-conflict reconstruction in Bosnia. Elements of 
SSR, attempted by Brussels, were subordinated to these larger goals as well. For example, 
the WEUPOL, de-mining activities and RA were promoted as a way of dealing with the 
legacy of war, that was precluding the return of refugees and displaced persons and assisting 
Bosnia in becoming a functional state. It is important to note that the EU’s SSR-related 
endeavours in BiH were not isolated from its activities in the sphere in the rest of the 
Western Balkans. The arms embargo, the ECMM, de-mining and certain RA conditions 
were not unique to the Bosnian situation, but applied in the neighbouring countries, too. 
The EU thus contributed to the emergence of rudimentary reciprocity between the Western 
Balkan states, that, as discussed in Chapter 2, is crucial for the sustainability of a security 
regime. Unfortunately, there was not enough will among the local actors or commitment on 
the EU’s part, that was still finetuning the CFSP and lacking the military muscle, to solidify 
the regime in the region.  
 
The EU’s impact on SSR in BiH in 1999-2013 
The EU’s profile in BiH started rising with the launch of the SAP in June 1999. In 
February 2002, when the HR of the international community was given “a double hat”, 
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allowing him to act as an EU Special representative, the Union’s position in Bosnia was 
strengthened further (Noutcheva 2012: 95). If previously the EU supported the PIC reform 
agenda in a subordinate role, with the double-hatting of the HR, it was given the power to 
shape the reform process in BiH, ensuring the compliance not only with Dayton, but also 
with the SAP (Chandler 2006: 35). By the time the EUPM succeeded the IPTF in January 
2003 and EUFOR Althea took over responsibilities of NATO’s SFOR in December 2004, 
the EU’s leadership in the country was confirmed (Dowling 2008: 181). By 2005, the Union 
was involved “in every level of BiH policy preparation and implementation” (Chandler 
2006: 39). Despite this strong position, however, it did not manage to accelerate Bosnia’s 
European integration. Although negotiations on SAA started in November 2005, the 
document was only signed on 16 June 2008 (EC 2008g: 4). Bosnia’s Europeanisation 
process was hampered by problems with police restructuring and inability of political elites 
reach to consensus on constitutional changes that would allow Bosnia to function without 
support of the international community. As a result, in 2013, Bosnia remained a potential 
candidate for the EU membership. 
Despite the slowness of the integration process, in 1999-2013, Bosnia benefited from 
an extensive SSR agenda promoted by the EU. Thanks to the intensive use of the CFSP and 
CSDP instruments, that complemented the Commission’s reform endeavours, the EU 
approached SSR in BiH more forcefully and comprehensively than in the two other studied 
countries. This does not mean, however, that it had a single vision for the reform: like in 
Croatia and Serbia, requirements for SSR need to be extracted from various EU initiatives. 
Before looking at sources of SSR conditionality in Bosnia, a few words should be said about 
the EU agents facilitating the reform in the country. Although the Commission oversaw the 
SAP, and therefore SSR-related conditions, linked with the process, it had to share its 
influence in Bosnia with the EUSR, representing the CFSP and Council of the EU 
(Noutcheva 2012: 95). The fact that the EUSR’s post was merged with that of the HR in 
2002-2011 increased both the EU’s leverage over the reform processes and complexity of 
its engagement in the country. On the one hand, through double-hatting of the HR and 
EUSR, the EU received direct access to Bosnian political process and thus to elements of 
SSR, on the other – it led to confusion among local elites who found it difficult to 
differentiate between the mandates given to the HR/EUSR by the international community 
and the EU. To remove this confusion and increase the coherence of EU activities in Bosnia, 
the EUSR was de-coupled from the HR in 2011273 (Juncos 2013: 135). It should also be 
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mentioned that the EUSR’s role underwent several changes in the studied period: it was 
strengthened with new tasks and more resources through amendments to the original 
mandate (Council of the EU 2002b), which inter alia enabled the post-holder to better 
engage with other CFSP actors present in the country, namely the EUMM, EUPM and 
EUFOR (Juncos 2013: 136). As until its closure in 2007, the EUMM, known as ECMM 
until 2000, continued to focus on mostly the same tasks as in the previous period (EU 
Council Secretariat 2007), it does not require additional analysis here. The EUPM and 
EUFOR, on the other hand, deserve special attention. They were launched in Bosnia to 
strengthen the EU’s role in the country by promoting its values and norms (Juncos 2005: 
99) and contributed to border, police and defence reforms in the country. It is this 
contribution that is studied below. 
As relations between the EU and Bosnia evolved, the requirements for SSR 
developed, too. First, EU conditionality, demanding changes in the running and oversight 
of elements of the security sector, was presented to the BiH government in the 2000 Road 
Map and 2003 Feasibility Study. The former explicitly called for the introduction of the 
State Border Service (ESI 2000), while the latter emphasised the importance of police 
reform for integration into the bloc (EC 2003c). From 2004, key reform priorities including 
SSR, identified by the EU, were communicated to BIH through the European Partnership 
that was updated on two occasions: in 2006 and 2008. The annual progress reports, released 
by the European Commission were instrumental in holding BiH accountable. SSR 
provisions can be found in sections on political criteria and European standards in Justice, 
Freedom and Security. As BiH did not achieve a candidate status in the studied period, the 
Commission’s reports were not upgraded to include more detailed SSR requirements 
through Chapters 23, 24 and 31, like they were in Croatia and Serbia. Similarly, with the 
SAA being enforced only in 2015, demands for defence, police and border reforms274 
formulated in the document, remain outside the scope of this study. On the other hand, in 
Bosnia, regularly updated mandates of the EUSR, EUPM and EUFOR served as an 
important source of information of the bloc’s SSR conditionality.  
To help ease the financial burden of running demanding security sector reforms, the 
EU offered BiH substantial support via the CARDS National Programme and CARDS 
Regional Programme in 2001-2006, and the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) 
that included the Multi-Beneficiary Assistance from 2007275. CARDS programmes, whose 
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entire budget for Bosnia reached 503 million EUR, funded SSR-related projects in such 
areas as JHA, IBM and de-mining (Berenschot and Imagos: 2013: 150). IPA, that allocated 
659 million EUR to Bosnia in 2007-2013, continued supporting these areas, but only 
through two out of its five components: (1) Transition Assistance and Institution-Building 
and (2) Regional and Cross-border Cooperation (Juncos 2012: 64). The limitations on 
funding were imposed due to Bosnia’s potential candidacy. Bosnia’s security sector also 
benefited, although indirectly, from allocations to the EU’s CSDP missions – the EUPM 
and EUFOR. The diversity of tools used by the EU to promote SSR in BiH allowed it to 
influence the reform on both – political and organisational – levels. 
The EU’s approach to the political level of SSR in Bosnia was closer to that applied 
in Serbia, than Croatia. This is because the fragility of the state created by Dayton prompted 
the EU to pay considerable attention to the country’s governance system, demanding its 
overhaul to help Bosnia become an effective and fully functioning state (EC 2003c: 6). The 
uncertainty over Serbia’s statehood, as explained in the previous chapter, added an extra 
dimension to the EU’s SSR agenda in the country, too. Yet while in Serbia this dimension 
was mostly removed after the peaceful dissolution of the State Union in 2006276, in Bosnia, 
the EU, continued calling for consolidating the state and implementing a constitutional 
reform277, that would allow domestic elites to take full responsibility for the state 
governance, throughout the studied period. In the security sector, state consolidation by the 
EU was mostly promoted through requirements for strengthening security competences of 
the common state and establishing effective coordination mechanisms between various 
levels of government (EC 2013e: 6). Still, trying to respond to unique needs of the complex 
Bosnian state (EPRS 2017: 7) did not prevent the Union from engaging in the same three 
areas of the political level of SSR in Bosnia as in Croatia and Serbia, namely oversight of 
the security sector, cooperation with the ICTY and regional cooperation.  
Although the Constitution of BiH, incorporated into the DPA, established a basic state 
structure with most of security competences delegated to the entity-level, Bosnia developed 
all significant measures of control as a result of a series of reforms, sponsored by the 
international community (Hadzovic and Dizdarevic 2012: 52). Thus, the system of state 
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parliamentary oversight, represented by the Joint Committee on Defence and Security 
(JCDS) and Joint Committee on Supervision of the work of Intelligence and Security 
Agency of BiH, emerged from defence and intelligence reforms respectively. As 
intelligence reform is not covered by the study, the second committee is not part of this 
analysis. The JCDS, established in December 2003 with a mandate to monitor the 
implementation of the national security and defence policy and oversee the activity of the 
army (EPRS 2017: 8), benefited from the EU’s impact only marginally (Berg 2016: 26). 
Although the European Commission regularly monitored the committee’s work, it did not 
target it directly. Instead, it was the OSCE that provided training and information assistance 
to committee members (Marijan 2016: 30). The EU, however, left indirect impact on the 
system of parliamentary oversight in Bosnia by supporting the development of 
parliamentary democracy in general. Within the SAP framework, regular visits for 
members of BiH’s Parliamentary Assembly were arranged to the European Parliament and 
advice was offered on improving the efficacy, efficiency and transparency of the 
parliamentary work (EC 2007e: 5; EC 2009c: 6). For instance, in 2007, both Houses of 
BiH’s Parliament amended their rulebooks on advice of the HR/EUSR (EC 2008g: 9). 
Additionally, under CARDS and IPA, the state Parliament in BiH was offered programmes 
to build capacity of its members and administrative staff. For the most part, these focused 
on technical assistance, like IPA 2010 “Document Management System”, yet became more 
versatile with the enforcement of the SAA (EC 2016d). Although entity parliaments and 
the parliament of Brcko also have committees for overseeing security matters, in the studied 
period, the EU did not engage with them directly (EPRS 2017: 8).  
The EU’s engagement with the executive system of control over Bosnia’s security 
was even more complex. On the state level, this system was established through laws, 
regulations and amendments to entity constitutions to include the Presidency of BiH, 
entrusted with supreme command and control over the AFBiH, MoD, in charge of the 
administrative organisation of defence and overall defence policy278, and Ministry of 
Security (MoS), responsible for the protection of international borders, dealing with crimes 
of international or inter-entity character and harmonisation of activities between the entity 
Ministries of Interior and the MoI of the Brcko District279. It was the MoS that attracted 
substantial attention and resources of the EU. The ministry was important for establishing 
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an effective system of border management in BiH and coordination of law enforcement 
functions on the state level. When police reform came against the opposition of Bosnian 
Serbs and had to be reconfigured to allow Bosnia progress within the SAP, the significance 
of the MoS grew further. The EU supported the establishment of the ministry, its 
operationalisation (EC 2003: 26c), and evolution (Tolksdorf 2014: 65).  
The EUPM provided capacity-building and assistance with support functions, such 
as human resources management and budgeting (Padurariu 2014: 8), while the European 
Commission offered generous funding for the implementation of the legislative and 
institutional frameworks that expanded the MoS mandate in 2008. For instance, one 
component of the IPA 2008 project “Support to the Police Reform Process” assisted with 
the operationalisation of the Directorate for Coordination of Police bodies, one of the seven 
new state-level agencies established in response to the EU conditionality (EC 2016d: 7). 
The EU funding was also used to build sustainable working relationships between the MoS 
and other state ministries, such as the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Ministry for Human 
Rights and Refugees (EC 2009d). In contrast to this extensive engagement with the MoS, 
the EU showed limited interest in the work of the MoD, occasionally commenting on its 
development in annual reports, and letting NATO guide its development (EC 2006g: 12; 
EC 2007e: 12). Like in the sphere of parliamentary control, executive oversight of the 
security sector in BiH also involves the level of entities and Brcko district, e.g. presidents 
of the entities, entity/cantonal governments and ministries of affairs of entities/cantons 
(Hadzovic and Dizdarevic 2012: 53). Although initially the EU preferred to focus on the 
state-level only, after the adoption of the 2008 police laws, it started providing IPA funds 
to harmonise the state-level policing with lower levels of governance (EC 2009c: 60; MoS 
BiH 2013).   
In terms of the oversight of the security sector by independent bodies and the public, 
the EU’s support to these areas has been mostly indirect. Thus, the EU closely followed the 
establishment of the state-level Ombudsman office and abolishment of the entity 
ombudsmen (EC 2009c: 11), provided financial assistance for strengthening the 
institutional and administrative capacities of the Data Protection Agency and bringing it 
closer to European data protection standards (EC 2010g: 16), assisted with the 
implementation of the Public Procurement Law and establishing a comprehensive public 
procurement system in BiH,  as well as monitored the work and development of the Anti-
Corruption Agency, Communications Regulatory Agency, Parliamentary Military 
Commissioner and Public Auditors Office (EC 2016e). Although these measures were not 
explicitly linked to SSR, they indirectly contributed to the reform as they promoted 
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transparency and accountability of the state apparatus and its key sectors, including 
security. Nonetheless, some of the EU activities in this sphere could be linked more directly 
to SSR. For instance, the Public Complaints Board, the Board for Complaints of Police 
Officials and the Independent Police Board of BiH not only appeared as the result of the 
EU conditionality on police reform, but also benefited from the Commission and EUPM’s 
support (EC 2011b: 57). Additionally, the EU supported public scrutiny over security 
matters by promoting independent media and the development of civil society in BiH more 
generally. Media bodies and CSOs were the beneficiary of assistance via CARDS and IPA, 
as well the Civil Society Facility. The EU prioritised increasing the capacity of CSOs, 
improving their democratic role, building networks between the entities and across the 
region, and mobilising civil society for the fight against organised crime (Berenschot and 
Imagos: 2012: 56).  
Overall, the EU’s input into the development of the system of oversight of the security 
sector in Bosnia has been mixed: on the one hand, it engaged directly with the matter by 
supporting the MoS and independent policing agencies, on the other – it focused on 
improving the efficiency and transparency of the state administration and capacity-building 
of civil society and media, contributing to democratisation of the Bosnian state and its 
security sector as a result. To an extent, the EU’s engagement with this element of SSR in 
Bosnia was affected by the unique nature of the Bosnian state. This uniqueness also found 
reflection in cooperation with the ICTY. 
Having identified cooperation with The Hague as an early priority in the SAP (EC 
2003c: 10), the EU had to deal with two opposing approaches to the matter in the country: 
the Federation was arguably the only player in the region that actively supported the 
tribunal’s work280, while the RS did not capture a single indictee until 2005 (Hartman 2009: 
77). While trying to maintain single-state conditionality, the EU had to recognise this 
discrepancy and single out the RS as the entity holding back BiH from finding a resolution 
to the legacy of war crimes (Noutcheva 2012: 127). The gravity and scale of war crimes 
committed on the territory of BiH, as well as the role of the security sector in perpetuating 
these, meant that SSR in the country could not be completed without full compliance with 
the ICTY conditions. To highlight the importance of the issue, the EU did not allow Bosnia 
to move ahead within the SAP without satisfactory cooperation with The Hague. Unlike in 
Croatia and Serbia, however, in Bosnia it was not the ICTY question that delayed the SAA, 
but police reform (Hartman 2009: 77). Cooperation with the ICTY, although slow, 
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 Although the Federation as an entity was willing to cooperate with the ICTY, the Bosnian Croats have not 
always shared this vision (EC 2003c: 10).  
235 
 
progressed quicker than the reform of the police. Under increased pressure from NATO and 
the EU, the RS started transfers of war crime suspects in 2005 and in 2007 Carla Del Ponte 
announced that BiH’s compliance with the tribunal was satisfactory (ibid.). The EU reached 
the same conclusion in 2008 (EC 2008g: 21). Moreover, the ICTY’s evidence suggested 
that no more fugitives were hiding on the RS territory after 2006, prompting the EU and 
international community increase the pressure on Serbia281, whose security networks 
provided cover to many of the indictees remaining at large, including the Bosnian Serb 
military leader Ratko Mladic (Gow and Zverzhanovski 2013: 156). Even so, the ICTY 
conditionality remained high on the list of the EU priorities. After 2008, when Radovan 
Karadzic, the RS president during the war, was arrested in Belgrade, the Commission kept 
insisting that both entities continue providing access to witnesses and archives, freeze 
economic assets of the indictees, investigate support networks that protected fugitives and 
improve cooperation on domestic trials (EC 2009c: 21; EC 2011b: 20; EC 2013e: 20).  
In the ICTY-related matters, the European Commission relied on the support of the 
HR/EUSR, EUPM and EUFOR. It is notable that the HR could use the Bonn powers to 
dismiss officials obstructing cooperation with The Hague. Although the EU advocated the 
phaseout of these powers, it usually supported such actions regarding the indictees 
(Noutcheva 2012: 127). The EUPM supported the ICTY conditionality mostly indirectly 
by promoting police reform, while EUFOR was given a mandate to contribute more openly 
via tracing and arresting indicted war criminals (Knauer 2011: 9). With time, the EU 
agencies learnt to speak with one voice on the issues of war crimes in Bosnia, while also 
coordinating their approaches with other external actors present in the country. In general, 
by insisting on cooperation with the ICTY, the EU helped Bosnia’s security sector to 
become more professional, accountable and transparent. Nonetheless, even with all 
indictees transferred to The Hague282, the issue of war legacy in BiH remains resolved only 
partially, leaving a shade over SSR. 
Finally, the EU promoted regional cooperation as an element of the political level of 
SSR. Namely, it emphasised the importance of regional relations in policing, border 
management and on the issue of war crimes. While encouraging constructive relationships 
between Western Balkan states and in broader SEE, the EU recognised a special link 
between BiH, Croatia and Serbia. Connected by the war legacy and ethnically identical 
populations, the three states, and their security relations, often deserved special attention on 
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part of the EU (EC 2003c: 18). The regional context in which Bosnia existed became more 
favourable for normalisation of relations between former adversaries in 1999-2000. With 
the death of Tudjman and electoral defeat of Milosevic, building bridges became easier, 
although not simple.  
To allow Bosnia to progress towards the EU, the European Commission required 
proof of improved and evolving neighbourly relations. In the sphere of policing, an 
important piece of evidence were agreements concluded by Bosnia with other Western 
Balkan states, which could be of a generic nature, e.g. police cooperation agreements with 
Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Serbia (EC 2008g: 23-24; EC 2012f: 22), or dedicated 
to more specific issues, such as cooperation in fighting organised crime and terrorism 
concluded with Albania, Macedonia and Serbia (EC 2010h: 23-24). The EU monitored not 
just the signing and ratification of such agreements, but also closely followed their 
implementation. Moreover, it encouraged Bosnia to go beyond bilateral protocols to set up 
wider networks outside the Western Balkans, e.g. Bosnia’s 2011 decision to establish a 
network of police officers in the countries of the region, EUROPOL and certain EU member 
states was seen as an achievement (ibid.). Similarly, the Union commended the conclusion 
of a protocol between BiH, Montenegro and Serbia to start a joint centre for police 
cooperation in Trebinje in December 2013 (EC 2014b: 24).  
Regional cooperation on border security was identified as equally important. Such 
activities as joint supervision of borders, e.g. with Croatia, or joint border patrols and 
regular meetings between border police, e.g. with Montenegro and Serbia, were greeted by 
the EU as a sign of normalisation of relations in a highly sensitive area (EC 2007e: 22; EC 
2009c: 23, 56).  The EU also wanted Bosnia to demonstrate commitment to the IBM on the 
regional level, that is why it monitored the signature and implementation of protocols on 
strengthening IBM cooperation with neighbouring states (EC 2010h: 24). Additionally, 
Bosnia was invited to join regional initiatives, developed by the EU agencies, e.g. the 
Frontex Western Balkan risk analysis network (ibid.: 54), and non-EU bodies, e.g. MARRI, 
owned regionally but receiving financial help from the EU, and SEECP that covers broader 
SEE region (EC 2012f: 22; EC 2011b: 22). In terms of dealing with the legacy of war 
crimes, Bosnia had to improve cooperation on exchange of evidence and transfer of 
suspects with Croatia and Bosnia (EC 2009c: 22). It was a way of addressing the regional 
impunity gap and speeding up the process of reconciliation in the Western Balkans. 
Provision of adequate victim and witness protection, cooperation between courts and 
prosecutors from Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia and extradition agreements were also meant 
to help with the achievement of reconciliation (EC 2010h: 21-22; EC 2013e: 22). While 
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insisting on close cooperation on war crimes, the EU was mindful of the “special parallel 
relationships” existing between BiH’s entities and Serbia and Croatia. Although the latter 
was publicly denounced by Zagreb, the former remained a source of concern (EC 2003c: 
18).  
In short, all three elements of the political level of SSR in Bosnia, supported by the 
EU, have targeted the improvement of security governance system in the country and 
security relations in the Western Balkans. In Bosnia, the EU efforts to strengthen the 
civilian and democratic control over security bodies were accompanied by calls for an 
overhaul of the weak constitutional system, created by Dayton to allow BiH to become a 
functioning state, capable of fulfilling demands of the integration process into Euro-Atlantic 
institutions. As political elites in BiH failed to reach consensus on the constitutional reform, 
a comprehensive system of oversight, with parliamentary, executive, judiciary and 
independent measures of control, built recently under supervision of external actors, 
including the EU, remains fragile. Cooperation with the ICTY and neighbouring countries 
on security matters also produced mixed results: while the level of cooperation achieved by 
2013 would have been inconceivable right after the Bosnian war, it still lacks stability and 
irreversibility, leaving Bosnia’s security sector vulnerable. The EU invested a lot of effort 
and finances into enhancing the good governance of BiH’s security sector and 
harmonisation of the country’s security relations with other Western Balkan states, 
especially Croatia and Serbia. Nonetheless, its work on the political level of SSR is not 
finished. 
Having provided an important, although mixed, input into the political level of SSR 
in BiH, the EU engaged with the organisational level of defence, police and border reforms 
in the country even more vigorously. In defence reform, the DRC was convened by the HR, 
who also acted as the EUSR at the time. Moreover, the discovery of evidence by EUFOR 
in December 2004 that Ratko Mladic had been supported in hiding from the ICTY by the 
VRS, enabled the HR/EUSR to extend the mandate of the DRC, leading to the abolishment 
of the entity ministries of defence and establishment of a single state command structure of 
the military as well as a single army (Koneska 2014: 91-92). Although the contribution by 
the EU actors is important to acknowledge, it should not be overemphasised, as it was 
NATO’s PfP conditionality that was leading defence reform in Bosnia initially (Vetschera 
and Damian 2006: 31). With time, as EUFOR’s mandate evolved to include capacity-
building activities and Bosnia’s membership in NATO became less certain, due to the RS 
leadership choosing to side with Serbia (Bassuener 2015a: 5), the EU’s role in Bosnia’s 
defence reform grew. According to some security experts, the EU now leads defence reform 
238 
 
in BiH “operationally” or “tactically”, while NATO is still responsible for the strategic 
level283. In 1999-2013, the EU’s impact on the reform is discernible in four key areas: policy 
and legal advice, training, technical assistance and support with overcoming the war legacy. 
Policy advice was provided by the EU through EUFOR Althea and through EC annual 
reports. The latter monitored the implementation of key legislation in the sphere of defence 
and demanded harmonisation of BiH’s legal acts with the EU’s strategies and policies. For 
instance, the 2004 European Partnership called on Sarajevo to implement the Law on 
Defence as a matter of priority (Council of the EU 2004a). The Commission regularly 
criticised the outdated character of the BiH Demining law, that Bosnia was unsuccessfully 
trying to update with the help of UNDP since 2008 (EC 2011b: 20, AETS Consortium 2015: 
31), and expressed dissatisfaction with the development of legislation on SALW (EC 
2008g: 57). To comply with the EU requirements, BiH included activities and obligations 
from the EU Strategy on SALW (Council of the EU 2006c) into its SALW Control 
Strategies for 2006-2012 and 2013-2016 (MoS BiH 2016: 5). The general policy guidance 
was still left by the EU to NATO, which after admitting BiH to the PfP programme in 2006 
continued closely cooperating with the state, although the 2010 invitation to join the 
Membership Action Plan (MAP) was still not acted upon in 2013, pending the resolution 
of the immovable defence property issue (NATO 2017). As the transfer of immovable 
defence property from entity to state level was identified by the PIC as one of the conditions 
for closing the OHR, the EU closely monitored it, too (EC 2008g: 12; EC 2013e: 7). 
EUFOR’s input into the defence policy of BiH was more direct, yet its role in defence 
reform was still supplementary to NATO’s (Bertin 2008: 74). EUFOR took over SFOR’s 
responsibilities in December 2004, receiving the executive mandate to oversee the 
implementation of Annexes 1-A and 2 of the DPA under UNSCR Resolution 1575. The 
mandate, that had to be renewed annually under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, identified 
four key military and four supporting tasks for the EU’s third military operation284 (Council 
of the EU 2004b). While the key tasks focused on deterrence, contributing to a safe and 
secure environment, supporting the OHR in peace implementation, conducting information 
operations and managing the residual aspects of the DPA, e.g. de-mining and weapons 
collections; supporting tasks included activities to fight organised crime, assistance in 
defence reform and support to the ICTY with tracing indictees (ibid.). Although defence 
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 Interviews with an MoD official/former NATO employee and security expert conducted by the author in 
Sarajevo in September 2016. 
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 Here, EUFOR is analysed from the point of view of its contribution into BiH’s defence reform, for a 
broader evaluation of the operation, see Bertin (2008), Knauer (2011), Pulko, Muherina and Pejic (2016), 
Juncos (2013: 147-159).  
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reform assistance was initially given little attention by EUFOR, with changes to the 
mandate which were introduced four times in the studied period, the task moved up the 
operation’s agenda. EUFOR was providing policy advice to the MoD and AFBiH on gender 
equality and human rights (Pulko, Muherina and Pejic 2016:103) and on the development 
of normative frameworks for managing stockpiles of ammunition, weapons and explosives 
(Carapic, Chaudhuri and Gobinet 2016: 21). It is important to emphasise that EUFOR’s 
policy advice was closely coordinated with NATO that kept small headquarters in Bosnia 
after the departure of SFOR to focus on defence reform and some operational supporting 
tasks like counter-terrorism and detention of persons indicted by the ICTY (Juncos 2013: 
153). Moreover, NATO played a significant role in EUFOR’s overall development.  
The launch of EUFOR Althea was made possible thanks to the previous work of 
NATO’s IFOR and SFOR that stabilised the security situation in the country, allowing the 
EU to enter a relatively risk-free environment (Peen Rodt and Wolff 2012: 142; Pulko, 
Muherina and Pejic 2016:93). Established as a Berlin Plus operation, EUFOR could also 
rely on NATO common assets and capabilities such as communication and information 
systems (Bertin 2008: 73). Furthermore, with nearly 80 per cent of SFOR troops coming 
from Europe and staying in Bosnia under EUFOR command after a change of insignia, 
EUFOR could settle down quickly (ibid.: 64). Despite some hiccups during the transition 
and minor overlaps in activities, EUFOR and NATO’s cooperation has been working well 
(Peen Rodt and Wolff 2012: 148). While maintaining close working relations with 
NATO285, EUFOR aimed to support Bosnia on its journey towards the EU integration, 
especially as it was designed to be part of the EU’s comprehensive approach to the country 
and the Western Balkans (European Council 2004). The alignment of EUFOR’s activities 
with those of other EU actors present in BiH improved with time.  
One of the biggest changes to EUFOR’s mandate was introduced in January 2010, 
when the list of operation’s tasks was extended to include non-executive capacity-building 
and training support for BiH authorities (Council of the EU 2010a), practically turning 
Althea into a military-civilian operation from a purely military one (Pulko, Muherina and 
Pejic 2016:93). In September 2012, the operation further reconfigured its focus to capacity-
building and training of the AFBiH, while retaining its executive obligations, including 
support in maintaining a safe and secure environment in Bosnia286 (EUFOR BiH 2016). 
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 Mandate changes were accompanied by the reduction of the troop levels (from 7, 000 troops in 2004, only 
600 were left in BiH in 2012, supported by the Over-the-Horizon forces) and altered force structure. These 
amendments can be partly explained by the reduced threat of large-scale violence in BiH, and partly by the 
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Although some criticised the introduction of non-executive tasks (Bassuener 2015: 101), 
many welcomed this development as a step in the right direction (Knauer 2011: 12; Juncos 
2013: 157). This is mostly because the introduction of the capacity-building element to 
EUFOR allowed the EU to become more actively engaged in the country’s SSR and gave 
it new tools to assist BiH in becoming a security provider (Pulko, Muherina and Pejic 
2016:94). One of the key goals pursued by EUFOR in this respect was building 
professionalism and capacity of the AFBiH to ensure it could perform a conventional army 
role and act as a humanitarian actor (ibid.). A new component, Mobile Training Teams 
(MTT), established within EUFOR, was used as a main tool for capacity-building, focusing 
on providing the BiH army with knowledge, technical expertise and mentoring assistance 
at tactical, operational and strategic levels (AETS Consortium 2015: 28). To facilitate local 
ownership of defence reform, the MTTs worked to transfer responsibility for the future 
training courses to the Bosnian authorities (Carapic, Chaudhuri and Gobinet 2016: 21-24). 
In 2010-2013, the EU also organised several rounds of “Rapid Response” exercises that 
involved Over-the-Horizon forces and EUFOR troops to train the AFBiH to deal with 
internal security threats (Bassuener 2015: 101). Overall, capacity-building and training 
support provided by EUFOR was a useful contribution into the AFBiH’s self-sustainability 
(Pulko, Muherina and Pejic 2016:94).  
Technical assistance to defence reform was provided by the EU mostly regarding 
post-conflict reconstruction and modernisation of the army. Thus, EUFOR provided advice 
on inventory maintenance and management, while MTT trainings often focused on assisting 
the AFBiH staff with acquiring skills necessary for operating new equipment (Carapic, 
Chaudhuri and Gobinet 2016: 24). It was not an easy task as the AFBiH lacked resources 
for procurement and EUFOR could not purchase the equipment either (Pulko, Muherina 
and Pejic 2016: 100). To alleviate the problem, EUFOR used its own assets to train the 
AFBiH (ibid.) or relied on equipment donations from participating MTT countries (Carapic, 
Chaudhuri and Gobinet 2016:21). By dealing with residual tasks of the DPA such as 
supervision of storage sites and disposal of surplus weapons, EUFOR contributed to 
technical aspects of defence reform, too (EC 2007e: 12). With the downsizing of the 
operation, however, responsibility for these areas was transferred to local actors (Juncos 
2013: 157). A bulk of the EU’s technical assistance concentrated on dealing with the issue 
of small and light weapons. The EU considered the lack of control over this area to be an 
obstacle to the establishment of the rule of law, sustainable economic development and 
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human security in the country (Hadzovic, Krzalic and Mihajlovic 2013: 8). Uncontrolled 
presence of SALW also drained the MoD budget and posed a threat to civilians (AETS 
Consortium 2015: 9). Like in the rest of the region, in BiH, the EU worked through the 
EUSAC framework within SEESAC. It supported SALW collection campaigns, raising 
awareness among the BiH citizens about dangers of SALW and unexploded ordnances, 
improved security of storage sites and promoted regional cooperation (SEESAC 2013; 
SEESAC 2014). In many cases, EUSAC activities had a regional dimension that apart from 
improving regional security was also aimed at rebuilding trust and achieving reconciliation 
in the Western Balkans.  
The size of threat posed by SALW in BiH prompted the EU to look for additional 
ways of tackling the issue. Thus, it provided nearly 5 million EUR under the Instrument for 
Stability (IfS) to support the UNDP’s “Small Arms Control and Reduction Project in BiH”, 
the two phases of which in 2008-2009 and 2009-2011 destroyed over 8, 300 tonnes of 
ammunition (AETS Consortium 2015: 9). In 2013, a follow-up programme was launched 
by the UNDP and OSCE, for which the EU allocated 3.9 million EUR under the IfS (ibid.). 
By supporting these actions, the EU contributed to the security, safety and development 
prospective of individuals and local communities, affected by the problem (Council of the 
EU 2014). Unfortunately, in 2013, with nearly 1.2 million firearms spread around the 
country, 89 per cent of which were in civilian possession, the problem was still lacking 
resolution (Hadzovic, Krzalic and Mihajlovic 2013: 10). 
The situation was somewhat similar in the sphere of de-mining. In 2013, 1,219 km2 
remained contaminated despite continuous efforts of local and international actors to 
remove the mine threat from BiH (Mine Action Review 2014). Since 1996, the EU has been 
a key stakeholder in Bosnia’s de-mining process, having spent around 40 million EUR in 
the period to 2013 (AETS Consortium 2015: 3). While EUFOR restricted its engagement 
in mine action over time, the European Commission continued supporting the sector 
through donations under CARDS, IPA and Anti-Personnel Landmines (APL) programmes 
(EC 2008i: 8). Under CARDS287, the EU allocated funds to strengthen the CPA capacities 
to conduct de-mining projects independently under the entity supervision and under 
APL288, assisted BiH authorities with the removal of anti-personnel land mines. Problems 
with inter-entity coordination of CPA activities and lack of transparency in the work of the 
BHMAC, the agency supervising mine-related issues on the state level, undermined the 
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effectiveness of the EU’s mine action under CARDS and APL (Mine Action Review 2014). 
Nonetheless, the EU kept supporting de-mining in BiH through IPA. Even more, it 
increased the variety of projects on offer. Specifically, it funded projects on mine clearance 
and technical survey (e.g. under IPA 2007, 2008 and 2011), mine risk education (e.g. IPA 
2008 project managed by “Posavina without mines”), mine victim assistance and land 
release (both under IPA 2011) (AETS Consortium 2015: 59). While the bloc closely aligned 
its mine action support with local strategies, the most recent of which was released in 2009, 
and managed to achieve most results set within individual projects, BiH still lacks the 
capacity and resources to make the mine threat an issue of the past (ibid.: 31). Without an 
updated legal framework, reformed and more transparent BHMAC, Bosnia is unlikely to 
reach a proclaimed goal of becoming mine-free by 2019. Apart from assisting with de-
mining and SALW problem, the EU’s post-conflict support focused on cooperation with 
the ICTY. As already mentioned, the EUFOR’s mandate included the search for persons 
indicted for war crimes by the ICTY (Council of the EU 2004b), which was widely 
perceived as one of its key contributions into stabilisation and peace-building in Bosnia 
(Knauer 2011: 17). 
To conclude, the EU played an active role in Bosnia’s defence reform in 1999-2013, 
acting through the European Commission, HR/EUSR and EUFOR. The latter’s presence 
gave the EU an opportunity to promote change in BiH’s defence sector more directly than 
it did in Croatia and Serbia. Nevertheless, its efforts came secondary to those of NATO that 
remained in charge of defence reform in the country. In 2013, BiH remained dependent on 
external provisions of security, although local ownership considerably increased in the 
sphere, partly thanks to EUFOR’s work. 
In police reform, the EU quickly assumed the leadership role, although in 2000 the 
operational level was still handled by the IPTF, while the OHR managed the reform 
strategically. In 2003, the EU not only launched the EUPM, that worked “to establish 
sustainable policing arrangements under Bosnia ownership” (Council of the EU 2002a), but 
also named police reform among sixteen political conditions Bosnia had to satisfy to start 
negotiations on the SAA (EC 2003c: 41). In 2004, police reform became part of the EU’s 
political conditionality, when the EU Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten 
presented Bosnian authorities with the list of three policing principles they had to fulfil to 
sign the SAA (Patten 2004). It is widely believed that these principles originated in the 
OHR and made their way into the SAP under the pressure of Paddy Ashdown, the then 
HR/EUSR, who considered centralisation of the police an important step in the state-
building process of BiH (Muehlmann 2009: 156; Noutcheva 2012: 167; Tolksdorf 2014: 
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65). For the EU, at least initially, centralisation was not the only possible way of dealing 
with inefficient policing in BiH. A functional review, financed by the European 
Commission and released in June 2004, found that the presence of fifteen law enforcement 
agencies (thirteen police forces and two state-level institutions, SBS and SIPA), was not 
the core problem, but one of many in BiH (ICMPD and TC Team Consult 2004). The study 
offered three possible models for restructuring the Bosnian police: (1) single national police 
with 5-7 regions; (2) two entity police forces, the Brcko District police, SIPA, SBS and 
several state-level coordinating bodies, but no cantonal forces; and (3) a bottom-up 
approach that would keep all the law enforcement bodies in the country while developing 
several state-level support institutions (ibid.: 118).  
Once the first, top-down, model was identified by the HR/EUSR as most suitable289 
and three policing principles were made part of the SAA negotiations, the EU had to find a 
way to move police reform in BiH forward. The task proved problematic, as the bloc was 
neither willing to impose the reform, nor able to convince local elites to adopt it voluntarily. 
Imposition, for example through the HR’s Bonn powers, was opposed by the European 
Commission due to the sensitivity of the matter and complexity of the reform’s 
implementation (Noutcheva 2012: 125, 161). Securing support of domestic actors was out 
of reach, too. Both normative and efficiency arguments used by the EU and HR/EUSR to 
help parties reach consensus within the PRC and later the Directorate for the 
Implementation of Police Restructuring (DIPR), set up in 2006, lacked substance. The 
presence of decentralised police forces in many EU states and EU’s insistence on police 
decentralisation in other Western Balkan states allowed Bosnian Serbs, who obstructed the 
reform the most290, reject European standards as an adequate justification for the centralised 
police in BiH. The efficiency argument, while difficult to counteract, was not powerful 
enough on its own to coax Bosnian elites into re-drawing the LPA boundaries. Besides, 
many in the RS considered police restructuring to be an attempt at constitutional 
restructuring of the state and therefore actively resisted it (Collantes-Cellador 2009). A 
perceived threat to their autonomy and identity291 fed Bosnian Serb opposition to 
establishing new LPAs by crossing the inter-entity boundary. While the EU wanted BiH to 
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expert in Sarajevo, September 2016).  
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overcome constitutional weaknesses of Dayton and saw a more centralised model as 
preferable, it lacked the mandate to demand such changes292 (Noutcheva 2012: 60).  
Without such a mandate and in circumstances of increasingly volatile domestic and fragile 
regional environment, the EU had to lower the bar for police reform on several occasions. 
In 2005, with the start of accession talks with Croatia, and the launch of SAA talks with 
Serbia and Montenegro, BiH was the only Western Balkan state293 without a contractual 
relationship with the EU (ibid.: 126). To avoid the country’s isolation, the EU accepted a 
watered-down proposal, developed by the RS President Cavic, as compliant with the three 
principles and recommended starting SAA negotiations on 21 October 2005. In 2007, with 
the political crisis brought about by reforms of the then HR/EUSR Miroslav Lajcak, who 
tried to relax veto mechanisms in BiH, and upcoming independence of Kosovo threatening 
to upset the regional balance, the EU settled for a compromise that promised to establish 
seven new state-level coordination bodies and made restructuring of the police conditional 
on the future constitutional reform (Tolksdorf 2013: 23-24). By lowering demands, the EU, 
on the one hand, rescued the SAA with Bosnia, and on the other, damaged the credibility 
of its conditionality. Nonetheless, even with the failure of the police restructuring, the EU 
managed to leave important impact on police reform in BiH, which although focused on 
the question of centralisation in 2005-2008, involved other aspects, too. 
The EU provided policy and legal advice to police reform through several channels. 
Having included the three principles of policing into the SAP, the European Commission 
provided a general framework for the reform. By supporting the PRC financially and 
refusing to sign the SAA without an agreement on police restructuring, the Commission 
also tried to shape the progress of the reform, yet without resorting to the direct imposition 
techniques294. The HR/EUSR Ashdown, who convened the PRC, and his successors who 
continued the efforts to restructure the police, Christian Schwarz-Schilling and Miroslav 
Lajcak295, represented the EU as well, although their EUSR hat was relatively unknown to 
the public (Muehlmann 2009: 157). The political elites, on the other hand, were familiar 
with the EU credentials of the HRs, as the latter regularly referred to EU conditionality and 
EU standards when facilitating the reform. Moreover, the European Commission supported 
the implementation of decisions and laws adopted as part of police reform. It did so not 
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 Interview with a former employee of the EUPM and EU Delegation to BiH, conducted in September 2016.  
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 Schwarz-Schilling had insignificant impact on the reform, while Lajcak tried to replicate Ashdown’s 
forceful approach. For more details, see Koneska (2014: 128-133).  
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only by monitoring progress and identifying gaps in strategic policing documents through 
annual reports (EC 2009c: 58; EC 2010h: 14, 57-58; EC 2013e: 52), but also through 
allocating funds to the EU Delegation to BiH via CARDS and IPA. Although most of this 
work focused on technical assistance and capacity-building, there were also projects 
offering policy and legal support to Bosnian authorities. In 2008, for example, after the BiH 
Parliament adopted two laws envisaged in the Mostar Declaration, the EU commissioned a 
team of rule of law experts to work in the EU Delegation office in Sarajevo on supporting 
local actors in the implementation of these laws and on legal harmonisation between the 
state, entity, Brcko district and cantonal levels.296 After the end of the EUPM’s mandate in 
2012, a Law Enforcement Section was established in the Delegation, to continue providing 
strategic and policy advice on policing and wider rule of law issues, as well as support 
Bosnian law enforcement agencies through technical assistance.297  
The EUPM298 provided policy and legal advice too, although cautiously at first. 
Launched in January 2003, the mission had a limited mandate to monitor, mentor and 
inspect the Bosnian police to align their practices with international standards and 
contribute to peace implementation in BiH (Merlingen and Ostauskaite 2006: 61). Even 
without a mandate to contribute to police reform, the EUPM worked with the OHR on 
different concepts of police restructuring from the start of the PRC (Muehlmann 2009: 143). 
The Head of the EUPM was also a member of the PRC. Furthermore, in 2003-2005, the 
mission helped with drafting and implementing laws and other expert advice on police 
matters (Juncos 2013: 144). Although the IPTF considerably improved operational 
capabilities of many of the BiH police forces, very little was done to develop support 
functions of the police (Metz 2010: 59). The EUPM attempted to change the situation by 
investing into policy planning, budgeting and human resources management (ibid.). While 
these contributions were important, they were also limited as in the first years of existence 
the EUPM struggled to find an identity. To ensure continuity, 119 IPTF experts and the 
IPTF Commissioner stayed on to work for the EUPM (Padurariu 2014: 6). Although this 
smoothed the transition, it also made it difficult for the EUPM to develop an independent 
profile (Merlingen and Ostauskaite 2006: 61). Tensions with EUFOR over the fight with 
organised crime also contributed to the EUPM’s identity problems. EUFOR, having 
converted the SFOR’s Multinational Specialised Unit into the Integrated Police Unit, used 
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it to fight illegal activities such as weapons smuggling and drug trafficking (ibid.: 56-57), 
which undermined the EUPM’s efforts in the field. The situation improved in 2005-2006, 
when the EUPM, EUFOR and the EUSR agreed on Seven Principles on Coordination and 
Operational Guidelines that made the EUPM a leading CSDP actor for tackling organised 
crime in BiH, while EUFOR was prescribed a supporting role (Juncos 2013: 140). 
Additionally, in 2006, the EUPM received stronger powers for dealing with organised crime 
and given a mandate to assist police reform (Tolksdorf 2013: 23). The mission therefore 
helped with the implementation of the 2008 police laws and establishment of the Directorate 
for Coordination of Police Bodies (Juncos 2013: 145). It was also thanks to the EUPM 
assistance that state-level police agencies, such as SIPA and SBS/border police became 
fully operational (Padurariu 2014: 8). Overall, however, the EUPM paid more attention to 
training activities and technical assistance. It was engaged in educating and instructing local 
police officers through a variety of projects, many of which, at least initially, were based 
on co-locating EUPM personnel at mid and senior levels of BiH police agencies (Collantes-
Celador 2009). Although co-location practices became less common after the first renewal 
of the EUPM’s mandate in 2006, the EUPM continued prioritising raising professionalism 
levels of the BiH police and developing managerial skills among police leadership (Metz 
2010: 60).  
While some of the EUPM projects, such as the Police Education and Training 
Programme launched in 2004, focused exclusively on capacity-building, many others 
included a training component alongside other tasks (Merlingen and Ostauskaite 2006: 67). 
These latter projects could be roughly divided into initiatives promoting specialisation and 
modernisation of BiH’s law enforcement. Specialisation was necessary for achieving 
effectiveness in dealing with different types of crimes. The crime police programme that 
combined basic criminal investigation training with training in the criminal procedure code 
and the criminal justice programme that mentored court police officers are examples of the 
EUPM initiatives promoting specialisation (ibid.: 65-66). Modernisation was meant to help 
the Bosnian police overcome not only the legacy of war, but also move from the socialist 
past to the European future. Although the IPTF conducted some important work in this 
respect, the fractured nature of the country’s police forces meant more needed to be done. 
The EUPM assisted police officers on all levels to improve their IT and communication 
skills, acquire competence in intelligence-led policing and independent law enforcement 
according to the best EU and international standards (EEAS 2012). One of the biggest 
achievements of the EUPM was the engagement with the policing staff in all parts of BiH 
through regional and field offices (ibid.). Unfortunately, accomplishments of the mission 
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were undermined by its project-based approach, that although at times attempted a long-
term structural reform, especially through its capacity-building activities, mostly dealt with 
specific disconnected issues (ibid.; Juncos 2013: 142).  
A broader approach to police reform was pursued by the European Commission that 
worked to prepare BiH for the EU membership through CARDS and IPA projects. Due to 
initial gaps in coordination between the EU Delegation, that managed such projects, the 
EUPM, EUSR and other external actors engaged in police reform in BiH, such as the OHR 
and USAID, as well as due to the lack of uniformity in police matters across the two entities, 
the Commission’s approach also had limitations. Overall, the European Commission 
projects and those of the EUPM pursued similar goals – strengthening the sustainability and 
independence of BiH’s law enforcement agencies, harmonising their practices and 
improving efficiency of their work.  Moreover, in both, technical assistance played an 
important role. Thanks to CARDS and IPA funding, various police bodies in BiH acquired 
modern equipment, adopted rules and procedures for exchanging information and improved 
connectivity between each other through the introduction of shared databases. For example, 
through projects funded by the European Commission, BiH aquired the Criminal Analysis 
Network – a central database for storing all intelligence data and a telecommunications 
system that connects police units throughout the country (Dimireva 2010). While these 
initiatives considerably improved the work of the Bosnian police, they did not solve the 
issue of structural fragmentation that plagued the sector’s development. As observed by 
several interviewees with experience in police reform in BiH, police coordination and 
cooperation remain weak not only between the entities, but also between cantons in the 
Federation.299 
Technical assistance provided by the EUPM produced similar results: although it 
contributed to the improved professionalism and accountability of the police in BiH, more 
harmonised policing practices in different parts of the country and operationalisation of 
state-level bodies, it did not overcome the divisions (Merlingen and Ostauskaite 2006: 66-
67; Padurariu 2014: 7-10). It is worth noting that the EUPM’s engagement in technical 
assistance developed with the evolution of the mission’s mandate that was updated four 
times between 2006 and 2012. Thus, if at first, the EUPM emphasised standardisation and 
accountability of the police, with the introduction of the second mandate, it prioritised the 
development of capabilities for fighting organised crime and centralisation of Bosnian law 
enforcement, while at the end, it facilitated cooperation between the police and criminal 
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justice system (Padurariu 2014: 7). To achieve coherence of action between different police 
bodies in the entities and Brcko District, the EUPM invested in standardised record keeping 
systems, financial management systems, based on models from EU member states, and 
harmonised recruitment processes (Merlingen and Ostauskaite 2006: 69-70). To ensure 
effective fight against organised crime, the EUPM developed guidelines on intelligence-led 
policing and procedures for data protection, assisted local actors in planning and conducting 
investigations, often relying on EUFOR’s capabilities, and supported the development of 
investigative powers of SIPA (ibid.: 66; Juncos 2013: 140; Padurariu 2014: 8). Having 
achieved an extension of SIPA’s competences through lobbying for a stronger mandate 
together with the OHR, the EUPM assisted the agency’s work through advice and 
mentoring on effective management of data, cooperation with the Court of BiH, the 
Prosecutor’s Office and lower-level police institutions (Metz 2010: 59-60; Becirevic and 
Cehajic 2013: 48). The fight against organised crime and strengthening capabilities of state-
level institutions remained at the centre of the EU attention even after the departure of the 
EUPM in 2012.  
In terms of post-conflict assistance, the EU’s impact after 2000 was limited. The 
EUPM, unlike the IPTF could not dismiss local police officers deemed to be involved in 
war crimes or obstructing cooperation with the ICTY (Merlingen and Ostauskaite 2006: 
63). The Head of the mission could recommend the dismissal of individual officers to the 
OHR, yet this practice was used on very few occasions (Juncos 2013: 143). Nonetheless, 
the EUPM made some impact on this area through improving cooperation between the 
police and judiciary, which led to higher confidence of the ICTY in the latter300.  
Overall, for the most part of the third studied period, the EU led police reform efforts 
in BiH though the SAP conditionality, a double-hatted position of the HR/EUSR and its 
first civilian mission, the EUMP301.  The inability of the bloc to justify requirements for 
centralisation of the police with the provisions of the DPA, the acquis or its own practices 
in other countries and get all its agencies present in Bosnia act in unison damaged the reform 
efforts. To prevent BiH from falling behind other Western Balkan states, Brussels had to 
settle for a compromise, postponing the finalisation of police restructuring until the 
domestic elites agree on a broader constitutional revision. Although the EU was unable to 
complete the process of restructuring, it contributed to the reform in many other ways, 
which are often overlooked. By 2013, the European Commission and EUPM strengthened 
the local ownership of the reform, improved the professionalism and accountability of the 
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local police forces, as well as their crime fighting capabilities, and were instrumental in 
harmonising legislation on the state, entity, cantonal and Brcko District levels. The changes 
achieved “advanced the transformation of the Bosnian police from an instrument of ethnic 
warfare into a professional service” (Merlingen 2009: 162). Still, the biggest challenges 
facing the police in Bosnia, i.e. politicisation and fragmentation, were left unanswered, 
rendering police reform in the country incomplete, which it will remain while BiH is 
undergoing the process of state-building.  Having linked the integration process with the 
reform, the EU would not be able to abandon it half-way without sustaining considerable 
reputational damage.  
The final aspect of SSR in BiH considered here is border reform.  Although border 
reform was started by the PIC in 1997 and managed for the first few years by the OHR and 
UN302, it was transferred into the EU’s ownership already in 2003. This happened thanks 
to the launch of the EUPM, which from the onset took on several border security 
improvement projects (Eralp 2012; 101) and due to BiH committing to the EU standards of 
border control at the Ohrid Border Conference and consequently to the Guidelines for IBM 
in the Western Balkans, released by the Commission in 2004. Even before 2003, the EU’s 
impact on border security was noticeable: while the European Commission pressed for the 
establishment of the SBS in the Road Map to allow BiH progress in the SAP, the 
UNMIBH’s Border Police Department and the IPTF ensured that the SBS’s operational 
model was based on EU standards and norms (Hills 2006: 198).  Although the SBS could 
control BiH’s external borders already in 2002, the agency was still weak and in need of 
guidance when the IPTF left the country (Skogstrom 2006). The EU’s assistance therefore 
was crucial to ensure it was fully operational and relied on a well-developed policy and 
legal framework. Established by a law, imposed by the HR in 2000, the SBS’s legal basis 
was fragile. Due to several amendments to the Law on the State Border Service in 2004 and 
2007, that were partly inspired by the EU requirements, partly by the need to improve the 
efficiency of the service, the SBS, renamed the border police in 2007, strengthened its 
position among the state-level law enforcement agencies of BiH (BPBiH n.d.). Moreover, 
many laws specifying competences of BiH’s border police, were either adopted or 
underwent changes to satisfy EU conditionality, e.g. the Law on border control was adopted 
in 2009, and Law on movement and stay of aliens and asylum, was released in 2003, and 
updated in 2008 and 2012 under EU pressure (EC 2009c: 55; EC 2008g: 54; MoS BiH 
2015: 72-73).  
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Moreover, the EU’s support was crucial for the development and implementation of 
BiH’s IBM strategy to pursue the creation of open and secure borders (Collantes-Celador 
and Juncos 2012: 204). The first national Strategy on IBM, adopted in July 2005, benefited 
from the 2002 CARDS regional project “Support to and Coordination of Integrated Border 
Management Strategies”, while the 2008 revised version of the strategy and Action Plan on 
the IBM directly resulted from the 2005 CARDS project “EU Support for the 
Implementation of the Integrated Border Management Strategy for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina” (EC 2008j). With the launch of IPA in 2007, the European Commission 
continued supporting the IBM strategy in Bosnia. Later projects such as the IPA 2008 
“Support for the Implementation of the BiH IBM Strategy and Action Plan” addressed not 
only harmonisation of the BiH IBM legislation with EU standards and development of 
common risk analysis, but also coordination of work between all institutions involved in 
the concept (DEUBiH 2012; DEUBiH 2015). Apart from the border police, the IBM in 
Bosnia involves the Indirect Taxation Authority (ITA), State Veterinary Office, State Plant 
Health Administration of BiH, Service for Foreigners’ Affairs and three Border 
Inspectorates established at the entity level and the Brcko Disctrict (DEUBiH 2015). The 
MoS is the national coordinator for the implementation of the IBM strategy. As explained 
in chapters on SSR in Croatia and Serbia, the IBM concept in the Western Balkans focuses 
on three pillars: intra-service cooperation, inter-agency cooperation and international 
cooperation. Although CARDS projects started addressing the second and third pillars in 
addition to the first one, it was IPA that contributed to improved cooperation between 
different services involved in border management in BiH and development of their 
international connections the most (Collantes-Celador and Juncos 2012: 205). Thus, one of 
the elements of the above-mentioned IPA 2008 project supported the development of a clear 
communication and coordination structure between the border management agencies in the 
country (IPA 2008k: 5-7). It is worth mentioning that the EUPM supported the development 
of the IBM legal framework through its own projects (Skogstrom 2006; Eralp 2012: 101), 
yet its assistance was more extensive in the areas of capacity-building and technical aid. 
In terms of policy and legal advice, the analysis of the EU’s influence cannot be 
complete without considering reforms introduced by the Roadmap for visa liberalisation. 
In June 2008, the European Commission set requirements for substantial reforms to be 
implemented in four key areas to allow BiH citizens visa-free travel to the Schengen zone 
(EC 2008l). The areas that included document security, illegal migration, public order and 
security, and external relations and fundamental rights brought about technical (e.g. 
improved infrastructure for asylum procedure) and legal changes (e.g. harmonisation of 
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criminal codes on all levels, implementation of the Law on citizenship, Law on data 
protection, National Anti-Corruption Strategy, etc.) (Populari and ESI 2009). Despite a 
demanding character of these reforms, leaders from both entities showed unanimity in 
supporting their implementation (Noutcheva 2012: 130). The tangible promise of visa-free 
travel to the Schengen zone temporarily united the camps that were normally in opposition. 
It would be wrong the assume, however, that the reforms went smoothly. In May 2009, 
Bosnia scored lowest among other Western Balkan states participating in the process303, 
which prevented it from achieving a visa-free Schengen travel at the end of 2009 with 
Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia that emerged as reform leaders (Knaus 2009). To catch 
up with the neighbours, within only several months, BiH implemented colossal changes to 
the sensitive area of security: it introduced biometric passports; adopted key legislation on 
issues ranging from border control to prevention of financing terrorist activities; and 
improved working relations with EU member states, neighbouring countries and EU 
agencies involved in policing, justice and border matters – Eurojust, Europol and Frontex304 
(ibid.). This allowed the European Commission to recommend visa liberalisation for Bosnia 
in November 2010 (Noutcheva 2012: 130). The experience of reforms in 2008-2010 
challenged the image of Bosnia as a dysfunctional state and confirmed the EU’s SSR 
capabilities. By holding BiH accountable to the same benchmarks as the rest of the region 
and by offering a real incentive, based on European standards supported by the acquis, the 
EU demonstrated it could persuade Bosnian elites to implement even highly demanding 
reforms of the security sector (Knaus 2009).  After the visa liberalisation process was 
successfully completed by BiH, the EU continued promoting the harmonisation of BiH 
legislation on border management with the EU standards, especially in terms of the IBM305, 
and conditioning of the BiH border police to work according to best Schengen practices 
(DEUBiH 2015a).  
Policy and legal work in BiH’s border control went hand in hand with capacity-
building and technical assistance. As already mentioned, the EUPM played an important 
role in both. It entered Bosnia at a time, when the country’s security situation was mostly 
stable, but state-level security institutions, including the SBS, were still fragile. Entrusted 
with helping the locals develop a working common policing space, the EU’s police mission 
identified the SBS development among its key priorities (Merlingen and Ostauskaite 2006: 
71). Capacity-building programmes, run by the EUPM encompassed technical training, 
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projects for higher management and specialised training to combat organised crime. The 
scope and focus of technical exercises varied considerably: some programmes provided on-
demand training to border guards on how to detect forgery (ibid.) or use high-tech 
surveillance equipment, often donated by the EU states, while others offered advice to 
separate agencies involved in the IBM on regulations, procedures and standards they 
required to implement to comply with the EU guidelines (Eralp 2012: 101). Similarly, these 
agencies were offered help in developing working relations between each other, e.g. EUPM 
used the co-location procedure to improve coordination between the ITA, SIPA and other 
policing bodies (Padurariu 2014: 10). Co-location was also used to develop the 
management capacity of senior SBS officers. Thus, a 70-strong co-location team, mostly 
from Germany, mentored top border officers on ways to delegate authority, transparency in 
decision-making and importance of planning and risk analysis for effective border control 
(Merlingen and Ostauskaite 2006: 71). Focus on the management level, just like in police 
reform, was perceived by the EUPM to be of key importance for developing local 
ownership in border security (Skogstrom 2006). Capacity-building programmes with the 
emphasis on fighting cross-border organised crime, including trafficking of arms, persons 
and drugs, became more common after the update of the EUPM mandate in 2006 (Padurariu 
2014: 8). Improved capacities for fighting organised crime and corruption were also among 
the main goals of projects funded by the European Commission through CARDS and IPA, 
as demonstrated by the CARDS 2006 project “Support to the State Border Service” and 
elements of the IPA 2010 “The EU Support to Law Enforcement in BiH” (EC 2006h; 
DEUBiH 2015b). These projects were often more ambitious and comprehensive than 
projects of the EUPM, as they contained various other elements e.g. technical and policy 
assistance.  
Technical assistance to the SBS/border police was of utmost importance, too, as BiH 
had no experience of managing external borders until 1995. The country’s needs in this 
respect were also heightened due to war damage. The EUPM and European Commission-
funded projects offered the Bosnian border police modern equipment, databases, 
infrastructure for forensics and biometrics as well as support with constructing border 
crossing points (BCPs)/ closing illegal crossings. Initially, at least for the Commission, 
supply projects were prioritised. Thus, supply of surveillance and protection equipment was 
ensured through CARDS 2001 and 2002 programmes, while CARDS 2003 funds were 
allocated for the acquisition of an Automatic Fingerprint Identification System, supply of 
hardware for Weapons Database System, national DNA Database System and Criminal 
Analysis Network (EC 2006h). By the time IPA was launched, the Bosnian border police 
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had basic equipment, and the focus shifted onto the infrastructure necessary to comply with 
the Schengen requirements and improvement of connectivity and cooperation between 
different border services. The EU support was crucial for connecting separate databases on 
migration and border control existing in BiH into a single network, improving data 
exchange between numerous police agencies in Bosnia306. Similarly, the EU demands and 
financial assistance were behind the development of the integrated system of control of 
state border crossings (CSBS) that connected all international BCPs in BiH by 2013 (EC 
2013e: 49). The EUPM, while not providing the equipment to the border police, offered 
substantial operational support to border management agencies on maintaining it, e.g. 
through inventory management307. Working on developing local ownership, it refused to 
get involved in guarding the borders (Eralp 2012; 101). EUFOR, however, during the first 
two years in BiH, did not shy away from patrolling borders and organising operations to 
tackle trans-border crime (Friesendorf and Penksa 2008: 683). It also provided the SBS 
with high-tech equipment, e.g. aerial military maps and night-vision goggles, and trained 
the border police in using it (ibid.).  
One of the areas of technical assistance that remained topical till the end of the studied 
period was linked to border crossings. Thanks to more than 12 million EUR under CARDS 
2001-2004, BiH constructed and equipped BCPs in several key locations such as Orasje, 
Gradina – Jasenovac and Kamensko (ITABiH 2007). Work on more BCPs continued even 
after 2013 (EC 2013e: 49). Blocking illegal border crossings along Bosnia’s 1,551 km state 
border was a similarly challenging task that BiH could not complete on its own. The length 
of the state border and geography of the country created favourable opportunities for cross-
border organised crime that exploited weaknesses in the country’s border control. Having 
made the first financial contribution into the elimination of unauthorised BCPs towards 
Croatia in 2003 (Court of Auditors 2007), the EU continued prioritising this area of border 
reform even a decade later. Thanks to the EU assistance, all illegal border crossings towards 
Croatia were closed by 2009308 and by 2013 – towards Montenegro, leaving only the closure 
of unauthorised BCPs on the border with Serbia pending (EC 2013e: 49). Securing the 
Croatian border first was not accidental, as from June 2013 it became the external border 
of the EU. Support to Bosnia’s border crossings therefore, as well as technical assistance to 
the country’s border police in general, was used as a tool for developing security structures 
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and capacities needed for achieving an effective line of defence for the EU (Hills 2006: 
198).  
Another area of border security that attracted the EU’s attention was the issue of 
border delineation. Although a small country, Bosnia has one of the longest state borders 
in Europe. After the war, it had only two neighbours – Croatia and the FRY, which after 
2006 turned into three: Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro. None of the three neighbours had 
a ratified demarcation agreement with BiH in 2013309, and all had unresolved border 
disputes. Montenegro disagreed with BiH over the Sandzak area310, Serbia – over the 
meandering Drina River and the area around Bajina Basta, while Croatia had a long list of 
disputes with Bosnia311, among which issues around the Bosnian coast-line around Neum 
and Croatian Port of Ploce were the most contentious (Gosar 2012: 90-92). Like in Serbia 
and Croatia, the EU monitored existing border disputes in BiH through progress reports of 
the European Commission, while approaching them as bilateral problems (EC 2013e: 21-
22). Nonetheless, the involvement of the bloc was necessary to facilitate agreements on 
border management between BiH and Croatia on the eve of the latter’s joining the EU312. 
In general, the EU’s role in finding a solution to Bosnia’s border disputes was minimal, 
which can change as BiH or its neighbours get closer to the EU membership.  
To conclude, the EU in BiH approached border reform in a similar way to border 
reforms in Croatia and Serbia. It provided policy and legal advice on the implementation of 
the IBM strategy (first in line with the concept for the Western Balkans, then for the EU), 
harmonisation of BiH legislation with the Schengen practices and improvement of 
cooperation with its member states and agencies. It also invested substantial resources into 
capacity-building of all services involved in border management, modernisation of 
equipment and infrastructure at BCPs and development of data and information exchange 
networks, necessary for managing borders, as well as achieving effective asylum and 
migration policies. While criticising border disputes with neighbours in European 
Commission’s progress reports, the EU preferred not to link them with the process of 
integration into the bloc. It is important to acknowledge that in Bosnia, unlike in Croatia 
and Serbia, the European Commission’s efforts to improve border security were supported 
by Council instruments, namely the EUPM and EUFOR. The EUSR was promoting the 
reform, too. Compared to other elements of security sector in BiH, border security is often 
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presented as the area that had the most robust and comprehensive reform, and the EU 
contribution plaid an important role in the process.313 
 
Conclusion  
Compared to Croatia and Serbia, the transformation experienced by Bosnia in 1991-
2013 is simultaneously less and more substantial. On the one hand, 18 years after the war, 
BiH could not yet fully exercise its sovereignty due to the continuing civilian and military 
presence of the international community in the country. Moreover, the process of Euro-
Atlantic integration produced limited results: having joined NATO’s PfP in 2006 and 
received invitation for the MAP in 2010, Bosnia’s relationship with the alliance stalled, 
while decade-long negotiations with the EU did not even result in a candidate status. On 
the other hand, the country reached stability after the most violent conflict seen in Europe 
since World War II, developed institutions normally found in a democracy and 
implemented a rage of demanding reforms. Given the devastation left by the war in 1995 
and weak statehood created by Dayton, these achievements are not insignificant. The 
process of BiH’s development in the studied period was therefore rather uneven. SSR 
reflects this unevenness, too.  
In the sphere of defence, instead of three separate conscription-based armies at the 
end of the war, BiH now has a unified professional army under a single chain of command 
and civilian oversight. There is also the single state-level border police, responsible for 
border management and security, as well as implementation of the EU’s IBM standards in 
cooperation with other border management services. The only security service that resisted 
centralisation was the police. Although several state-level agencies, such as SIPA and 
Directorate for Coordination of Police Bodies were established, both entities kept their own 
police forces organised according to two different models. This is not to say police reform 
brought no results: professionalism of police officers and efficiency of policing in the 
Federation and RS were considerably improved, largely thanks to the UN’s IPTF and EU’s 
Police Mission. Nonetheless, Bosnian police agencies are still highly politicised and 
disconnected, which means police reform and SSR in the country more generally remain 
incomplete.  
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The unfinished SSR is of concern to the EU, which linked elements of the reform to 
the promise of membership in the bloc and made Bosnia a testing ground for its civilian 
and military crisis missions. With the help of EUFOR Althea and the EUPM, double-hatting 
of the HR as EUSR, as well as a growing profile of the SAP, by 2013, the EU evolved into 
the leader of border and police reforms and a tactical guide of defence reform in Bosnia. 
Unfortunately, the SSR agenda, promoted by the EU did not bring the local elites fully 
together. While Bosniak, Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb leaders (as well as most of the 
opposition) agreed on the future of BiH in the EU, they disagreed on what was needed to 
achieve the membership. As certain elements of SSR put an emphasis on centralisation, the 
RS leadership and to, a lesser extent, Bosnian Croat elites feared this could lead to the 
reduced autonomy of the ethnic groups they were representing and eventual restructuring 
of the state. The link between SSR and state-building in BiH is the most visible and 
problematic among the studied Western Balkan states. Until the two entities and three key 
ethnic groups agree on the future constitutional shape of the country, the EU, and entire 
international community, will have to accept a limited character of the reform in the 
country. Considering the analysis presented in the chapter314, five considerations can be 
drawn about the EU’s role in SSR in BiH.  
First, it should be highlighted that EU’s SSR agenda has been closely intertwined 
with SSR activities undertaken by other external actors. Both the EUPM and EUFOR 
benefited from the ground work, conducted by the UN and NATO respectively, while the 
missions cooperated with these, and many other actors, to fulfil their constantly evolving 
mandates. Joining the HR and EUSR positions in 2002-2011 brought the EU even closer to 
the rest of the international community which mostly worked in unison on peace and state-
building in BiH. This closeness, while largely seen as beneficial to Bosnia, made it difficult 
to differentiate the EU’s SSR efforts in the country and introduced an element of confusion 
for local actors that could not always tell whose conditionality they were fulfilling. 
Moreover, as police restructuring illustrated, the overlapping of reform agendas 
undermined the EU’s credibility and opened its conditionality to criticism. 
Second, in BiH the EU had a wider choice of tools for promoting SSR than in Croatia 
and Serbia. Alongside the financial help and conditions coming from the European 
Commission, Bosnian SSR was influenced by the Council that acted through the EUSR, 
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EUPM and EUFOR. This allowed the EU to approach border, police and defence reforms 
in BiH more deeply and consistently.  
Third, by engaging in SSR in Bosnia, the EU demonstrated an ability to adapt and 
learn (Juncos 2013). From an actor marginally involved in de-mining and police reform in 
a single town, that was providing support to others, it evolved into an agenda setter. Even 
when the SAP started guiding the region and BiH’s development, the EU kept adapting to 
the situation on the ground. For instance, it updated the mandates of the EUPM and EUFOR 
on several occasions. It also adjusted requirements for police restructuring in 2005 and 2008 
when it became clear no consensus would be reached on the reform. Although these actions 
are often criticised as a sign of weakness, the critics forget that the EU was unable to justify 
centralisation requirements through the acquis or common practices in the bloc. Failure to 
compromise therefore could have led to the isolation of BiH. 
Fourth, SSR in Bosnia, just like SSR in Croatia and Serbia, was used as a means of 
member state-building. Yet the distant nature of the membership promise, the absence of 
acquis behind certain demands and weakness of the state made the “pull of Brussles” less 
effective in Bosnia than in its neighbouring countries. The disagreements between political 
elites in the country regarding the future shape of BiH introduced another layer of difficulty 
for SSR and other reforms. Conflicting visions of the Bosnian statehood, promoted by the 
political leadership of the entities, undermine the EU’s efforts to bring BiH into the EU 
family. As long as there is no consensus between the entities on the constitutional structure 
of the state, Bosnia’s place in the embryonic security community emerging in the Western 
Balkans is questionable.  
Finally, the EU’s SSR efforts in BiH had a clear regional dimension. Whether it was 
cooperation with the ICTY, joint border controls or police cooperation to fight organised 
crime, the EU encouraged BiH officials to work closely with their neighbours. Special 
attention was paid to BiH’s relations with Serbia and Croatia, due to their role in the war of 
1992-1995 and the influence they retained over their ethnic populations in the country. In 
the absence of regional trust, the EU’s impetus was important for establishing working 
relations between key security bodies of the three former adversaries, trying to substitute 
the link of the legacy of war and with the membership in the bloc.  
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
 
As outlined at the beginning of the thesis, the concluding chapter serves three 
purposes. First, it compares the EU’s SSR policies in Croatia, Serbia and BiH, by analysing 
differences and similarities in the EU approaches to the three countries and the results they 
achieved. Second, it summarises the findings of the research by revisiting the research 
question and third, it identifies strengths and limitations of the work, as well as outlines 
possible avenues for further development of the research. The chapter opens with 
comparative analysis.  
 
Comparative analysis of the EU’s involvement in SSR in Croatia, Serbia and BiH 
Following Alexander George’s (1979) method, the case studies are compared in a 
focused and structured manner. The comparison is focused as it deals with two level of SSR 
– political and organisational, and only three aspects of the reform in Croatia, Serbia and 
BiH, i.e. defence, police and border reforms, from the point of view of the EU’s impact on 
them. It is structured, as it is guided by the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) that 
allows to distinguish three periods of analysis within the chosen timeframe: 1991-1995, 
when the Balkan subcomplex represented a case of regional conflict formation (RCF), 
1995-1999, the time of a failed security regime, and 1999-2013, an emerging embryonic 
security community within the EU/Europe RSC. The analysis, provided here, is therefore 
cross-temporal and cross-spatial,315 as I assume that using both dimensions can better the 
understanding of both the EU’s security policies in the Western Balkans and the 
discrepancies of development between individual states of the region.  
As mentioned in previous chapters, the first period, from 1991 to 1995, differs from 
the other two as its context does not create favourable conditions for security sector reform. 
Although SSR is applicable to a range of environments, it is not typical for the context of 
open warfare and interconnected conflicts, characteristic of an RCF. It is still important to 
analyse this period to determine whether the security sectors of the three case studies had 
the same or different starting points of SSR, to define factors that enabled or held back the 
EU’s engagement in the reform, and to assess the evolution of the EU as a security actor in 
the region. Besides, it is during this period that the EU tried its hand at SSR in the Western 
Balkans for the first time, although on a limited scope of one town in BiH. While this 
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experience is examined below, I first analyse the EU instruments that influenced the 
security development of the three states, identifying them as precursors of the bloc’s impact 
on the political level of the reform. These instruments include the Arbitration Commission 
on Yugoslavia, arms embargo, the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) and 
sanctions against the SFRY/FRY.  
The Arbitration or Badinter Commission defined the general shape and international 
personality of Croatia, Serbia and BiH by ruling that internal boundaries between Yugoslav 
republics could be regarded as international borders. By convening the commission, the 
EU, then still the EC, at least in the eyes of regional players, bore responsibility for its 
decisions, although as demonstrated by Croatia’s case, it did not follow them blindly. It was 
not surprising therefore that Badinter’s ruling denying the Serbian populations in Croatia 
and BiH the right to self-determination, contributed to the spread of anti-EU sentiments 
among the Serbs.316 The arms embargo imposed by the EC/EU on Yugoslavia in July 1991 
was another EU instrument, applied to all three states. It was meant to prevent the spread 
of violence in the region, but instead, combined with the UN embargo, introduced in 
September 1991, tilted the military balance in favour of the FRY (dominated by Serbia), 
disadvantaging Croatia and BiH, and unintentionally contributed to the criminalisation of 
the security sectors of the three states and their societies more broadly. The FRY inherited 
the JNA and most of the military equipment and weapons from the SFRY, while Croatia 
and BiH had to build their armies practically from scratch in the conditions of war. The 
police, which represented a republican service in the SFRY, and paramilitary groups, using 
criminal networks piercing the Balkans, were of utmost importance in this process. 
Moreover, in BiH the security sector was divided between the three warring ethnic groups 
– Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats. While the former group were left to their 
own devices, the latter two could count on support from Belgrade and Zagreb respectively. 
Trying to treat all post-Yugoslav states in the same way, the EU successfully resisted calls 
for lifting the embargo for Bosniaks. These actions, although criticised by the USA, have 
contributed to preventing the escalation of violence and reaching a diplomatic solution to 
the Bosnian war.  
Despite efforts to act as an impartial mediator, the EU, as the rest of the international 
community, singled out the FRY/Serbia as the main aggressor in the Yugoslav conflicts of 
the 1990s. As a result, it excluded Belgrade from programmes offered to other Balkan states 
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and used punitive economic measures to pressure Milosevic to cooperate. Thus, the ECMM 
that created real and symbolic links between the EU and individual Balkan states, including 
Croatia and BiH, did not open its offices in the FRY, whereas the economic sanctions that 
cut off financial aid and stopped trade relations with the whole of Yugoslavia in October 
1991, were enforced only against Serbia and Montenegro after November 1991. These 
actions isolated the Milosevic regime and consolidated the anti-EU sentiment in the FRY. 
It should also be mentioned that by placing the ECMM in Croatia and BiH, Brussels 
received unique insight into the security situations in these countries, yet in the absence of 
appropriate tools, was unable to apply the information collected to bring peace to the region. 
This inability to stop the violence and manage the crises contributed to the loss of trust in 
the bloc among Western Balkan states. Consequently, negative attitudes to the EU were not 
restricted to the FRY, but spread around Croatia and BiH, too. In such circumstances, the 
EU’s attempts to manage the results of conflicts were met with suspicion and doubt, which 
can be observed in treatment of the EU administration of Mostar (EUAM) that includes the 
only example of the bloc’s involvement in the organisational level of SSR during the first 
period. As part of its mandate, the EUAM promised to unite the town’s police, divided 
between the Bosniak-controlled eastern and Croat-controlled western parts. The completion 
of the task was entrusted to the WEU Police Force (WEPOL) that started work in September 
1994. Yet by the end of 1995, the WEU contingent, acting on the EU’s behalf, achieved 
only modest results. It improved police communication infrastructure, established a joint 
operations centre and organised separate patrols with the East and West Mostar police 
forces. The progress was limited due to several reasons, most importantly, a mismatch 
between the ambitious goal and tools available for its achievement. With no previous 
experience in crisis management, limited resources to support the WEUPOL and lack of 
military power to back up its demands, the EU could not unite the deeply fractured town 
and its police in two years. 
In short, the EU’s SSR activity in 1991-1995 in the Western Balkans was minimal. 
Only BiH experienced the EU’s impact on police reform in Mostar towards the end of the 
war. This is not surprising, considering the lack of instruments in the EU toolbox for dealing 
with military conflicts and hostile regional context. Most of the EU’s efforts at this time 
were aimed at stopping the violence, finding a peaceful solution to the conflicts and 
managing their consequences.  
The end of the wars of Yugoslavia’s dissolution changed the EU goals in the Western 
Balkans to promoting stabilisation and normalisation of life in the region. With the launch 
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of the Regional Approach (RA) in 1996, the EU also set to facilitate regional cooperation, 
reconciliation and good neighbourly relations. Elements of SSR it attempted in 1995-1999 
were therefore subordinated to these goals. During this period, when the international 
community tried to pacify the Western Balkans and substitute regional rivalry with 
reciprocity, typical of security regimes, the EU showed growing interest in the functioning 
and management of the security sectors of Croatia, Serbia and BiH. The political level of 
the reform was affected mostly indirectly through the continuation of the arms embargo, 
work of the ECMM in Croatia and BiH, the RA conditionality and return of punitive actions 
against the FRY/Serbia with the break-out of war in Kosovo. All of these activities touched 
upon security practices of the studied countries, although none was guided by SSR 
considerations. After all, the EU’s concept of the reform was still missing.  
The arms embargo, applicable to the three studied countries, and some of the 
autonomous EU sanctions against the FRY targeted security sectors in more obvious ways, 
than the ECMM and RA. The embargo was kept by Brussels, despite the lifting of the UN 
restrictions in November 1995. This decision, explained by desire to protect international 
personnel engaged in peace-building activities in post Yugoslav states, allowed the EU to 
contribute to arms control and confidence-building measures, coordinated by the OSCE in 
Croatia, Serbia and BiH. With the start of the Kosovo conflict, however, the ban, 
strengthened by the 1998 Council decision to prohibit the export of equipment that could 
be used for internal repression of terrorism to the FRY, led to the exacerbation of the anti-
EU sentiment among Serbian authorities and security elites. Travel restrictions that directly 
affected the FRY’s security sector leadership and oil embargo that aimed to deny the FRY 
army the means to conduct military operations had a similar effect. The feelings of mistrust 
and hostility towards the EU became aggravated among FRY security actors after the bloc 
prevented the security top brass from travelling freely to its member states and tried to cut 
off supplies to the military in the face of NATO’s bombing. These attitudes lingered even 
after the end of the Milosevic era, making the EU’s SSR activities more problematic. On 
the other hand, the EU’s punitive measures weakened the Milosevic regime and isolated 
Serbia even from its FRY partner, Montenegro.   
The ECMM in Croatia and BiH contributed to the stabilisation of the countries by 
monitoring the implementation of the Erdut Agreement and the DPA. While continuing to 
provide a link between the countries and the EU, it lacked the tools and ambition to 
influence their security sectors more directly. The Regional Approach, as a more 
comprehensive EU policy, covering all Western Balkan states, was better suited to approach 
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SSR. While emphasising sectoral issues, including in the sphere of policing, border security 
and to a lesser extent defence, the RA contained requirements for establishing a system of 
democratic governance in Croatia, the FRY and BiH, which is one of the key elements of 
the political level of SSR. For example, in the cases of Croatia and BiH, the RA reports 
directly called for the removal of political influence over the police and army and insisted 
on the introduction of democratic civilian control over the security sector. Given differences 
in state consolidation in Croatia, the FRY and BiH, the RA’s priorities for the countries’ 
political systems differed. Thus, in BiH, the EU emphasised building common institutions, 
while in Croatia and the FRY, it focused on the separation of powers and good governance. 
In all three states, however, the RA promoted the emergence of functional states, where 
human rights are protected, and public security is provided, not threatened, by the security 
sector. Another element of the Regional Approach that was equally applicable to all case 
studies and important for SSR was the requirement to cooperate with the ICTY. Due to the 
unfavourable standing of the tribunal among most ethnic groups in Croatia, Serbia and 
BiH317 and the lack of will in the EU to use coercive power or negative conditionality to 
improve regional relations with The Hague, the requirement was largely ignored.  Speaking 
more broadly, the RA in Croatia, Serbia (as part of the FRY) and BiH and its SSR 
conditionality were also mostly ignored by local actors, prompting the EU to use the 
approach as a monitoring tool. If in the former two cases, the implementation of the RA 
was obstructed by the semi-authoritarian regimes, suspicious of the EU, in BiH it was side-
lined by other efforts of the international community building peace in the war-torn country 
under the DPA framework. 
The EU’s impact on the organisational level of SSR in 1995-1999 was similarly 
limited. It provided financial assistance and policy advice to Croatia and BiH to help with 
the post-conflict transformations of their defence sectors, police and border services. Serbia, 
however, received no direct or indirect support for its security sector reform. This was 
because it chose to deal with the Kosovo issue through violence, instead of looking for a 
peaceful solution, reclaiming the “pariah status” it tried to shed via the peace-making efforts 
of Milosevic in the mid-1990s. Even so, the EU monitored the practices of the country’s 
police, criticising them for unprofessionalism and disregard for human rights, and endorsed 
the normalisation of border relations with its neighbouring states through the RA reports.  
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In Croatia and BiH, defence reform was promoted through support for mine clearance 
action and research on de-mining. In the former, the EU acted through the WEU Deming 
Mission as it was still lacking a defence policy of its own, and in the latter, it assisted the 
UN and provided direct support to de-mining NGOs and local authorities. In BiH, it also 
contributed to the development of the strategic documents for dealing with the mine threat. 
These activities contributed to a safer environment in the countries, improved refugee 
returns and the development of civilian and military expertise on de-mining. In police 
reform, while recognising the leadership of the UN and OSCE in Croatia and BiH, the EU 
argued for professionalisation of the services and introduction of democratic policing, 
respectful of human rights and intolerant to organised crime. Additionally, in Bosnia, the 
WEUPOL further improved infrastructure, offered training opportunities to the police of 
West and East Mostar and established the Unified Police Force, capable of acting only in 
the central zone of the town. The mission’s achievements, like in the previous period, were 
mainly technical as the EU refused to recognise that police unification in the divided town 
was a politically-charged issue. It was still an important experience, as it allowed the EU to 
use elements of SSR as a tool of post-conflict transformation. Border reform in all three 
states was seen as an important step to regional reconciliation. The EU provided advice on 
restoration of border controls and introduction of international standards into the work of 
their border services. In Croatia and BiH, it also supported the development of customs 
services, which demonstrates that even before the introduction of the Integrated Border 
Management (IBM) for the Western Balkans, the EU understood border security in broad 
terms.  
In short, in 1995-1999, the EU showed more interest in elements of SSR in Croatia, 
Serbia and BiH than at the start of the 1990s. Its activities in the area were subordinated to 
the goals of post-conflict reconstruction and regional reconciliation. During this period, the 
bloc’s relations with Serbia deteriorated further over the Kosovo conflict, leaving the 
country without even limited support for its defence, police and border reforms from the 
Union. Punitive measures introduced by the EU against the FRY and Serbia after 1998, 
such as the travel ban and oil embargo, while isolating and weakening the Milosevic regime, 
aggravated the anti-EU attitudes in the country and made them common in the security 
sector. Although Croatia and BiH were offered SSR support by the EU, it was limited and 
irregular. The European Union was content playing a supporting role to either local actors 
or other members of the international community. Besides, its foreign policy was only 
taking shape and defence policy would only develop after the Kosovo war. At the same 
time, the countries remained distrustful of the EU after its failure to manage Yugoslavia’s 
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dissolution. Tudjman’s semi-authoritarian regime was wary of the RA, seeing it as an 
attempt at a new Yugoslavia, and the fragmented BiH had enough DPA conditions to fulfil 
without having to deal with the requirements from the EU, that had no special role under 
the peace agreement. It should also be emphasised that this period demonstrates the 
emergence of discrepancies between the three case studies: Croatia spent the post-war 
period strengthening its statehood, although under semi-authoritarian rule; Serbia, while 
remaining part of the FRY, started moving further away from Montenegro, and descended 
into violence over the status of Kosovo; and BiH, under the supervision of the international 
community, faced the dilemma of making the two entities and three ethnic groups work 
within the framework of a common state. The differences between the states would become 
more prominent in the next period, affecting their relationship with the EU, including in the 
sphere of SSR. 
After the end of the Kosovo conflict, with the launch of the Stability Pact and 
Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), the Western Balkan states were offered an 
opportunity to integrate into the EU. The death of Tudjman and electoral defeat of 
Milosevic created a further opening for regional transformation and reconciliation. Croatia, 
Serbia and BiH did not use these opportunities equally, which is reflected in different levels 
of integration into the EU they achieved by 2013. Croatia joined the bloc in July 2013, 
Serbia was granted a candidate status in March 2012, while BiH was still a potential 
candidate at the end of the researched period. In terms of SSR, differences can also be 
detected on both political and organisational levels, although in many cases the EU’s 
approach to the reform was similar in all three countries. Thus, on the political level, the 
EU promoted three elements of the reform in Croatia, Serbia and BiH: the oversight of the 
security sector, cooperation with the ICTY and regional cooperation.  
The oversight of the security sector was approached by the EU through support for 
and advice on establishing parliamentary, civilian and public control measures over 
different security agencies of the three countries. In Serbia and BiH, however, this aspect 
of the reform was supplemented by demands for state consolidation. While Croatia, having 
achieved territorial integrity in 1998 with the reintegration of Eastern Slavonia, did not 
experience any serious challenges to its statehood, the same cannot be said about Serbia 
and Bosnia. Serbia existed within four different configurations, i.e. the SFRY, FRY, State 
Union of Serbia and Montenegro (SCG) and the Republic of Serbia, between 1991 and 
2013, which put a strain on its development as a functioning state. Although BiH 
maintained the same shape after 1995, the state created by Dayton was fractured, weak and 
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not self-sustaining. The EU’s insistence on state consolidation in Serbia and BiH is 
therefore not surprising. In the sphere of security reform this demand took different forms 
for the two states. In Serbia, where defence and border security were a joint responsibility 
of the federal and later SCG government, the EU advocated clear separation of powers 
between the federal/ State Union and republican levels and harmonisation of security 
practices with Montenegro. When the SCG ceased existence in 2006, and Serbia parted 
ways with Montenegro, the EU switched to prioritising the promotion of good security 
governance as an element of democratisation and Europeanisation of the state apparatus. 
The same approach was applied to Croatia but starting from 2000. In BiH’s security sector, 
state consolidation was about building/ strengthening common state institutions and 
establishing effective coordination between different levels of government. Even though by 
2013 the army and border police were centralised, the unfinished restructuring of the police 
and absence of constitutional reform to remove the external influence over the state’s 
governance system, meant that the question of state consolidation remained significant for 
Bosnia’s SSR even after 2013.  
The analysis of the EU’s impact on the oversight of security sectors in Croatia, Serbia 
and BiH cannot be complete without evaluating the character of this impact and motivation 
for it. The three cases demonstrated that the EU tended to influence parliamentary, civilian 
and public control through a mixture of indirect and direct measures. For example, in all 
three states, parliamentary control over security bodies have been strengthened thanks to 
the EU’s efforts to support the development of their parliamentary democracies, while 
public control was improved through its assistance for the development of independent 
regulatory bodies, media and civil society. Some of the EU’s actions were directly aimed 
at improving the oversight of the security sector, e.g. as demonstrated by the EU’s attention 
to the work of the Committee for Defence and Security in Serbia and its role in the 
transformation of the latter into two more specialised bodies, the Defence and Internal 
Affairs Committee and Security Services Control Committee. In none of the three cases, 
however, was the EU found to follow a coherent and comprehensive programme while 
approaching the political level of SSR (or SSR in general). The motivation for its actions 
in the sphere can be explained by the need to prepare Croatia, Serbia and BiH for future 
membership in the bloc. Transparent and accountable security sectors are seen by the EU 
as a prerequisite of effective and functioning states that can fulfil demands of the integration 
process into Euro-Atlantic institutions. As Croatia, Serbia and BiH progressed with their 
EU membership talks at a different pace, Brussels demonstrated different levels of 
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engagement with their security reforms, which is even more evident on the organisational 
level, compared below.  
The second element of the political level of SSR affected by the EU is linked to the 
work of the ICTY. Cooperation with this ad hoc court of law had significance for SSR in 
Croatia, Serbia and BiH for three main reasons. First, the tribunal’s work led to the 
dismissal of security personnel, embroiled in war crimes, and therefore professionalisation 
of security agencies in the Western Balkan states. Second, it contributed to the achievement 
of full civilian control over the security sector by dismantling the protection networks 
harbouring fugitives. Finally, by encouraging the states to tackle the legacy of war, it 
promoted restoration of trust and peace in the region. Although the EU supported the ICTY 
nearly from the moment of its establishment in 1993 and included cooperation with the 
tribunal into the RA and SAP conditionality, it started actively insisting on the improvement 
of this cooperation in Croatia, Serbia and BiH’ only around 2004-2005. Given differences 
in the scale and gravity of war crimes in each country and coercion from other members of 
the international community, there were some differences in the ways the EU promoted 
cooperation with the ICTY in the three studied countries. Nonetheless, they did not affect 
the essence of the EU’s ICTY conditionality. The EU demanded Croatia, Serbia and BiH 
to capture and transfer indictees to The Hague, provide security guarantees to witnesses, 
develop functional channels of communication with the tribunal and investigate support 
networks. While most of the public in Croatia, Serbia and the RS318 in BiH remained 
opposed to the ICTY, the state elites of the three states had to eventually accept the necessity 
of cooperation with the court. The emphasis of the EU on the matter within the SAP is one 
of the key reasons behind this change.  
The third and final element of the political level of SSR, promoted by the EU in the 
Western Balkans is regional cooperation. In Croatia, Serbia and BiH, it was mostly 
facilitated in three areas: policing, border security and dealing with the legacy of war. The 
latter involved cooperation between the states not only on matters relating to the ICTY, but 
also to domestic trials. In Serbia, relations with Kosovo were added as an extra requirement, 
as the EU wanted to ensure the latter was able to participate in regional initiatives, too. In 
general, the EU endorsed regional cooperation on security issues to build the capacity of 
Croatian, Serbian and Bosnian security actors, introduce them to international and EU 
standards in policing and border security and develop trust and reciprocity in the region. It 
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is important to acknowledge that the EU’s attention to the regional dimension of SSR 
became more visible in the organisational level of the reform in 1999-2013 as well. Finally, 
it should be pointed out that while the EU prioritised cooperation between the Western 
Balkan states and specifically Croatia, Serbia and BiH, considering their shared past and 
identical ethnic populations, it also encouraged the development of working security 
relations with a broader SEE area.  
The organisational level of SSR in 1999-2013, like during the previous period, is 
divided into defence, police and border reforms. In defence reform, the EU’s footprint was 
the least visible in Croatia, where NATO assumed leadership in 2000, and most noticeable 
in BiH, where the bloc used not only the European Commission’s conditionality but relied 
on efforts of the EUSR (who acted as the HR of the international community in 2002-2011) 
and EUFOR Althea to promote the reform. In Serbia, for a long time the EU avoided 
engagement with defence issues due to the constitutional and legal uncertainty surrounding 
the FRY and SCG, and strong anti-EU sentiment among the top brass, mentioned above. 
The peaceful break-up of the SCG and Serbia’s decision not to pursue NATO membership, 
prompted the EU to show more interest in the area. Using priorities, set out in the European 
Partnerships in 2006 and 2008, it demanded Belgrade adopt some strategic legislation in 
the sphere of defence. Once this was achieved, however, the EU switched to supporting 
defence reform in the country from the point of its own security infrastructure, particularly 
CSDP and Battlegroups. In fact, in all three countries the EU’s efforts at defence reform 
were closely linked to preparing them for demands of EU membership. In BiH, given the 
distance of the membership perspective and the weakness of the state, EUFOR was also 
used to promote self-sustainability of the recently unified army. To address the membership 
requirements for Croatia, Serbia and BiH, help Serbia establish a legal defence framework, 
compatible with the EU standards, and strengthen the sustainability of the Bosnian army, 
the EU used policy advice, training, technical assistance and post-conflict support. The 
latter two categories were often combined. For example, in Croatia and BiH, the EU spent 
considerable financial resources (from the mid-1990s to 2013, around 20 million EUR and 
40 million EUR respectively) on mine clearance action and developing de-mining expertise. 
Serbia received less support in this sphere due to a smaller scale of the mine threat and 
persisting perceptions of the country as an aggressor. It should also be highlighted that the 
EU’s technical and post-conflict assistance had a strong regional dimension. Thus, the 
problem of small and light weapons, tackled by the EU in Croatia, Serbia and BiH mostly 
in cooperation with the UNDP, was approached through various regional projects, while 
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de-mining programmes often focused on territories, lying between several Western Balkan 
states.  The importance of regional context was also recognised in the context of CSDP.  
While the EU’s role in defence reform in the Western Balkans should be 
acknowledged, it is important to understand that it was limited. The bloc did not try to 
compete with NATO and was content with supporting the Alliance’s endeavours. Even in 
BiH, where it carved itself a special place in defence thanks to EUFOR, and in Serbia, 
where NATO’s impact was restricted due to its involvement in the Kosovo war, the EU 
preferred to focus on non-strategic elements of the reform. In Croatia, its focus remained 
firmly on its own security infrastructure.  
In police reform, the EU’s involvement was more prominent. This is because 
policing, just like border security, is part of Justice and Home Affairs, an area of priority 
for the Western Balkans. The EU relied on the SAP to raise the profile of police reform in 
all three countries and used four areas to promote its implementation, namely: policy and 
legislation, training and sharing best practices, technical assistance and post-conflict 
assistance. There were three other important similarities in the EU’s treatment of the reform 
in Croatia, Serbia and BiH, which were linked to the issue of organised crime, regional 
cooperation and patterns of engagement with other external actors in the field. Fight against 
organised crime provided an overarching theme for a bulk of the EU efforts to build the 
capabilities of the local police services, equip them with the skills and technologies 
necessary to deal with different types of criminal activities, ranging from drug trafficking 
to terrorism, and develop legislative frameworks, compatible with international and EU 
standards. To tackle the transnational nature of organised crime and help law enforcement 
agencies, representing the former adversaries, to build a working relationship, the EU 
promoted regional cooperation in policing through CARDS and IPA projects, as well as its 
CSDP missions. Croatia, for example, contributed to the EUPM in BiH and EULEX in 
Kosovo. What concerns the EU’s relations with other external actors involved in police 
reforms, e.g. the OSCE and the UN, they followed the same pattern in all researched 
countries. From a supporting actor that did not usually consider the work done by others, 
which often led to overlaps and wasted funds, the EU evolved into a leader of police reform 
that not only coordinated its efforts with other agents, but also often relied on them to 
promote its own procedures and policies.  
Having acknowledged similarities in the EU’s approaches to police reforms in 
Croatia, Serbia and BiH, it is important to analyse differences. These are most clearly 
discernible in specific aspects of the four reform areas and general approaches to the reform 
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in the studied countries. Although the EU focused on the same areas of the reform, i.e. 
policy advice, training, technical and post-conflict assistance, in all three regional states, it 
prioritised different aspects of these areas in each country, which could partly be explained 
by different levels of development and post-conflict reconstruction achieved by the states 
by 1999-2000, and partly their closeness to the membership in the bloc. Thus, in Serbia, 
technical assistance was for a long time understood by the EU in terms of modernisation 
and demilitarisation, while in Croatia nearly from the start of the third period, it was about 
specialisation of the police and preparation for the demands of membership. In Croatia and 
until 2011 in Serbia, the EU applied a project-based approach to police reform. In BiH, it 
combined a project-based approach with a long-term structural reform. The development, 
achieved by the Croatian police thanks to internal and external effort, by the early 2000s, 
the emergence of strong support for the EU membership soon after Tudjman’s death and 
the strength of Croatia’s statehood meant that the country had a good foundation for 
fulfilling EU requirements on transforming its policing and could progress fast with the 
reform. By 2013, it was deemed to have created an effective, although still developing, 
institutional and legislative framework on policing, reaching the standards found inside the 
EU. In Serbia, the fractured political scene, poor exposure to externally-led programmes in 
the immediate post-Milosevic period and continuing challenges to its statehood (first within 
the FRY and SCG, then over the status of Kosovo) rendered the EU’s project-based 
approach to police reform only partially effective. With the Council’s decision to 
reinvigorate the focus on the rule of law in the Western Balkans in 2011 and Serbia’s 
achievement of a candidate status in 2012, the EU started moving towards a more strategic 
and comprehensive approach to the reform. The results achieved by 2013, however, were 
not enough to finalise police reform in the country, as Serbia still lacked developed 
infrastructure and a fully operational legal framework on policing.  
The EU’s involvement in BiH’s police reform stands out from its approaches in 
Croatia and Serbia not only because its first civilian mission, EUPM, spent nearly ten years 
trying to improve standards of policing in the country, but also because it identified police 
reform as one of the key conditions for the membership negotiations. In BiH, therefore, the 
EU defined the general framework of police reform. Having chosen a top-down model for 
restructuring the police in Bosnia’s two entities, however, the bloc was unable to convince 
domestic actors to adopt it. Without the acquis on policing or precedent of supporting 
centralisation of the police in other Western Balkan states, the EU conditionality was easy 
to oppose. In the Republika Srpska (RS), the opposition was the strongest. Fearing that the 
reform was just a pretext to change the state system, created by Dayton, the RS refused to 
270 
 
support it, putting BiH’s progress within the SAP at risk. To save the SAA talks from total 
collapse and BiH from isolation, the EU lowered its demands on several occasions and 
agreed to postpone the finalisation of police reform until BiH implements a constitutional 
reform. By 2013, the EU’s support contributed to modernisation and professionalisation of 
law enforcement agencies in BiH, harmonisation of legislation on state, level, cantonal and 
Brcko District levels, and improved operational capacity of state-level institutions, e.g. 
SIPA. Nonetheless, it did not remove the problem of politicisation of the police nor lead it 
to self-sustainability. These issues are unlikely to be resolved until the country removes 
uncertainty surrounding its statehood. The EU, having invested considerable effort into the 
reform and linked it to the membership in the bloc, cannot abandon it without sustaining 
substantial reputational damage.  
The final element of SSR analysed in this work is border reform. In the three studied 
countries, compared to defence and police reforms, the EU promoted it in the most 
comprehensive and consistent way. Considering the geographic closeness of the Western 
Balkans to the bloc and its vulnerability to organised crime, the EU, within the Ohrid 
Process, developed an overarching strategy for the region’s borders security and labelled it 
the Integrated Border Management for the Western Balkans. The goal of this strategy is to 
develop a working system of well-coordinated national and regional agencies in border 
management. The presence of such framework enabled the EU to set the same benchmarks 
for border security in Croatia, Serbia and BiH, while promoting them through the already-
familiar areas of legal approximation, training, technical assistance and post-conflict 
support. Although technical in nature, the IBM concept for the Western Balkans understood 
border security in broad terms by integrating border control, trade facilitation and border 
regional cooperation. After Croatia, Serbia and BiH achieved substantial progress in the 
implementation of their national IBM strategies, aligned with the IBM concept for the 
region, the EU started introducing them to the IBM concept, designed for the members of 
the bloc, which was to prepare them for the future in the borderless Schengen zone.  
Given differences between the three states’ experiences with border security, border 
reforms in each of them progressed at a different pace. Croatia emerged as a regional leader 
since its borders were never militarised and remained intact since 1998. In Serbia, with only 
minor changes introduced to border security after Milosevic’s departure, the IBM took off 
only in 2006, when Belgrade gained full control over border issues that previously had to 
be coordinated with Podgorica. Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in 2008 
returned the uncertainty into Serbia’s border security. By the time that Croatia’s border 
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reform achieved levels of border security, compatible with international standards 
(although not those of the Schengen zone), Serbia built a working border management 
system, but did not bring its asylum, migration and, to a lesser degree, visa policies in line 
with the EU’s demands. BiH for a long time struggled to comply with the EU’s IBM 
requirements as it had no experience in managing external borders until 1995, lacked a 
state-level border agency until 2000 and its borders sustained the biggest damage during 
the regional violence of the 1990s. With the help of the European Commission’s projects, 
the EUPM and even EUFOR, however, BiH created a modern border service, which while 
still developing, is arguably the most effective domestic security actor in the country.   
An important part of border reform in the three countries was linked with the 
harmonisation of their visa policies with those of the EU. Croatia, like before, was in a 
better position than its neighbours. As the only Western Balkan country that was not placed 
on the negative visa list, it could adjust its visa, migration and asylum policies to EU 
requirements relatively quickly. Serbia and BiH, on the other hand, had to go through the 
visa liberalisation process between 2008 and 2010, which dominated their border reforms 
at the time. Although BiH found it more difficult to fulfil demands of the process at first, it 
managed to achieve a free-visa regime with the Schengen zone soon after Serbia.   
Other important successes of the reform concern improved regional cooperation on 
border issues in the Western Balkans and support of the EU-led efforts by other members 
of the international community. By choosing to approach border security in all three states 
through a region-based IBM approach, the EU contributed to the emergence of reciprocal 
relations between their border management systems. Furthermore, these relations were 
promoted by other external actors, involved in border reform in Croatia, Serbia and BiH as 
the EU’s IBM strategy for the Western Balkans was integrated in a broader regional 
initiative, the Ohrid Border Process. It is therefore possible to conclude that the EU’s 
approach to border reform achieved bigger progress in the researched states319 than defence 
or police reform thanks to a combination of factors, among which the emphasis on technical 
character of the reform, offer of tangible incentives, coordination of activities with the rest 
of the international community and use of the same conditions for all Western Balkan states 
deserve a special mention. Of course, border security in Croatia, Serbia and BiH remains a 
challenging topic mostly because of the unresolved border disputes, which the EU prefers 
to treat as bilateral issues in the absence of the acquis on border delineation, uncertainties 
surrounding Serbia-Kosovo relations and the lingering legacy of war. Even in such 
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circumstances, however, the EU’s contribution into border reform of the three states has 
been significant.  
To conclude the comparative analysis320, I need to identify factors behind differences 
in the results achieved by the EU’s SSR-related activities in the studied countries, which 
will also be the answer to the second part of the last research sub-question “How and why 
did Croatia, Serbia and BiH, the three countries chosen for case studies, respond to the 
EU’s SSR efforts differently?”. On the surface, the EU’s involvement in the political and 
organisational levels of the reform followed similar approaches in all researched countries. 
On the political level, the EU promoted the development of good security sector 
governance, cooperation with the ICTY and regional relations. On the organisational level, 
defence, police and border reforms focused on policy and legal advice, capacity-building, 
technical assistance and post-conflict reconstruction. Moreover, clear goals guided the EU’s 
engagement with the Western Balkans during the three periods defined with the RSCT’s 
help: in 1991-1995, it was mostly concerned with stopping the violence through peaceful 
means; in 1995-1999, it sought ways to stabilise the region and normalise life there, while 
in 1999-2013, it worked on the integration of the regional states into its institutions. A closer 
look at SSR in Croatia, Serbia and BiH reveals that similarities in the EU’s approaches were 
not enough to achieve similarities in results. I identify four main factors explaining these 
differences, namely: lasting presence of war legacy, nature of statehood, proximity of the 
EU’s membership and involvement of other members of the international community in 
SSR.  
While all three researched states went through wars, the damage they sustained 
(actual and reputational) were different. Croatia, under a strong leadership that made the 
war part of national mythology started recovering soon after the 1992 UN-negotiated 
ceasefire, although its territorial integrity would be restored only in 1998. Serbia, having 
engaged in four regional conflicts between 1991 and 1999, emerged as a piranha state, 
condemned and shunned by most of the international community until the early 2000s, 
while BiH was hit by violence so hard it required military and civilian international 
involvement to build peace between its two entities. Thus, the legacy of war, although for 
different reasons, left a more lasting impact on Serbia and BiH than Croatia, affecting not 
only their ability to respond to the EU’s SSR demands, but also the nature of their 
relationship with the bloc. For example, in Serbia, the EU’s punitive measures during the 
1990s created a strong anti-EU camp in the security sector which made the EU’s 
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engagement with the country’s SSR challenging. The second factor is closely linked to the 
first one. The fact that Serbia existed in four different configurations between 1991 and 
2013 and is still in dispute with Kosovo over the latter’s status introduced an extra 
dimension into the EU’s approach to the country’s SSR. The same as Bosnia’s reluctance 
to undergo a constitutional reform to achieve full control over its governance. Although, 
formally, BiH is independent, its sovereignty is undermined by the presence of the OHR. 
Croatia, whose statehood remained unchallenged since the end of the war, presented a much 
simpler case for the EU’s SSR. The nature of statehood of the studied countries therefore 
influenced the nature of the EU’s engagement with SSR there, making the bloc introduce 
additional requirements for the reform when states lacked consolidation or had their 
sovereignty challenged.  
Proximity of the EU’s membership promise is the third identified factor. The analysis 
demonstrated that after 1999, the EU used SSR as a member-state building tool to create 
effective and functioning states, capable of joining the bloc. Through SSR, the EU was 
encouraging elites in Croatia, Serbia and BiH to subscribe to the values shared by its 
member states, develop effective security institutions and reciprocal relationships between 
them (hence a strong emphasis on regional cooperation) as well as learn to act according to 
the same rules and principles, thus promoting the emergence of elite security community. 
The changes demanded by the EU in the security sector were therefore not just technical 
but held high political cost for domestic actors. The closer the country was to membership, 
the higher was the incentive for its elites to implement SSR. The further it was – the more 
the elites resisted, fearing the loss of public support and consequently power over the EU 
conditionality. The proximity of membership also reinvigorated the EU, prompting it to pay 
closer attention to SSR issues in countries that moved closer to the prospect of membership. 
The choice of a more comprehensive approach to police reform in Serbia after 2012 
demonstrates this point.  
Finally, the involvement of other external actors in SSR in Croatia, Serbia and BiH 
had significance for the EU’s performance in the field. It was not only because this 
involvement defined the level of progress achieved by the security sectors in the Western 
Balkans by the time the EU emerged as the regional leader, but also because it influenced 
the character of the EU’s engagement with SSR in the studied countries. For instance, as 
NATO was guiding defence reform in Croatia, the EU only approached this aspect of SSR 
from the point of its own security architecture, while in Serbia it had to provide some 
strategic advice. The presence of other members of the international community was also 
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important for coordination purposes. Although the EU developed a well-coordinated 
approach to border reform that was supported by other participants of the Ohrid Process, it 
struggled for a long time with coordinating its activities in police reform with other actors, 
involved in the area such as the OSCE and the UN, which led to unnecessary overlapping, 
wasted funds and confusion among regional actors. 
As can be seen, each of the identified factors – the legacy of war, nature of statehood, 
closeness of the membership perspective and presence of other external actors – had an 
impact on the EU’s engagement with SSR in Croatia, Serbia and BiH and the results this 
involvement achieved. While it is possible to identify other contributing factors, the 
analysis conducted here singled out these four as having the most significance for the three 
studied cases. 
Main Findings 
Having compared the case studies, I can summarise the findings of the work by 
reviewing three remaining sub-questions and answering the main question of the thesis. 
The first sub-question “How did the security situation in the Western Balkan change 
between 1991 and 2013?” was addressed with the help of RSCT, which provides the 
analytical framework for the research. This theory was chosen for the study of the security 
transformation of the Western Balkans and evaluation of the EU’s role in the process as it 
provides a clear and comprehensive framework for analysing regional development, defines 
security as a relational phenomenon, studies the interrelation of external and internal factors 
in security relations, recognises regions as durable systems, susceptible to change, and 
creates a flexible and open approach to the study of security relations. According to Barry 
Buzan and Ole Waever, who developed the theory, the Balkans represents a subcomplex, 
i.e. a region, whose members find their security situation interconnected, while 
simultaneously being connected to a large complex. The analysis conducted in Chapter 4 
demonstrated that the Balkan subcomplex is part of the European regional security complex 
(RSC), and its boundaries in 1991-2013, despite some fluctuations in the early 1990s, 
largely coincided with the area, defined by the EU as the Western Balkans. The Western 
Balkan states that include Albania and all post-Yugoslav states, except for Slovenia, 
developed into a cohesive group thanks to the networks of ongoing or potential conflicts. 
Although the subcomplex can be shown to have two poles – in Serbia and Albania, its 
security is determined by the core of the European RSC, to which it is linked 
geographically, politically and economically. 
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The place of the Balkan subcomplex in the European RSC, which is also defined as 
the EU/Europe security community, was not always accepted and was only confirmed 
through the transformations of security situation in the region after 1999. Between 1991 
and 1995, the Western Balkans developed into a regional conflict formation (RCF), whose 
security situation was dominated by a combination of closely interlinked conflicts that 
could not be easily untangled. Paradoxically, the networks that connected the Western 
Balkan states into an RCF, brought the region closer to a wider Europe by exposing it to 
transnational threats like organised crime and illegal migration. Although the European 
Community (EC) was first to respond to the Balkan crises of the early 1990s, it was unable 
to manage them. Undergoing transformation into the EU, it lacked a fully operative foreign 
and security policy, unity among its members and, most importantly, a military muscle to 
resolve the violent conflicts. The USA and NATO had to step in to stop the violence in 
1995, putting an end to the strategy of containment, pursued by the international community 
in the Balkans in 1991-1995. By using negotiation and imposition, external actors, led by 
the USA and under growing influence of the EU, started stabilising the Balkan subcomplex. 
Various regional initiatives, including the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) and Regional 
Approach, worked to introduce members of the subcomplex to the principles of regional 
cooperation, good neighbourliness, transparency and reciprocity. Had they taken root, the 
region could have developed into security regime. This did not happen, however, as the 
legacy of war was inadequately addressed, the international community could not agree on 
what constituted the region and continued treating it as an area, separate from the rest of 
Europe.  
The Kosovo conflict of 1998-1999 acted as a watershed moment for the Western 
Balkans: it exposed limits of reactive and selective responses, utilised by the international 
community previously, and demonstrated that the region was of key importance for the 
security and stability of the EU. The European Union emerged as the leading actor in the 
development of the Western Balkans at the end of the 1990s, trying to prevent the spread 
of transnational threats from the region to its member states, repair the reputational damage 
sustained through the failure of its early efforts to manage the crises and compensate the 
diminishing interest in regional affairs on part of the USA. With the launch of the Stability 
Pact and the SAP, the bloc started working on strengthening the statehood of Western 
Balkan states and fostering amicable relations between them. By exposing the Western 
Balkan leaders to its regional and bilateral initiatives, it helped the Balkan subcomplex to 
transform into an embryonic security community that is based not on common identity (as 
a mature type), but on elite cooperation. It is therefore argued that between 1991 and 2013 
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the security situation in the Western Balkans changed drastically from largely negative and 
dominated by war to mostly positive and peaceful. This change was achieved under the 
pressure of the international community, which from the end of 1999 is led by the EU. 
To evaluate the contribution of the EU into the improved security situation in the 
Western Balkans, this thesis studied its influence on the transformation of regional security 
sectors. The focus on security sectors does not reduce regional security complexes and 
subcomplexes to security relations alone but makes the research more targeted and 
manageable. The process of transformation of security complexes is captured through the 
concept of security sector reform, which covers polices and activities promoting effective 
and efficient provision of state and human security within a framework of good and 
democratic governance. In the context of this work, SSR is seen as a tool that can be used 
by internal and external actors to change the nature of security interdependence in states 
and regions, helping them move from the pole of enmity to the pole of amity. By integrating 
SSR into RSCT, it is therefore possible to study the transformation of regional conflict 
formations into security communities.  
The European Union has been engaged in conceptualisation and implementation of 
security sector reform since the 1990s. Chapter 4 analysed the policy framework put 
together by EU institutions on the reform to answer the second sub-question of the thesis: 
“What constitutes the EU’s approach to SSR?”. As a versatile instrument that is based on 
foreign, security and development policies, over the years SSR was used by the EU as an 
element of conflict-prevention, peace-building, democratisation, sustainable development, 
state-building and even member state-building. The foundation of the EU’s SSR framework 
was formulated in 2005-2006 with the release of three documents: “EU Concept for ESDP 
support for Security Sector Reform (SSR)”, “Concept for European Community Support 
for Security Sector Reform” and “The Draft Council Conclusions on a Policy Framework 
for Security Sector Reform”. Nearly a decade later the policy was complemented with two 
European Commission communications titled “Elements for an EU-side Strategic 
Framework for supporting Security Sector Reform (SSR)” and “Elements for an EU-wide 
strategic framework to support security sector reform”. According to these documents, the 
EU defines SSR as a multi-sector and long-term process, aimed at achieving accountable, 
effective and efficient security sectors that operate under civilian control and adhere to the 
principles of good governance, transparency and the rule of law. The bloc takes a 
comprehensive approach to the reform, recognising that it can be applied in post-conflict, 
developing and developed contexts. Such understanding has not always been present in the 
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EU: it developed through years of practice that preceded the first official attempt to 
formulate an SSR policy framework. The EU’s first efforts to bring about changes to 
security sectors of third states were limited and erratic. Thus, in the Central and Eastern 
Europe in the early 1990s, SSR was understood as professionalisation of police and 
improvement of border security, while the Working Group on Security and Defence issues 
of the SP, convened by the EU, equated SSR with defence reform. Practical work conducted 
by EU member states, the WEU and ESDP/ CSDP missions, and cooperation of the 
European Commission with other international organisations, involved in the field, allowed 
the EU’s SSR concept to evolve and mature. It is important to acknowledge that 
consequently this evolution helped the EU to become a more confident security provider 
(Faleg 2012: 162). By taking a broad approach to security that goes beyond defence, the 
concept of SSR is not reserved for use by hard security heavyweights like NATO. The EU, 
as an actor of sui generis nature and the largest donor in the world with access to a variety 
of foreign policy tools, not only can engage in SSR, it is also uniquely positioned for 
promoting it on state and regional levels.  
As part national, part transnational policy, SSR can be applied by the EU as a tool of 
integration that aligns the work and management of the security sectors of non-EU states 
with EU values and norms. Currently, it is widely believed that SSR epitomises European 
integration, externalises the success of the EU as a security community and can be applied 
as a security community-building instrument (Spence 2010: 93, Ekengren 2010: 103). This 
thesis, by studying the EU’s impact on SSR in the Western Balkans between 1991 and 2013, 
demonstrates that the EU’s engagement with the reform in the region has not always had 
the potential to be used as such an instrument. It developed from trial and error, and in 2013 
was still evolving. After all, the bloc started engaging in SSR-related activities in the 
Western Balkans before its concept of SSR was formulated, and its experience with the 
reform was not necessarily as comprehensive as was prescribed by its theoretical 
framework.  
To answer the third research sub-question “How was the EU’s SSR approach 
implemented in the Western Balkans on the regional level?”, I examined the engagement 
of the bloc with the reform between 1991 and 2013, following the periodisation, developed 
in Chapter 3. Breaking down the analysis according to the three periods – 1991-1995, 1995-
1999 and 1999-2013 – not only ensures consistency of the research, but also serves the 
purpose of determining whether different types of RSCs necessitate different aspects of 
SSR. The analysis of the first period from 1991 to 1995 confirmed the assumption expressed 
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in Chapter 2 that SSR cannot be pursued on the regional level in regional conflict 
formations. The context of open warfare that engulfed most of the Balkan subcomplex, 
leading many of its members to lose domestic monopoly over their security sectors, created 
no opening for the reform. The EU, that lacked capabilities and unity among its member 
states to prevent violence or effectively manage Yugoslavia’s dissolution, did not yet see 
the Western Balkans as a distinct area in need of a regional approach. Most of the bloc’s 
activities at this time were focused on finding a peaceful solution to conflicts between 
(post)-Yugoslav states and providing them with humanitarian aid. It is therefore impossible 
to speak about the use of SSR in the Western Balkans on the regional level between 1991 
and 1995. The end of wars, however, brought about through a combination of diplomatic 
effort, exercised by the USA and Contact Group and NATO’s intervention, changed this 
situation. When the EU released its Regional Approach, it was the first time the Western 
Balkans was formally recognised as a distinctive group, different from CEE and the rest of 
SEE. The RA was also the first instrument used by the EU to formulate requirements for 
the regional level of SSR. In general, this regional SSR conditionality was directed at 
normalisation of the work of security sectors in the Western Balkans. The focus was placed 
on post-conflict stabilisation and fostering good-neighbourly relations. It also promoted 
reciprocal relations that form the basis of security regimes. As the security regime did not 
take hold in the region, it is difficult to judge what aspects of SSR are typical for this type 
of an RSC. It is possible, however, to comment on elements of the reform applied by the 
EU to promote a shift from war to peace in the region.  
The RA’s SSR conditionality mostly concerned the work of the police 
(professionalisation, modernisation, cultivation of police culture respectful of human rights 
and intolerant to organised crime), border services (post-war reconstruction, introduction 
of international and EU standards of border management and normalisation of relations 
between states of the region), judiciary (securing its independence and professionalism) and 
in the case of Croatia, the FRY and Bosnia cooperation with the ICTY. While the EU 
commented on defence issues in certain Western Balkan states, it did not attempt to 
formulate region-wide requirements for the sphere. This is not surprising, as there was still 
no EU-wide defence policy. The RA also contained requirements for good governance of 
the security sector that differed from state to state, reflecting diverse levels of state 
consolidation in the region.  In short, through the RA framework, the EU prioritised 
activities that could professionalise and modernise security sectors, as well as make the rule 
of law and respect of human rights commonly accepted in the Western Balkans. The bloc 
promoted harmonisation of relations between states of the region, hoping to turn them into 
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good neighbours that would refrain from violence to solve future disagreements between 
each other, and choose peaceful means instead. Nonetheless, such reciprocity did not 
emerge in the region before 1999.  
While SSR-related demands of the RA should be recognised, it is important not to 
overemphasise them. References to elements of the reform were disjointed and scattered 
around the policy. This was one of the main reasons why SSR did not take off on the 
regional level in the Western Balkans in the immediate post-war period. The fact that the 
initiative was not fully supported and, in certain cases, opposed by regional actors, like 
Croatia and the FRY, contributed to the lack of effectiveness of the RA-supported SSR, 
too. Finally, it is noteworthy that the EU’s RA activities were poorly coordinated with other 
external initiatives that promoted regional approaches to SEE. Such coordination was 
difficult in the absence of agreement in the international community on the definition of the 
Balkan subcomplex. 
After the Kosovo conflict, the EU’s approach to SSR started getting more coordinated 
and coherent. Having offered the Western Balkan states the prospect of membership and 
launched the Stabilisation and Association Process to support their integration, the EU 
confirmed that the future of the region lay in the bloc. Between 1999 and 2013, the Union 
came to explicitly acknowledge the importance of SSR for the reconstruction, stabilisation 
and Europeanisation of the region. If in the previous period, it tackled the reform timidly, 
hoping that security sectors in the Western Balkans would transform eventually, almost as 
a by-product of general conditionality, after 1999 it recognised SSR as a distinct reform 
agenda, in need of a targeted approach. This recognition was not immediate but gradual, 
since the Union was still in the process of formulating its SSR vision. Furthermore, it is 
worth noting that some of the EU’s initial attempts to refine the concepts of the reform, 
developed by the Council and European Commission, took place in the Western Balkans. 
Thus, in 2006 two consecutive EU presidencies held high-profile events on SSR in the 
region that discussed not only regional SSR needs, but also the future of the EU as an SSR 
actor.  
The EU used two main channels during this period to promote the reform regionally: 
the SP and SAP. The SP, launched by the bloc, but transferred into the OSCE ownership 
until it became regionally owned in 2008, had a broader coverage than the SAP, as it 
included Moldova, Bulgaria, Romania as well as the Western Balkans, while the SAP only 
focused on the latter group. Nonetheless, with time many of the SP SSR-related initiatives, 
such as the Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative, developed an exclusive 
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emphasis on the Western Balkan states. The EU provided strategic guidance and financial 
assistance to such projects. The SAP linked the stabilisation of the Western Balkans with 
the process of integration into the EU, thus introducing a new element into regional SSR. 
In addition to being used for post-conflict reconstruction, peace-building, democratisation 
and sustainable development, SSR also became an instrument of EU integration and 
member state-building. The SAP therefore does not set out to cultivate a separate Western 
Balkan identity but strives to Europeanise the Western Balkans and make it part of the EU/ 
Europe security community.  
Karl Deutsch identified three essential conditions for the success of security 
community: compatibility of main values held by the political elites inside the community, 
political responsiveness and mutual predictability of behaviour. The EU’s involvement with 
regional level of SSR in the Western Balkans after 1999 has been pursuing the fulfilment 
of these conditions. The framework of the SAP has been used to bring the Western Balkan 
elites to congruent values by insisting they adopt “the values and models on which [the EU] 
is founded” and adopt social, economic and political rights and liberties shared by EU 
member states (Council of the EU 2000). Transparency, accountability and good security 
governance have been among the main values promoted in the sphere of security. By 
agreeing to pursue membership in the bloc and follow the SAP conditionality, the Western 
Balkan elites have agreed to adhere to values, shared inside the EU. Political 
responsiveness, which is understood through building effective and efficient institutions, 
was facilitated through the organisational level of SSR. In 1999-2013, the EU encouraged 
security and political elites of the Western Balkans to become more responsive to each other 
through capacity-building, assistance with modernisation and professionalisation of their 
security sectors and development of support functions of their defence bodies, police 
services and border management systems. Finally, mutual predictability of behaviour 
required regular contact between security sectors of the Western Balkan states. The EU 
endorsed such contact through regional projects and initiatives that exposed regional 
players to the principles and standards guiding the functioning and management of security 
systems in its own member states. As the main recipients of the SAP conditionality were 
political elites and not entire societies, the EU’s endeavours to harmonise relations between 
Western Balkan states led to the emergence of an embryonic or elite security community in 
the region. SSR efforts in this type of an RSC can be seen to show equal attention to issues 
of governance and functioning of the security sectors. Thus, within the SAP, the EU 
emphasised the need for democratic and civilian oversight as well as efficiency and 
effectiveness of the Western Balkan security sectors, trying to build functioning states, 
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whose security systems would be compatible with the security systems of the bloc’s 
members. 
In short, the EU’s regional approach to SSR in the Western Balkans changed 
considerably throughout the studied period: if in the early 1990s, the Union was unable to 
deal with the reform due to the hostile environment and lack of capabilities, in the mid-
1990s it promoted elements of SSR, even without having a formal framework on the reform, 
as an instrument of stabilisation and from 1999-2000, while still working on the 
conceptualisation of the reform agenda, applied it as an instrument of integration into the 
bloc and member state-building. Between 1991 and 2013, the EU learned to be an actor of 
SSR by doing. Its evolution was by no means complete in 2013, not only because the 
concepts, formulated by the Council and Commission in 2005-2006, were not united into a 
single programme, but also because the practical application of the reform was not as 
comprehensive as the concepts suggested. Although compared to the RA period, in 1999-
2013, the EU’s SSR-related regional projects were more frequent and better coordinated, 
they were rarely presented as part of the SSR agenda. Despite this, the objectives and 
outcomes of such initiatives were normally aligned with the reform concepts, accepted by 
the EU. By promoting good governance, accountability and efficiency of security systems 
in the Western Balkans, through the SP and SAP projects, the EU contributed to developing 
positive security relations between the states of the region. When SSR started to be applied 
as a member state-building tool, the Western Balkan elites were introduced to security 
practices of EU member states that as members of the mature security community tend to 
solve their disputed peacefully, without resorting to violence. This application can therefore 
be linked to the emergence of an elite security community in the region, whose members 
choose peaceful cooperation, too, but because of the policies pursued by decision-making 
elites, not due to the common identity.  
The regional dimension of the reform while important, was not self-standing: it 
formed an extension of the EU’s SSR endeavours on the state level, studied in the thesis on 
the example of Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia. The analysis of SSR in these states provided a 
closer look at the EU’s evolution as a security actor. It traced how from an actor without a 
common security and defence policy, it transformed into a leader of SSR in the Western 
Balkans that used the reform to make states of the region part of the European zone of 
peace. The analysis revealed discrepancies in the EU approaches to different elements of 
the reform: if border reform was tackled from a comprehensive perspective in all three 
states, the reform of the police required minor attention in Croatia, strategic guidance in 
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Serbia and an overhaul in BiH, while defence reform, was mostly used to prepare the three 
states for participation in the EU’s defence infrastructure. More discrepancies were found 
in the results, achieved by the EU in the three countries. As these were analysed at the start 
of the chapter, which answered the fourth research sub-question and identified key factors 
behind them – namely, the lasting legacy of war, degree of state consolidation, closeness of 
the membership perspective and presence of other external actor – there is only one question 
remaining unanswered in the thesis. This is the main research question, which asked “To 
what extent did the EU’s engagement with security sector reform in the Western Balkans 
contribute to changing the region’s security dynamics?”  
According to RSCT, the security dynamics of an RSC or regional subcomplex are 
formed under the influence of distributions of power and relations of amity and enmity 
inside them. The analysis of changes in the security situation of the Balkan subcomplex, 
whose boundary for the most part of the studied period coincided with the Western Balkans, 
demonstrated that the region had two poles: one in Serbia and one in Albania. By 2013, 
however, neither of these poles could act as the centre of the subcomplex, as it was the EU 
core that decided overall security of the Western Balkans. Power relations in the region 
were therefore put under the influence of the EU/Europe security community. Having 
decided to offer the prospect of membership to states of the region, putting away ad hoc 
and reactive measures after the Kosovo conflict, the EU started exposing the Western 
Balkans to norms and values found inside the bloc, trying to convince the regional players 
of the benefits of cooperation over competition and peace over war.  
SSR that was used by the EU in the Western Balkans as a tool of stabilisation and 
peace-building in the mid-1990s and evolved into a member-state building tool after 1999, 
was given a prominent position in the process of the region’s European integration. By 
improving the practices of security sectors in the region and promoting the establishment 
of civilian democratic control over them, the EU worked not only on harmonising security 
relations between Western Balkan states, but also on bringing them closer to standards 
practiced by its member states that as members of a mature security community do not 
consider violence to be a viable solution to conflicts and disagreements. The EU’s impact 
on SSR was of utmost importance for changing the role of regional security agencies from 
instruments of oppression and war crimes to guarantors of human security and human 
rights, thus cultivating amicable relations and ousting enmity from the region. Reforms in 
Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia produced varying results, demonstrating that this change while 
started has not yet been complete everywhere in the Western Balkans. Nonetheless, the shift 
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from the negative pole of security interdependence to the positive one in the region is 
already observable. Modernised and professionalised regional armies, police services and 
border management systems regularly cooperate between each other, while subscribing to 
the principles of democratic governance. As a result, the return of large-scale violence to 
the region in 2013 was highly unlikely. By prioritising the regional element of SSR and 
paying attention to the political and organisational levels of the reform, the EU can be said 
to have contributed to these developments and therefore changes of the regional security 
dynamics from the negative pole of security interdependence to the positive one. Although 
the exact extent of this contribution is impossible to determine due to the presence of other 
powerful players in the reform and inconsistency of the bloc’s action over the studied 
period, its significance is difficult to deny. Of course, it is important to acknowledge that 
the implementation of SSR in the Western Balkans had its limitations. By 2013, 
achievements of the reform changed the behaviour of Western Balkan political and security 
elites yet did not go down to the lowest levels of the security sectors. Hence, it is still too 
early to speak of the irreversibility of the regional transformation and worth extending the 
research to later periods. 
 
Limitations, contribution to the literature and avenues for future research  
With the comparative analysis and main findings covered, the final part of this chapter 
is dedicated to the discussion of limitations of the research, its contribution to the wider 
literature and possible avenues of future development. Having chosen a comprehensive 
theory of regional security, I studied changes in the security dynamics of the Western 
Balkans through the prism of security sector reform. This was done to make the research 
more manageable and focused. Nowhere in the thesis is it suggested that SSR is the only 
analytical tool that could be used to examine the transformation of security 
interdependence. According to RSCT, the security dynamics of an RSC are influenced by 
a wide range of relations inside and between the units constituting a security complex that 
span political, economic, social and security spheres. It means that changes in security 
relations between unites of the complex or subcomplex, like the Western Balkans, can be 
investigated through any type of these relations or their combinations, e.g. socio-economic 
interactions. Security sector transformations were put in the centre of this research to reduce 
its complexity, but other approaches are possible, and they could be explored in separate 
studies. The second limitation is linked to studying SSR on the example of the systems of 
security sector governance and reforms of army, the police and border services. As the 
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research contains a comparative component, it was important to choose parts of the security 
sectors that were present in all three case studies. SSR, however, is a comprehensive 
concept that apart from core security actors and security management and oversight bodies, 
also covers non-statutory security forces and non-statutory civil society groups. Although 
these two latter groups were not included into the thesis and only three core security actors 
were analysed, it could be beneficial to examine more elements of SSR in further research. 
Among bodies that could be added next, I would emphasise judiciary and non-statutory 
security forces. Lastly, as the research was partly motivated by desire to contribute to the 
study of the EU as a security actor, it focused only the role of the bloc in SSR in the Western 
Balkans. This was not to suggest that it was the only actor engaged in the sphere. In fact, 
the analysis acknowledged the role of other players such as NATO, the OSCE, the UN, the 
USA, Russia and Turkey. Nonetheless, their contributions were not explored in detail. This 
could be another avenue for future research. Due to the findings of the thesis confirming 
the significance of other external actors for SSR in the region, I would particularly look into 
cooperation between various actors and compare contributions made by the EU and NATO, 
due to the importance of the latter during the early 1990s and its engagement in defence 
reform. 
Despite the limitations described above, the thesis contributes to several areas of 
research. First, it indicates the possibility of new applications of RSCT. Having studied the 
transformation of the Western Balkans in 1991-2013, not only did I refine the definition of 
the Balkan subcomplex, suggested by Buzan and Waever in 2003 to account for the 
development unaccounted for by the authors of the theory, but also demonstrated that RSCT 
can be useful for the study of the evolution of a single region, and is not reserved for 
comparative regional studies only. The thesis therefore can be placed next to other recent 
works, such as Diez (2005) and Barrinha (2014), that revisit positions of RSCT by either 
challenging Buzan and Waever or building on their research to examine new developments 
that happened in the empirical cases they originally investigated. Second, the current work 
creates new knowledge on the EU as a security actor and actor of SSR. It is widely 
acknowledged that the EU is well-placed for promoting SSR thanks to its unique nature and 
access to a variety of foreign policy instruments. The literature on the bloc’s engagement 
with the reform has been steadily growing after the release of SSR concepts by the Council 
and European Commission. Some of the examples include: Spence and Fluri (2007), Britz 
(2011), Dursun-Ozkanca and Vandemoortele (2012) and Faleg (2016). Some works were 
also released on the EU’s experience with SSR in the Western Balkans, e.g. Marenin 
(2007), Collantes-
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My thesis contributes to this literature by studying the evolution of the EU as an actor of 
SSR on regional and state levels. Finally, the thesis can be placed in the framework of 
research on sectoral Europeanisation of the Western Balkans. As the integration of the 
region into the bloc became protracted, researchers started paying closer attention to the 
impact of the EU on various policy sectors of Western Balkan states, trying to identify its 
possibilities and limitations. For example, the Europeanisation of the Western Balkan states 
was analysed through the EU’s influence on the area of Justice and Home Affairs (Trauner 
2011), energy sectors (Diez, Stirton and Wright 2009) and environmental governance 
(Fagan and Sircar 2015). My thesis expands this category of research by studying the 
Europeanisation of the security sectors in the region.  
Having come to the end of my research, I can identify at least three possible options 
for developing it in the future, without counting the ideas mentioned at the start of the 
section, in connection with the limitations of the work. The first possible avenue is to 
expand the research to other Western Balkan states. The analysis of the EU’s role in SSR 
in Albania, FYROM, Kosovo and Montenegro can shed more light on factors that influence 
the performance of the bloc in the area and better explain the discrepancies of regional 
development. The second potential path is to use SSR in the Western Balkans for 
comparative examination of the Council of the EU and European Commission’s approaches 
to the reform. As demonstrated in the case studies, the EU did not always speak with one 
voice when promoting SSR in the Western Balkans, although it tried to offer comprehensive 
approaches to the states of the region. By investigating more closely differences and 
similarities in approaches to the reform of the Council and Commission I can further 
contribute to the study of the EU as a security actor. The last possible route, which at the 
time of writing I find the most interesting, is to study the security community-building 
potential of SSR in regions without a real membership perspective. As the EU has invested 
considerable resources into the improvement of security situations in such countries as 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, including through CSDP missions with the focus on 
SSR321, countries of the Eastern Partnership would be the natural choice for such a study. 
Given the role played in this region by Russia, this project would also need to make it part 
of the investigation.    
 
 
                                                          
321
 For example, the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) and the 
European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM).  
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Annex I 
An inventory of SSR activities, undertaken by the EU in the Western Balkans322 
Reform area Types of activities with examples 
Political level 
General Policy and legal advice to relevant institutions, e.g. parliaments, 
governments, ministries and law enforcement agencies on the issues 
of political control and improvement of good/democratic 
governance. 
Civilian control 1. Assistance in adopting a national security strategy and 
policy. 
2. Support for the establishment and reform of governmental 
and administrative bodies, responsible for the provision of 
civilian control, e.g. Ministry of Defence, Ministry of 
Interior, customs and fiscal administrations. 
3. Assistance to ensure control of budgeting, management, 
accountability and auditing of security expenditure. 
Parliamentary control 1. Policy and legal advice to parliaments and parliamentary 
commissions dealing with different aspects of security. 
2. Training and sharing best practices (e.g. training members of 
parliament and parliamentary staff, organising study visits). 
3. Technical assistance to parliamentary commissions working 
on security issues. 
Public control 1. Assistance to civil society and media to improve expertise in 
the sphere of security and capacity to monitor the security 
sector bodies. 
2. Assisting states with the development of independent 
regulatory bodies that could improve the transparency of the 
security sector.  
Regional dimension Facilitation of cooperation between security sectors of neighbouring 
states and states linked geo-strategically to build good 
neighbourliness, accountability and transparency.  
The legacy of war 
crimes 
Promotion of cooperation with the ICTY to facilitate reconciliation.  
Organisational level 
General Institutional support in adopting legal foundations for the security 
system.  
Defence sector 1. Policy and legal advice (e.g. assistance in defining a defence 
policy, separating tasks between army and police; advice on 
organising defence structures, including their chain of 
command, finances and political control; defining military 
planning procedures). 
2. Training and sharing best practices (e.g. training military 
personnel, including Chiefs of Defence and senior officers; 
training on democratic principles of modern armed forces, 
regarding human rights, gender issues, international 
                                                          
322
 The inventory is based on the provisions of the Council and Commission Concepts on SSR, using the 
adjusted model of Hänggi and Tanner (2005: 100-104).   
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(humanitarian) law; co-locating EU experts to Ministries of 
defence in partner countries to mentor, monitor and advise 
local authorities on defence policy). 
3. Technical assistance (e.g. helping with the acquisition of 
modern non-lethal military equipment, establishing the 
mechanisms for procurement and maintenance) 
4. Post-conflict assistance (e.g. reorganisation of the army for 
peaceful time; disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration as part of SSR) 
Police 1. Policy and legal advice (e.g. conducting an assessment of 
policing needs; assistance in defining a policing strategy and 
policy, compatible with objectives of the Justice/Rule of 
Law sector; advice on organising police forces, including 
administration, budget control, transparency, accountability 
and political control). 
2. Training and creating opportunities for social learning 
(introducing police to the principles of modern policing and 
police management with a special focus on international 
law, human rights and gender issues; offering special 
guidance to the police force during the period of transition; 
co-locating EU experts to the Ministry of Interior). 
3. Technical assistance (e.g. helping with the acquisition of 
modern equipment, improving connectivity among law 
enforcement agencies).  
4. Post-conflict assistance (e.g. assistance in delineating tasks 
and responsibilities between police and army). 
Border control 1. Policy and legal advice (e.g. assistance in assessing needs, 
objectives and rules for border and customs services; advice 
on adopting a strategy on border control and policies for its 
management; advice on organising the border and customs 
sector, including political control). 
2. Training and sharing best practices (e.g. training customs 
officers and border guards on principles of good border 
control; training on human rights, international law and 
gender issues; co-locating EU experts to the national bodies 
responsible for border control and customs). 
3. Technical assistance (e.g. help with equipping border control 
services with modern up-to-date technology, compatible 
with international standards). 
4. Post-conflict assistance (e.g. assistance with restoring 
controls over borders). 
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Annex II 
The impact of the EU on SSR in Croatia between 1991 and 2013 
Period Reform Area SSR activities 
1991-1995 Political level 
 General 
 
The EC/ EU did not implement any SSR 
activities directly, yet it influenced the security 
situation in the country through three key 
instruments: • European Community Monitoring 
Mission (ECMM) that collected 
intelligence on the developments in 
Croatia, offered confidence-building and 
mediation assistance; • Arbitration Commission that defined 
Croatia’s shape and recognised it as a 
state; • arms embargo that prohibited Croatia 
from importing weapons and military 
equipment, on the one hand, and 
contributed to the spread of illicit 
practices in the security sector, on the 
other.  
The EU also supported the implementation 
of the UN arms embargo. 
 Organisational level 
 General n/a  
1995-1999 Political level 
 General  
 
• The EU continued impacting the security 
environment in Croatia through the work 
of the ECMM and arms embargo. • The Regional Approach (RA) framed the 
EU’s approach to Croatia and the rest of 
the Western Balkan states at the time. 
Due to the isolationist policies of 
Tudjman, however, the policy was 
mainly used as a monitoring tool and not 
an instrument of transformation.  • Within the RA, Croatia was criticised for 
the lack of separation of powers, which 
is a basic requirement for the emergence 
of democratically governed security 
sector. • Croatia’s cooperation with the ICTY was 
also seen as unsatisfactory. • Regional dimension of security 
cooperation was highlighted by the EU 
for the first time at this period.  
 Organisational level 
 General  The main concern is post-conflict stabilisation 
and return to normality. 
 Defence sector Mainly technical and post-conflict assistance: 
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• Starting from 1998, the EU offered 
support with mine-clearing action as a 
way of facilitating post-conflict 
normalisation of life in the country.  • Financial aid was also provided for 
research on de-mining which led to the 
rise of professionalism in the army and 
development of civilian and military 
expertise in the subject. • Emphasis on cooperation with the ICTY.  
 Police • Policy advice on professionalization of 
the police. • Training advice on ways to eliminate 
non-transparent and criminal practices in 
the police, especially in the sphere of 
refugee returns.  • The EU was mainly concerned with 
post-conflict normalisation of policing 
yet provided minimal help, letting the 
UN and OSCE be in charge of the 
reform.  
 Border • Technical assistance and advice on 
restoring and establishing border 
controls and crossings between Croatia 
and its immediate neighbours. • Advice on manging visa policies 
regarding other Western Balkan states, 
particularly BiH, Republika Srpska as 
part of the latter, and Serbia and 
Montenegro.  • Assisting through confidence-building 
and monitoring activities other 
international actors, e.g. the OSCE, in 
improving customs and border relations. 
1999-2013 Political level 
 General • Minimal involvement. The constitutional 
changes implemented in Croatia after the 
change of the Tudjman regime that 
reduced presidential powers and 
increased the power of legislature were 
seen by the EU as satisfactory. • The bloc insisted on improving 
cooperation with the ICTY. • National SSR efforts were linked with 
the regional reform through the SAP.  • Although the EU did not offer a 
comprehensive strategy for improving 
the political level of SSR, it used annual 
progress reports to monitor the 
functioning of the security oversight 
mechanisms in the country. 
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• Civilian control of the security forces 
was seen as mostly satisfactory from 
2005-2006. 
 Civilian control • Support to MoI, MoD, and other 
governmental bodies, e.g. Ministry of 
Finance and the Ministry of Agriculture, 
to ensure they had the capacity and the 
right legislation in place to oversee the 
work of the security sector. • Some changes in legislation regulating 
accountability in the public procurement 
were prompted by the EU, e.g. the 
Regulation on public procurement for 
security and defence (2012). 
 
 Parliamentary control • Mostly indirect impact through general 
support to preparing the Parliament for 
the EU accession, e.g. Committee for 
Internal Policy and National Security 
and the Council for Civilian Oversight of 
Security and Intelligence Agencies 
benefited from the IPA 2007 
twinning project “Support to the 
Parliament of Croatia for the Preparation 
for EU Accession”. • Training was provided to both MPs and 
staff working in the committees. 
 Public scrutiny • Mostly indirect impact through 
supporting the development of the civil 
society and independent media more 
generally or by promoting access to 
public information. • In the final stages of the accession talks, 
security CSOs were involved in 
monitoring Chapters 23, 24 and 31. • EU pressure was instrumental for the 
development of independent regulatory 
bodies, such as the Office for the 
Prevention of Corruption and Organised 
Crime (USKOK), the State Attorney’s 
Office and Office of the Ombudsman. 
This helped to make Croatian security 
bodies more transparent and 
accountable. 
 Regional dimension • The EU prioritised the development of 
cooperative practices between Croatia 
and its Western Balkan and SEE 
neighbours. • Policing, border security and issues, 
linked to the legacy of war were 
highlighted as especially important. 
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 The legacy of war crimes • With the launch of the SAP, full 
cooperation with the ICTY was 
identified as one of the key political 
conditions for Croatia’s integration into 
the EU. • By refusing to move the negotiation 
progress until Croatia apprehended all of 
its ICTY fugitives, the EU helped to 
make the security sector more 
transparent and democratically 
governed. • The ICTY conditionality led to changes 
of behaviour among the elites but not 
broader society.  
 
 Organisational level 
 General 
 
 
SSR is linked to the process of European 
integration. It is approached as a tool of 
strengthening Croatia’s statehood and member 
state-building.  
 Defence •   Policy and legal advice: 
- The EU assumed a supporting role to 
NATO. It offered advice on 
legislation regarding the non-
proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and arms control, e.g. in 
2002, Croatia adopted the EU Code 
of Conduct on Arms Exports; 
- Support for the development and 
implementation of the National 
Strategy and Action Plan for the 
Control of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons (SALW).  
 
  • Training and sharing best practices: 
- The EU invested in preparing 
Croatia to be part of its own security 
infrastructure. 
- Training and administrative capacity 
building activities were offered for 
Croatian officials working in the 
MoD and General Staff along with 
study visits to Brussels for defence 
staff. 
- ESDP/ CSDP training and 
specialised training for participating 
in the EU Battlegroups.  
 
  • Technical assistance:  
- Rather limited, visible most in the 
area of SALW (also part of the post-
conflict assistance); projects were 
often carried out in cooperation with 
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the UNDP office in Zagreb, e.g. in 
2010-2012, the EU supported the 
UNDP-coordinated “Fewer 
Weapons, Fewer Tragedies” 
campaign, that was part of the EU 
regional project “SEESAC arms 
control in the Western Balkans”. 
  • Post-conflict assistance: 
- mine clearance action supported 
under CARDS 2002, 2003, 2004 
CARDS regional programmes and 
IPA 2007-2013. Examples of 
projects included “Return of the 
refugees and internally displaced 
persons – sustainable development 
in return areas, demining programme 
in the Republic of Croatia” (CARDS 
2003) and “De-mining programme 
in war affected areas“ (IPA 2010 , 
implemented 2011-2012 in Osijek-
Baranja and Vukovar-Srijem 
County). 
- Insistence on cooperation with the 
ICTY. After the cases of Gotovina 
and Bobetko were closed, the 
emphasis shifted to providing the 
tribunal with the access to military 
information and protection of 
witnesses. 
 
 Police • Police reform was approached by the EU 
as part of the public administration 
reform. 
 • Policy and legal advice: 
- Advice on revising key legislation 
on policing, e.g. the Criminal Code, 
the Police Act and the Secrecy Act.  
- Demands for adopting an 
appropriate legal framework on 
policing, especially such issues as 
organised crime, corruption, money 
laundering, trafficking in human 
beings, drugs and weapons.  
- Facilitation of cooperation 
agreements with EU agencies, e.g. 
the Europol, and EU member states. 
- Requirements to set up a number of 
new policing bodies, such as the 
Europol section within the 
Department for International Police 
Cooperation and the National Police 
Office for the Fight Against 
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Corruption and Organised Crime 
(PNUSKOK).  
 
  • Training and sharing best practices: 
- Providing advice on developing 
training and HR management 
programmes for police officials and 
general staff working in the three-
tier police system. 
- Support with developing 
professional capacity regarding new 
approaches to policing (e.g. 
community policing), police 
management, intelligence-led 
policing and inter-agency co-
operation. 
- Raising awareness of the acquis. 
- Introducing police to EU-specific 
rules and principles. 
- Specialised training on fight with 
organised crime, e.g. CARDS 2004 
“Strengthening the Croatian 
Capacity to Combat Drugs 
Trafficking and Drugs Abuse”. 
- Sharing the EU best practices in the 
field of policing, e.g. through 
encouraging links between the MoI 
and the EU’s law enforcement 
agency Europol.  
 
  • Technical assistance: 
- Support with strengthening the 
capacity of the Ministry of Interior 
and the General Police Directorate to 
tackle transnational organised crime, 
money laundering, trafficking in 
human beings, drugs and weapons, 
and illegal migration, e.g. through 
financing the development of the 
Central Intelligence System (CIS) 
under CARDS 2002 and 2003. 
- Support for the set-up of specialised 
crime analysis units in each of 
Croatia’s 20 police districts. 
- Assistance with the Criminal 
Intelligence System (iCIS) based on 
intelligence-led policing. 
- Demands to develop an internal 
network that could link the 
headquarters of the General Police 
Directorate with 20 police districts 
and 175 police stations.  
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- Assisting the MoI with human 
resources management by launching 
projects aimed at updating the 
existing infrastructure, software and 
hardware, e.g. through the technical 
component of the PHARE 2005 
project “Strengthening Human 
Resources Management, Education 
and Training at the Ministry of the 
Interior - Police Academy”. 
- Supply of new equipment for police 
stations, e.g. under the IPA 2009. 
 
  • Post post-conflict assistance  
- As most post-conflict issues were 
dealt with by the OSCE and UN, the 
EU did not engage in this area much, 
apart from promoting cooperation 
with the ICTY. 
 Border • Policy and legal advice: 
- Assistance in assessing needs of 
border and customs services in terms 
of legislation, HR, equipment, 
general organisation and training/ 
education. 
- Support with the strategic documents 
in the field, e.g. within CARDS 
2001 “Integrated Border 
Management: Border Police” and 
CARDS 2001 “Integrated Border 
Management – Interagency 
Cooperation”, Croatia adopted the 
Border Police Development Strategy 
and National Strategy for Integrated 
Border Management (IBM). 
- Preparation for adopting the 
Schengen acquis through developing 
the Schengen Action plan.  
- Adjusting legislation regarding visa, 
asylum and migration policies to 
align it with the EU requirements. 
- Advice on and careful monitoring of 
bilateral and regional relations with 
neighbouring Western Balkan states.  
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  • Training 
- Support for basic and specialised 
training of staff in border agencies 
and respective Ministries. 
- Support with the development of 
training programmes/ strategies and 
education manuals: e.g. within the 
PHARE 2006 project “Blue Border 
Surveillance”, the Maritime Police 
Development Strategy was drafted.  
- Demands for training of border 
management and customs staff to 
comply with the EU principles and 
Schengen acquis.  
 
  - Technical assistance: 
- Extensive support to facilitate 
capacity-and institution-building of 
all agencies, engaged in border 
management. 
- Assistance with the development and 
implementation of the Integrated 
Border Management and 
modernisation of Croatian border 
and customs agencies. 
- Assistance with the development of 
capacities necessary for the 
implementation of three pillars of 
the IBM: intra-service (e.g. between 
BCPs), inter-agency (between border 
control agencies) and international 
(with Interpol and Frontex) 
cooperation. 
- Support with adjusting the IBM to 
the EU standards, e.g. through the 
IPA 2010 “Integrated Border 
Management – Further strengthening 
of enforcement capacities of the 
Customs and Border Police”.  
- Support with the implementation of 
a National Border Management 
Information system (EC 2004: 15), 
developing working IT structures 
and installing databases in numerous 
state border agencies. 
- Preparation for participation in 
asylum and migration management 
systems, e.g. DublinNet and 
EURODUC systems 
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  Post-conflict assistance • Facilitation of finding solutions for 
border disputes with other Western 
Balkan states, in particular, Slovenia, 
Serbia, Montenegro and BiH.  
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Annex III 
The impact of the EU on SSR in Serbia between 1991 and 2013 
Period Reform Area SSR activities 
1991-1995 Political level 
 General 
 
The EC/ EU did not implement any SSR 
activities in the SFRY/ FRY in this period, but 
influenced the security situation in the country 
through: • independent sanctions against 
Yugoslavia – although the EC embargo 
on arms and military equipment had a 
minimal effect, the Milosevic regime 
was hit by the economic sanctions that 
froze preferential trade concessions 
established in 1980 and suspended all 
financial cooperation with the bloc; • support for the implementation of the 
UN sanctions regime via the Sanctions 
Assistance Missions and the WEU 
operations;  
(these actions inter alia contributed to 
the isolation of Serbia and Montenegro, 
consolidation of the Milosevic regime, 
criminalisation of the country and 
emergence of distrust towards Brussels) 
and • work of the Arbitration Commission that 
shaped Serbia (initially, within the FRY) 
and consequently its security sector. 
Decisions of the Commission denied 
recognition to the Serbian para-states in 
Croatia and BiH, delivering a blow to 
the idea of Greater Serbia, and kept 
Kosovo and Vojvodina within the 
structure of Serbia. They also 
contributed to deepening the anti-EU 
sentiment in the country. 
 Organisational level 
 General n/a  
1995-1999 Political level 
 General  
 
• Like elsewhere in the region, the EU 
hoped that the Regional Approach would 
be its main instrument of influence in the 
FRY. It was the EU’s first attempt to set 
conditions and standards for the FRY 
that touched upon some aspects of the 
security sector’s work and management. • After a brief period of rapprochement in 
1996-1997, the RA turned into a 
monitoring tool, mostly ignored by 
Milosevic, and used by the EU to 
criticise aspects of the FRY and Serbia’s 
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policies, including in the sphere of 
security.  • The RA reports, criticised the lack of 
cooperation with the ICTY, 
imbalances between federal and 
republican competences that made the 
Serbian Parliament more powerful than 
that of the FRY, poor government 
accountability and absence of effective 
separation of powers • With the start of the Kosovo conflict the 
EU targeted the security sector through 
the arms embargo, that remained in place 
since 1991, travel restrictions, that 
singled out military and police 
leadership as a separate group, and oil 
embargo, designed to deprive the 
Serbian military of petroleum supplies. • The sanctions had mixed results. On the 
one hand, they weakened the Milosevic 
regime by isolating Serbia. On the other, 
they unintentionally led to the 
aggravation of the anti-EU sentiments 
among the Serbian political and security 
leadership.  • Regional dimension of SSR was already 
discernible in the EU’s approaches to the 
reform.  
 
 Organisational level 
 General  In 1995-1997, the main concern was post-
conflict stabilisation and return to normality. 
From 1998 – stopping violence in Kosovo and 
bringing about a regime change.  
 
 Defence sector • n/a 
 Police • The EU expressed concern over poor 
professionalism of the police and their 
disregard for human rights.  • Criticism of police brutality in dealing 
with the public and opposition.  • No direct or indirect support of the 
reform. 
  
 Border • Focus on normalising border relations 
with neighbouring Western Balkan 
states.  • Some advice on restoring border controls 
and crossings with Croatia, criticism 
over poor handling of border relations 
with FYROM and Albania.  • No direct or indirect support of the 
reform. 
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1999-2013 Political level 
 General • The constitutional and legal uncertainty 
in Serbia prevented the EU from getting 
engaged in SSR activities straight after 
the ousting of Milosevic. • In the immediate post- Milosevic period, 
the EU focused on problems with the 
division of powers between the federal 
and republican, and in 2003-2006 
between the State-Union and republican 
authorities.  • With the peaceful split of the State 
Union of Serbia and Montenegro, the 
EU’s focus shifted to the questions of 
better governance and consolidation of 
institutions. State-consolidation 
remained important due to the Kosovo 
issue. • Civilian control of the security forces in 
Serbia was seen by the EU as mostly 
satisfactory after 2011, i.e. once the 
remaining ICTY fugitives were 
transferred to The Hague.  
 
 Civilian control • The EU identified the establishment of 
civilian control over the army and police 
as early priorities.   • MoD, National Security Council (NSC) 
and other relevant ministries, e.g. 
Ministry of Finance and Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Water 
involved in border management, were 
offered sporadic policy advice on 
organising their work, managing their 
finances and becoming more transparent. • Support to MoI initially was equally 
sporadic, but from 2011 started gaining a 
more comprehensive character. 
Additionally, the EU improved 
cooperation with other external actors to 
reform human resources management 
system of the Ministry, which has the 
potential to strategically change the work 
of the police in the country. • Advice on amending the public 
procurement legislation, e.g. the Public 
Procurement Law, adopted in 2012 and 
the 2009 Regulation on Public 
Procurement Procedure in the Defence 
and Security Sector.  
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 Parliamentary control • Monitoring the parliamentary oversight 
of the military and from 2007 the 
security sector as a whole.  • Advising the National Assembly on 
increasing the specialist staff and 
resources, as well as narrowing down the 
jurisdiction of the Committee for 
Defence and Security. The split of the 
Committee into two bodies: Defence and 
Internal Affairs Committee and Security 
Services Control Committee was partly 
inspired by Brussels.  • Indirect contributions into strengthening 
the parliamentary control of the security 
forces by investing into strengthening 
the parliamentary democracy in Serbia 
through:  
- financial assistance to 
building the institutional 
capacity of the Serbian 
Parliament; 
- advice on changes to key 
legislation to harmonise it 
with European standards and  
- opportunities for MPs and 
parliamentary staff to 
participate in exchange 
programmes and study visits 
to Brussels and Strasbourg 
to share best practices.  • Parliamentary control was seen as 
limited throughout the studied period.  
 Public control • Mostly indirect impact to enable civil 
society’s involvement in the 
governmental decision-making processes 
and participation in Serbia’s accession to 
the EU. • Indirect impact through promoting 
independent media and transparency of 
governmental policies. • With the start of the accession talks, 
CSOs active in the sphere of security 
were involved in screening exercises for 
Chapters 23, 24 and 31 and invited to 
briefings with the EU negotiating team. • Support to independent regulatory 
bodies, such as the Ombudsman, 
Commissioner for Free Access to Public 
Information and the Anti-Corruption 
Agency to eradicate corruption and 
illegal practices in the security sector as 
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well as make it accountable and 
transparent.   
 
 Regional dimension • Regional cooperation in the security 
sphere was promoted as a way towards 
reconciliation, good neighbourly 
relations and a climate conducive to 
addressing open bilateral issues.  
- It was most clearly encouraged in 
four areas: police cooperation, 
border security, war crimes legacy 
and Kosovo question.  
 
 The legacy of war crimes • Cooperation with the ICTY became one 
of the key political conditions for 
integration into the bloc. • The EU demanded the transfer of 
indictees with links to Serbia, including 
those from Republika Srpska, to The 
Hague and development of a legislative 
framework that would put direct pressure 
on indicted suspects and enable regional 
cooperation on war crime issues. E.g. 
The Law on the freeze of assets of ICTY 
indictees in April 2006 was adopted to 
satisfy the EU requirements. • To respond to the resurgence of 
radicalism in the country and prevent 
Serbia from slipping away from the 
EU’s sphere of influence, Brussels had 
to adjust its ICTY conditionality on 
several occasions.  
 
 Organisational level 
 General 
 
 
Although at first SSR was approached as a 
technical matter, after Serbia started showing 
stronger commitment to the process of EU 
integration, it became part of a member-state 
building process.  
 Defence Despite having an opportunity to lead defence 
reform in Serbia, given the country’s strained 
relationship with NATO over the 1999 bombing 
campaign and its decision to stay outside military 
alliances, the EU chose to focus only on those 
areas of the reform that it found relevant for the 
process of integration. 
 • Policy and legal advice: 
- The EU insisted on the adoption 
of strategic documents in the 
sphere of defence such as a 
defence strategy and national 
security strategy, which were 
released in October 2009, and 
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fundamental laws on defence, 
required by the constitution, e.g. 
the Law on the Army of Serbia 
(2007), Defence Law (2007), 
and Law on the Use of the Army 
and other Defence Forces in 
Multinational Operations outside 
Serbia (2009).   
- When Serbia started making 
progress in the accession talks, 
the EU placed more emphasis on 
the adoption of legislation 
enabling the country’s 
integration into CSDP and 
harmonisation of its position 
with EU standards in such areas 
as small arms and light weapons 
(SALW), non-proliferation and 
arms control regimes. 
- In 2013, Serbia was still lacking 
some legal documents demanded 
by the EU, e.g. a new law on 
trade of arms and military 
equipment.  
 
  • Training and sharing best practices: 
- The focus was on preparing Serbia 
for participating in the EU security 
infrastructure. 
- CSDP training, engagement of 
Serbian military in the development 
of the Battlegroup concept. 
- Sharing best practices through the 
European Military Committee and 
study visits to Brussels/ workshops 
in Belgrade for MoD officials and 
military personnel.  
 
  • Technical assistance:  
- Limited, mostly visible in the area of 
SALW (also part of post-conflict 
assistance) and preparations for 
Serbia’s integration into CSDP 
structures. 
- On SALW, the EU mostly worked 
through the EUSAC framework in 
SEESAC. Its assistance focused on 
planning and conducting activities of 
SALW controls for the purposes of 
collection, seizure and destruction 
and safe disposal of state- and 
private-owned surplus stockpiles.  
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- Many actions had a regional 
dimension as the EU considers 
SALW to be a regional problem. 
- After receiving the candidate status 
in 2012, Serbia was given many 
opportunities to improve its defence 
capabilities in the field of crisis 
management, e.g. in the areas of 
cyber defence and countering 
improvised explosive devices. This 
assistance intensified after 2013.  
  • Post-conflict assistance: 
- minor support with de-mining. Help 
was provided either directly (the first 
EU donation to mine-clearing 
activity in Serbia was made in 2006) 
or more frequently via the 
International Trust Fund for de-
mining and mine victims assistance. 
- Cooperation with the ICTY was an 
overarching issue for SSR and 
defence reform. After the transfer of 
Mladic and Hadzic to The Hague in 
2011, the EU focused on access to 
military archives and bringing to 
responsibility of security actors 
involved in harbouring fugitives.  
 
 Police The EU framed police reform as an element in 
reform of the public administration. • Policy and legal advice: 
- The EU monitored the process of 
drafting and implementing the Law 
on the Police (2005). Its pressure 
was instrumental for the adoption of 
key legislation to fight organised 
crime, corruption, money 
laundering, trafficking in human 
beings, drugs and weapons (e.g. the 
EU influenced the adoption of the 
National Anti-Corruption Strategy in 
2005 and its updated version in 
2013). 
- Advice on aligning Serbia’s legal 
police framework to EU standards, 
e.g. the Law on Private Security 
2013 and the Development Strategy 
of the Ministry of Interior 2011-
2016.  
- The EU insisted on Serbia 
formalising its relationship with its 
law enforcement agencies, e.g. 
Europol. 
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-  Advice and guidance on police 
cooperation with Kosovo law 
enforcement structures. EULEX 
acted as an intermediary in the 
process after signing a special 
cooperation protocol with Belgrade 
in 2009.Cooperation was restricted 
to the areas of combating organised 
crime and cross-border issues.  
- The First Agreement on Principles 
Governing the Normalisation of 
Relations” signed by Belgrade and 
Pristina in April 2013 started the 
process of dismantling Serbia’s 
parallel police structures in northern 
municipalities of Kosovo.  
 
  • Training and sharing best practices: 
- At first, training was provided to 
improve the level of professionalism 
among police officers, introduce 
them to modern practices especially 
in the sphere of criminal policing 
and enhance their digital literacy.  
- Many of the EU projects had a 
regional dimension, e.g. 
“Development of reliable and 
functional policing systems and 
enhancing combating main criminal 
activities and police cooperation”, 
funded under CARDS 2002/2003.  
- The police education reform that 
started in 2004 was coordinated by 
the OSCE, while the EU was 
involved mostly indirectly since the 
membership prospect provided an 
overarching stimulus for police 
reform in Serbia. E.g. OSCE training 
courses were aimed at introducing 
the Serbian police to EU standard 
practices and helping them to absorb 
social values and human rights 
principles, respected by EU member 
states.  
- From 2008, the EU started 
emphasising the improvement of 
internal control in the MoI and law 
enforcement agencies as a way of 
promoting professionalism and 
preventing corruption or misuse of 
power in the service. 
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- Sharing best practices in policing via 
the promotion of cooperation and 
information exchange with Europol.  
  • Technical assistance: 
- The EUMM provided logistical 
support to the OSCE mission to the 
FRY that was training officers for 
the Multi-Ethnic Police Element 
(MEPE) in South Serbia in 2001-
2002; 
- From 2002, CARDS funds were 
directed to improving the capacity of 
police to fight organised crime and 
corruption by offering them 
equipment and IT-training. 
- Promoting better coordination 
between the MoI and General Police 
Directorate on the one hand, and 48 
regional command police centres 
and 161 police stations, on the other.  
- Demands for an IT system to 
connect police with the courts and 
prosecution.  
- Supporting capacity-building in the 
areas of corruption, organised crime, 
illegal migration, money laundering, 
trafficking in human beings, drugs 
and weapons and war crimes. 
- Specialisation was seen as a way of 
boosting expertise of the Serbian 
police. 
- Technical assistance to improve 
connection of Serbia’s police to EU 
structures and agencies.  
  • Post-conflict assistance 
- First projects in JHA were aimed at 
rehabilitating Serbia’s police 
infrastructure, damaged in the wars.  
- War crimes legacy had to be 
addressed as part of the reform. 
Encouraging the Serbian police to 
cooperate with law enforcement 
services in other Western Balkan 
states to tackle the issue of war 
crimes.  
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 Border • Policy and legal advice: 
- The EU’s European Agency for 
Reconstruction in partnership with 
other donors, assisted with the 
development of strategic documents 
on demilitarisation of borders in 
2001-2002. 
- More comprehensive support was 
provided after the SCG ceased to 
exist. The EU guidance determined 
the content of Serbia’s national IBM 
strategy and corresponding Action 
Plan, both released in 2006. It also 
offered support with the 
implementation of the documents.  
- Guiding Serbia towards harmonising 
its border control and management 
systems with its neighbours. 
- As part of the dialogue on visa 
liberalisation with the EU, Serbia 
had to adjust its legislation on border 
control with the Schengen Border 
Code. E.g. Law on Protection of 
State Border (2008), Law on 
Foreigners (2008), Law on Travel 
Documents (2008), Migration 
Management Strategy (2009) and 
Law on Migration Management 
(2012) were adopted under the EU 
guidance. 
- The EU required the development 
and adjustment of visa, asylum and 
migration policies to align with its 
own requirements. 
- Advice on improving law 
enforcement cooperation with EU 
member states, Balkan neighbours 
and relevant international agencies, 
e.g. Interpol and Europol.  
- After Serbia was granted the 
candidate status in 2012, a stronger 
emphasis was placed on aligning its 
IBM strategy with the EU IBM 
concept.  
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  • Training 
- Training component was often part 
of the supply and infrastructure 
projects to help border police to 
learn using modern technologies and 
equipment.  
- Help with the development of 
training programmes and curricular 
for staff involved in the IBM, e.g. 
the CARDS 2006 twinning project, 
“Implementation of Integrated 
Border Management Strategy” 
provided training for key personnel 
and offered guidance on updating 
the HRM of the border police. 
- Training to improve the work ethics 
to remove corruption from the 
border control and management 
service.  
- Sharing best practices in border 
policing by inviting Serbia to 
cooperate with Frontex.  
  • Technical assistance: 
- Support with building administrative 
and operational capacity of the 
agencies involved in border control 
and management.  
- Assistance with modernising 
infrastructure at border crossings and 
in Border Police Directorate, e.g. in 
2001-2006, 73% of the CARDS 
budget allocated to border issues in 
Serbia, was spent on infrastructure 
projects, with the rest going towards 
supply contracts and supervision 
contracts for infrastructure measures. 
- Assistance with the development of 
capacities necessary for the 
implementation of the Integrated 
Border Management.  
- Guidance on changes required under 
the Roadmap on visa-free travel with 
the EU in reference to document 
security, illegal migration, public 
order and security, and external 
relations issues connected to the 
movement of persons.  
- An emphasis on improving intra-
service (e.g. between BCPs), inter-
agency (between border police, 
customs and phytosanitary 
inspection) and international (with 
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Interpol and Frontex) cooperation 
after 2007.   
  • Post-conflict assistance 
- The EU insisted on the 
demilitarisation of borders in the 
FRY/ SCG/ Serbia since border 
security in the bloc is seen as an area 
of policing, rather than defence. 
- Financial support to rehabilitate 
border crossing points damaged 
during wars. Priority was given to 
those BCPs that were located on 
borders with EU member states/ pre-
accession countries or were part of 
key European transport routes.  
- Monitoring progress in solving 
border disputes with neighbours, e.g. 
Croatia and BiH, without getting too 
closely involved in the process.  
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Annex IV 
The impact of the EU on SSR in BiH between 1991 and 2013 
Period Reform Area SSR activities 
1991-1995 Political level 
 General 
 
The EC/ EU got involved in SSR through police 
reform in Mostar, and influenced the security 
situation in BiH through: 
 • the work of the Arbitration Commission 
that determined Bosnia’s general shape 
and international personality as a state. 
The EC’s decision to recognise BiH as 
an independent state also quickened the 
start of the conflict and internationalised 
it;  • arms embargo that influenced the 
distribution of military power among the 
warring parties and contributed to the 
criminalisation of Bosnia’s key security 
players. On the other hand, the EC/ EU’s 
support for the arms embargoes, 
introduced by its member states and the 
UN, prevented further escalation of 
violence and made a diplomatic solution 
to the conflict possible; • the European Community Monitoring 
Mission (ECMM) that established a link 
between BiH and the outside world and 
participated in confidence-building 
measures. 
 Organisational level 
 Defence n/a 
 Police • The European Union administration of 
Mostar (EUAM) among other tasks 
included the unification of the town’s 
divided police forces. It pursued this 
goal through the WEU Police Force 
(WEUPOL). •  In 1994-1995, the mission achieved 
limited results of technical character: it 
established a joint operations centre, 
improved police communications and 
organised joint patrols on the 
demarcation line between two parts of 
the city separately with the East Mostar 
police and with the West Mostar Police.  
 
 Border  n/a 
1995-1999 Political level 
 General  
 
• The EU continued influencing Bosnia’s 
security situation through the arms 
embargo, the ECMM and the EUAM.  
357 
 
• By maintaining the embargo, the EU 
contributed to the arms control and 
confidence-building activities, promoted 
by the OSCE under the Sub-regional 
arms control agreement. • From 1996, the overarching framework 
for the EU’s endeavours in the Western 
Balkans and BiH was provided via the 
Regional Approach (RA). It monitored 
the implementation of the DPA and 
promoted the building of common 
institutions.  • The RA reports were critical of the poor 
separation of powers and 
underdeveloped system of good 
governance in the country. • Control of the military and police by 
democratic political means was 
demanded to improve Bosnia’s 
democratisation process. • Overall, the Regional Approach in 
Bosnia was mainly used as a monitoring 
exercise as it was side-lined by other 
efforts of the international community to 
build peace in the country.  
 
 Organisational level 
 General  The focus was on the pacification and post-
conflict stabilisation of the country. 
 Defence sector Mainly post-conflict assistance: • Since 1996, the EU was closely involved 
in de-mining by providing support to the 
United Nations Mine Action Centre, 
working with the BiH Civil Protection 
Authority (CPA) and financing the 
efforts of local de-mining NGOs.  • In 1998, the EU co-created with the 
World Bank the “Bosnia and 
Herzegovina – National Mine Action 
Plan” that outlined priorities of de-
mining in the country. Its involvement in 
the mine clearing action was aimed at 
improving the returns of refugees and 
displaced persons, making land safe for 
agriculture, reconstruction and 
development, and building up local 
civilian and military expertise.  • BiH and particularly the RS were 
criticised for unsatisfactory cooperation 
with the ICTY.  
 Police • Post-conflict assistance mainly focused 
on Mostar and was provided through the 
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WEUPOL that by the end of its mandate 
in 1996 established the Joint Police 
Headquarters, organised first joint 
patrols between the police forces from 
West and East Mostar, and set up the 
Unified Police Force (UPFM). It also 
improved the police infrastructure and 
trained police officers. Nonetheless, the 
mission’s ambitious goals were reached 
only partially as the UPFM was weak 
and acted on a limited territory of 
Mostar’s central zone.  • Policy and legal advice was provided 
through the RA reports, although the EU 
recognised the IPTF’s leadership in 
police reform. The reports criticised the 
inefficiency of law enforcement services 
in fighting organised crime, deplored 
human rights violations by police 
officers and argued for the application of 
the principle of equal protection by law.  
  
 Border • After the war, emphasis was on 
normalising border relations with 
Croatia and the FRY. • Advice was provided on increasing the 
efficiency of border controls and 
establishing freedom of movement 
between the entities. • Technical assistance (through the 
CAFAO project) for the development of 
the whole-state customs system, which 
contributed to the OHR and IPTF’s 
efforts of introducing the state border 
police.  
 
1999-2013 Political level 
 General • The EU’s profile in BiH started rising 
with the launch of the SAP in June 1999 
and double-hatting of the HR as EUSR 
in 2002. • With the launch of the EU Police 
Mission (EUPM) in January 2003 and 
EUFOR Althea in December 2004, the 
EU became a leading actor in police and 
border reforms, and acquired a distinct 
role in defence reform.  • No comprehensive SSR strategy was 
offered to BiH, although the EU spent 
considerable time and effort trying to 
harmonise actions of its key actors 
working on the reform in the country. 
These included the EUMM (operational 
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until 2007), the EUSR (double-hatted as 
the HR of the international community 
in 2002-2011, and as Head of the EU 
Delegation from 2011), the EUPM 
(2003-2012), EUFOR, and the European 
Commission, acting through the 
Delegation of the EU to BiH. • The EU’s approach to SSR in Bosnia 
was influenced by problems with state 
consolidation. It was mostly promoted 
through requirements for strengthening 
security competences of the common 
state and establishing effective 
coordination mechanisms between 
various levels of government. • The EU saw civilian control of the 
security forces as mostly satisfactory 
from 2007. 
 Civilian control • The EU displayed varying levels of 
interest in different elements of BiH’s 
system of civilian control over the 
security sector.  • The Ministry of Security, responsible for 
the protection of international borders, 
dealing with crimes of international or 
inter-entity character and harmonisation 
of activities between the entity 
Ministries of Interior and that of the 
Brcko District, received the most direct 
support from the EU among the 
executive control bodies. The bloc 
supported the establishment of the 
ministry, its operationalisation, and 
evolution.  • The EU funding was also used to build 
sustainable working relationships 
between the MoS and other state 
ministries, such as the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs and Ministry for Human 
Rights and Refugees.  • After the adoption of 2008 police laws, 
assistance was provided to harmonising 
state-level strategies on policing with 
policy documents released by lower 
level administrations.  • The EU showed limited interest in the 
work of the MoD, letting NATO guide 
its development. 
  
 Parliamentary control • The EU marginally contributed to the 
creation of the Joint Committee on 
Defence and Security (JCDS) within the 
BiH Parliament as the committee was set 
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up by the Defence Reform Commission 
(DRC), convened by the HR/ EUSR, that 
also included the EU Presidency as a 
permanent observer. • Indirect impact on the system of 
parliamentary oversight in Bosnia by the 
EU was more substantial. The bloc 
supported the development of 
parliamentary democracy in general, 
which affected the security sector, too.  • Under CARDS and IPA, the state 
Parliament in BiH was offered 
programmes to build capacity of its 
members and administrative staff. 
Initially, such programmes focused on 
technical assistance (e.g. the IPA 2010 
“Document Management System”), yet 
after the signing of the SAP they became 
more versatile and aimed inter alia at 
improving parliamentary cooperation 
between the state and entity parliaments.  • Although entity parliaments and the 
parliament of Brcko also have 
committees for overseeing security 
matters, the EU did not engage with 
them on these matters directly. • Due to problems with state 
consolidation, BiH’s parliamentary 
credentials in the sphere of security were 
seen as fragile.  
 
 Public control • Mostly indirect impact through 
monitoring the establishment of 
independent state bodies (e.g. the state-
level Ombudsman office, Data 
Protection Agency, Anti-Corruption 
Agency and Parliamentary Military 
Commissioner, promoting independent 
media and the development of civil 
society in BiH more generally.  • Limited direct support was also offered: 
the Public Complaints Board, the Board 
for Complaints of Police Officials and 
the Independent Police Board of BiH not 
only appeared as the result of the EU 
conditionality, but also benefited from 
the European Commission and EUPM’s 
assistance.  
  
 Regional dimension • Regional cooperation in the security 
sphere was mostly emphasised in the 
areas of policing, border management 
and the issue of war crimes. Special 
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attention was paid to BiH’s relations 
with Serbia and Croatia due to their role 
in the war and connection between the 
countries and parts of BiH’s population.  
 The legacy of war crimes • Cooperation with the ICTY became one 
of the key political conditions for 
integration into the EU. • The EU demanded the transfer of 
indictees to The Hague, improved 
legislation, access to witnesses and 
archives, investigation of support 
networks that protected fugitives and 
improved cooperation on domestic trials. • It relied on support of EUFOR that was 
mandated to apprehend the indictees. 
 
 Organisational level 
 General 
 
 
SSR was used to strengthen state-level 
competencies in BiH and prepare the country for 
requirements of membership in the bloc.   
 
 Defence Although NATO led defence reform in Bosnia 
strategically, the EU developed capabilities to 
guide the reform operationally and tactically.  
 • Policy and legal advice: 
- The EU offered policy advice 
through EUFOR Althea and to a 
lesser extent through Commission’s 
annual reports. 
- The European Commission 
monitored the implementation of key 
legislation in the sphere of defence 
(e.g. Law on Defence, Law on De-
mining) and demanded 
harmonisation of BiH’s legal acts 
with the EU’s strategies and policies 
(e.g. legislation on small arms and 
light weapons (SALW) was updated 
to comply with the EU SALW 
Strategy).  
- EUFOR was mandated to assist 
BiH’s defence reform as part of its 
supporting tasks. With the updates to 
the mandate its role in defence 
reform increased. Thus, it provided 
policy advice to the MoD and 
AFBiH on gender equality, human 
rights and on the development of 
normative frameworks for managing 
stockpiles of ammunition, weapons 
and explosives.  
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  • Training and sharing best practices: 
- EUFOR developed a strong 
capacity-building element thanks to 
changes introduced to its mandate in 
2010 and 2012. By offering training 
to the AFBiH, EUFOR was building 
the latter’s professionalism and 
capacity to perform a conventional 
army role as well as provide 
humanitarian support. 
- Mobile Training Teams (MTT), a 
component within EUFOR, was 
used as a main tool for capacity-
building, providing the BiH army 
with knowledge, technical expertise 
and mentoring assistance at tactical, 
operational and strategic levels.  
- In 2010-2013, the EU also organised 
several rounds of “Rapid Response” 
exercises that involved Over-the-
Horizon forces and EUFOR troops 
to train the AFBiH deal with internal 
security threats. 
  • Technical assistance:  
- Limited, mostly aimed at 
modernisation of the army, e.g. 
EUFOR provided advice on 
inventory maintenance and 
management.  
- At the start of its mandate, EUFOR 
also dealt with residual tasks of the 
DPA such as supervision of storage 
sites, disposal of surplus weapons 
and de-mining.  
- A lot of resources were spent on the 
area of SALW, also part of post-
conflict assistance. The EU mostly 
worked on these issues by 
cooperating with SEESAC within 
the EUSAC framework. It supported 
SALW collection campaigns, raising 
awareness among the BiH citizens 
about dangers of unexploded 
ordnances and promoted regional 
cooperation. 
- Additionally, the EU used the 
Instrument for Stability funds to 
support the UNDP’s SALW action.  
  • Post-conflict assistance: 
- De-mining was approached as a key 
task.  
- EUFOR offered support with 
clearing mines only initially; with 
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the decrease of its troop levels, it left 
the area to local actors and the 
European Commission. 
- The European Commission 
supported de-mining through 
donations under CARDS, IPA and 
Anti-Personnel Landmines (APL) 
programmes.  
- Cooperation with the ICTY was also 
crucial for defence reform. Apart 
from monitoring the issue via annual 
Commission reports, the EU offered 
support with the search and capture 
of persons indicted for war crimes 
by the ICTY through EUFOR. Partly 
thanks to EUFOR’s work, no ICTY 
fugitives were believed to hide in 
BiH after 2006. 
 Police Police reform was presented by the EU as part of 
the public administration reform. It also emerged 
as one of the key conditions for the progress of 
BiH within the SAP.  • Policy and legal advice: 
- When the EU in cooperation with 
the HR/ EUSR developed three 
principles of policing – exclusive 
state competence for policing at state 
level, re-designing local policing 
areas on technical criteria and 
keeping politics out of police 
operations – police reform in BiH 
became subordinated to the EU’s 
political conditionality.  
- In 2005-2008, the issue of 
centralisation dominated the reform 
process, but unification of police 
forces did not take place due to the 
lack of acquis on policing that could 
justify the EU’s demands, strong 
opposition to police restructuring in 
the RS and uncertainties surrounding 
the constitutional structure of BiH. 
- Policy advice was provided on the 
adoption and implementation of key 
policing legislation, e.g. the EU 
Delegation to BiH supported the 
implementation of the Law on 
Directorate for Coordination of 
Police Bodies and Agencies for 
Support to Police Structure of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Law on 
Independent and Supervisory Bodies 
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of Police Structure of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, both adopted in 2008. 
- The EUPM prioritised the 
development of support functions of 
the police, hence provided advice on 
policy planning, budgeting and 
human resources management. 
Additionally, it assisted state-level 
police agencies, such as SIPA to 
become fully operational. 
- The EU facilitated cooperation 
agreements with its law enforcement 
agencies and member states. 
 
  • Training and sharing best practices: 
- Pursuing sustainable policing under 
BiH ownership, the EUPM 
implemented numerous projects with 
a strong training component that was 
often based on co-locating EUPM 
personnel at mid and senior levels of 
BiH police agencies, as well as 
Ministries at the state, entity and 
cantonal levels (in the Federation), 
in public security centres (in the RS) 
and Brcko District. 
- To develop managerial skills, the 
EUPM trained police managers in 
the areas of financial management, 
logistics, professional education and 
human resources. 
- Study visits for the BiH police to EU 
countries were organised by the 
EUPM, too. 
- Projects financed through CARDS 
and IPA often contained a training 
component, yet usually had broader 
goals such as improving the 
capabilities and capacities of police 
bodies, strengthening cooperation in 
the area of law enforcement and 
making a contribution into fighting 
organised crime, e.g. CARDS 2003 
“Police Capacity-building” and IPA 
2010 “Support to law-enforcement”. 
- Sharing best practices by 
encouraging cooperation with the 
EU law enforcement agencies, e.g. 
Eurojust and Europol. 
- The European Commission projects 
and those of the EUPM pursued 
similar goals – strengthening the 
sustainability and independence of 
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BiH’s law enforcement agencies, 
harmonising their practices and 
improving efficiency of their work, 
yet coordination of activities was not 
always present.  
 
  • Technical assistance: 
- Supply of new equipment and 
assistance with databases. 
- Police agencies in BiH developed 
rules and procedures for exchanging 
information under the EU guidance.  
- Technical assistance provided by the 
EUPM changed between 2003 and 
2012, due to adjustments of the 
mission’s mandate. In general, it 
focused on several key areas: 
standardisation of policing practices 
in the country, improved 
professionalism and accountability 
of the police, institution-building, 
especially at state-level and 
improving the country’s capabilities 
for fighting organised crime. 
Cooperation between the police and 
criminal justice system was also 
seen as important. 
- EUFOR’s capabilities were often 
used for the EUPM’s projects in the 
sphere of fighting organised crime. 
- Technical support was provided to 
SIPA. 
  • Post-conflict assistance 
- Limited. The Head of the EUPM 
could recommend the dismissal of 
individual police officers deemed to 
be involved in war crimes to the 
OHR, yet this practice was used on 
very few occasions. 
- The EUPM invested in improving 
cooperation between the police and 
judiciary, which led to higher 
confidence of the ICTY in the latter 
and helped with the domestic 
prosecution of war crimes.  
-  
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 Border Border reform was identified as an early priority.  • Policy and legal advice: 
- EU standards and norms were used 
as guidelines for the first Law on the 
State Border Service (2000), and its 
amendments released in 2004 and 
2007. 
- Many laws specifying competences 
of BiH’s border police, were either 
adopted or underwent changes to 
satisfy the EU conditionality (e.g. 
the Law on border control, adopted 
in 2009, and Law on movement and 
stay of aliens and asylum, released 
in 2003, and updated in 2008 and 
2012).  
- Support with the strategic IBM 
documents was crucial. Within the 
IBM concept, the EU provided 
important advice on the development 
of a clear communication and 
coordination structure between all 
border management agencies, not 
just the border police.  
- As part of the Roadmap for visa 
liberalisation, BiH had to develop 
and implement extensive legislation 
on visa, asylum and migration 
policies (e.g. it adopted the Law on 
citizenship, Law on data protection 
and National Anti-Corruption 
Strategy).  
- Adjusting legislation to Schengen 
practices was seen as important.  
 
  • Training and sharing best practices: 
- The EUPM offered three main types 
of capacity-building programmes for 
the border police in BiH:  
(1) technical training that assisted 
with the development of skills for 
working with modern equipment or  
offered advice on IBM regulations; 
(2) projects for higher management 
that developed managerial capacity 
of senior border police officers; and  
(3) specialised training to combat 
organised crime that traditionally 
included a trans-border component, 
and therefore involved other 
Western Balkan states. 
- Projects funded by the European 
Commission focused on improving 
the capacities of the border police in 
367 
 
BiH to fight organised crime and 
corruption. 
- After BiH completed the visa 
liberalisation process, the EU started 
prioritising trainings on best 
Schengen practices of border 
control.  
- Sharing best practices by 
encouraging cooperation with 
Frontex.  
  • Technical assistance: 
- Given the absence of international 
borders in BiH during the Yugoslav 
era and devastation left in the 
country by the war, the initial 
priority for the EU was the supply of 
necessary surveillance and 
protection equipment, e.g CARDS 
2003 funds were allocated for the 
acquisition of an Automatic 
Fingerprint Identification System 
and Criminal Analysis Network. 
- At the start of its employment, 
EUFOR provided the SBS with 
high-tech equipment, too.  
- As part of the Roadmap for visa 
liberalisation, BiH was offered 
assistance in reference to document 
security, illegal migration, public 
order and security, and external 
relations issues connected to the 
movement of persons. 
- Assistance with the development of 
capacities necessary for the 
implementation of the Integrated 
Border Management, especially 
development of intra-service (e.g. 
between BCPs), inter-agency 
(between border control agencies) 
and international (with Interpol and 
Frontex) cooperation. 
- The EUPM offered substantial 
operational support to border 
management agencies on 
maintaining the equipment. 
  • Post-conflict assistance 
- Extensive support with the 
construction of BCPs in accordance 
with the IBM regulations and 
closure of numerous illegal border 
crossings. 
- Monitoring border delineation 
disputes with Croatia, Serbia and 
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Montenegro. The EU preferred to 
treat the disputes as bilateral issues, 
hence – minimal involvement in 
their resolution.  
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Annex V 
Comparison of the EU’s impact on SSR in Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia between 1991 
and 2013 
Aspects of SSR Croatia Serbia BiH 
1991-1995 
Political level The Arbitration 
Commission defined 
the general shape and 
international 
personality of the 
state. Croatian para-
state in BiH was 
denied recognition. 
  
 
The Arbitration 
Commission defined 
the general shape and 
international 
personality of the 
state. It also denied 
recognition to Serbian 
para-states in Croatia 
and BiH.  
 
The Arbitration 
Commission defined 
the general shape and 
international 
personality of the 
state. Additionally, it 
internationalised the 
conflict and sped it 
up.  
 
 
 The EU arms 
embargo (and the 
EU’s support for the 
UN embargo) 
disadvantaged the 
state in the conditions 
of war and 
unintentionally 
contributed to the 
criminalisation of the 
security sector.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The EU arms 
embargo (and the 
EU’s support for the 
UN embargo) set the 
military balance in 
favour of Serbia and 
unintentionally 
contributed to the 
criminalisation of the 
security sector.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The EU arms 
embargo (and the 
EU’s support for the 
UN embargo) 
militarily 
disadvantaged the 
state (Bosniaks, to the 
greatest extent) and 
unintentionally 
contributed to the 
criminalisation of the 
security sector.  
It also helped 
prevent the escalation 
of violence and reach 
a diplomatic solution 
to the Bosnian war.  
 The ECMM created a 
real and symbolic link 
between the EU and 
Croatia and provided 
the former with a 
unique perspective on 
the security situation 
in the country. It was 
unable, however, to 
change this situation.  
 
 
Sanctions against the 
FRY contributed to 
the isolation of the 
Milosevic regime and 
consolidated the anti-
EU sentiment in the 
country 
The ECMM created a 
real and symbolic link 
between the EU and 
BiH, while providing 
the former with a 
unique perspective on 
the security situation 
in the country. 
Nonetheless, the 
instrument was not 
capable of changing 
the situation from war 
to peace.  
  
Organisational level n/a n/a The EU contributed 
to police reform in the 
country by deploying 
the WEUPOL in 
Mostar. The mission 
achieved results of 
predominantly 
technical character 
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due to the lack of 
experience in crisis 
management, limited 
financial resources, 
lack of military power 
and overly ambitious 
goals.  
1995-1999 
Political level The EU embargo on 
arms, munitions and 
military equipment 
contributed to arms 
control and 
confidence-building 
measures, coordinated 
by the OSCE under 
the Dayton 
Agreement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The ECMM 
contributed to the 
stabilisation of the 
country by 
monitoring the 
implementation of the 
Erdut Agreement and 
the DPA. 
 
The Regional 
Approach (RA) 
demanded the state 
developed a system of 
democratic 
governance. It set 
requirements for 
depoliticization of the 
police and army and 
insisted on the 
introduction of 
The EU embargo 
contributed to arms 
control and 
confidence-building 
measures, coordinated 
by the OSCE under 
the DPA. With the 
start of the Kosovo 
conflict, the 
strengthening of the 
ban against the FRY 
led to the 
exacerbation of the 
anti-EU sentiment 
among Serbian 
authorities and 
security elites. 
 
Travel restrictions 
and oil embargo made 
the EU even more 
unpopular. On the 
other hand, these 
measures weakened 
the Milosevic regime 
and isolated Serbia 
even from its FRY 
partner, Montenegro.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The RA demanded 
the state developed a 
system of democratic 
governance. It 
emphasised 
separation of powers. 
 
 
 
 
 
The EU arms 
embargo contributed 
to arms control and 
confidence-building 
measures, coordinated 
by the OSCE under 
the Dayton 
Agreement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The ECMM 
contributed to the 
stabilisation of the 
country by 
monitoring the 
implementation of the 
DPA. 
 
 
The Regional 
Approach demanded 
the state developed a 
system of democratic 
governance. 
It called on BiH to 
remove political 
influence over the 
police and army. It 
also set conditions for 
establishing common 
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democratic civilian 
control over the 
security sector. It 
emphasised 
separation of powers.  
 
 
The RA promoted the 
transformation of 
Croatia into a 
functional state.  
 
Cooperation with the 
ICTY was identified 
as a priority, but the 
EU was not ready to 
use coercion to 
improve it. 
 
The implementation 
of the RA was 
obstructed by the 
semi-authoritarian 
regime of Tudjman, 
who feared it would 
lead to a new 
Yugoslavia.  
 
 
The EU was forced to 
use the RA as a 
monitoring, and not 
transformative tool.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The RA promoted the 
transformation of the 
FRY into a functional 
state. 
 
Cooperation with the 
ICTY was identified 
as a priority, but the 
EU was not ready to 
use coercion to 
improve it. 
 
The implementation 
of the RA was 
obstructed by the 
semi-authoritarian 
regime of Milosevic 
that harboured strong 
anti-EU sentiment 
over the bloc’s 
sanctions. 
 
The EU was forced to 
use the RA as a 
monitoring, and not 
transformative tool.    
institutions and state 
consolidation, before 
emphasising the 
importance of 
separation of powers 
and good governance. 
 
The RA promoted the 
transformation of BiH 
into a functional state. 
 
 
Cooperation with the 
ICTY was identified 
as a priority, but the 
EU was not ready to 
use coercion to 
improve it. 
 
The RA was side-
lined by other efforts 
of the international 
community building 
peace in BiH under 
the DPA framework. 
 
 
 
 
The EU was forced to 
use the RA as a 
monitoring, and not 
transformative tool.   
Defence Support for mine 
clearance action and 
research on de-
mining. 
n/a Support for mine 
clearance action and 
research on de-
mining. 
The EU also 
contributed to the 
development of the 
strategic documents 
on the mine threat. 
Police The RA reports 
focused on 
professionalisation of 
the services and 
introduction of 
democratic policing. 
The EU recognised 
the leadership of the 
UN and OSCE in the 
reform. 
The EU used the RA 
reports to monitor the 
practices of the 
Serbian police and 
criticise them for 
unprofessionalism 
and disregard for 
human rights. 
 
 
The RA reports 
focused on 
professionalisation of 
the services and 
introduction of 
democratic policing. 
The EU recognised 
the leadership of the 
UN in the reform. 
 
The WEUPOL that 
finished work in 1996 
improved 
professionalism of the 
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police of West and 
East Mostar and 
established the 
Unified Police Force, 
active only in the 
central zone of the 
town. The mission’s 
achievements, like in 
the previous period, 
were mainly 
technical.  
Border services The reform was 
framed as a step 
towards regional 
reconciliation. 
 
Advice on restoration 
of border controls and 
introduction of 
international 
standards into the 
work of border 
services. 
 
Support for the 
development of 
customs services as 
part of border 
management.  
The reform was 
framed as a step 
towards regional 
reconciliation. 
 
 
 
The reform was 
framed as a step 
towards regional 
reconciliation. 
 
Advice on 
establishing border 
controls in 
compliance with 
international 
standards.  
 
 
 
Support for the 
development of 
customs services as 
part of border 
management.  
1999-2013 
Political level The oversight of the 
security sector was 
promoted through 
support for and 
advice on establishing 
parliamentary, 
civilian and public 
control measures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Good security 
governance is seen as 
an element of 
The oversight of the 
security sector was 
promoted through 
support for and 
advice on establishing 
parliamentary, 
civilian and public 
control measures, as 
well as demands for 
state consolidation. 
To achieve the latter, 
the FRY/ SCG was 
asked to ensure 
separation of powers 
between the federal/ 
State Union and 
republican levels and 
harmonise security 
practices between 
Serbia and 
Montenegro. 
 
After 2006, the EU’s 
focus shifted to good 
security governance 
The oversight of the 
security sector was 
promoted through 
support for and 
advice on establishing 
parliamentary, 
civilian and public 
control measures, as 
well as demands for 
state consolidation. 
To strengthen the 
state, BiH was 
required to develop 
common state 
institutions and 
establish effective 
coordination between 
different levels of 
government. 
 
 
Throughout the 
period the EU 
continued prioritising 
state consolidation in 
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democratisation and 
Europeanisation of 
the state apparatus.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cooperation with the 
ICTY was promoted 
to raise 
professionalisation of 
the country’s security 
sector, achieve full 
civilian control over it 
and restore trust and 
peace in the region. 
 
 
Regional cooperation 
was facilitated in 
policing, border 
security and to deal 
with the legacy of 
war.  
as an element of 
democratisation and 
Europeanisation of 
the state apparatus. 
The Kosovo issue 
kept the salience of 
the state-
consolidation agenda. 
 
Cooperation with the 
ICTY was promoted 
to raise 
professionalisation of 
the country’s security 
sector, achieve full 
civilian control over it 
and restore trust and 
peace in the region.  
 
 
Regional cooperation 
was facilitated in 
policing, border 
security, to deal with 
the legacy of war and 
over the issue of 
Kosovo.  
BiH. It also 
highlighted the 
importance of good 
security governance 
for Europeanisation 
of the state.  
 
 
 
Cooperation with the 
ICTY was promoted 
to raise 
professionalisation of 
the country’s security 
sector, achieve full 
civilian control over it 
and restore trust and 
peace in the region.  
 
 
Regional cooperation 
was mostly facilitated 
in policing, border 
security and to deal 
with the legacy of 
war.  
 
Defence The EU supported 
defence reform in the 
country from the 
point of its own 
security infrastructure 
(e.g. CSDP and 
Battlegroups), while 
NATO led the reform 
strategically. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The reform was 
promoted through 
policy advice, 
training, technical 
assistance and post-
conflict support.  
 
 
 
 
 
Engagement in 
defence reform was 
delayed until at least 
2006, when the SCG 
peacefully dissolved. 
The reform mainly 
focused on preparing 
Serbia for demands of 
the EU membership., 
however in the 
absence of NATO’s 
pull, the EU was 
forced to guide the 
reform strategically at 
initial stages of the 
country’s 
independence.   
 
 
The reform was 
promoted through 
policy advice, 
training, technical 
assistance and post-
conflict support. Due 
to Serbia’s 
involvement in four 
regional conflicts, 
post-conflict support 
With the help of 
EUFOR, the EU 
became the leader of 
the operational side of 
the reform, 
introducing BiH to 
the CSDP 
infrastructure and 
promoting self-
sustainability of the 
army. NATO 
continued to lead the 
reform on the 
strategic level.  
 
 
 
 
 
The reform was 
promoted through 
policy advice, 
training, technical 
assistance and post-
conflict support. 
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Technical assistance 
and post-conflict 
reconstruction had a 
regional dimension.  
was more limited than 
in Croatia and BiH.  
 
 
Technical assistance 
and post-conflict 
reconstruction had a 
regional dimension. 
 
 
 
 
Technical assistance 
and post-conflict 
reconstruction had a 
regional dimension. 
Police  A priority area under 
Justice and Home 
Affairs.  
 
The reform was 
promoted through 
policy advice, 
training, technical 
assistance and post-
conflict support.  
 
Fight against 
organised crime 
provided an 
overarching theme for 
the reform. 
 
Regional cooperation 
was placed high 
among the reform 
priorities. 
 
Having struggled to 
coordinate its 
activities with other 
external actors at the 
start of the period, the 
EU adopted more 
harmonised 
approached towards 
the end.  
 
The EU applied a 
project-based 
approach to the 
reform. It still 
progressed fast thanks 
to the achievements 
of domestic and 
external actors in the 
area by 1999, strength 
of Croatia’s statehood 
and emergence of 
strong support for 
membership in the 
EU. 
 
A priority area under 
Justice and Home 
Affairs. 
 
The reform was 
promoted through 
policy advice, 
training, technical 
assistance and post-
conflict support.  
 
Fight against 
organised crime 
provided an 
overarching theme for 
the reform. 
 
Regional cooperation 
was placed high 
among the reform 
priorities.  
 
Cooperation with the 
external actors 
improved towards the 
end of the period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Having applied a 
project-based 
approach at the start, 
the EU switched to a 
more strategic 
approach in 2011-
2012, as Serbia was 
getting closer to the 
membership in the 
bloc. 
The project-based 
approach was less 
successful than in 
Croatia due to 
the fractured political 
scene, poor exposure 
to externally-led 
A priority area under 
Justice and Home 
Affairs. 
 
The reform was 
promoted through 
policy advice, 
training, technical 
assistance and post-
conflict support.  
 
Fight against 
organised crime 
provided an 
overarching theme for 
the reform. 
 
Regional cooperation 
was placed high 
among the reform 
priorities.  
 
Cooperation with the 
external actors 
improved towards the 
end of the period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The EU combined a 
project-based 
approach with a long-
term structural 
reform. Police reform 
was identified as one 
of the key conditions 
for the membership 
negotiations. In the 
conditions of strong 
opposition to the 
reform in the RS, 
which were partly 
inspired by fears to 
lose the autonomy of 
the entity, the EU 
agreed to postpone its 
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programmes in the 
immediate post-
Milosevic period and 
continuing challenges 
to Serbia’s statehood.   
finalisation until BiH 
implements a 
constitutional reform. 
Police reform is 
therefore going to 
stay unfinished until 
BiH removes 
uncertainty 
surrounding its 
statehood. 
Border services A priority area under 
Justice and Home 
Affairs.  
 
Approached in a more 
comprehensive way, 
compared to defence 
and police reforms.  
 
Framework for the 
reform was provided 
by the Integrated 
Border Management 
for the Western 
Balkans, integrated 
into the Ohrid 
Process.  
 
The reform was 
promoted through the 
areas of legal 
approximation, 
training, technical 
assistance and post-
conflict support. 
 
The country emerged 
as a regional leader in 
the reform since its 
borders were never 
militarised and 
remained intact since 
1998. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A priority area under 
Justice and Home 
Affairs.  
 
Approached in a more 
comprehensive way, 
compared to defence 
and police reforms.  
 
Framework for the 
reform was provided 
by the Integrated 
Border Management 
for the Western 
Balkans, integrated 
into the Ohrid 
Process. 
 
The reform was 
promoted through the 
areas of legal 
approximation, 
training, technical 
assistance and post-
conflict support. 
 
The IBM took off 
only in 2006, when 
Belgrade gained full 
control over border 
issues that previously 
had to be coordinated 
with Podgorica. 
Kosovo’s unilateral 
declaration of 
independence in 2008 
imposed further 
constrains on the 
reform. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A priority area under 
Justice and Home 
Affairs.  
 
Approached in a more 
comprehensive way, 
compared to defence 
and police reforms.  
 
Framework for the 
reform was provided 
by the Integrated 
Border Management 
for the Western 
Balkans, integrated 
into the Ohrid 
Process.  
 
The reform was 
promoted through the 
areas of legal 
approximation, 
training, technical 
assistance and post-
conflict support. 
 
For a long time, BiH 
struggled with the 
IBM as it had  
no experience in 
managing external 
borders until 1995, 
lacked a state-level 
border agency until 
2000 and its borders 
sustained the biggest 
damage during the 
regional violence of 
the 1990s. With the 
help of the European 
Commission’s 
projects, the EUPM 
and even EUFOR, it 
established a working 
border management 
system. 
376 
 
As the only Western 
Balkan country that 
was not placed on the 
negative visa list, 
Croatia did not have 
to go through a visa 
liberalisation process. 
It harmonised its visa, 
migration and asylum 
policies with EU 
practices within 
membership talks.  
 
Improved regional 
cooperation was 
among the priorities 
of the reform.  
 
As the EU’s IBM 
strategy for the 
Western Balkans was 
integrated in a 
broader regional 
initiative, the Ohrid 
Border Process, the 
reform benefited from 
other external actors’ 
contributions. 
The visa liberalisation 
process dominated the 
country’s reform in 
2008-2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Improved regional 
cooperation was 
among the priorities 
of the reform. 
 
As the EU’s IBM 
strategy for the 
Western Balkans was 
integrated in a 
broader regional 
initiative, the Ohrid 
Border Process, the 
reform benefited from 
other external actors’ 
contributions. 
The visa liberalisation 
process dominated the 
country’s reform in 
2008-2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Improved regional 
cooperation was 
among the priorities 
of the reform. 
 
As the EU’s IBM 
strategy for the 
Western Balkans was 
integrated in a 
broader regional 
initiative, the Ohrid 
Border Process, the 
reform benefited from 
other external actors’ 
contributions. 
 
 
